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FRANZ HALDER

War journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder,
Chief of the General Staff of Supreme
Command of the German Army (OKH), Vol VI.
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Volume VI

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THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL
OF
GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

**Chief of the General Staff
of the
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)**

14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942

VOLUME VI

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VOLUME VI.

CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA. PART I.

The Chief of the Army General Staff.

First entry: 21 February 1941

Last entry : 31 August 1941

* * * * *

21 February 1941

Morning Conference: No special news. Things in Libya are proceeding satisfactorily. In the Eastern Mediterranean no clues to British measures.

Admiral Canaris: Points discussed:

- a) The general situation. All briefing of the Wehrmacht (also on naval and air matters) must be centralized in our hands.
- b) British capabilities at the outset of the operation in the East.
- c) Preparatory measures in the Ukraine and the Baltic States.
- d) Safeguarding of security, top secret matters.
- e) Personnel matters (Change of Section Chiefs).

Lt. Col. Radke:

- a) Soldiers' Memorial Day: Decoration of graves, celebrations in Berlin and in units.
- b) Army Art Exhibition opening on 16 March.
- c) Organization of Propaganda (Hesse).

Conference with ObdH: (Heusinger present): Reports from the Army Groups. -- Operational objectives for Barbarossa. Full agreement is reached on all proposals.

OCu IV: Current matters.

British Air Strength. 15 February 1941

	Bomber and Transport	Fighter	Close Recon-naissance & multiple purpose	Long-range recon-naissance	Total Staffeln		
<u>K.</u>	1100	(750 Class I (350 " II	700 (550 I (150 II	400 including Transport and Seaplanes	300 Land 70 Sea	400 2600	180 to 192
<u>Mediterranean</u>							
Egypt, Libya, Sudan	300		180	70	35	585	45 to 50
Greece, Crete	120		60	-	-	180	10 to 12
Malta, Gibraltar	20		30	-	10	60	5
Irak, Palestine	45		35	45	5	130	10
Aden, Kenya	80		60	-	5	145	11
India, Far East	60		20	75	5	160	12

In the Eastern Mediterranean 20 % Second-Class.

In East Africa, Irak, India, Far East: 60 % Second-Class.

To these must be added the South African and Australian Air Forces in Egypt, Eastern Mediterranean, Kenya and Far East (Singapore)

100 South African aircraft (6 Staffeln) in Kenya (60 % Second Class)
 50 Australian aircraft (4 Staffeln) in Egypt and Eastern Mediterranean
 50 Australian aircraft (4 Staffeln) in the Far East (Singapore).

Naval Aircraft:

Shipborne (not including aircraft carriers)	150) Of these about 200 are in the Mediterranean.
On aircraft carriers	350	
On land, for new aircraft carriers, etc.	150	
On land, for other purposes	100	

22 February 1941.

Morning Conference: No important new developments.

Russian Air Force. (Gen. Gennadi):

a) Air Force is not an independent part of the armed forces
(Organisation).

b) Ground facilities and strength:
1100 airfields, 200 serviceable. Equipment inferior to ours. Estimated strength 4,000 - 5,000 bomber and fighter aircraft. North of Pripet:
Reconnaissance and bombers 1530, fighters 2200
South of Pripet:
Reconnaissance and bombers 675, " 1250
Main concentration north of Pripet.
Our Air Force considers this the final Russian disposition for their concentration in the West. (New Russia pamphlet).
Transport aircraft and parachutists: based on Kiev.
By next summer, it is estimated, 60% of the above strength will be ready for commitment.

c) Types: Reconnaissance craft obsolete, range around 300 km (a few new ones have range up to 640 km); speed 150 to 250 km.

Close-support craft: Majority old types; cooperate with Armd. troops. Between 100 and 200 are modern (speed: 380 km, range up to 700 km). Armament: only machine guns (4 fixed forwardfiring MG).

Fighters: Rata - J 16 is good; 4 machine guns, or 2 machine guns and 2 cannon. Inferior to the German fighter (Spain); is slightly slower. Craft now under construction probably not ready for 1941.

Bombers: Two-thirds good; SB 1 - 3 and TB 3, make up two-thirds of total. SB 1 - 3, range 600 km, night and bad-weather craft.

Fair game (TB 3. Range 1,000 km (bomb load 2,000 kg).
for German (BB 3. Range 1,500 km (bomb load 800 kg).
fighters

Transport craft: Not much is expected.

Paratroops: Same.

d) Training, leadership and tactics:
Fighters and bombers good while in formation; depend heavily on lead pilot. Blind and bad-weather flying deficient. Fighters are especially trained for action against ground targets, but their foremost mission is to fight enemy air force in the air and on the ground. Between Fighter and bomber teamwork poor.
Leadership: Hard and brutal, but without training in modern tactics; mechanical, lacking adaptability.

e) Ground organization, Air Force Signal troops: Air force signal troops, as we know them, are non-existent. Only radio communications! Transmit in clear in emergencies. Ground organization scanty. Large parts attached to flying organizations. Supply stocks apparently low.

f) Probable dispositions: See b).
Deployment will take considerable time; is being watched*. Fighters work in close support of their own and against enemy ground troops. Close-support craft against enemy armor. Bombers have targets in the enemy rear area. Clear nights essential. Targets: East Prussian supply base, Silesian industries, Romanian oil fields, Baltic ports, Berlin.

g) Own air strength: Our Air Force expects Russians to have 4,000 (probably more) plus 600 new craft.

<u>Russian</u>		<u>Friendly</u>	
1600 bombers)	Ratio 1:2	Barbarossa and Z Et	West
4050 fighters)		2,500.	900

If we assume 60 % operational: 1,100 to 1,700 (sic) bombers
2,650 to 4,050 fighters.

Barbarossa: AGp North 380)
Center 910) Planned strength.
South 510)

Russian, AAA: 300 medium, 200 light and AA MG batteries.
Own total: 798 medium) AA batteries.
827 light)

von Treskow (Ia AGp B):

Discussion of our broad viewpoints regarding conduct of operation Barbarossa in theater of Army Group:

- 1.) No battle at Bialystok, but at Minsk.
- 2.) Watch against gap between his Army Group and Leebl
- 3.) Press with all means available behind southern wing, so as to obviate threat to flank. Technical details of build-up.

Gen. Jacob reports off on leave.

Heusinger: Current matters. -- Transmissions to List of our study on attack on Turkey.

ObdH (on phone):

- 1.) 8.8 cm AA guns to be used as "concrete crackers" for Barbarossa-
 - a) Are they needed against Russian fortifications? sa.
 - b) Can we count on having Ground Forces AA available for ground combat?
 - c) Can we distribute 10 cm guns so as to have them on hand in time as "concrete crackers"?
- 2.) Ground Forces AA units must be activated: are to be committed on motor highway. Will have to train there, not in Z.I.
- 3.) 110 Renault * on hand: Enough for three mobile Siege Gun Bns.

Col. Mierzinsky (Foreign Armies East): Mission to collect most complete data on enemy (Russian) fortifications.

23 February 1941

Sunday, Berlin.

Work on draft of Tactical Manual for Motorized Battalion. -- Talk with (Ex-Crown Prince) George of Saxony. -- Leyher family.**

24 February 1941.

Schuchard (Liaison Officer to Abetz): Situation report. Confidence in Vichy apparently is on the rise since the Cabinet reshuffle and there is a desire to win our Government over to a policy of trusting collaboration.

Vogl (Armistice Commission):

- a) 13,000 trucks from Occupied Zone on the way. Difficulties in moving them out.
- b) Beginning March we join in control of Morocco and Algiers. Concurrence of Rome not yet received. I emphasize our interest in Algiers.

Gen. von Kirchheim reports before leaving for Africa.

Gen. Tiemann and Lemelsen (CG XXXXVII Corps) report.

Heusinger: Aerial and naval operations:

- a) Dardanelles cannot be blocked with aerial mines. -- Lemnos. We have no naval force there. Airborne landing! -- In peacetime some shipping available on Thracian coast. Can be chartered. - Importance of the Greek Aegean coast. Nothing can be expected of Italian Navy. -- Rumanian oil for Italian Navy. -- Protection of coastal shipping route to Odessa.
- b) Operations in the Baltic: Navy sees no possibilities for active support. No protection for our coastal supply route.
- c) Hangoe: Navy does not consider it a practical base for the Russian fleet. Aalands Islands afford no naval bases.

Buhle:

- a) Ready for Fifteenth Armd. Div.:
20 March: 1 Rifle Bn. and 1 AT Bn.
1 April : 1 Rifle Regt. and light Hd. How. Bn.
15 April: Remainder.
- b) Tank complements; 1 May: in th general complete (Interchange of Tank III, IV, and II and I necessary).
Between 1 May and 15 about 3-4 Divs. come off the line, i.e. about 5 % of the entire tank forces in the East.
15 May to 15 June one Div. comes off the line, i.e. replacements would drop out for four weeks. I suggest that the pro tem Armd. Divs. be not activated before 1 June and meanwhile see to it that the Armd. Divs. get their tank replacements.
- c) French tanks not much good in Norway. Try to use old Czech tanks instead.
- d) 15 Brigs. (mixed Brigs.) as of 1 June (7 for East!).

25 February 1941.

Morning Conference: Nothing of importance. Uncertainty persists as to British intentions in the Mediterranean, both in the Malta area and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Personnel: Ia, Rommel; Frfurth for Bulgaria. Wachenfeld for Romania. Xylander?
- b) Operation against Afghanistan.
- c) Items for discussion with Navy and Air Force.
- d) Charge of duties for Konrad.
- e) Tactical training for Russian campaign.
- f) Tank replacements: Whatever becomes available before start of operations, goes to the front. What comes after, will be held for new units. Location: Warsaw.
- g) Supply trains for Libya. Combine Italian and German supply trains. Take trucks from Italian Divs.!
- h) Preparation for continuation of African operation. Production for it must be under way by summer.

Heusinger:

- a) Barbarossa: Briefing of the Divs. arriving at the front in the last transport waves (also discussed with Training Sec.).
- b) Afghanistan - Persia.
- c) Gibraltar - Malta - North Africa (here attack on Egypt with two Armd. Corps besides Italian units).
- d) For event that the British land in Thrace, something must be done to forestall them! List must be prepared for that.
- e) Various inquiries from List on the execution of Operation Marita.

Ochsner: Current matters of Chemical Warfare and Decontamination Service.

von Thoma: Current problems of motorization of Army. Replacement of maintenance NCO's. Training manual for Rifle Regts. and Rifle Bns. in Armd. Divs.

26 February 1941.

Berlin --- War Academy:

Visit to courses conducted by Feyerabend, Blumke, Staedke. Impression on the whole good. Afterwards, address to the participants and conference with the instructors.

1715 - 1830 hrs. Conference with Adm. Schniewind on common problems of Operation Barbarossa.
(Baltic: Coastal protection and Finland. -- Difficulties of organizing coastal shipping for supply purposes along the Baltic coast.
Aaland, Hangoe, Black Sea. Questions of Russian naval forces and possibility of supply routes along the coast.)

South-East: Lemnos. Their ideas jibe with ours. -- Dardanelles. Shipment of oil to Italy (through Canal of Corinth).

Mediterranean: Gibraltar, coastal shipping, Africa, Malta. -

West: A unified Coastal Defense.

Evening. von Ziehlberg: Current matters. -- Liaison Officers.

27 February 1941

Morning Conference: Possibilities for speeding up shipment of troops to Libya. Withdrawal of study on Italian Generals by Foreign Armies West.

Bogatsch:

- a) Questions regarding Air Support Hq Staff* and signal communications settled to conform to our wishes. Air Staff somewhat small.
- b) Liaison between AGps and Air Force will be handled by Support Commander.
- c) Allocation of airfields for reconnaissance planes.
- d) AA: AA Corps are to stay, also ground missions (Fuehrer ord. It would be out of the question to leave them with the Air Fleets and use them as reserves.
- e) Ground Forces AAA:
Thirty batteries, i.e. 10 battalions, are supposed to be on hand for us on 1 May.
Beginning May, additional 30 batteries, i.e. 10 Bns., will be added as organic AA of the Ground Forces.
We have specified: 50 Bns., including 30 mixed; (mixed Bns. make up 60 to 80 % of total requested) plus 11 light Bns. requested: 22-24, i.e. 50 %).**

f) Air Defense Commanders for rear area (24 Reserve Bns.).
East of the Reich frontier.

Heusinger: Current matters. One additional Corps Hq for third wave of Marita (L Army Corps Hq). - Corps Hq (reduced) Boehm in Holland to be released. - Distribution of the Reinforced Brigs. (15) which will be ready in the Z.F. beginning middle of March. Liaison Officers for Bulgaria.

Jodl inquires officially, whether we have any reason for wishing to have approach march in Bulgaria stopped, which would still be feasible today. The answer is in the negative.

Radke: Friction between the Deputy of the Fuehrer and ObdH (regarding Mieth, Weck and other incidents).

Buhle: Ground Forces AAA: Materiel: So far nothing has been delivered by the Air Force. Promise to send bulk of equipment second half of April, so that everything would be on hand 1 May. Provisional fire control instruments for Batteries. Hope to get fire control instruments also for Bns.

Training: Courses in progress. Specialists ready 1 May. Afterwards unit training. Personnel apparently not bad. Battery training a minimum of three weeks. Cannot be in action before 1 June.

Traction equipment lacking: Tests now in progress to determine serviceability of French traction equipment. Only limited mobility. Will have supply vehicles, but tactical mobility cannot be achieved. (No ammunition columns). Two batteries are put on self-propelled mounts, to serve as heavy tank destroyers.

"Traction Bns., motorized" could be formed, but chain of command and control would be very difficult in practice.

Fellgiebel:

Finland. Senior Sig. Corps Officer to Finland for operational communications (through Sweden postal network).

Marita: Three river cables; tele-communications via Belgrade.

Barbarossa: Each Armd. Group 2 dcm lines. Three large direct transversal decimeter lines. Supply service network East: Government -General, trunk lines to the advancing armies.

Monitoring of cryptograph traffic: Seehausdienst *.

Conference with Gen. Jeschonnek, (present Major Christ, Col. Heusinger):

North: Reconnaissance off Murmansk (based on central Norway).
Hangoe - Aalund : no facilities.

Barbarossa: Fighters 6:1 (3:1); training and material said to be considerably inferior.

Bombers 2:1 (1:1). Training inferior.

Fighters: Only 400 modern, total 3,000; for close-support effort.

Bombers 1,600 to 2,000, mostly older types.

Air Force expects concentrated attacks against our spearheads, but thinks they will collapse owing to our superior technique and experience. Targets for long-range fighters.

Russian ground organizations, being organic to operational flying units, are clumsy and, once disrupted, cannot be readily restored. Distribution of forces: 1 Air fleet for each AGp. Further details later.

Mediterranean remains possible, but purpose must be clearly defined. Malta-Crete in preparation (airborne landing). I call attention to possibilities for airborne operations in Tangier and Ceuta. Corsica still being studied.

France: Relatively strong fighter and long-range fighter forces under Sperrle. In Holland, Belgium and Northern France excluding Brittany. -- Night fighters. Fight for control of air for reconnaissance over the sea.. XI airborne Corps probably to go to France (deception). Attila still on active list. AAA ample.

ZI: Weise. * -- Fighters and night fighters in the Ruhr and Northwest Germany. AA defense will be slightly weakened (20%) in favor of Barbarossa.

Airborne troops: XI Corps. Either use right off the start or not at all. Discussion of possible airborne operations in the Mediterranean and in Barbarossa.

AAA: Fuehrer wants no serviceable piece to remain inactive. Personnel for 30 Batteries. AA Corps, of 6 Bns., for Sixth Army (Armd.Group 1) and for Armd.Group 2.

Norway: Unchanged, under Stumpff.

Liaison Air Force - Ground Forces: Konrad's position.

Buhle: Tanks for Norway. -- 800th Regt. as "fire brigade" against uprisings! Use of tanks in Barbarossa. Roechling projectile for Armor in Libya.

von Ziehlberg: Current personnel matters (Liaison Officers, personnel assignments on the Balkans).

28 February 1941.

Twelfth Army has started building of bridges. Covering force of fighters and AA has crossed into Bulgaria.

Morning conference:

No special reports. Still no clear picture of British intentions.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. -- (With Buhle present) Peacetime organization of OKH.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Navy's evaluation of the situation. Situation and intentions of Air Force agree with information in yesterday's conference with Jeschonneck.

- b) Norway: Disposition of forces and operational staffs for Barbarossa.
- c) Hangoe. Only Luftwaffe can do it.
- d) Briefing of the CGs of Armd, Groups and Corps on technical innovations by the Ordnance Office.
- e) "Suedwind".* Comments on Hilpert's study.
- f) Exchange of views on operation in Libya. We must beware of unduly interfering there.

Brig. Gen. Dr. Grosse (Med. Corps) and Brig. Gen. Dr. Bingler (Med. Corps) call.

Maj. Gen. Paulus:

- a) Report on trip to Guderian's map maneuver: Very satisfactory. The leaders arrived at conclusion that the Pripet line would be reached in eleven days.
- b) Result of consultations with AGp. B on the conduct of operation Barbarossa. General agreement of views!

Gen. Bogatsch: Result of conference with Jeschonneck. - AA problems.

Col. Matzky:

- 1.) Foreign Office sent cabled instructions to Ambassador Ott to see to it that Japan should rush attack of Singapore.
I suppose that it is not as simple as all that for Japan. A coordinated war plan is probably needed as a basis.
- 2.) Turkey: Leading Turks are reported to have expressed misgivings to Papen to the effect that Germany's Balkan policy is moving to a point where Turkey would be forced to go to war against her. Papen has been instructed to make the following statement to the Turkish government: Germany is fighting England only, but otherwise wants only peace and order on the Balkans. But if the Turks were trying to find fault, he would be ready at any time to pack his trunks.
- 3.) Russia: Isolated reports on Russia's unfriendly attitude towards us received lately, are of no importance. Russia has made no protest against our measures, nor against Bulgaria's attitude.
- 4.) 1 March 1941, is the date when Bulgaria will sign the Tripartite Pact by Bulgaria. Russia, Turkey and Yugoslavia are being informed of our march into Bulgaria.

Evening. Message is received that two of the three Danube bridges are finished. Bad weather, bottomless roads.

1 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Construction of bridges on the Danube makes good progress. (Last bridge finished 1000 hrs. Tested for loads of 26 tons).

Conference with Paulus and Heusinger:

- 1.) Situation in Libya. Rommel's preparations for forthcoming attack.
- 2.) "Suedwind": Expression of opinions on Hilpert's study; forestalling action.
- 3.) Norway: Organization of Command agencies for Operation "Silberfuchs".

OQu IV (with Liss): Situation in England (homeland): Now 40 Divs., including one new Armd.Div.
Squabble between Hq. Second Army and Ninth Armd.Div. as to who is to have credit for capturing the French war archives.

Heusinger: Current business of Operational Sec.

Ehlert: (Ia, Africa Corps) reports in; Is briefed on our ideas concerning coming offensive operations.

ObdH (on phone): Liaison instructions for Konrad. I make quite plain my annoyance at K.'s working methods.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Result of conference in Paris. Rather unsatisfactory. The personalities involved will not be able to avoid friction for long.
- b) Provisioning of forces in France from local sources will be feasible.
- c) There will be difficulties in obtaining enough trucks for motorization of troops in France. Wood generator gas etc.
- d) Feeding of industrial workers is getting difficult. Belgium, e.g. wants emergency train Bayern with one million rations. Industrial canteens.
- e) Barbarossa: CP of Gen Qu operational as of 10 April. Administrative orders on 20 March.
- f) Libya: Shipping space.

2 March 1941.

(Sunday - Zossen).

Twelfth Army (List) marches into Bulgaria.

Crossing was effected at 0600 hrs, as per schedule, on the two eastern bridges; 1000 hrs on the western bridge. Delay was due to bridge damage sustained when opening for passage of oil barge train.

Reports from Rintelen on alleged Italian plans for offensive in Albania. Attack is to start within a few days on the supposition that the Greeks will withdraw troops from the Albanian front in reaction to our advance into Bulgaria.

The mere fact that Italy believes to be able to launch such a drive on a few days notice shows that no more than local attacks are to be expected. They do not in any way affect our plans.

Evening in Berlin.

3 March 1941.

- Gercke:
- 1.) Assembly of troops is proceeding according to plan. (Government-General now falls in line). We shall be ready on time.
 - 2.) Water transport problems viewed in the light of future developments.
 - 3.) Railway Construction Troops needed for additional lines serving not only current requirements but also stockpiling of new base. In contrast to the West, also station installations will have to be moved forward and operation must be organized on military lines. Construction Troops must advance right behind the Armor. Whereas in France we had a wide frontage on which the railroads were pushed forward, the base line of departure in the East will be narrow. One Railroad Bn. changes tracks from Russian to German gauge at rate of 20 km a day.
 - 4.) Distribution of Railway Troops. In the West four Cos, in Norway three (including two operating units), two in Bulgaria. All others set aside for Operation Barbarossa.
 - 5.) Road construction to follow behind advancing troops.--- Main supply routes.
 - 6.) Railway accidents.

Conference with ObdH:

- 1.) Military-political situation on the Balkans. Coordination with political leadership again very tenuous.
- 2.) Operational possibilities in Libya now and later, when additional troops could be released from Barbarossa.

- 3.) Continuous intrigues by various non-military agencies against us, to undermine the position of the military.

Jodl OKW (on phone): Liaison with political command is too loose. We must have a clear knowledge of what is going on.

- a) Is the political command interested in having German advance elements appear at the Greek frontier to impress on the Greeks that we are faster than Mr. Eden's troops, who is just now in Athens?
- b) What are Turkey's reactions: Must we expect interference from that quarter?
- c) Are the Italians being made to understand that piecemeal attacks in Albania are only disrupting plans?

Reply:

Concerning a): OKW welcomes everything calculated to further an early appearance of German troops on the Greek frontier. However, the question is still being discussed with the Fuehrer. Definite instructions soon.

Concerning b): Turkish question "settled".

Concerning c): Wholly in agreement with OKW.

von Etzdorf:

- a) Effect of note informing the Russian Government of our march into Bulgaria. General reaction: Obvious concern. Molotov replied to the German Ambassador in writing, as follows:
- 1.) Events have not developed on the line recommended by Russia. It is a matter of regret that contrary to the Russian proposal of 25 November, the German Government has deemed it desirable to take a course infringing on Russian security interests. The march into Bulgaria is in opposition to the Russian conception of security zones, which include that country.
 - 2.) The Reich Government cannot expect Russia to give any support of its action in Bulgaria. (This probably refers to diplomatic support).
- b) Effect of the information on the Turkish Government: Friendly in tone, no direct reference to the matter. Eden had shown understanding for Turkey's situation. Nothing tangible has come out of Eden's visit. Turkey has not been maneuvered into any new commitments, because Turkey is not yet sufficiently armed at the moment. Eden had pointed to the Italian collapse. Turkish Foreign Minister and Yugoslav Envoy cooperate to keep Yugoslavia from tying herself to Germany.
- e) A similar announcement of the German march into Bulgaria, by the Bulgarian Government, met with an unfriendly reception, without any comments, in Yugoslavia.
- d) Letter of the Fuehrer to the Turkish State President: "No further intentions".

- e) Meeting Antonescu-Goering arranged for 5 March in Vienna.
- f) Conversation Oshima - Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop urges early attack on Singapore (from the land side). Leave Philippines alone. Cover requirements in Netherlands East Indies. Oshima refers to raw materials shortages. Wants end of war with China.
- g) Letter Fuehrer - Il Duce: Cannot get anywhere with Spain. The impending arrival of our Armd.Divs. in Africa sets off new trains of ideas, which he hopes he will be able to talk to him about. Anxiety about Dodecanese. We need Rhodes for operations against Suez.

Heusinger:

- a) Current business of the Operations Sec.
- b) Hansen at one time, was instructed to help List with transportation on condition that the material would be returned by 20 March, so as to be reconditioned by 1 April. Now 350 trucks have been turned over. Sixteenth Armd.Div. is spread over too large an area and ought to recall one of its Rifle Regts. AT troops have been detached for service at Constanza and the Danube Delta.
- c) Navy has earmarked six 17 cm guns and six 15 cm guns for the Thracian coast.

Gen.Jodl:

- a) The question as to whether armor should soon be sent up to the Greek frontier, will not be decided before tomorrow, since we must first clear up the situation with the Yugoslavs.
- b) For the time being the Fuehrer will not use his influence with Il Duce in the question of the Italian attack in Albania. Let them scorch their noses!
- c) On the whole, the Fuehrer shares our view.
- d) Great excitement on the "Mountain" * caused by receipt of a picture of an British tank with 80 mm armor. What can we put up against it in Africa, and what else could we do?

Buhle:

- a) Protection of our tanks against British 80 mm tank in North Africa.
- b) Furloughs. All must terminate on 11 April.
- c) Coast artillery: Activate 5 new Bns.
- d) Traction problems of the partly motorized Siege Gun Bns.
- e) Requisitioning of trucks in France.
- f) Conversion of conventional tanks to amphibian tanks takes 12 weeks.

4 March 1941.

0900 -- 1100 hrs. Attend conference held in Gen Qu office dealing with supply service for AGp. South. We must not underrate the difficulties connected with switching the fuel supply base of the entire Army Group to the Romanian oil base. The idea of the Advanced Supply Points must not be overdone. With all its advantages, the system has the drawback of rigidity which we must not take upon us until the development of the operations can be made out clearly. As long as we don't know exactly where we stand we must be content with improvised installations, which later on can be reorganized into such supply points.

Vogl (Armistice Commission):

- a) Control services in all French western ports will be taken over in the near future. General Eichhorn, assigned to this mission, is standing by with his economic staff and other agencies. In Oran, Tunis and Algiers, German liaison agencies (with 8 airplanes) will be integrated with the Italian organization.
- b) Fuel will be very short in supply in France and North Africa till the middle of April. A 14,000 ton tanker is on its way from America. Doubtful whether the British will let it through.
- c) Seizure of French merchant shipping by the British. French want easing of regulations to strengthen convoy system, for vessels sailing in French convoys have so far not been attacked by the British.
- d) Important points in the exchange of notes: French demand on permission to recruit soldiers in the Occupied Zone. Demand release of white Colonial officers from PW camps, for service in North Africa.
- e) 13,000 trucks bought by us. First instalment has arrived at the Demarcation Line. Transfer will be completed after 15 March.
- f) Rubber crop in Indochina: 25,000 ton for us, 18,000 ton for France (partly for our purposes). 25,000 ton for America. This portion is now claimed by Japan.

Gen. Scherer, the new Headquarters Commandant, successor of Colonel Schmelzer who died today, reports.

Maj.Gen. Mueller:

- a) Claer-Stefanie affair.-- Psychiatric observation of Stefanie necessary.
- b) Studies on International Law with a view to a reform of International Law. Must be turned over to a Commission under BdE after the war.

- c) Measures against the De-Gaulle movement in France.
Question of death sentences.
- d) Cooperation of Replacement Army and Field Army. Interchange of NCO's and Officers.
- e) Findings on hospital inspection. Social service care can stand improvement (vocational guidance, vocational training, psychological care). Use of Field Hospitals. Medical service not a problem of transportation, but one of supplies.

5 March 1941.

Morning Conference: March into Bulgaria proceeding according to plan. Subsequently conference with OQu I and Operations Officer on current matters.

OQu IV - Krabbe:

- a) Hungarian intrigues against our military attaché, who has become irksome for them (Krabbe). -- Our demands regarding road building and railway preparations.
- b) Negotiations Buschenhagen in Sweden (take in a lot of ground!).
- c) Current matters.

von Bernuth: Directives for training of Divs. under Generals who will be their leaders in the Eastern campaign.
Current business of the Training Section.

Map Exercise Gen Qu on problems in the theater of AGp South.
Question of Supply Points , Advanced Supply Bases, CPs of Gen Qu is discussed.

von Ziehlberg: Death of Col. Schmelzer Hq Commandant.--
Efficiency ratings and other current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Wagner Gen Qu : Draft of an OKW directive on organization and administration of the occupied areas in the East. Behind the advancing troops, Government Commissars will be established, who will have Armed Forces Commanders attached to them. The stipulations of the ObdH are to be observed, but otherwise the Army must not be burdened with administrative tasks. Special missions of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

ObdH - Keitel:

- a) The Fuehrer will not advise ~~the~~ Duce against an offensive in Albania; he will merely tell him that we shall come in later.

- b) Yugoslavia: Conference with Regent Paul produces no positive results. No intention to join the Tripartite Pact. No transportation facilities across Yugoslavia. It is hoped to settle the Greek question without the use of force. However, so far I can see no signs that such a solution has a chance.
- c) Great excitement over Lofoten raid.*

6 March 1941.

Quiet day. -- Advance into Bulgaria proceeding according to plan. Otherwise, only telephone consultations throughout the day; no important conferences, except one on AAA problems (Bogatsch) and current operational matters. Desk work on neglected larger studies.

7 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Advance in Bulgaria continues according to plan. Uncertainty on the situation in the Aegean persists. -- French canal system seems to be largely serviceable again; only the Rhine-Rhone Canal and the canal connections with the English Channel, paralleling the Seine, have not yet been restored.

OQu IV with Chiefs Foreign Armies East and West: Situation reports. England, no important new information. Russia: We are getting a clearer picture of disposition of forces.

Gen.Brand:

- a) Fuehrer order regarding 160 Batteries for Norway. This number will include 38 batteries already sent to Norway (10-28 cm). The Batteries still unassigned are to be accompanied each by one officer, 2 NCOs and 15 EM; also, there will be one Battalion Staff for every 6 batteries, and two telephone sections with 12 km wire each for each Battery. Immediately available: 33 batteries. The main thing is that there must be no reductions in the allocations for coastal defenses in the Black Sea and the Baltic.
- b) K Battery can be used against Brest-Litowsk (citadel). *
- c) Results of the large Observation Bn. exercise. Attempt to centralize the heavy sections in the Army Corps was a failure. The solution lies in keeping the old method and reducing the number of heavy sections.

- d) Trials with R projectile * for 15 cm How. satisfactory. 5,000 projectiles a month; larger output not before fall.
- e) Missions for railway artillery in the East not yet final. Probably we shall have use for the following:
1 - K 12; 5 - K 5; 1 - Bruno N; 2 short Bruno (in AGp North).

1500 hrs: Funeral ceremony for Col. Schmelzer — Hq Commandant.

Chief Personnel Division: Consultation on officer, replacements, reassignments, etc.

ObdH (on phone): Operational intentions in Libya.— Defenses on West Coast (artillery, tanks).— Air missions in the East.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Norway, Coastal defenses: artillery, captured enemy tanks (Renault) and 1 Bn (2 Cos) of 201st Arm. Regt.
- b) Organization of the still unallocated 250 2 cm AA into groundforces antiaircraft force; horsedrawn?
- c) GHq troops for Barbarossa:
 - 20 out of 28 Eng. Bns:) can get small truck
 - all Railway Eng. Bns:) column as of 1 May.

Rear services and signal components will be ready in time.
- d) Two medium Fd. How. Bns and four 10 cm Gun Bns become new GHq Artillery reserve as of 1 June.
- e) Liaison Staff "North" and "South".
- f) Improvement of Thirteenth Armd. Div.

Capt von Both reports on results of his inspection trip to Libya. Rommel's operational intentions need a sound basis and should be reviewed in the light of practical possibilities. Supply services in Libya must be centralized; supply route to Libya still leaves room for improvement. (Naples, Rome).

8 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Yugoslavia apparently veering round to the Tripartite Pact. Three possibilities for the British. Report of British efforts to trade capitalships for destroyers.

7th convoy arrived in Libya; 8th convoy Palermo; 9th still in Naples on account of British Cruisers.

Lt. Col. Reinhard reports as Chief of Staff General Army Office.

Heusinger: 1.) Rowehl flies for Richthofen and List.

- 2.) Liaison Officers for Eastern Campaign AGp
South: One older Officer with two or three younger assistants form a Liaison Detachment.
AGp Center: 1 Liaison Officer each for AGp, Guderian and AHq 9 (Hoth) (total 3).
North: 1 Liaison Officer for AHq 16 (Hoepfner) (1).
- 3.) Disposition of Russian forces at the front and in the rear.
- 4.) Demands on Luftwaffe for demolition and disruption missions.
- 5.) Defenses in the West.
- 6.) Operation in Libya.

Gen. Ott (Inf): Tactical Manual for Antitank Co. in Inf. Regt.--
General training problems (utilization of terrain, kneeling position for aiming) etc.) *

Enemy intelligence from Turkey reveals that apart from air support England is preparing to support Greece with two to three Divs., now standing by on islands between Lemnos and Crete, so as to be moved into Greece via Volos, or also into Turkey, if necessary.
Greek intentions. At start, defense of Struma or Vardar, as the case may be. In case of an attack on Vardar Valley a defense is planned, with the right wing based on Mt. Olympus, and the left wing extending over Mt. Gramosi (on the Greek Albanian border) to the present left wing in Albania.

Paulus:

- a) Organization of road improvement work.-- A new map of Russia showing road conditions (good work).
- b) Military-political data for Grohmann's study.

Report on Yugoslavia's Reply. Regent Paul thinks he can induce his Cabinet to accept the Tripartite Pact, on three conditions:

- a) No transit for German troops. Discussion possible on transportation of materiel by rail and by Danube.
- b) No commitment to active participation in this war.
- c) Access to the Aegean for Yugoslavia.

9 March 1941.

(Sunday - Berlin).

Work at Home: Organization of the West during the Barbarossa Campaign.

Questions relating to Operation "Sonnenblume". -- Attache service.-- Efficiency ratings.

10 March 1941.

Conference on situation: Italian drive in Albania 9 March -- Aegean.-- 8th and 9th convoys due at Tripolis. Advance of Twelfth Army difficult.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Clarification necessary about instructions for defenses in Norway.
West Coast, Baltic, Black Sea, Aegean Islands.
- b) Clear-cut statements wanted from Navy on:
What are the capabilities of the Russian Navy in Baltic and in Black Sea?
What can our Navy do, and what are its limitations? (Canaris).

Heusinger:

- a) Current business.
- b) Rommel is instructed not to advance his front too far ahead before arrival of Fifth Lt.Div. and sufficient Italian forces.
- c) Coastal defense problems in the West and in the Baltic. (Ruegen).
- d) Our troops must start building field fortifications on the Russian border early and on a sufficient scale. Handle rear line more as a propaganda show! *

Radke:

- a) Case Hesse.-- Fired from the Press Section by the OKW because of clumsy handling of motion picture matters.
- b) Inquiry to Gen.Mieth on alleged political indiscretions at a conference in December, 1939.
- c) Recruiting for SS; no danger; cannot fill their ranks.
- d) Participation of Party members in Church activities permissible only if Party membership is held in the background.

Lt. Col. Kochler reports as Chief of Staff of the BdE. Problems of coordination discussed.

ORu IV: a) Yugoslavia. Belgrade Cabinet meets today. Yugoslavia's three conditions for joining the Tripartite Pact have been accepted by Germany and Italy.

- b) Greece: Up to 4 March, only 7,000 British in Greece (Air Force), in Athens area. In the last few days additional 5,000 arrived in Athens area (claimed mission: protection of airfields). Reports state that evacuation of Thrace is being prepared. Greece said to be getting ready for war. Change can be hoped for only if Yugoslavia changes her attitude.
- c) Turkey's reply to Fuehrer's letter still outstanding.
- d) Conference Goering-Antonescu: Increase in oil deliveries. German production aids accepted. Sparing of Iron Guard refused. Wants to form new Party from reliable elements.
- e) France: Darlan announces convey protection against England for French shipping; will use arms if necessary. Proposal to appoint Laval Minister-President.
- f) Spain: Franco's letter stating reasons preventing his entry into the war now demands clearcut statement on colonial promises.
- g) Fuehrer's demands on Japan. ~~Japanese~~ capabilities.

11 March 1941.

Morning conference: Report of Russian movements from Moscow Military District toward Smolensk and Minsk. Intelligence on new roads in Russia, which would indicate existence of better roads than heretofore assumed. Encroachment on command fraction of Oad by OKW, which orders that Fourth Mtn.Div. must join "Marita" in place of some other Div.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Libya: Shipping space.-- Separate supply organization for Libya.--
Moldavia: Health conditions. Officers mess problems (too many use up too much food).

Col.Gen. Hoepfner: Missions for Armd.Gr. 4 in Operation Barbarossa discussed.

Vorl (Armistice Commission):

- a) French shipments to North Africa stopped.
- b) Mediterranean ports now under our control: West of Marseilles, German Control Officers; east of Marseilles, by Italian Officers, with German representatives.
- c) French report on progress of disarmament in North Africa expected soon.
- d) Food situation in France has deteriorated. Grain reported sufficient only for 1 to 1½ more months.

- e) Protest against British materiel shipments on Bagdad railroad to Greece or Turkey.
- f) Djibuti. Italians release weapons for 7 French Bns, for defence against British.
- g) 13,000 trucks bought in France.

von Uthmann: Report on Sweden. Only the use of railways will be open to us. Roads to the North not practicable before middle or end of June; moreover interrupted by water bodies crossed by ferries.

Lunch with Uthmann, Jodl (OKW): Showdown over direct interference with the command function of OKH. (Substitution of Fourth Mt.Div. for 183rd Div.).

von Ziehlberg: (Central Branch) Current reassignments. -- Style of living of officers in Hq. Procurement of additional food directly from France for their Sections.

Heusinger: a) Another AA Bn. for Rommel (ObdL).

b) 8th and 9th convoys have arrived in Libya. Marada freed.

c) Movement order for Fifteenth Armd.Div.

12 March 1941.

Morning conference:

- a) Question regarding relation between Liaison Officer Albania and AHq 12.
- b) Yugoslavia: 3 Divs. mobilized. Strength 70,000.
- c) Intensive convoy activity in Mediterranean.
- d) Rommel: Bulk of Fifth Armd.Regt. now on land. Movement to the front will be completed in about 7 days (including one day of rest). Enemy reconnaissance from Agedabia to the south.
- e) Transport congestions in Bulgaria. - Boulogne railroad station bombed out.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Magnesium flare photographs for night reconnaissance.
- b) Instructions on missions of AA in Operation Barbarossa.
- c) Organization of home air defense.

Wagner (Gen Qu) (Baentsch-Finkh):

- a) Libya: Apart from remaining on the defensive, two courses of action are open to us:
Mounting a major offensive from Agedabia with main thrust against Tobruk.
Starting several minor offensives in sectors along the coast.
For the first alternative we would need four Supply Column Bns. in addition to the four Supply Column Bns already shipped to Libya.
For second alternative, a total of four Supply Column Bns. would do, but the drawbacks of plan are loss of time and lessened striking power. Send Memorandum to OKW.
- b) Coastal shipping Tunis-Libya.
- c) List of functions for "Command Posts" of Gen Qu.
- d) Fuel problem.

Adm. Schuster, Capt. Heye (Navy) with Heusinger and Loyke:
Navy-Army problems in the Aegean (Samothrake, Thasos, and Lemnos).
Common problems in Black Sea (inshore coastal supply line to Odessa and points east).

Lunch with Adm. Schuster, Capt. Heye, Capt. Loyke, and Col. Heusinger.

Col. Spalke (Chief, War Economy Mission, Romania) report on
situation of Romanian war economy. Picture of armament economy fairly satisfactory; agricultural production could be increased. - Unpleasant stories about Gerstenberg.

Radke: New OKW Propaganda Directive. -- Morale building in hospitals.

13 March 1941.

Morning conference: Report from Japan: Shipment of British troops to Greece from North Africa are said to have been in progress since 1 March.

Boetticher reports, that appearance of German troops in North Africa had sobering effect on Weygand.

Libya: Fifth Armd. Regt. at the front on 20 March!

Marada free.

Marita: Bridge at Bechetu dismantled. Ferry in operation. Second Armd. Div. crosses over bridge at Turun Magurelo.

Hommerich-Mueller:

- a) Supply of maps for Barbarossa (four to six sets for each Div.).

- b) Future organization of Surveying Service. An Air Force memorandum; idea not acceptable.

Wagner Gen Qu):

- a) Conference at Ministry of Economics:
Russians are getting cagey. Flow of oil down to a dribble; a 40% price increase demanded for grain. We stop coal deliveries and delivery of the cruiser. * Romanian production completely in our hands. Annual oil output will be increased from 1.5 to 5.9 million tons.
- b) Fuel. Aviation gasoline on hand sufficient for one year (last year 200 000 tons were turned over to us). Motor and Diesel fuel very tight.
Without Russian deliveries we shall be able to sustain a large-scale offensive on existing stocks for a period of 2 to 2½ months. After that we shall have to depend on our own production and on Romania.
- c) Supply Columns, Schell believes he can let us have additional 4,000 tons for Libya.
- d) Oil drum factories in Romania meet production schedules.
- e) Supply problems Norway.
- f) Charge of duties for Military Commander France.
- g) Conference Wagner-Heydrich: Police matters. Border control service.

14 March 1941.

Morning conference:

- 1.) Albania: The Greeks are attacking, instead of the Italians.
Yugoslavia: Slovenia is being evacuated.
First, Third and Fifth Divs. are setting up Rear Services.
Greece: Flight of population in Thrace; no Englishman in Saloniki up to 10 March.
England: Britain requests, 1 cruiser, 119 submarine chasers, 115 patrol vessels, 2,5 million tons from U.S.
- 2.) OKW: Movement of third wave (Marita) must wait on order of OKW.
- 3.) Libya: Graziani -- difficulties.
- 4.) Barbarossa: 2,500 trains of firstechelon have been dispatched.

OQu I: Deception maneuvers in the West — More friction with Konrad over delivery of materiel.

Operations Sec: Heusinger, Grolmann, Gehlen report on plans of the Armies in Operation Barbarossa.

Twelfth Army: Operation against Cernanti with only one Div. of the left wing is wrong. Will have to use also Romanian Mt. Brig. (4) on this wing.

Seventeenth Army: Hungarians and Slovaks must be mobilized about two days before the operation starts and follow behind. Fake commotion on the front between Tarnow and the Mountains* (Security Div., etc.).

Sixth Army: On the whole in agreement with the very heavy concentration of forces; should point left wing further to north (Kowel)!

Fourth Army: Its southern portion still rather weak; its central portion is getting too close to Bialystok. Concur on all other points.

Ninth Army: Disposition with objective Lomza is waste of effort. On the northern wing coordination between Armd. Gp. 3 and Army not yet perfect. Feel for operational requirements lacking here. Army Hq evidently cannot assert itself over the CG of Armd.Gp. and is reluctant to place Infantry units under the command of Armd Gp.

Eighteenth Army: Our suggestions have not been paid much attention to. Teamwork Hoepfner — Inf. Corps must still be brought into line with our ideas.

Sixteenth Army: Front still too wide. In any event striking power will be greater when reserves close up.

OQu IV, with Chiefs of Sub-Sections: Report on situation: Libya and Egypt:

Fifteen British Divs. (including two of Armor). In Libya itself between four and eight(including Armd.Divs.).

England: Activation of 5 Divs. has started. Total of 45 Divs. now in the homeland, including 4 Armd.Divs. (two new). Of the 41 Inf. Divs., about 21 are ready for assignment. Flow of materiel permits fitting of one to two Inf.Divs. per month.

France must reduce her troops in North Africa to 120,000 by 1 April.

Russia: Reported mobilization of four age groups probably only replacements, as the specialists are already in the services. Intensified concentration on the borders of the Baltic provinces. Reported road movements from direction Moscow toward the frontier via Minsk.

Conference with ObdH: Situation and intentions Libya — Situation in Bulgaria.— Personnel matters. — Heusinger reports on Armies for Operation Barbarossa.

Wagner Gen Qu: Fuel situation (stocks for only three months).— Preparations in Romania: Fuel preparations adequate, ammunition varying, Definition of command powers of Gen Qu. Command Posts.— " Administrative Orders" for Barbarossa.

Noon: Demonstration of pyrotechnics and signal devices. Inspection of Zeppelin*signal center.

15 March 1941.

Morning conference: Marada in our hands. Swap of naval craft (Britain) U.S. -- (H.M.S. King George V).

- Gen. Buhle:
- a) Inspection ObdH. of Training Divs, 101st Div. Sectional railroad bridges.
 - b) Artillery and 2 cm AA for Norway.
 - c) Antiparatroop defense.
 - d) Organization of Liaison Detachment Romania.

Gen. Brand: Questions regarding use of artillery on coasts of Norway, Denmark, Holland, western France. Railway artillery on the Barbarossa front. -- ObdH reserves allocation for himself. Unfortunately ObdH emphasizes security of French West Coast to such an extent that his specifications can be met only by sacrificing striking power in Barbarossa. Of course, when you ask the Navy and everybody else, whether they could carry out their missions 100% or whether they would need some aid from the Army, everybody wants something from the Army. The point, however, is not to be 100% sure everywhere, but rather to make sure of the necessary minimum of safety, and then put everything behind Operation Barbarossa.

Heusinger: Current business. -- Preparations for report to Fuehrer.

16 March 1941.

(Sunday Berlin).

Nameday celebration. Preparations for Report to Fuehrer. -- current business.

17 March 1941.

Wagner (No entries)

Conference on situation:

- Albania: Operation without conclusive results.
- Greece: British troops 18-20,000 strong (including Air Force). No higher command staff. Attache' tour cancelled.

Buschenhagen: Solvaer.*-- Fuehrer insists: Norway must be rendered absolutely safe against any surprise attack. British now are in position where they must take the offensive. West is impregnable, perhaps Syria; best chance Norway. Our Air Force largely centralized; Navy weak, shipping lacking for large-scale land operations. If the British secure a lodgment, ~~cooperation~~ cooperation with Russia will become possible. Construction of continuous defense system impractical and, moreover,

unnecessary. Objective of defense: The English must not be allowed to gain a foothold, not even for two weeks. Safeguarding of our traffic along the coast, both by sea and by land. All centers of economic and military importance must be secured against surprise raids. (Air raid warning posts, etc.). To insure accomplishment of this task: Set up 160 Batteries (echeloned in depth, with Inf. and AA cover). -- Transfer all replacement organizations of Norway units to Norway, as well as one or two of the Occupation Divs. earmarked for France. -- Increase strength of Construction Troops.

Barbarossa: 50% cannot be taken out of Norway.* -- Sweden is not likely to let us use their facilities. -- Dietl will strike via Petsamo. Two Divs. to Narvik to relieve Dietl.

Strengthening of defenses: Falkenhorst's proposal: For Murmansk only 2 Mt. Divs. Third Mt. Div. cannot be managed. One Occupation Div. for Norway: one-third to northern Norway, two-thirds to southern Norway. 54 Batteries with reinforced T/O can arrive in northern Norway by sea on 15 April; five or six large steamers. Personnel will proceed to Narvik as "furlough personnel"**. This plus one-third of the Occupation Div. and two MG Bns. for northern Norway will make up for Second Mt. Div. by 15 May.

Central Norway: Batteries by 25 April. 50 Batteries in ports (lower T/O; reinforced by Inf.).

Southern Norway: 50 Batteries and two-thirds of one Occupation Div. will sail from Stettin on May 1.

Operation Silberfuchs: 2nd Mt. Div. will strike toward Polarnoj, 1 Finnish Div. (12th Brig.) and 1 German Div. from Kemi-jaervi in eastern direction. Seaborne movements: Allow 6 days for unloading at Kemijaervi and Uleaborg.

1500 - 2030 hrs. Fuehrer conference (with Col. Heusinger):

- 1.) Marita: The operation must be carried to the objectives that will assure us a base for air domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. This requires control of Attica, perhaps even of the Peloponnese. Operation must be carried out with maximum speed. Occupation of Thasos and Samothrake if possible should be simultaneous with occupation of the coast. To accomplish this we must try to obtain shipping from Romania and Bulgaria. -- Lemnos will be seized by paratroops as soon as possible, thereafter.

Turkey: Satisfactory letter from the Turkish Chief of State would suggest that Turkey is desirous to keep out of a conflict with Germany. Forces assigned to watch Turkey may be withdrawn after we have reached the Aegean coast.

Conclusion: The forces allocated for Marita must be written off from build-up for Barbarossa.

- 2.) Barbarossa:

- a) We must score successes from the very start. There must be no reverses.

- b) It would be pointless to base our operational plans on forces which cannot be counted on with certainty. As far as actual fighting troops are concerned we can depend only on German forces.
 The Finnish forces can only be counted on to attack Hango and prevent a Russian withdrawal into the Baltic area.
 On Romania we cannot rely at all. Their Divisions have no offensive power.
 From Sweden we can expect nothing, for we have nothing to offer.
Hungary is unreliable. She has no reason for turning on Russia. Her political aims lie in Yugoslavia, where they see something for themselves.
Slovaks are Slavs. May perhaps be used for occupation purposes later.
- c) Rokitno Marshes would not restrict movements. (!) It is a terrain in which Armies could maneuver freely. (!)
- d) AGp North and Center will push as far as the Dniepr, then, taking advantage of the protection afforded by the river, mass forces for a thrust to the north. Moscow is of no importance whatsoever.
- e) AGp South: "It would be fundamentally wrong to attack everywhere." Pruth and Dniestr are rivers, which will block any offensive. The Dniestr is much more impregnable as a defense line than the Rhine. Hence, no attack across the Pruth. "Here we would only drive the Russian away from a spot where we should beg him to stay put."
- f) Conclusion:
 In the Romanian sector, employ only the forces necessary for the protection of Romania. All other available forces will be used for frontal attack north of the Carpathians, with greatest weight on the northern wing, where additional armor will be brought to bear. Armd. units must be pulled out of Romania at the earliest!

3. Finland-Sweden-Norway:

- a) No plans can be based on the assumption that Swedes will tolerate transit of combat troops.
- b) Present defense of Norway not yet strong enough. The British will make diversionary attacks. Norway vulnerable: Fjords, roads.
- c) No threat in the West: Air incursions impossible in daylight. Landings in the West out of the question. Some troops in the area can be released for Norway. (Two or three Divs.)
- d) Proposal to Sweden. We want to relieve two Mt. Divs. in northern Norway, and request right of transit for two Divs. (material by sea).
 If arrangements cannot be made, exchange must be made by sea.

- e) One Mt. Div. is to be released in this manner. An attempt will have to be made to ship another Div. into the Gulf of Bothnia shortly before beginning of operations. These two Divs. will have the double mission of keeping the British from establishing a foothold in Murmansk, and of closing the White Sea Canal.
4. Gen. Wagner presents the great picture of supply. No comments.
5. Rear Areas: No difficulties in Northern Russia, which will be taken over by Finland. Baltic States will be taken over together with their administrative machinery. Ruthenians will welcome us with open arms (Frank). Ukraine uncertain, Don Cossacks uncertain. We must create Republics isolated against Stalin's influence. The intelligentsia put in by Stalin must be exterminated. The controlling machinery of the Russian Empire must be smashed.
In Great Russia * force must be used in its most brutal form. The ideological ties holding together the Russian people are not yet strong enough and the nation would break up once the functionaries are eliminated. Caucasia eventually will be ceded to Turkey, but first must be exploited by us.
6. Lybia: Agrees to the forward shift of the defensive front. Current preparations must enable us to pass over to the offensive as soon as a favorable balance of strength is attained. Sending of additional troops now impractical. Landing operation in Tunisia is rejected; plan to purchase ships in Tunisia must be studied.

2230 hrs. Gen. Paulus is given outline of the results of Fuehrer conference.

18 March 1941

Morning Conference:

Albania: The Italians are relieving their frontline Divs. British in the Peloponnesè? What use can be made of Rhodes?

Yugoslavia: Report of preparations to join the Tripartite Pact.

Four Battleships must be laid up for repairs (Hipper, Scheer, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau).

Speidel (Paris):

- a) Balance of security assignments between Belgium and France.
- b) 100,000 prisoners of war must be evacuated if Operation Attila comes off. Would guard units become available?
- c) Political situation (Weygand!).
- d) SD and SS are spreading themselves all over.

Vogel (Armistice Commission):

- a) Surrender of arms and material: Surprisingly good progress. 341 train-loads of material.
- b) Aircraft construction program is running into snags. France wants concessions (prisoners of war, coal).
- c) 7.5 cm Field Guns (700) cannot be shipped off. Alternative: Have panoramic telescopes turned in.
- d) Trucks (13,000) are going out at very good rate. Tires first-class.
- e) Altmeyer case not yet settled.
- f) Material depots in Africa will not be shipped out until later.
- g) Casablanca Commission had difficulties owing to vastness of area and Italian passive resistance.

Ochsner:

- a) AGp D has assigned Chem. Mortar. Regt. (Dora) to the Armd. Group.
- b) Improvised vehicles for terrain decontamination. Will be stored in the chemical defense depot. 12 truck columns for chemical defense depot. Training with operating units. Sprinkling from trucks no problem.
- c) Chem. Mortar: 40 is coming off production too slowly.
- d) Briefing of chemical warfare officers by Ochsner.

Radke: Hess' letter. — Böhler's letter. — Files on incidents in Poland closed by SS. — Case Tondorf settled. (Government General)

- Wagner:
- a) Moldavia base must be maintained despite change of conditions.
 - b) Marita: Strength requirements for rear services.
 - c) Directives on policies for OKW rear area issued.

Heusinger: Discussion of possibilities in view of the changed situation on Barbarossa and Marita. Sixteenth Armd. Div. can be pulled out as of 25 March. By 15 May all armed units of AGp South, with the exception of SS Viking Div., can be assembled north of the Carpathians. Kleist then will have 5 Armd. Divs., 3 mot. Divs., and SS Adolf Hitler. 9 Divs. GHq reserves will be coming in behind AGp A, between 16 May and 5 June.

Conference with ObdH: Change of plans to conform to new situation. Mission for List in view of new situation. Norway orders requested from OKW. Personnel questions.

von Ziehlberg: Out of turn seniority advancements and other current business.

19 March 1941

Conference: Yugoslavia will join Tripartite Pact. -- British in Greece 18,000 to 20,000 strong.
Port Said-Alexandria: British troops ready for embarkation. Twelfth Army reports information interpreted to indicate evacuation of Thrace.

Heusinger: Discussion on disposition of forces in Greece, Romania and Norway. -- GHQ reserves.

Foertsch (Colonel) reports completion of the War Academy course. Remains at my disposal.

Töppe, late OCu France (Gen Qu I), reports as CO of Gen Qu CP North, for Barbarossa.

Krebs (Chief of Staff VII) reports off to Moscow as substitute for Koestring (during the latter's illness). Detailed review of the military situation and its impending alteration resulting from assembly of our troops on Russian border. Summation of points to which he should give particular attention. General questions of line to be followed in talks.

Winter (Ia, AGp A): Review of revised missions for AGp South. Depth of disposition and concentration of tanks in Sixth Army. -- Hold Seventeenth Army close toward the northern wing. -- Possibilities of subsequent attack from the Moldavian front, meanwhile deception and sham movements.

Hermann (Ia, AGp C): Missions for AGp North reviewed:
Armd. Gr. 4 must jump off together with Infantry.
Strong infantry forces on both sides of road to Siauliai.
Shift one or two Divs. to Memel area.
Problem of bridges for Memel crossing at jump-off.

Buhle: AP shells for 5 cm gun on tanks = 15% of total ammunition. Flamethrowers for Rommel. -- Combat with engineers with flamethrowers on tank I. -- Development program for Infantry.
Norway: Replace construction troops with Reich Labor Service. Reorganize Corps Hq III as a Corps (mot.) Hq.

Paulus: Points brought out at conference of ObdH with Armd. Div. Commanders: Close control of Divs. by Corps. -- Air situation. -- Protection of rear communications of armd. units. -- Close teamwork with Inf.

20 March 1941

Heusinger: Current matters: Norway. -- Romania. -- Greece.

Enemy Intelligence: Greece. Landing of British troops seems to have started. Movements, also motorized elements, from Attica northward.

Gen. Rommel: Report on Lybia. Overall impression: British passive and apparently thinking in terms of defense only. British Armd. units apparently being concentrated in direction of Bengasi. The area to the south, around Agedabia and Solum, seems to be treated as a no-man's land. This would indicate British intentions to defend the Djebel area, which offers favorable health and tactical conditions. We shall not be able to attack on the base line of the arc * in the direction of Tobruk before the enemy in the Djebel is beaten. But the Africa Corps is not strong enough at the present to do this. Nevertheless we could weigh the possibility of occupying the no-man's land around Agedabia and making preparations for a drive in direction Tobruk next fall.

Afternoon: OQu I and Gen Gu confer on details with Gen. Rommel, who then will present an estimate of what he could achieve with available forces before onset of the hot season.

Ministerial Director Sarnow:

- a) Whale oil: 10,000 plus 15,000 tons, a total of 25,000 tons.
- b) Dutch gold: 35 millions.
- c) Rubber: stocks on hand 4,000 tons; monthly withdrawals 800 tons. ---
Belgian gold 235 tons = 536 million gold marks
- d) German war finance system.

- Gen. Paulus:
- a) Results of conference with Rommel. In line with morning discussion.
 - b) Results of conference with Guderian on disposition of forces on right wing of AGp Center.
 - c) Appraisal of possibilities of operations in northern Norway (Britain-Russia).

21 March 1941.

Situation: The British seem to be disembarking also at Saloniki. Perhaps they are making preparations for a stand east of the Vardar line. We will have to reckon with a total of no more than 4 British Divs., brought over in two crossings (six days each).

Conference with ObdH and Rommel: In line with yesterday's conferences. --- Also current matters. --- Assignment for Army Hq 11. --- ObdH trip to Bulgaria. --- Edirne corner.

Matzky: Current matters of his Section, including questions of protocol.

<u>Gen. Otto (Slovakia)</u> :	T/O	actual
Officers:	1196	885
General Staff Officers	37	16
Generals	7	3
NCO's	5093	2378

Lunch: Vogl (Armistice Commission), Otto (Slovakia) and aides.

Heusinger:

- a) Dispositions of AGP Center (Armd. Gr. Hoth) for jump-off not yet perfect. Reluctance still shown to team up Inf. with Armd. units at the jump-off.
- b) Group Falkenhorst will be directed by OKW.
- c) Police Div. to be put under Himmler and sent to East.
- d) GH q troops must be taken from List and allocated to AGPs South and Center. List will keenly feel loss of medium artillery, assault batteries, light AA Bns., Engineers, bridge columns etc.

Evening: Demonstration of visual training aids (Sculptetus and Major Wratschko, Chief of Army Film Center).

22 March 1941.

Situation: No important news.

Heusinger - von Grolmann: Discussion of disposition for List's drive. Liaison Officers. -- Romania. -- Protection of border in the East.

The question of protecting the Eastern border in event of Russian preventive action is becoming acute. However, we must not allow ourselves to be scared into premature measures. I do not believe that Russia would take the initiative. It surprises in List's plan that no measures are taken to protect his eastern wing (apparently Bulgarians!), and that Armd. Corps is set to strike in direction of Veria and Katerini, instead of Edessa. Instructions to Grolmann for his conference with List.

Noon: Lunch guest of State Secretary of the Foreign Office*, with Oshima, and Alfieri. Discussion of our demands to Japan and Italy (Libya).

Evening: George calls, in Berlin on official business.

23 March 1941.

(Sunday - Berlin).

George visiting. Max drops in on his way from Warsaw to the West.

Had words with ObdH over his signing of an operational order for List.
At home: Future organization of the General Staff. --
General Staff personnel. -- Efficiency ratings and minor desk jobs.

24 March 1941.

Situation: No signs yet of any change in Thrace. East of the Mesta river there are still only one Div. and the border guards. West of the Mesta 4 to 5 Divs.; British in line Katerini - Veria - Edessa.
British reinforcements apparently also on Crete.
Yugoslavia will join Balkans' pact tomorrow.
Turkey's attitude unchanged. No cause for anxiety.
England seems to be under heavy pressure.

Paulus - Heusinger - Beck:

- a) Shipment of light* troops to Romania must be speeded up after departure of XIV AC and Thirteenth and Sixteenth Armd. Divs. The danger of having only weak light troops in Romania must not be overlooked.
- b) Instructions to Rintelen on our intentions in North Africa.
- c) Romania must soon be informed on the need for strong defense measures on the Pruth border.
- d) 5 Coastal Arty Bns. are leaving for Romania beginning 5 April.

von Ziehlberg: Reassignments in April, 1941, and current matters.

- Buhle:
- a) AT defense in Greece.
 - b) Corps Hq Hansen and liaison officers.
 - c) Air Signal Bn.; allocation of trucks.
 - d) Military police patrols checking trains through Hungary.
 - e) Bridge columns: March and April 20; beginning May, eight to ten each month; target 460. Problem of traction, however, remains unsolved.
 - f) Special wishes of the Air Force for 22nd Airborne Div.
 - g) 15,000 Polish peasant carts with drivers will be made ready for Barbarossa by beginning of May.

25 March 1941.

(Yugoslavia joins
Tripartite Pact).

- Situation:
- a) In Greece, one Australian Div. from Palestine, one New Zealand Div. from Tobruk. Troops from Palestine are being replaced, apparently from Mesopotamia. Concentration of British Eastern Mediterranean Fleet off Crete, purpose unknown. Possibly Crete as staging area for movements.
British are disembarking troops in Greece: Attica, Volos. Scattered British detachments reported on Katerini - Edessa line. Greek islands off Turkish coast said to be still free from British troops, as are Thasos, Mytilene, Kephallonia and Lemnos.
 - b) Roatta, Chief of Italian General Staff.

- c) Alleged trouble between Twelfth Army and Romanian authorities over supplies, on account of demands by Twelfth Army not previously discussed.

Wagner: (Gen Qu):

- a) Report on stocks of gas ammunition: Available on 1 June; 2 mill. for Lt. Field How., $\frac{1}{2}$ mill for Med. Field How. Gas of several types will be fired at the same time. Shells on hand in sufficient quantities, need only to be filled; has been ordered.
The munitions depots can load:
Prior to 1 June: 6 trains daily
after 1 June : 10 trains daily.
To speed delivery, three gas trains will stand by behind each AGp,
The assembly of gas trains in the Z.I. will depend on availability of sidings to Chief of Transportation.
- b) Decontamination: Static decontamination station on the border. -- 19 Field Decontamination Companies (one for each Army; Norway and Romania 2; Gen Qu reserve 7). Assignment to Armd. Groups is declined.
- c) Friction with Schell, who interferes in the business of the then Gen Qu. Huff between ObdH and Gen Qu, who feels offended that he was not told about some alleged divergence of opinion between them.
- d) Lybia: Mil. Com. for Rear Area.
- e) Bulgaria: Establishment of a supply base Bulgaria, after List has started drive to the south.
- f) Care of wounded for East: 50,000 beds to form hospital pool for East (base hospital); under BdE.
- g) 38 hospital trains are readied for evacuation of the base hospitals to the ZI.
- H) Military administration Greece: Question open.

Siewert: Missions of Liaison Detachment Bulgaria.

Heusinger:

- a) Changes in the instructions on assembly of troops for Barbarossa in view of the new situation on the southern wing. Changes in the demands on Air Force.
- b) Comparison of Russian and German strength ready for commitment. We are extremely weak compared with the Russians up to 20 April. After that the Divs. arrived in such numbers as to eliminate all danger. Meanwhile of course, our supply base is under a threat, but I believe that we must avoid any unusual forward concentrations at this time.

- c) New instructions for AGp, South.
Various possibilities of operational disposition in AGp Center (Ninth Army).
- d) Mission of Army Hq 11 in Romania. Also various minor current matters.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Agenda for conference of Finance Minister with OKH. — Reinforced Border Control Service.
- b) Item for discussion for conference with Heydrich on impending Eastern matters.
- c) Conference Altenstadt - Thomas.

- von Bernuth:
- a) Motion pictures: Activation of eight new motion picture units, (two for tropics) brings total to 16 (including 2 in ZF., 2 in Libya).
 - b) Program for peacetime officer training:
 - c) Experiences of the Training Divs.

Evening: Lecture by Prof. Mende before the officers of General Staff: Currents in the intellectual life of present-day Russia.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Progress of deception maneuvers in the West. Review of orders issued.
- b) Reflections on British capabilities: Shipping space available at any one time could take care of only four Divs. That would severely limit their capabilities for anything outside their operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

26 March 1941.

Situation: No important news. British strength in Greece is hardly more than 30,000 at the moment. This number, however, is reported to include Air Force and supply services, which means that they would not even have two complete Divs. as yet.

1030 Paulus: British capabilities. For my part, I don't think it very likely, at least for the present, that the British would send to Kirkenes any of the 20 homeland Divs. they may have gotten up by now. Such a move would be more likely later on, after getting in touch with Russia following the start of our attack. But even then the mutual distrust of the British and Russians in this area is so strong that we can expect more benefit than trouble from such a move. England's foremost concern is the Eastern Mediterranean and the land route to India. Here they are building up strength, but only with defensive intentions for the time being.

1100 Conference with Heusinger in ObdH's Office:
Discussions in preparation of tomorrow's conference of CGs.
No new ideas.

Gen. Otto (Gen of Inf.) reports as substitute for the CG XXX AC who is sick.

Talk about tactical manuals: MG Co and Inf Regt. will not be ready for begin of the offensive.

Konrad: Air targets in England: Seaborne supplies, shipping, harbour installations. Minesowing. Training against ship targets, etc. Weather questions. -- Weather reports. -- British food situation.

Waldau: Outcome of map maneuver Bogatsch (AA). -- Difficulties of airborne operations in Barbarossa. -- Review of Air Force missions

Fellgiebel: a) Hungary. Some signal operating troops must be set up in Hungary. Communication lines AGp South - Army H q ll.
b) Marita: Very difficult without telephone line Belgrad - Nish - Saloniki. Solution by using civilian facilities.
c) Sweden. Same solution.
d) Finland: Senior Sig. Corps Officer.
e) Radio communications questions. Dummy traffic in Romania, and other current matters.

Noon: Japanese Officers my guests at lunch: Chief of the Japanese military mission, a general of the mission, Military Attaché Bansai.

From 0930 Conference of ObdH with the CGs of the AGps, Armies and Armd. Gps.

AGp. Center: No significantly new viewpoints. Only Ninth Army and Hoth will need direct orders to get them to team up Inf. Divs. with Armd. Gp. in the jump-off.

AGp. North: Plan to strike with one Div. (SS Div. Reich) in the direction of Kowno is criticized; is changed by AGp. At Kowno we must do as best as we can with improvisations and keep Armd. Grp. together. In this case, too, cooperation of Inf. Divs. in the attacking sector of the Armd. Group is discussed and accepted by AGp.

1200 hrs. Called to the Reich Chancellery on account of Yugoslav coup d'état.

1300 - 1430: Fuehrer demands earliest possible march into Yugoslavia. Four invasion thrusts:

- a) On Lists's right wing, reaching Axios river via Novo Selo, to give quick support to advance of List's right wing.
- b) Detached from the right wing, but still under List's command: Strike from the area around Sofia towards Skoplje, to join up with the Italians and to prevent linking up with Greece.*
- c) With a separate group from the Sofia area, in direction of Belgrade, to seize enemy capital and open up the Danube.
- d) From Germany, in the North, perhaps even from Hungary, with Armd. . . .

1600: After return: ObdH continues conference with the CGs of the AGps, etc. (AGp South), General discussion. Present: OQu I. I discuss with Operations Section the operational possibilities against Yugoslavia and their ultimate effects on Barbarossa. Subsequently, conferences with Operations Officer, Transportation Officer, Gen Qu and ObdH on time needed for assembly and grouping of forces for Yugoslavia.

28 March 1941.

Leeb: (Ordnance Office), Increase of effectiveness and range: Rocket projectiles for Lt. Fd. How. To begin with, only a few thousands rounds. Bore tapers from Med. Fd. How. caliber to Lt. Fd. How. caliber. Tapered-bore tubes are ground down, e.g. from 5 cm at breech to 3.7. cm at muzzle.

Antitank weapons: Tapered-bore tubes and 8.8 cm, 10 cm gun on self-propelled mount (as of May).

Hollow-charge projectile: Equal section hollow-charge projectiles for larger calibers, 7.5 to 10. Fitted with impact fuse, can be used also by Lt. Field How., against Infantry.

"D" Siege gun: 80 cm caliber, maximum range 40,000 m, available for Spain after March 1942; Railway gun on Spanish railways.

1230 Reich Chancellery: (Myself, Paulus, Heusinger):

Fuehrer reviews the courses of operations open to us: Thinks that group against Nish must be made as strong as possible, because strongest resistance may be expected in this sector (armament center, capital).

Go-ahead given for negotiations with Hungary. Accordingly I instruct Paulus to proceed to Budapest immediately. Negotiations with Bulgaria must refer only to preparative measures.

Italy: Fuehrer's letter to Il Duce. Speaks of situation which is serious but not disastrous, and of determination to crush Yugoslavia. Demands suspension of drive in Albania, covering of northern flank of Albanian front, and readiness for attack in Istria.

Il Duce's letter to the Fuehrer: Promises to call off drive in Albania, to cover three northern approaches to his wing and to add six Divs. to the seven Divs. stationed in northeastern Italy (in addition to the 15,000 frontier guards). Also pledges support of Croat separatist movement.

Turkey: List must report immediately if Turks march into the Edirne corner; such a move is not very likely. The Fuehrer's appraisal of Turkish attitude is highly optimistic. He has told the Turkish Ambassador that Russia did not join the Tripartite Pact, because the Fuehrer would not agree to Russian bases in the Straits.

Other matters put before the Fuehrer:

- a) List should not be confined to Mt. Olympus line.
- b) Timing: List is to strike at the earliest; the drive toward Skoplje should coincide with List's attack, if possible.
- c) Air Defense Africa. Fuehrer thinks Rommel should try to make the best with what he gets.
- d) Airborne operation: Fuehrer suggests an airborne landing at Krusevac (Yugoslavia's arsenal). Regt. Goering to Vietinghoff.

- Buhle:
- a) Orders for Corps Hq Hansen.
 - b) Light Road Construction Bns: Five activated by the Reich Labor Service.
 - c) Tactical control of 22nd Div. (under XI Air Corps).
 - d) 10.5 cm AT Gun, SPM.
 - e) Training of Maintenance NCO's during the war.
 - f) Make preparations for reconditioning of tanks, etc. after Greek and Yugoslav campaigns.
 - g) Make best use of postponement of Barbarossa which gives us at least 4 weeks.

Lt. Col. Spaeth (Liaison Officer in Albania):

Orientation on situation for his personal information, with instruction to talk to the Italians only on matters regarding Twelfth Army.

Paulus-Heusinger: Composition Second Army:

1st Mt. Div., carried by Truck Transportation Regt., arriving by 11 April. XXXXIX Corps (fully motorized) Kuebler. LI Corps, Briessen LII Corps, Reinhardt XXXXVI Corps, von Vietinghoff Temesvar: Reinhardt, XXXXI Corps (mot.) plus SS Div. Reich. One Artillery Regt. Staff. one medium field How. and one 10 cm Bn. One Eng. Bn., Bridge Column; Div. Grossdeutschland? 4 Artillery Commanders, 4 Artillery Regt. Staffs, 8 Medium Field How. Bns., 2 Siege Gun Bns., 2 15 cm Gun Bns., 2 Observation Bns., 2 Assault Gun Bns. (from the East), 3 Eng. Regt. Staffs, 16 Bridge Columns, 3 Eng. Bns., mot.; 3 Bridge Construction Bns., 3 AA MG Cos., 2 Medium and 2 Lt. AA Bns.

Army Hq Schobert will be sent to Romania sometime later.

Capt. Giese, Capt. Obermayer report in; assigned to Operations Sec.

Gen. Konrad: Briefing on operational intentions of OKH against Yugoslavia.

Gen. Jodl OKW calls up: Hungary agrees to everything and accepts proposals.

29 March 1941.

Kinzel (reports from Finland):

- a) European Russia: 15 Divs. more than previously estimated.
- b) Russian Armd. Corps Pskov with two Armd. Divs.: 2 Tank Regts., 1 Rifle Regt. Etc.
- c) Paratroops: 10 Brigs. of 3 Bns. each.

Situation: OQu IV: Italian defense measures against Yugoslavia in the North, and preparations for attack in Albania (contrary to promise to Fuehrer).

3 Divs., including Armd. Div. Centauro to Libradz, Kukes and Scutari.

Italian Fleet: Motor torpedo boats to Suda Bay (Crete).
3 British Divs. left Alexandria for Crete on 9 March (reported by Japanese Gen Staff)

Op. Off.: 2 ships of the 15th convoy to Libya (supply) torpedoed. 8th MG Bn. arrived at El Agheila. Operational order for Yugoslavia issued.

Tv. Off.: Two movements shifted from Barbarossa will not get through.

OQu IV: Requests of foreign governments to accredit officer observers. Tours of Romanian Gen Staff officers on Western front. -- Werth (Hungary) wants us to recall Krabbe.

Fellgiebel reports on possible Signal Communication lines between Army Hq 2 - Hungary -- Italians; Temesvar -- Army Hq 12. Tunnel shelter for Fuehrer train south of Wiener-Neustadt.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Basic factors of supply operation against Yugoslavia. Instruction for rear services to detrain along railroad line Linz - Vienna whenever practical and keep line to Graz open for troops. Group Temesvar must be based for supplies on Merk's * organization in Romania. Have everything ready to use Danube below Vienna! Army Hq 12 needs more trucks.

von Etzdorf: Conversations with Matsuka apparently successful. Attack on Singapore seems to be contemplated. Noncommittal on dates. Matsuka was informed that we are not interested in a Russo - Japanese non-aggression pact; agreement on fishing rights, etc. would be enough. State Secretary is being informed on dates for attack on Yugoslavia and for Barbarossa. Watch Belgrade diplomatic corps!

Bogatsch: Army Hq. 2, Army Air Commander (7): 1 Long-range recon Staffel, 1 Courier Staffel, 1 light Sig. Bn.
II Corps: 1 Close-range recon Staffel) Old type
III Corps: 1 Close-range recon Staffel)
XXXXVI Corps (mot.): 1 Group Air Commander; 1 Close-range recon Staffel, plus 2 Close-range recon Staffeln for Armd. Divs.; 1 Air Signal Net Operations Co.
XXXXIX Corps must be helped out by XXXXVI Corps.

Army Hq. 12: 8 Close-range recon Staffeln (including 4 for Armd. Divs.) Long-range reconnaissance (2 Staffeln to be lent by VIII Air Corps). (Silent reserves: 2 Close-range recon Staffeln at Bucharest).

Wagner (Gen Qu), Baentsch, Krumpelt (Supply Officer, Army Hq 2)! Discussion of Administrative Orders attached to Operational Orders. "Operation 25".

Some difficulties will develop in Romania and Bulgaria owing to scarcity of transport. Nevertheless, despite unloading points far to the rear and with the remainder of the frontward movement having to depend on trucks, they will squeeze through with getting the supply troops going and just manage to complete stockpiling before start of the operation.

Paulus phoning from Vienna:

- a) Reports unexpected delays in arrival of Infantry units.
- b) List wants to put Kleist in command of the entire Western drive, not only of Group Nish.
- c) List does not want to strike against Greece until way is open for attack toward Ueskub.

These wishes have as basis the desire to assure success of the Greek campaign, whereas my considerations aim at speedy conclusion of the Yugoslav operation. I think that Group Ueskub will be ready to strike on 5 April, and believe it is sound to postpone List's Greek drive until then.

2100 ObdH (on phone): Short report on my talk with Paulus and my view of List's proposals: divergent ideas; we must watch out!

2200 Gehlen: Finish drafting of assembly orders for "Operation 25".

30 March 1941. (Sunday)

0830. To Berlin. Phone talk with ObdH on List's proposal and my criticisms.

1100. General meeting at Fuehrer Office. Address lasting almost 2 1/2 hours. Situation since 30 June. Mistake of British not to take advantage of chances for peace. Account of subsequent events. Italy's conduct of war and policies sharply criticized. Advantages for England resulting from Italian reverses; England puts her hope in the U.S. and Russia. Detailed review of U.S. capabilities. Maximum output not before end of four years; problem of shipping. Russia's role and capabilities. Reasons for necessity to settle the Russian situation. Only the final and drastic solution of all land problems will enable us to accomplish within two years our tasks in the air and on the oceans, with the manpower and material resources at our disposal.

OQu IV Our goals in Russia: Crush armed Forces, break up State. — Comments on Russian tanks: redoubtable; 4.7 cm gun (AT) a good medium weapon; bulk of tanks obsolete. Numerically Russia's tank strength is superior to that of any other nation, but

they have only a small number of new giant types with long 10 cm guns (mammoth models, 42 @ 46 tons). Air Force very large in number, but mostly outmoded; only small number of modern models.

Problems of Russia's vastness: Enormous expanse requires concentration on critical points. Massed planes and tanks must be brought to bear on strategic points. Our Air Force cannot cover this entire huge area at one time; at the start of the campaign it will be able to dominate only parts of the enormous front. Hence, air operations must be closely coordinated with ground operations. The Russians will crumple under the massive impact of our tanks and planes.

No illusions about our Allies! Fins will fight bravely, but they are small in number and have not yet recovered from their recent defeat. Romanians are no good at all. Perhaps they could be used as a security force in quiet sectors behind very strong natural obstacles, (rivers). Antonescu has enlarged his Army instead of reducing and improving it. The fortunes of large German units must not be tied to the uncertain staying power of the Romanian forces.

Mines! Questions regarding Pripet Marshes: Flank protection, defenses, mines. Problems arising if Russians should make strategic withdrawal: Not likely, since they are anchored on both the Baltic and the Ukraine. If the Russians want to pull out, they must do so at an early stage; otherwise they cannot get away in good order.

Colonial Tasks! With our goals in the East achieved we shall need no more than 50-60 Divs. (~~armor~~). One part of the Ground Forces will be discharged into armament production for Air Force and Navy; the others will be required for other missions, e.g. Spain.

Clash of two ideologies. Crushing denunciation of Bolshevism, identified with social criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for our future. We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no comrade before nor after the battle. This is a war of extermination. If we do not grasp this, we shall still beat the enemy, but 30 years later we shall again have to fight the Communist foe. We do not wage war to preserve the enemy.

Future political map of Russia: Northern Russia goes to Finland. Protectorates: Baltic States, Ukraine, White Russia.

War against Russia:^{the} extermination of the Bolshevik Commissars and of the Communist intelligentsia. The new states must be Socialist, but without intellectual classes of their own. ~~Group~~ ^{Creation} of a new intellectual class must be prevented. A primitive Socialist intelligentsia is all that is needed. We must fight against the poison of disintegration. This is no job for Military Courts. The individual troop commanders must know the issues at stake. They must be leaders in this fight. The troops must fight back with the methods with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU men are criminals and must be dealt with as such. This need not mean that the troops should get out of hand. Rather, the commander must give orders which express the common feelings of his men.

Embodiment in This war will be very different from the war in the West.
ObdH Order In the East, harshness today means lenience in the future.
Commanders must make the sacrifice of overcoming their
personal scruples.

Noon: All invited to lunch.

Afternoon: Fuehrer Conference:

- a) Yugoslav Question. Decision in conformity with my ideas.
List will attack with L Corps and on his Marita front on
5 April. SS Adolf Hitler attached to Corps.
Kleist will attack with 3 Armd. and 2 Inf. Divs. and 1
Bulgarian Div. on 8 April.
Group Temesvar on 12 April.
Weichs likewise on 12 April.

Italy is no help as a partner. In Albania they are paralyzed
with fear. On the Giulia Frontier they claim they cannot attack
before 22 April. No need to define a boundary for them against
sector of Second Army since they will not attack anyway.
Details: Airborne landing Krusevac. - Assignment of Regt.
Coering. - Location of GHq.

Op. Sec.: Ship 22nd Div. to Hungary.

- b) Barbarossa: Reports of AGp leaders and of several subordinate
commanders (Guderian). Nothing new, except a clever plea by
Rundstedt for assigning the Carpathian sector to the Hungarians
and making the Pruth line an offensive front.

31 March 1941.

Reporting in or out: Several Gen. Staff officers, leaving (Natzmer,
v.d.Heyde) or joining us (Nippold).

Situation: Yugoslav movement to south (Skutari, Skoplje); British
movement toward the Yugoslav northern border. Yugoslav mobili-
zation continues.

Paulus: Returning, reports on conferences with List and with Weichs and
Hungarian Army High Command.

List, as was evident from his cabled report, wants to give
precedence to the drive into Southern Yugoslavia and conse-
quently would like to cut Group Nish down to two Armd. Divs.
Wants to keep back 60th mot. Div. as reinforcement for the
Ueskueb Group. Moreover, he insists that he is too weak with
respect to the Yugoslav concentrations in the South.

Weichs accepts mission assigned to him. Will be informed on
Hungarian intentions.

Hungary readily accedes to our demands concerning Army Hq 2.
Wants to attack along Lake Balaton and Tisza river, and with
smaller forces east of the Tisza. Hungarians will fight under
German High Command.

Gen. Thomas reports on organization of the war economy with regard to Operation Barbarossa.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Transfer of GHq to Wiener Neustadt or Baden near Vienna.
- b) Problem of protective measures for Iron Gate.*
- c) List sends message that he must have 60th mot. Div. for Ueskueb under all circumstances.

Heusinger: Availability of new Divs. for Operation 25:

- 101. Lt. Div. (as of 9 April, Brody)
- 100. Lt. Div. (as of 15. April, Doellersheim).
- Twelfth Armd. Div. perhaps ready before 18 April (i.e. 12 Apr).
- Perhaps bring over Fourth Armd. Div. (Bordeaux).

Teletype talk with List: Need of strong motor forces for Ueskueb drive emphasized. Pleads again for 60th Div. Request declined. Bulgarians do not want to take active part in campaign against Yugoslavia. Are afraid of Turkey.

von Ziehlberg: Organization of a Forward GHq.

1 April 1941.

Situation: Eden in Belgrade. New Balkans alliance: England - Greece - Yugoslavia. Movements to Southern Serbia continue. Increasing signs of disintegration of the Yugoslav State.

von Ziehlberg: Transfer of GHq to Vienna area. -- Conference with Thiele and Fellgiebel on signal facilities. Target date 8 April 0000 hrs.

ObdH: Discussion of offensive possibilities against Southern Serbia. Von Brauchitsch plays with the idea of having Second Armd. Div. strike toward Veles instead of against Greece, in order to be stronger in Southern Serbia. I oppose this disposition which would allow the entire Greek Second Army to get away from us. We must steel our nerves to believe in the devastating effect of the attack of Ninth Armd. Div. and SS Div. Adolf Hitler on Skoplje. Must yet talk over missions of Army Hq 2 in Operation 25 with Witzleben.

von Witzleben: C/S. Army Hq 2. Discussion of dispositions for drive of Second Army. Main effort on left wing; first objective: Hills north of Zagreb.

Gen. Jodl (OMW): Fuehrer wants maximum railroad schedule set in operation at latest possible date.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Currency arrangements for Romania are now coordinated with those in effect in Bulgaria.

- b) Finkel's report. Rommel shows total lack of interest in supply organization. Transportation lying idle in Naples. Staff Weller (Rome) very good.
- c) Preparations for Military Government in Operation 25.

Gen. Brand:

- a) Artillery commander for Army Hq 4. Temporary incumbent: Gen. Berlin with Staff drawn from Artillery School.
- b) Setting up of heavy artillery on the Channel Coast. Turn over to Navy four 34 cm French railway guns (range 40 km).
- c) "Fortress gun emplacements". Trials with K 3 gun tube requested. Must be put off.

von Bernuth:

- a) Reorganization of training supervision after departure of Army Hq 2.
- b) Tactical employment of Chem. Mortar units.
- c) Regulation and coordination of military training projects of Labor Service and Hitler Youth.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Fuehrer will leave for Hq South on 7 April at the earliest, but more likely on 8 or 9 April.
- b) Discussion of outcome of visit to Hungary.

Gehlen comes with report that Army Hq 12 cannot launch operations before 6 April (7 April better). Reply: OKH demands specific reasons.

2 April 1941.

Situation: Tartar reports from Bulgaria about Yugoslavia. Claim 3 Divs. and 9 Brigs. and very much Artillery and Engineers in southern Serbia. -- Must be seeing things!

Reports from Greece speak of four British Divs., including one of Armor, as well as 2 Divs. disembarking at Piraeus. Considering the time factor alone, this is quite impossible.

Turkey is said to have changed sides suddenly. Popular sentiment is in favor of war with Germany. Military attaché in Ankara reports the opposite.

Col. Greiner reports out (was in charge of training manuals in Section of Chief Inf. Off.); takes over command of an Inf. Regt.

1300 - 1400. Fuehrer Conference on over-all situation in Yugoslavia (Heusinger with me). New viewpoints. Emphasis again on Nish. Mission of Twelfth Army discussed. Plan regarding Croat autonomy. Strong language about Italians, who should use their Air Force on front of Twelfth Army, instead of on their Albanian front.

Gen. Heiner is briefed on his duties. Suggestion is made to set up a German Administrative Hq in Budapest.

- Buhle:
- a) Refitting of mot. units after Operation 25.
 - b) Ban on furloughs lifted. 5 % for farmers.
 - c) All units in Operation 25 have their field replacement Bns., except 164 Div.
 - d) Brigade 900, assignment possible as of 15 May, while training goes on. Components:
 - 1 Rifle Regt. (two Bns.)
 - 1 Lt. Arty. Bn., plus Assault Gun Bn.
 - 1 Eng. Bn., two Cos.
 - 1 Sig. Bn., two Cos.
 - 1 AT Bn., of three Cos (1 Co 4.7 cm)
 - Rear Services (for Supply Columns)
 - e) Use of Tank Training Bn. and Reconnaissance Training Bn. (mot.)
 - f) Use of French medium B 2 gun in Barbarossa (Seventeenth Army)?
 - g) Tank III with long 5 cm gun. Tube too long.
 - h) Waterproofing of Tank III and IV : Fording depth increased to 2.20 m. (Work must be intensified to attain depth of 4m): Waterproofing must be accomplished throughout Third and Eighteenth Armd. Divs., Fourth, Tenth, Fourteenth, Seventeenth Armd. Divs. In all other Divs. for 2 - 3 tanks.
 - i) Greater carrying capacity for ammunition and fuel in tanks. Gasoline in outside steelhooped drums; as yet no solution for ammunition.

Foertsch reports as Liaison officer OKH to Army Hq 12. Receives briefing on situation. — List of duties.

Heusinger: Current business: Authorization of forward shift of Divs. in the East. — Reporting schedule for Army Hq. 2. Employment of Airborne Divs. (Movement takes 12 days!) Take Parachute Regt. instead.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone: Gienanth is at the end of his tether trying to check SS in the Government-General. Requests action by OKH, to back him up in the question of evacuation of billets.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Transfer of Executive Power from Army Commanders to Corps Commanders in Operation 25. Definition of jurisdiction of the Special Detachments etc. of the SS and Secret Field Police.

3 April 1941.

Situation: Agedabia taken by German Africa Corps (which reports heavy British losses). Enemy in hasty retreat to the north. Turkey estimates British strength in Greece at 3 Divs., as we do.

Heusinger:

- a) Airborne Div. needs 5 trips to get to Nish. Air route via Bucharest. Total 15 days (starting 7 April). Better to transfer Parachute Regt. to Bucharest, which is then available for missions anywhere. (Yugoslavia, Greece).
- b) Date for jump-off of Operation 25 will be set by OKW.

- OOu IV: a) Reports from Finland: Attempts to recruit men for SS Regt. Nord are viewed with disfavor; Finns would rather have revival of Jaeger Bn. 27 idea.*
- b) Italian-Portuguese arms deals are purely financial transactions; no raw materials involved.
- c) Bircher, Danniker** - visit of schools etc. in Germany.
- d) Material turned over to Oshima (situation maps) and Marras*** (secret regulations); other current matters.

Ochsner: Conference on preparations for Barbarossa - Gas protection for horses. - Tactical problems in use of smoke. - Preparations for smoke laying exercise.

OOu IV reports that the Fuehrer wants to take control of the Hungarians out of hands of OKH, and give orders to them directly.

Too bad!

Col. Homlock brings letter from Werth, Hungarian Chief of Gen. Staff, requesting recall of Krabbe. Reports Yugoslav mobilization completed; 1.2 million men. Matschek has founded a Croat National Unity Party.

Keitel (Personnel Div.):

- a) Officers situation generally satisfactory. All quotas filled. Junior officers situation good (New training class 15 May).
- b) Bn. Commanders: bad shortage.
- c) Officer pools for Rumania (Army Hq 12), Vienna, and all Army Groups; 300 each.
- d) Out of turn seniority advancements - 255 Gen. Staff officers.
- e) Promotions of E-officers # to General rank.
- f) Results of Mieth.

Heusinger: a) Control of Hungarian Army by the Fuehrer, not by OKH, is due.

b) 22nd Div. all of a sudden is supposed to go to Ploesti, taking the place of Regt. Goering. Cannot be moved by rail.

c) Fuehrer Order to Africa Corps. Recognition of accomplishments and reminder not to be reckless, as Air Force units are being withdrawn, and arrival of Fifteenth Armd. Div. will be delayed; moreover, the Italians now need all their strength against Yugoslavia and so have nothing left for North Africa. Under these circumstances there is danger of English counter-attacks on flanks. Further advance authorized only, when sure, that British Armd. elements have been taken out of area.

d) Army Hq 12 wants to start operations on 6 April, at dawn. Air Force first against Rupel Pass.

Paulus: a) Tartar reports from Hungary: Teleki has committed suicide; his death is supposed to have political reasons. Horthy will not mobilize the entire Hungarian Army, but only border guard and one mot. Corps. Reported resignation of Hungarian Government.

b) Study for "Suedwind".

Buhle-Reinhard:

- a) Truck situation makes it necessary to equip armor units with French material.
Units affected: 20th Armd. Div., 14th, 18th, 25th, 36th mot. Divs. Last Inf. Divs. not to be fitted out before 20 May, to preclude necessity to reequip an additional mot. Div. -- One small Spare Parts Column for each reequipped Div. and 3 large Gen Qu Spare Parts Depots for French material are being organized.
- b) State Railroads near breakdown. They cannot take over any further jobs in the Southeast unless we help them out. Want release of 35,000 officials and employees of age groups 18 and over for operation and workshops.
Decision: We give them age groups 18 and over in all troops except Railway, Armd. troops and all units assigned to Operation 25. To what extent this should apply also to officers must be examined in consultation with Personnel Div.

Paulus: Reports of Teleki's suicide are confirmed. Apparently there have been serious disagreements in the Cabinet concerning participation in the campaign against Yugoslavia, which overtaxed the strength of the ailing Prime Minister. The current Foreign Minister is his probable successor. Mobilization will be limited to IV and V Corps, mot. War Minister von Bartha is on his way with a letter from Horthy to the Fuehrer.
Fuehrer's decision on start of Operation 25: 6 April, as was recommended by us after receipt of List's report.

4 April 1941.

Situation: British reported to be evacuating Bengasi, setting fires. In Northern Greece, the presence of 3 British Divs. is confirmed. Now, after all, the Bulgarians make their 6th and 11th Divs. available for Operation 25.

Paulus: Study for "Suedwind". -- Paulus, too, has got the impression at conference in Vienna, that supply officer, Twelfth Army, is not equal to his job.

- Bork:
- a) Listing of roads which must be restored in Serbia.
 - b) Use Railway troops for construction and, for the first time, operation of railroads in Serbia.
 - c) Technical crews (of Reich Ministry of Transportation) for reopening of Danube shipping lane will stand by in Vienna.
 - d) Activation of three (later four) Field Railway Directorates (294 civ. officials) and 18 Field Railway Operatinn Centers (1,000 civ. officials).
 - e) Liaison Detachments of Chief of Transportation at Armd. Groups, for emergency restorations of railroad operation in their sectors. With them, one Railway Eng. Co. (mot.) each, for construction and operation. -- Also for Kleist.

- f) Urged stepping up of shipment of products from Romania, not possible before middle of June.
- g) Fourth assembly echelon for Barbarossa (26 days) will probably be run from about 20 May to 20 June. Maximum railroad schedule. At that time it won't unbalance railroads, economic experts hold, since the spring bottlenecks will have been dealt with by that time.

- Radke:
- a) Case Mieth: Wording contested by witnesses. (Only Captl. Mayberg, attorney, insists on the wording. Members of the Army interrogated by a Gauleiter!
 - b) Case Claer cleared up with Bouhler. - "Army Yearbook" affair settled by talk with Bouhler.
 - c) Order concerning separation of Church function from troop celebrations. Ban on speeches by Chaplains on subjects other than purely religious ones. (OKW Order).
 - d) Old complaints about SS incidents in Poland. Investigations must be continued with participation of Army representatives. Final disposition must be deferred until all facts are known.
 - e) Memorial cemeteries in the East.

Doerr: Briefing of Liaison Officer for Udine.

von Salmuth reports back from leave. Review of situation in the East.

Col. Kinzel: Situation report on Yugoslavia: Reports on disposition of enemy forces show that border troops are being reinforced by Divs. from the interior of the country. This will result in stronger initial resistance, but later on, when this has been broken, in a speedy collapse. No central reserves will be available after that. In the south of the country (mountains) the Divs. of the Third Army are being split up into 9 Brigs. strung out along the border. Against northern Albania, comparatively strong forces have been brought up; in Scutari area at least 3 Brigs., on the northeastern border 3 Brigs., and on the border north of Lake Ochrida three more Brigs., making a total of a maximum of nine Brigs. The direction in which they are pointed is a little awkward for us in view of the lack of Italian preparedness for defense in Albania. We must expect Serbian penetration into Albanian territory and some very costly fighting there. There is no evidence of a weakening of enemy defense measures in their northern border area.

Situation report Russia: Foreign Armies East now admits that strength of Russian Army in European Russia must be set higher than estimated originally. (The Finns and the Japanese stressed that all along.) The total figure is now put at 171 Inf. Divs., 36 Cav. Divs. and 40 motor-mechanized Brigades.

The newly activated Armd. Corps of 3 Divs. apparently is stationed around Leningrad.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Part G of Administrative Orders for Barbarossa.
- b) Transfer of Executive Power to Armd. Groups and Corps Commanders disapproved.

- c) OKW order on administration of justice in occupied territories. Military Government set-up contemplated for Old-Serbia only.
- d) Fuel requirements for Serbia equal 14 days' requirements for Barbarossa.
- e) Supply situation: Generally speaking all preparations for Operation 25 are completed. 10,000 tons of fuel for Vienna (barge train) still to come.

Apart from that, Second Army is fully taken care of. Temesvar will be completely stocked by 8 April.

Twelfth Army: For the time being no crisis. Shipping for Marita made available in Constanza. First, 3 ships (10,000 tons). On 3, 4, and 6 April, one for Aegean. Daily loading capacity 400 tons, loading time 5 - 7 days; crossing will take 2½ days. Additional vessels are being assembled. Army Hq 12 specifies needs to Admiral Balkans. Supply Officer Romania supervises loading operations.

Danube basin: Barge train Belgrade", 10,000 tons plus one tanker, already in Vienna.

"Barge train II Romania" is being formed between Regensburg and Vienna; 16,000 tons, provisions and ammunition to Romania, for regrouping after conclusion of Marita. One trip will carry supplies for Moldavian base.

- f) Field Post problems which will result from cancellation of Army Leave trains.

Legation Councillor von Schmieder (in place of Etzdorf):

Review of Hungarian situation. Diplomatic procedure at the beginning of hostilities against Yugoslavia and Greece.

Conference with ObdH: Gives me his account of tour to the Balkans.

Conversation with King Boris and Antonescu, List and Weichs. No news about List. Apparently a good deal of friction between Kleist and List, because List regards his drive as the main thing and wants to cut down on Kleist,

Weichs does not want to give any Infantry to Corps Vietinghoff, disregarding ObdH's suggestion.

Boris is mobilizing 6 Bulgarian Divs., but will not allow them to cross into Yugoslav territory, on account of Balkans' Pact.

Antonescu knew nothing at all of our impending offensive against Yugoslavia. Requests that Hungarians should not operate east of the Tisza river. By 20 April, Romanian will have 15 Divs. and two-thirds of one mot. Div. in the Russian border region. Of our German Divs. one will go to the Bukowina border, one to the Pruth river knee; Armd. Div. to the approaches to Ploesti.

Kinzel: New intelligence from Yugoslavia, which gives an entirely different picture; the forces stationed near and north of Nish have moved south and are being replaced by units from central Serbia. Report that 2 Divs. in the Banat have been withdrawn behind the Danube. On the northern border no change.

- Liss:
- a) Australian Corps has disappeared from Cirenaica. Still in area: Seventh Armd. Div., 1 Australian Div., Sixth British, Ninth Indian. The bulk of the forces sent in Greece come from Cirenaica. After the victory over the Italians, strong forces seem to have been transferred to Abyssinia.
 - b) Greece: No British on Serbian soil. Wilson in command?
 - c) French West Africa: No change. De Gaulle has not made any progress.

- Heusinger:
- a) Friendly airplanes will be painted yellow.
 - b) British Mediterranean Squadron reported in direction Gibraltar. Azores apparently without importance for Dakar, but in American sphere of interest.
 - c) Operation Orsova.
 - d) Second Parachute Regt. in Plovdiv area with 2 Bns.; 1 Bn. still due (date uncertain).
 - e) Situation Libya: Bengasi taken. Reconnaissance units push on in the direction of Derna.
 - f) Air Force in Operation 25. Strength and disposition of forces. Ample.
 - g) Effect of Operation 25 on Barbarossa, which lost: 6 Inf. Divs. and 2 Corps Hqs from second and third assembly echelon. and 3 Inf. Divs. from GHq reserve. Of these Divs., the 6 former can be replaced from GHq reserve (third assembly echelon); 2 Corps Hqs, (XXXIX and LII), (third assembly echelon) can be replaced by XXXVII and LV from GHq reserve. Of 23 Divs. in GHq reserve, 12 remain available, including 5 mobile Divs. from the West.

Armer: Campaign in Yugoslavia: 3 Corps Hqs., 9 Armd. Divs. (7 Armd., 2 mot.) plus SS Regt. Adolf Hitler without Greece.

Timing: If Presov available, 17 Inf. Divs. and 13 Corps Hqs could be on the ground by 20 May; then 9 Inf. Divs. of the fourth assembly echelon (maximum railroad timetable); subsequently 24 Armd. and mot. Divs. and 5 Corps Hqs by 23 June. Armd. Divs. in Serbia would have to be refitted in rehabilitation districts (Vienna etc.) by 1 June; consequently must be out of the fighting by 30 April: 10 days for movement to the rehabilitation district, refitting will last 3 weeks.

Paulus took my place at conference this afternoon with the Hungarian War Minister von Bartha.

Bartha told him that Teleki committed suicide because he felt he could not take the responsibility for this policy after having himself signed friendship pacts with Yugoslavia. Left letter to Regent, urging on him a policy of loyal observance of pacts. This has made the Regent waver in his original decision. He sends the Minister to the Fuehrer, to appeal for sympathetic understanding and submit new proposals.

Mobilized: Border Guard, IV, V, mot. Corps (so he says). Promised additional mobilization of I and VI. II and VII (and III) still outstanding from original commitment. Promises that all Corps will be ready by 15 April (?), Armd. Corps by 12 April.

Paulus had been instructed by the Fuehrer before the conference as to what arguments he wanted him to use with Horthy. Apparently Bartha was extremely embarrassed by these arguments and after the reference to the agreements concluded in Budapest. We must wait and see what comes of this.

5 April 1941.

Morning Conference:

- a) Reports are confirmed that Yugoslavia is shifting her main forces to the area south of Nish. The informations - often grossly overdrawn - differ a good deal. One source places 12 Inf. Divs. and one Cav. Div. in Southern Serbia along Bulgarian border; another reports 10 Inf. Divs., 1 Cav. Div., 8 Inf. Brigs. Reports on Greece generally portray an unchanged situation. Estimates of British strength in Greece vary between 45,000 (which may be correct) and 120,000. The report that the Yugoslav High Command, in case of war, would seek to join up with the British and Greek forces, probably is correct.
- b) North Africa: Bengasi taken; equipment of one Italian medium artillery Regt. and one Armd. Bn. recaptured. Reconnaissance in direction of Derna in progress.

ObdH: Outcome of Fuehrer Conference on the evening of 4 April.

- a) Situation Hungary. The Fuehrer seems to be soft in his dealings with Horthy and appears to be impressed by the Teleki business. Hungary is not going to strike right away; it wants to wait until the Croats have declared their independence. With that, the State, with whom it concluded a Friendship Pact, will have ceased to exist.
- b) Fuehrer is greatly concerned over the Italians, particularly in Albania, as also over the possibility that the Serbs might fall back before the Italians in southward direction into the Serbian Mountains.
- c) Lines of action:
 - 1) Seize Agram quickly. Have Vietinghoff with one Armd. Div. (8th), move on Agram.
 - 2) Provide against developments south of Sava river. Vietinghoff's tanks must push further on toward Sarajevo.
 - 3) Serbia is assembling very strong forces in southern part of country. This increases the likelihood that Kleist would have to be shifted south from Nish.
 - 4) Move Reinhard and Vietinghoff closer to border.
 - 5) Airborne operations: Nish 22nd (Airborne Div.), Ueskuels (paratroops).

- d) Overall picture: The conduct of the campaign once more comes under the dictate of political considerations and, what is more, considerations of purely transitory character. This precludes any planning with clear goals and harbors the danger of dissipating our strength in a series of isolated operations. Always the same story. Good nerves are the only antidote.

Heusinger:

- 1.) I shall talk with Witzleben: Hungary's attitude may make it necessary to effect a quick seizure of Agram.*
Think over and report: Possibilities in following the original plan of operation against Agram (Eighth Armd. Div., Advance Combat Team, and remainder of Vietinghoff's Corps pushing only as far as the mouth of Drave river). What are possibilities, if parts of Vietinghoff's Corps have to strike earlier. (Fourth Armd. Div. already in place, Eighth Armd. Div. ready to strike on 10 April).
- 2.) Op. Sec. will prepare orders: Tie together List with 20nd Airborne Div. and Parachute Regt. at Plovdiv. Prepare for operation against Ueskueb and Nish. Reinhard will have SS Div. Reich available on 10 and 11 April; "Grossdeutschland" not before 12 April. Examine possibility of striking before these dates. List authorized to start operations.
- 3.) GHq Reserves: a) Troops: 101st Div. already assigned. 100th Div. arriving by 13 April (Vienna). Fourth Armd. Division in Vienna as of 15 April. Twelfth Armd. Div. as of 18 April, Warthe Lager and Olmuetz. Nineteenth Armd. Div. as of 20 April, Sennelager.
b) Truck transport units available: One group (for 1st Mt. Div.) as of 10 April.
One group (for 101st and 100th Divs.) as of 23 April.
One group (for 22nd Airborne Div.), still uncertain.
- 4.) Arrange moving of GHq, so that we can start work at Wiener Neustadt on morning of 9 April.

- Buhle:
- 1.) Development program for Chem. Mortar troops.
 - 2.) Norway: In addition to 160 Batteries: 7 Arty Regt. Staffs (small T/O); and 3 Construction Bns. We give them 1 Fortress Constr. Bn. and 2 Reich Labor Service Bns. Regional Defense Bns., nothing available. --- One Security Brig. --- MG Bn. can be taken out.
 - 3.) Set up Administrative Hq. Budapest by 15 April. (?)
 - 4.) Libya, dust protection for tanks (muzzles and turret base).
 - 5.) Rehabilitation of Armd. Divs. after Operation 25.

Witzleben (Army Hq. 29) on phone: Gets 3 assignments!

- 1.) Draft plans for quick seizure of Agram by Eighth Armd. Div. reinforced by Advance Combat Team.
- 2.) Split up Eighth Armd. Div. for missions south of Agram and make arrangements for arrival of Fourth Armd. Div., 15 April.
- 3.) Advance starting date for Vietinghoff.

Schuchard (Paris): Rivalry between Embassy and Military Commander more sharply marked. Abetz is in Berlin to see the Foreign Minister Embassy is overstepping its jurisdiction in all fields and tries to squeeze out the Military Commander. Proof that Embassy is working against us: De. Brinon said to be afraid that Abetz might leave his post, on the allegation that he could not work any longer with the generals and Wiesbaden.* Kommerzienrat Lehrer has mentioned a similar remark indicating Abetz's attitude toward us.

Reasons: Pressure from Ribbentrop. - Abetz! making every effort to score successes against us before his Minister. Arrest of Americans, which von Stuelpnagel refused, leads to disputes. "If higher authorities intervene, the fight might become unending".

von Ziehlberg: a) Current Gen. Staff business.
b) Studies on revision of Rules of Land Warfare (Kriegsrecht).

Heusinger: 1.) Second Army: Advance Combat Team of LI Corps:
1 Bicycle Bn., 1 Eng. Bn. mot., 1 Med. Arty. Bn.
Ready for operations: Fourteenth Armd. Div., 8 April.
Eighth Armd. Div. m 10 April.

2.) Sixteenth Regt.** and AA Bn., plus AT Co of 22nd Airborne Div. in Bucharest tonight.
Entire Div. in Bucharest ready for operation by 13 April
(?). Air Transportation available for two-thirds.
Commitment only on authorization by OKW.

3.) Parachute Regt. in Plovdiv by 7 April.

6 April 1941.

Campaign against Serbia and Greece.

Beginning of hostilities in Twelfth Army Sector.

Morning reports: Operation Iron Gate successful.* Against Southern Serbia, surprise apparently complete. Resistance on Rupel Pass. Ninth Armd. Div., 73rd Inf. Div. and Second Armd. Div. have crossed border. Second Army Sector: seizure of points of tactical importance on Yugoslav territory; demolitions in the interior.

Conference with ObdH: Situation: Corps Reinhard: Date fixed for start of operations. - Report from von Witzleben (Army Hq 2), that a strong Advance Combat Team of Armd. Corps of Vietinghoff will be ready to strike on 10 April. -- Preparations for bridge construction at Belgrade. Hungarians will help with bridging equipment; German Eng. troops (under-water cutting and welding, and demolition detachments) stand by in Bucharest and Vienna.

Hungary: In addition to mot. Corps and IV and V Corps, I and VII Corps have been mobilized since 5 April. Still outstanding from original commitment: III, II, VI Corps.

Disposition of Russian Forces: Strong concentrations in the Ukraine are noteworthy. Would be right for an offensive against Hungary and the Bukowina, but I feel sure this possibility can be discounted.

Paulus-Heusinger:

- a) OKW inquires about possibility of shifting Armd. Divs. to Romania: Possible dates of arrival: Fourth Armd. Div. on 22 April, if wheeled vehicles go by road; on 25 April, if everything goes by rail. Twentieth mot. Div. on 24 April, if wheeled vehicles go by road; on 5 May, if everything is shipped by rail. This would mean cutting across shipment of 239th Div., which then would not be ready until 29 April, and 170th Div. would arrive in Romania not on 28 April, but on 6 May.
- b) Airborne troops: At Plovdiv 2 Bns. of Parachute Regt., third on way. Arrived near Bucharest: Sixteenth Inf. Regt. Remainder of the Div. can be down by 13 April. Commitment only on authorization by OKW.

Air Force reports it believes to have scored a decisive success against enemy force, and that it now will turn to the targets requested by Ground Forces (railroads, highways).

Evening Report: Air Force has made three attacks on Belgrade (Palace, Citadel, Ponton Bridge) Destroyed 44 aircraft on the ground, 20 shot down; own losses 2 twin-engine fighters. AA Defense thin.

Sofia reports bombing attack by planes flying at high altitude.

Twelfth Army. Ninth Armd.Div. in action against retreating enemy west of Vetunica at 1400 hrs.

73rd Inf.Div. Advance Combat Team reached Kocane in the evening.

Second Armd. Div. fighting at Strumica. Intends to drive southward.

Sixth Mt. Div. reported on railroad line near Kalo Horjo.

Fifth Mt. Div. and 125th Regt. in heavy fighting on Rupel Pass.

72nd Div. at Chiron, pushing on toward Kate Vondru.

164th Div. advancing on Xanthi.

50th Div. still fighting in Nymphaea area.

Enemy columns moving from Stip on Strumica.

Heusinger:

- a) Plans worked out for changeover from Operation 25 to Barbarossa and for resulting modifications in Barbarossa plan.
- b) Twentieth mot. Div. will move close behind Fourth Armd.Div.
- c) Refitting facilities for Armd. units can be set up in the following areas:
 - Bucharest for 2 Divs. (without need of shipping new materiel)
 - Vienna 3 Divs.
 - Mil. Distr. VIII * 3 Divs.
 - Protectorate 2 Divs.
 - Berlin 1 Div.
 - Mil. Distr. IV**1 Div.
- d) Next successes of Rommel in North Africa.

7 April 1941.

Morning Reports: Progress over the evening situation only in Ninth Armd. Div. Sector. They have taken the mountain pass on their front. In the Greek border area fighting is rather heavy.

Libya: Reacting to the first surprise advances, the British seem to take energetic countermeasures to escape encirclement. Fuel difficulties.

Abyssinia: After abandoning of Addis Abeba, the Italians concentrate resistance in some districts of the Interior, in which they could hope to hold out until the rainy season.

Movements progressing satisfactorily. Twentieth mot. Div., if ordered entrained now, would arrive from Auxerre area on 19 April, 2000 hrs.

Disposition of the Russian Forces gives food for thought. If one discounts the much-advertised idea that the Russians want peace and would not attack on their own account, one cannot help admitting that their troop dispositions are such as to enable them to pass to the offensive on shortest notice. This might become extremely unpleasant for us.

Buhle - Wagner:

1.) Refitting:

- a) Schell needs three weeks. Hungary impractical, Romania for minor jobs.
- b) Military District XVII * : 3 Armd. Divs.
Military District VIII **: 3 Armd. Divs.
Protectorate: 2 Armd. Divs. (including Eighth Armd. Div.)
Military District IV*** : 1 Armd. Div.
Military District III # : 1 Armd. Div.
Romania : 2 Armd. Divs. (Thirteenth and Sixteenth Armd. Divs.) Supply Column Bn Vienna, or rather Chemnitz, where there are better facilities for refitting.
- c) GHq Troops and Columns distributed: (Protectorate and Milit. Distr. IV).
- d) Infantry Divs: 3 each in Milit. Districts XVII * and XVIII ##; 4 in Milit. District I###. About 2 in Bucharest.
- e) BdE must be ready for MT units by 20 April, for Armd. Divs. by 1 May.
- f) Current tank production: 80 German tanks III and 40 Czech tanks a month.

2.) Administrative setup for Southeast: Military Government for Serbia and, at first, also for Croatia. Preliminary orientation for Thurner. Give him temporary Staff Southeast.

3.) Tension Abetz/Stuelpnagel is really not directed against Stuelpnagel, but against Armistice Commission. The latter has instructions from the Fuehrer to be hard on the French. Abetz wants to take the collaboration line in conformity with Ribbentrop's policies. With Foreign Office and Armistice Commission receiving diverging

directives from above, contradictions and conflicts on the lower level are unavoidable. Futile for us to try to do anything against Abetz from here.

- 4.) Waffen SS - Poland: Reichsfuehrer (Himmler) sends representative to Government General, to straighten out the matter.

Jodl (OKW) on phone: Russia's uncertain attitude. Shall railroads be put on maximum schedule? On Fuehrer's decision, the reply is: No, but defensive measures now can be taken openly.

Housinger: Marching orders to Twentieth Div. mot. Move SS troops to more central location in France for convenience of entraining.

Org. Sec.: Requirements for future organization of Ground Forces:

24 Armd. Divs., including 10 for tropical service ("Light Divs.").

12 mot. Divs., including 5 Lt. Divs. for tropical service.

66 Inf. Divs., normal T/O, including 6 for airborne operations and 10 with tropical equipment.

10 Mt. Divs.

24 Mobile Divs., 8 with tropical equipment.

6 MT Regts. for operational assignments.

2 Air Transport Staffeln, each with carrying capacity of 1 Div.

Estimated Needs:

Theaters:	Armd.	Mobile	MT.	Inf.	MT Regt.
West	--	6	--	24	1
North	--	--	2	6	--
East	6	6	2	20	2
Southeast	--	--	--	6	--

Operational Groups:

Spain Morocco	3	2	--	2	1
North Afr.--Egypt	6	2	--	--	1
Anatolia	6	4	--	4	--
Afghanistan	3	4	6	4	1

Afternoon to Berlin (tailor) 1630 - 1930.

von Below: ObdH will have control of Army Hq 11, Armd. Gp. 2 and 3 during training in Z I (in conformity with my wishes).

Evening Reports: Skoplje and Stip taken, Movement of XVIII Corps in Rupel Pass has gotten under way.

Kleist starts operations on 8 April, 0520 hrs.
Bridge at Barcs taken (Second Army), which means, that with
the bridge at Koprivnica for XXXXVI Corps we can now
positively count on two bridges across the Drava.

Jeschonneck calls up, and hints sort of vaguely, that the Reich
Marshal has dropped remarks to the Fuehrer on "unsatis-
factory" progress of XVIII Corps. This damned back-
biting is starting again.
Fortunately, in this case, the Fuehrer already had the news
that meanwhile the XVIII Corps has broken through the moun-
tains after hard fighting.
I request preparations be completed for paratroop operation
against Saloniki.

Hoesinger: Can Second Army be given a free hand for drive on
Maribor? Yes!
Air Force reinforces VIII Air Corps by 2 Fighter Groups, 1
Divebomber Group, 1 Do 17 * Group, with two more coming
later.

Hinor reports mobilization of Hungarian I, IV, V, VII, Corps and the
Armd. Corps, comprising 12 Inf. Brigs., 2 mot. Brigs.,
2 Cav. Brigs. Eighteenth Brig. not mobilized (area flooded)-
Nineteenth Brig. remains west of Tisza river.

8 April 1941. Kleist starts offensive
in direction of Nish.

Situation Conference: New advances. Skoplje taken. Second Armd.
Div. on way to Saloniki. Overall picture shows complete
disintegration of the enemy operating in Southern Serbia.

Paulus: Discussion of instructions on deception manuevre on the
Western Front ("Haifisch"). **

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. -- With Matzky,
Attaché matters.

Conference with ObdH: He is still concerned about Albania, and
wants to urge List to move even closer to the Albanian border.
Doing this would serve no good purpose, for we are no longer
threatened from Albania. Any forces detached in this
direction are a waste of troops which now are needed for
building up swiftly the front facing south.

Airborne landing at Ueskueb *** desirable.

Afternoon. Leave on special train, at 1500.

2130. Breslau: List wants to get Fifth Armd. Div. to the south
as reinforcement for Ninth Armd. Div. as quickly as possible,
so as to be able to break through to Florina. Can't have
it. --

Kleist has not yet pushed beyond Pirot. The battle round Nish is still to come. Fifth Armd. Div. is needed there now, but after completion of its mission it can be released for the South. The request to have Sixteenth Armd. Div. brought up is justified.

In the evening, ObdH talks with the Fuehrer from his train. No decision on Sixteenth Armd. Div. Fuehrer suggests that, if road trouble impedes closing up of Fifth Armd. Div. behind Eleventh Armd. Div. toward Pirot, Fifth Armd. Div. might strike toward Kumanovo. (Wrong! In that event the Div. would be lost for the Nish operation). It would be better to have Fifth Armd. Div. attack Leskovac via Pirot.

9 April 1941. (Wiener Neustadt)

0800. (train one hour late): Arrival at Wiener-Neustadt. Our office is in the Maria-Theresia Academy.*

Situation Conference: Our troops have entered Saloniki (Second Armd. Div.). Local Army Commander has offered capitulation. In Southern Serbia, apparently only remnants of the enemy forces left. Italians report slackening of enemy pressure in Albania. At Skutari too, nothing has happened. North of the Danube, enemy seems to be evacuating. No report yet as to when Reinhard could start operations. In Second Army sector troops on the border are approaching the Drava. Maribor taken. Drava crossing near Barcs in hands of Fourteenth Armd. Div.

Kuebler reports entry of Second Armd. Div. into Saloniki at 0700 hrs.

List protests against yesterday's Wehrmachts communique, which fails to do full justice to the achievements of the Ground Forces and the honor of the attacking troops.

1130: OKW disapproves release of Sixteenth Armd. Div.

By noon it is clear, that the Nish front also is collapsing.

Hence, Fifth Armd. Div. is moved up via Nish in order to be brought to bear against Leskovac. The Greek Army between Turkish border and the Vardar river has capitulated. So far 20,000 prisoners are reported, (not counting the Greeks), including 5 Generals and a complete Divisional Staff; 100 guns; 28 AA guns, 25 AT guns; several hundred MG; 131 new Dornier aircraft engines, (on two fields), aircraft spare part depots; 4 Bridge Columns; 1,5 mill. liter or 1500 tons of gasoline; several rations depots and rations trains, and spare part depots. Skoplje radio transmitter intact in our hands.

Evidence of demoralization: Only the Serbians want to continue fighting. Macedonians and Croats throw their weapons away.

Heusinger:

- a) Reinhard is still facing garrisoned borders and antitank obstacles. Unless enemy withdraws, he will not start before 11 April.
- b) Possible reinforcement: 52nd Dc Projector Regt. * (rocket projectiles) range 6,000 m.
Eighth Chon. Mortar Bn. (heavy incendiary oil rockets), range 1,800.
43rd and 51th Engineer Bns.
- c) ObdH. with Fuehrer: Fuehrer releases Fifth Armd. Div. wants if in any way possible, junction with Italians along line Albanian border - Giulia border.

From Libya report of capture of 2,000 British including 6 Generals near El Mechili. It is claimed (agent report) that three Australian Divisions are moving up from Egypt.

Wagner:

- a) Greek Army should receive every possible consideration; Serbian Officers are to be treated in the worst possible manner (OKW order).
- b) Supply for Second Army: All right. Base of XXXXVI Corps is taken over by Staff Grote-Vienna. Field Hospitals for Second Army arrive late. Emergency improvisations! Send them hospital trains!
- c) Barge train Constanza (fuel, ammunition, rations, in ratio 3 to 2 to 1, total 10,000 tons). To be dispatched in groups of 4 ships. Transit $2\frac{1}{2}$ days.

Heavy British air raids on Kiel!

Evening reports: Kleist has driven through Nish and is advancing northward.

This evening's order to Twelfth Army, by special order of the ObdH, includes the instruction to move Fifth Armd. Div. to vicinity of XXXX Corps via Pristina, and have XXXX Corps make junction with the Italians "on both sides of Debar", completion of mission to be reported at once. To me, this order seems wrong. For it delays XXXX Corps with the trivial business of joining up with the Italians, when there is perhaps still a chance to push ahead, via Bitolj, to Florina, without serious resistance in the next few days. Probably this step, which I denounced when talking with the ObdH in the forenoon, is motivated by political considerations on top level.

The evening report brings a puzzling observation by Air Force that, from 1630 to 1700., no traffic was observed between Kozani - Florina - Edessa and Veria. Either the British are beginning to pull out or they have not advanced farther north than Larissa.

Request Air Force to strike against Volos and Piraeus.

Report from Attaché in Ankara that not only Britain, Greece and Yugoslavia, but also Turkish Army circles are exerting strong pressure to induce the Turkish political and military leadership to enter the war. This enthusiasm probably will quickly cool when they have heard announcement of the German successes on the radio.

10 April 1941 (Second Army starts operations with XXXXVI Corps)

Morning situation: Nothing substantially new. Fifth Armd. Div. apparently is still on the move to close on Pirot and probably will take two to three days to join XXXX Corps because of the detour over Pristina they had to take. Eleventh Armd. Div. is pursuing the enemy retreating toward Belgrade. In Southern Serbia an Advance Combat Team has broken through to Florina via Bitolj, and has made contact with the enemy. Let's hope that the eagerly desired junction with the Italians in Albania will come off soon, with XXXX Corps having taken not only Bitolj, Kicevo and Tetovo, but also Prizren, and the Italians having proclaimed their intention to meet us by advancing to Bitolj via Struga, and to Kicevo and Tetovo via Debar (Alpinis).

Reports indicating disintegration of the Serbian Army continue to come in. In Northern Yugoslavia Croats seem to have refused to obey orders in some instances. Concerning the liquidation of Thrace we have no detailed reports as yet.

The Greek Government has resigned. Political situation obscure. Unrest in Turkey and apparently also in Rumania. Hungarians (in response to the letter of the Fuehrer) have now promised to strike on 12 April, in the direction of Osijek, perhaps already on 11 April.

Rainhard, who still thinks he has major forces in front of him, now wants to start out on 11 April. We think he will encounter only Border Guards and Cavalry.

1230. Call up Grolman (who will report to Greiffenberg):

- a) Why was plan of attack of Second Armd. Div. changed?
At what tactical juncture do they intend to attack Veria?
- b) Liquidation of Thrace.
- c) Securing of coastal towns by XXX Corps.

Replies:

- a) Twelfth Army Hq, depending on the rate of progress of drive southward from Florina, is considering bringing up Second Armd. Div. over Edessa or Veria, as soon as the

pressure from the north begins to be come effective. Only as a last resort will the Div. be brought up by detouring them to the North, through Yugoslav territory.

- b) Capitulation negotiation concluded and report on way. In the sector of XXX Corps, as also in the mountains around Rupel Pass, the order to lay down arms apparently has not yet reached all elements.
- c) Communication with XXX Corps extremely difficult. Advance Combat Teams are occupying coastal towns. Naval detachments are being called.

1730. Conference ObdH with Fuehrer :

- 1.) New offensives against Greece. Boundary line against the Italian zone: From eastern bank of Lake Prespa to Pindus Mountains.
- 2.) Has agreed to continuation of drive on Larissa. Permission is obtained to transfer 60th Div. *
- 3.) Italians: Second Army must start operations with parts of Fourteenth Armd. Div. (from Zagreb) in the direction of Fiume at earliest date. The bulk of the Army may move in general direction Sarajevo.
- 4.) Russia: No reasons for anxiety.
Turkey: Attitude not quite clear yet; it would seem that British money again has been greasing palms. The Fuehrer does not want to let the Bulgarians march into Thrace as long as the Turkish attitude is not clarified.

Gen. Konrad:

- a) Bad weather for the next few days. Snow expected in the Serbian Mountains. Weather will be slow in clearing up.
- b) Distribution of German and Yugoslav air forces, and of German AA forces.
- c) Progress of operations against England. ObdH has likewise no clear picture on the distribution of British Air strength in the Eastern Mediterranean.

1745 Message that Fourteenth Armd. Div. has entered Zagreb, received by cheering population. Evening reports show steady advances by Eleventh Armd. Div. toward Belgrade, as also by Eighth Armd. Div., moving from Barcs on Slatina, and in the south by SS Div. Adolf Hitler from Florina toward Vevi. Elsewhere the reports are that the units following in the rear are closing up on all fronts. We have not yet been able to get the Italians going in Albania. On the Giulia border they are supposed to start on 11 April. I don't believe they will.

Hungarian Liaison Detachment reports on arrival: Brig. Gen. von Beldy, Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff) von Makray, Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff)

von Sziklay, Capt. Krasznay, Capt. Furgach.

11 April 1941. Good Friday (Operational Group XXXXI Corps starts operations).

During the night the Fuehrer had us on the phone again, trying to make us change the plans for Fourteenth Armd. Div., which is poised to drive west, and for Eighth Armd. Div., which will push southeast. Apparently Heusinger was able to contain this outbreak of jitters. Eighth Armd. Div. ~~will~~ still drive toward Osijek, Fourteenth Armd. Div. is already moving on Karlovac and will be pushed on toward Deinice.

Morning conference: Yesterday's picture confirmed: Fourteenth Armd. Div. roaming the country almost without enemy opposition. Eighth Armd. Div. has come up against some resistance near Slatina and will attack again today. The remainder of Second Army finds little opposition in its southward advance, but has difficult terrain and poor roads.

Nothing substantially new from Twelfth Army. The Italians on the Albanian front have not really got going yet and it looks as if we shall actually have to go up to the border to effect the junction. In the south our troops are still in contact with the British southeast of Florina. No positive measures which would indicate that British front is being taken back.

Talk with ObdH: I express resentment over interference with the conduct of operations. This timorousness shying away from every risk while continuously clamoring for victories, may be acceptable politically but from the military standpoint it is intolerable. We have our job cut out in the South, against Greece. Every unnecessary step in another direction is a sin against success.

Wagner:

- a) Labor pains in the setting up of a Military Government in Serbia. Air Force wants to furnish the General, and Consul-General Neubauer, in his capacity of representative of the Four Year Plan, already seems to be up to his ears of blocking any constructive work.
- b) Constanza: One ship can sail. * Await orders for further sailings. List needs nothing for Kavala. **
- c) Rommel makes preposterous demands. His wishes can be satisfied only insofar as preparations for Barbarossa permit.

Himer reports that Hungarians are set to start off on both sides of the Danube today, at 1400. Divebombers of our Second Army will give ground support. Talk on future missions south of the Danube.

von Greiffenberg reports, 1300: Saloniki harbor taken over empty.---
SS Adolf Hitler is in action against the British southeast
of Florina, between the lakes (British still have artillery
in area!) * -- Kleist: This morning's action still in
progress. Rupol Pass open for vehicles since last night. --
72nd Div. will reach Seres tonight.

Reports coming in the course of the day and evening show quickening
disintegration of the northern Yugoslav front. Units are
laying down arms or surrender to our planes flying overhead.
One Bicycle Co. captures an entire Brigade, complete with
staff. An enemy Division Commander radios to his higher Hq
that his men are throwing away their weapons and leave for home.
The only fighting still going on is south of Belgrade, in
the sector of Eleventh Armd. Div., but here, too, enemy
resistance was broken by evening. XXXXVI Corps is with its
right wing at Karlovac, where they are to wait for the Italians
who have at last come out via Fiume, which has surrendered
to them. With its left wing, XXXXVI Corps is in the area
south of Novi Sad. In Southern Serbia a junction with the
Italians has at last been effected on the northern shore of
Lake Ochrida (Struga). On the Greek-British front, west
and southeast of Florina, no new progress. Here we must
wait for our forces to close up, which should take another
day or two. In the Saloniki area, XVIII Corps is advancing
westward. The Hungarians are reported to have started
operations. Effect is not noticeable as yet.

Reinhard has started off, but his progress has been slowed
by bottomless roads.

12 April 1941.

(Bardia, North
Africa, taken).

The situation is developing according to plan. Yugoslav resistance
in the north has completely collapsed. Croatia wants to
declare her independence.

North of the Danube, Reinhard, south of the Danube, Cruewell,
and from the southwest, Eighth Armd. Div. are closing in on
Belgrade. The fall of the city is imminent.

In Northern Greece the British are making a stand and fight
back at Vevi, supported by Arty; apparently rear guard units.

After conference with ObdH: New operational order directing
assignment of First Armd. Group (Kleist) to Second Army as
of 13 April, 1941, 0600. Divisions previously earmarked
for GHq reserves have been stopped on route. We need no
additional troops for Serbia.

Gen. Streccius and Col. Zoellner call. Nothing of importan@o

Streccius, Zoellner, Beldy, Maklay, Siklay are my guests at luncheon;

present also Housinger and Zichlberg.

Evening no more desk work, but visit with Irmingard, until midnight. *

13 April 1941. (Easter Sunday).

Belgrade taken.

Morning reports: In Yugoslavia things are developing according to plan. Second Army moves in general direction of Sarajevo; in Croatia a Croat National Government is being formed. No news from von Vietinghoff (XXXXVI). The orders to turn south reached him yesterday noon. Since then we have had no signals from him. This must be investigated.

Kleist entered Belgrade with Eleventh Armd. Div. this morning at 0632. after an officers' patrol of Regt. Grossdeutschland had crossed the Danube and occupied the Ministry of War during the night.

More signs of demoralization in the Yugoslav Army are reported.. The Croats have stopped fighting altogether. Only on the Adriatic coast, some energetic commanders still seem to be trying to keep their troops together.

Greece. The Heights barring the approach to Vevi were taken after bringing to bear a concentration of medium artillery. Enemy situation shows the British with about one Corps (three Divs.) in the Kozani area, whereas the Mount Olympos front (facing Saloniki), which previously seemed to have been held by the British, has been taken over by the Greeks (with British Artillery). The plan of attack of Twelfth Army is to launch a double enveloping movement, with parts of its forces pushing on west of the Aliakmon river and with the XVIII Corps striking from Saloniki in the direction of Mount Olympus, and thereby to crack the British out of the Greek Front. This plan is completely in line with our ideas. Casualty reports so far are gratifyingly low: 400 killed, 1,900 wounded). Ammunition expenditure very small.

Morning Conference with ObdH produces no new developments.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Supply base must be set up in Belgrade.
- b) Plan of returning some units by boat, via Italy.
- c) Assignments for 602nd, 605th, 616th MT Regts:
602nd (moved the Mt.Div.) will be free as of 15 April. To be refitted in Chemnitz and Plauen.

605th (moved 161st Div.) will be available on 20 April; probably around Vienna. At the moment, its Third Bn. is with XXXXVI Corps, the other Bns. with 101st Div.

616th (in moved the Airborne Div.) Is the most severely strained of the Three. Second Bn. will be overhauled at Znain.

First Bn. is transport unit under Second Army; stays until 20 April. Third Bn. is in Romania, and will be for some time to come.

- d) Military Governments: Trans-Mur area goes to Hungary. Shift southern border of Styria across the Sava. Italy will take over Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina. Croatia is to become an independent State under German protection. For pre-1918 Serbia (including Montenegro), a centralized Military Government, which will control also the Banat area east of the Tisza river. Of the former, the region between the Danube and the Morava river, together with the Banat area east of the Tisza river is to be placed under special German protection, with military safeguards and a special regime. Southern Yugoslavia, as far as it is inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians, will go to Bulgaria.
- e) The following arrangements are to be made: In the theaters of Second and Twelfth Armies, the Rear Area Commanders will take over administration of these regions for the time being, while making all preparations for subsequently turning them over to the permanent authorities yet to be set up. Since these regions form a single economic whole, it would be advisable to have the two Commanders be assisted by one advisor, that is State Counciller Thurner.

General von Beldy (Hungary):

- a) Reports Hungarians have entered Novi-Sad.
- b) We reach an agreement with him to the effect that the motorized and bicycle-mounted units of the Hungarian Army will cross the Danube and will be further employed in the sector of Armd. Group 1. Hungary's consent to this measure will be secured.
- c) I inform him of our decision regarding eventual transfer on Trans-Mur area to Hungary, at a date yet to be set.
- d) Hungary's wishes regarding Nagykikinda and Agaye areas.

Jodl calls up (for Keitel):

- 1.) Belgrade. On 12 April, 1945, Capt. Klingenberg of the SS Div. Reich hoisted the German flag on our Belgrade Legation. At 1845, the Mayor of Belgrade handed over the city to the representative of the Foreign Office and to Klingenberg. Great excitement in Fuehrer Hq over fact that this report did not reach top level through the OKH.
- 2.) Protection of the Bor mining district.
- 3.) SS Reich and Regt. Grossdeutschland should, if possible, not move southward across the Danube, but rather stand by for other missions.

- 4.) Projected letter to Horthy on continued Hungarian participation. Parallel agreements between both Army Commands.

ObdH (hear from Engel): Fuehrer considers sending one mot. Inf. Regt. to North-Africa. ObdH had previously refused. on the following grounds:

- a) Matter was under consideration for a long time here.
- b) We don't see our way to spare troops for North-Africa in view of the impending great tasks.
- c) Shipping not available until Fifteenth Armd. Div. has reached Africa.
- d) Impracticable owing to lack of motor transport and fuel.
- e) Without strongest air support it would certainly be unwise to enter upon operations with ambitious objectives.
- f) As we approach Egypt, British resistance will stiffen.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. - Preparation of motorized CP caravan for Eastern Campaign.

Talk with ObdH on stopping movement of reserves. In Second Army the units affected are 79th and 125th Inf. Divs., and 60th mot. Div., in Twelfth Army, 46th, 76th and 198th Inf. Divs.

Talk with Gen. Paulus:

- a) Assign Police Div. to GHq reserves in West. Send 169th Div. to Norway.
- b) Divs. of the Fifteenth draft ready by 1 May: 2 Divs., by 15 May: all others. One will go to Norway to relieve 163rd Div., one to reinforce the occupation forces.
- c) Control of Divs., in ZI for training purposes can, in individual cases, still be settled to suit wishes of the Armd. Groups.
- d) Liaison Detachment Rome hands in colossal requests for Rommel. As far as we are concerned Barbarossa has precedence.
- e) Tank Repair Centers: Silesia and Berlin will be ready first, Vienna later. Berlin may be reserved for SS Div. Reich.

Heusinger 2300.: Issuance of current orders - Danube bridge problems. Latest reports on enemy resistance on front of XXXXVI Corps.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Organization of Military Government Serbia and procedure for transfer of territories to Hungary and Italy; also basic outline of structure of Great State. Issuance

of orders and telegrams to the agencies concerned.

14 April 1941. (Easter Monday).

Morning reports: Continuing advance of Second Army toward Serbian mountain area from the Northwest.

Resistance on the southern bank of the Save against elements of the XXXXVI Corps which are wheeling northward. Resistance also in the area of Cacak, in the Morava Valley west of Krusevac.

On the Greek front: Advance of the Ninth Armd. Div., which has taken Ptolemais. SS Adolf Hitler pushes westward in order to reach the Aliakmon Valley south of Lake Kastoria, and XVIII Corps strikes out eastward along the coast, via Kastoria.

Orders are issued to stop movements of: XXXXI Corps north of Danube (elements which have entered Belgrade will remain there);

Second Army (1st Mt. Div. and Corps
(125th Div. and 79th Div. under LI Corps
(101st Div., which will be shipped back by 602nd
(MT Regt.

Twelfth Army (76th Div.
(198th Div.

Rommel wants to drive toward Suez from Sollum via Marsa Matruk. Reich Marshal willing to furnish air support.

Talk it over with Jodl (OKW): This operation can be staged only as a raid. To hold Suez, we have neither the troops nor the supply facilities.--

OKW directive on continuance of the Greek operation contains nothing new, only some rather awkward formulations.

Fuehrer letter received here sharply declines out-of-turn promotions in the Gen. Staff. This, too, will pass. If there is any place, where achievement should be the standard for promotion, it is our organization.

Non-aggression Pact Russia - Japan for five years !

Albania: Since 13 April, the Greeks have been quite open about pulling back their northern wing. The Italians are following cautiously through Ochrida and Pogradec.

1400. - 1930. : By plane to Hq Second Army at Zagreb.

Review of the situation produces no significantly new information for OKH. The instructions issued by us have not yet reached Army Hq owing to bad signal communications. Future political set-up discussed. - Stopping of rear Divs. - Flight back over Baras, Lake Balaton, Lake Neusiedl.

ObdH at Hq. Twelfth Army, Sofia and Hq Armd. Group 1, Belgrade. Apart from reports indicating desirable development of situation, nothing of significance. Casualties low.

Armistice request by Yugoslav Government is answered with demand for unconditional surrender of arms. Destructions of any kind must cease. German operations are continuing.

Fuehrer's decision on Rommel's requests: Our prime objective is building up a front of ample width in the Solum area (including Shiwa Oasis). Apart from this, only raids.

Submission of OKW directive on Operation "Silberfuchs". *

Decision on organization of command in XI Air Corps (22nd Airborne Div.): Contrary to our demand, Air Force gets full control.

15 April 1941.

Wagner (Gen Gu): Military Government in Serbia is arranged so that we are only in charge of military safeguards and retain supervision of a general nature over the civil administration (Thurner). In all other respects, we'll let the Police and the agencies of the Four Year Plan fight it out between themselves!

Situation conference: Mopping-up operations in Serbia continue, with our forces converging from west, north and east.

In Greece, Ninth Armd. Div. has secured a bridgehead across the Aliakmon river, south of Kozani, but terrain south of the river is very difficult. The westward drive of SS Adolf Hitler and 73rd Div. through Kastoria still encounters strong resistance. XVIII Corps is advancing through the Olympos area (Mone Petras) and south of Katerini.

Reconstruction of Croatia will be in hands of Glaise-Horstenau.

Gen. Wimmer is slated to head Military Government for Serbia, when it is established.

Conference with ObdH produces no new viewpoints. He is casting about for ways to speed the build-up of a base for Rommel, and wants submarines and the Airborne Div. for this purpose. I think both methods are wrong. The Airborne Div. is non-motorized and therefore useless, once it is landed in Africa. ** Furnishing submarines is the business of the Italian Navy, for I think it would be a mistake to withdraw any of our submarines stationed round England and in Freetown.

Gen. Marras pays a call. A rather unproductive interview, during which I tried to rouse his interest in new tasks for the Italians in Bosnia, and to draw his attention to their lack of information on Greek withdrawals on the Albanian front. I doubt that he understood what I told him. -- The possibility of Italian help in using sea route in transferring our troops from Balkan is mentioned.

Col. Toussaint (lately Mil. Attaché in Belgrade) gives a dramatic account of his experiences previous to entry of German troops in Belgrade. There have been heavy civilian casualties and much material damage in the city; water and electric supply is disrupted. He shares my views concerning our further military action, which is no longer of the nature of a campaign, but rather a sort of liquidation in which there must be no let-up for even a moment, until the entire country has been combed through. Anyone refusing to surrender should be left to starve.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Review of naval warfare problems: He doubts the reported closing of the Dardanelles by British submarines. -- Coastal shipping route to Solum can be only partly protected by submarines. In any event, using submarines that way offers fewer opportunities for hitting the British, than does leaving them where they are now. Employment of Italian submarines would be desirable.

Gives a summary of submarine warfare to date: The peak will not be reached before next August.

Roosevelt's declaration including Greenland in the Western Hemisphere, is a maneuver to make it easier for the British to protect their convoys. So far only Iceland was included in the blockaded zone; now perhaps we shall have to extend it to include Greenland as well.

SS. Bismarck, Tirpitz and Prinz Eugen are to go into the Atlantic shortly. SS. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (the latter hit by an aerial torpedo and bombs) will not return before July.

Gen. Fellgiebel reports on plan to install a Senior Signal Officer in Belgrade, who will at first be under his command, and later serve under Military Government. Discussion of the new signal communication lines needed for continuation of campaign (Agram-Belgrade-Skoplje-Larissa and Sofia-Saloniki-Larissa-Athens).

Rommel reports meeting stubborn resistance at Tobruk, which blocks his advance; apparently a strong garrison, supported by Naval units from the sea. He has to use the two Italian Divs. to fighten the line of encirclement. Moreover, he is being attacked on the landside from Egypt. Now at last he is constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently strong to allow him to take full advantage of the "unique opportunities" afforded by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for quite some time over here.

Gen. Zorn (CG, Twentieth mot. Div.) reports out.

Hausinger: Reintegration into Barbarossa of units employed in Operation 25.

von Altenstadt (Gen Qu):

- a) Collection and screening of prisoners of war. Collecting points at bridges. Classification by nationalities and by following categories: War economy and armaments workers; agricultural laborers from the rich farming districts of Serbia; auxiliary services for our troops; remainder will be shipped home.

Order to this effect to Army Hqs 2 and 12 and letter to OKW.

- b) Croat Legion (Nonsense!) and Glaise-Horstenau's job.
- c) Reorganization of the Reinforced Border Guard at the Styrian and Carinthian border sectors, and activation of new Regional Defense Bns.

Evening reports: The Armistice Commission sent by the Yugoslavs consisted of some Generals of the Fifth and Second Armies, who could not be recognized as plenipotentiaries and so were sent back. - Group Kleist, coming from the north, cannot make any headway against the countless hordes of prisoners entangling his columns in the narrow mountain valleys. A spearhead of Sixteenth mot. Div., led by the Div. Commander and pushing its way through the masses of surrendering enemy units, has reached Sarajevo, where he has taken control of military and other authorities.

The Yugoslav Government has issued a proclamation to lay down arms.

The movements of Eleventh Armd. Div. and 60th mot. Div. continue, but are hampered by Serbs who want to surrender.

In Greece only slight gains on the coast and in the area of Mt. Olympus are reported. The enemy is still holding the Liakmon Valley. Little shipping traffic in the Aegean.

In Albania, the Greeks are falling back slowly.

16 April 1941.

Morning reports show no significant developments since last night. No progress in Twelfth Army sector.

Progress of the surrender negotiations: Weichs' formulation of the conditions is good and leaves no loopholes. The negotiators are not empowered to sign. Formal conclusion of the negotiations therefore cannot be expected before

tonight or tomorrow. In the meantime, fighting is practically over.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

von Thoma: Gets assignment to inspect the Armd. Divs. in Second Army: Condition of materiel, tracks; experiences.

Bogatsch:

- a) Report on reconnaissance work. Cooperation apparently good; reconnaissance units have done a good job.
- b) Reconnaissance behind Greek front in Albania has not yet yielded any conclusive results.
- c) Difficulties in equipping Reconnaissance Staffeln with motor vehicles. Completion of assembly of these units for Barbarossa jeopardized. The Staffeln now ready in France and in the Reich for shipment to the East are in part unable to move to their entraining points owing to the lack of motor vehicles of every description.

Gen. von Beldy requests orders for Hungarian units. Reply: We only want them to keep the mot. units on a stand-by footing. Hungary can dispose of all other units in the way she considers best. Reports of Serbian treachery in the occupied territory. Losses per Brigade: 20 killed, 200 wounded.

Reports coming in during the day contain nothing new, only the shocking loss by torpedoing of Convoy No. 20 en route to Libya. (Last elements of Fifth Lt. Div. and first group of Fifteenth Armd. Div., including the divisional staff and one regimental staff).

17 April 1941. (Capitulation).

Morning reports: Nothing of importance from Second Army sector. The movement toward the Dalmatian coast continues. In the sector of Twelfth Army, it is still a moot question as to what has become of the Greek forces west of the Pindus Mountains. I am quite sure that the opposition still met south of Servia is sustained only by weak forces taking advantage of the exceedingly favorable terrain. But what may be the enemy's operational intentions remains obscure. A drive by our forces west of the Aliakmon river is the only way to prevent the enemy from building up a front. But such a drive would end at Trikala and take us in front of the range rising north of Lamia, which must be regarded as the probable next defense position in the line from Gulf of Volos to Gulf of Aita. Other possibilities are afforded by the line Thermopylae-Lepanto - southern shore of Gulf of Patras. This position would require the transfer of Greek forces from the area west of the Pindus Mountains across the Gulf of Patras to the northwestern part of the Peloponnese.

Conference with ObdH produces in no new viewpoints. One upshot is request to Air Force Officer to intensify reconnaissance and aerial action against the rear of the Greek front in Albania, and order to Hq Twelfth Army along same lines.

The fact that communications between Hq Second Army and XXXXVI Corps and their Armd. Divs. are quite poor, is blamed by ObdH on the General Staff Service (Ic) *. I shall have the matter investigated.

Gen. von Glaise-Horstenau gives an account on his report to the Fuehrer. He emphasized the necessity to include Dalmatia in the Croat State now in process of formation, because without this territory, inhabited by Croats, the basic concept of the new State, namely unification of all Croats in one independent State, would lack vitality.

The impression gained by von Glaise-Horstenau at the conference is rather discouraging. Out of consideration for Mussolini, the Fuehrer does not want to risk curbing Italian claims. As a result Serbs and Croats will again make common cause against the Germans.

von Glaise-Horstenau has been assigned the mission by the Fuehrer to carry on the drive, initiated by Weichs, to raise Croat troop units of Bn. strength, which will be the nucleus of a Police Army to be organized with 2 to 3 Divs. now, and eventually 6 Divs.; it will receive, on the quiet, support from Germany; efforts should be made to keep out Italian instructors. **

On the political side SA-General Kasche goes to Croatia as German Minister, with Legation Councillor von Trott-Obergsell as his aide, to do the real work.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Summary of Zagreb conference with Krumpelt and Schmidt-Logan:

- a) Supplying of Second Army from the Belgrade base will be possible within the week.
- b) Experiences with "flying start". *** Some difficulties developed in keeping up the sequence of transports and in regard to equipment.
- c) Organization of Belgrade base: Disband base at Graz and Lake Balaton. Break up supply concentration by sending some to ZI and Romania.
- d) Order for setting up Military Government.
- e) Conference with Himmler:

Each Security Div. will have attached: one Police Bn. mot., one National Socialist Motor Corps Co., and one Technical Emergency Service Co. Release of Police Bns. to the Corps Hqs of the Security Divs. not feasible. Instead one mot. Police Regt., under a Senior Police Chief, will be stationed in area of each Security Corps Hq.

Heusinger: Conditions governing shipment of troops to Barbarossa area. Surrender conditions for Yugoslav Army.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Bogatsch: reports on conference with ObdL along lines of my requests. Also telephone conversation with Konrad.

In the evening report comes in that Bor copper mines were destroyed. Will have to be checked. - Report that capitulation of Yugoslav Army has been signed.

18 April 1941.

Morning situation: Confirmation of report that large bodies of Greek troops have been captured in Grevena Valley (20,000), and that the way to Trikala is now open for our Armor advancing in this region. It would appear that the road from Grevena to Trikala can be used also by motor vehicles.

This and the advance of Second Armd. Div. and XVIII Corps through the Tempe Valley and across the surrounding mountains precludes any further resistance north of Larissa. The enemy will not have any trouble escaping, for the forces committed on the Aliakmon river probably consist only of very weak rearguards, who can take advantage of extremely favorable terrain.

The Greeks, in conjunction with the British, probably first tried to build up a defense line running from Mt. Olympus along the Aliakmon Valley and the Gramose Mountains to the southern border of Albania. It seems that elements from Thrace and the British between Mt. Olympus and the Aliakmon river had this mission, while troops brought up via Kastoria were to take over the central portion of this line. With this portion now cracked out of the defense position, the enemy has to take back his line of resistance. To effect this movement, he appears to have sent back the Greek forces to build up defense positions in the rear, the first of which must be assumed to lie on the high ground north of Lamia whereas the second, and probably the mainline, may be expected along the line Thermopylae - Lepanto. The mot. British troops seem to be forming the rearguard east of the Pindus Mountains and will soon disappear under pressure from us.

West of the Pindus Mountains withdrawal will be more difficult for the enemy. Here the retreating enemy cannot help being crowded together and forced into a bottleneck, where our massed Air Force will have opportunity for effective action.

Major Gen. Foerster to the Air Force, designated as Military Commander for Serbia, calls. I briefly outline to him our interests: Effective military policing, restoration and safeguarding of lines of communications, keeping industries and crop collection going; protecting the Danube shipping route.

Wagner-Altenstadt-Heusinger:

Future military set-up in the Southeast. The best way will be to create a Commander-in-Chief Southeast, similar to the one we have in the west. Under his control should be: the Military Commanders Greece and Serbia, Liaison Command Bulgaria and Military Mission Romania, along with some Divs. (controlled by Corps Hqs.) This Commander-in-Chief Balkans would carry all the business of the ObdH, and so free us for operations in the East.

Radke: Current business : Mail censorship. -- Check patrols in the occupied Balkan territories. -- Conferences with SS-Gen. Wolff on Poland incidents in 1939 and Tiedemann case - Morale reports.

Gen. Paulus: Current business. -- Deception order. Agreement has now been reached with Navy and Air Force.

Kinzel:

- a) Details of enemy situation. The assumption that the Greeks started early to move troops from Albania to the Olympos area has been proved correct. The Italians saw nothing and reported nothing.
- b) A radio broadcast of the Greek Government has been reported, to the effect that war was lost and that population should keep calm. This report, which OKW wants passed on to all commanders in the field, is most certainly an OKW invention.--

Planes have dropped leaflets with purported proclamation of departing British Commander-in-Chief.

Fellgiebel Communication difficulties in Second Army, The reasons seem to lie partly in trouble with improvised equipment, partly in lack of initiative and skill of radio service in Second Army.

Gen. Wagner Organization of refugee control and materiel collection in the occupied Balkans territories.

von Ziehlberg: Fuehrer's birthday - Reassignments -- Organization of training in Gen.Staff and question of out-of-turn seniority promotions. -- I blow my top over tactless interference of ObdH in my command function.

19 April 1941.

The Morning Conference produces nothing significant in news or viewpoints. Among the intentions of Twelfth Army there is a plan to push XVIII Corps or at least Sixth Mt. Div. from area east of Larissa across the Odris Mountains to Lamia. That would be a mistake, for such a move gets the Div. into terrain on the Thermopylae front, where it could not make use of its special training and equipment (frontal attack across a plain).

PW interrogations are beginning to indicate a crumbling of the Greeks' will to resist on the front west of Pindus Mountains. -- Larissa taken this morning.

Dr. Haessler* reports his observation on visits to the front. Apart from the usual troubles incidental to the "flying start", everything seems to be all right.

Radke: Current matters of his Section, including dealings with the Party and chaplain questions.

Gen. von Beldy brings a letter of the Hungarian C of S. Report on minor frictions on transfer of the district between the Sava and Drava rivers.

Paulus and Wagner report on visit to Belgrade.

20 April 1941. (Fuehrer's Birthday).

1045 : Awarding of decorations.

1100.: Review of Staff.

1300 : Luncheon with Staff.

Situation: The British seem to be pulling out. South of Larissa our advancing troops are nearing the northern outskirts of Lamia. In the Thermopylae Pass, no evidence of enemy resistance. Roads clear as far as Athens. West of the Pindus Mountains the Greek withdrawal movement after all appears to be slower than was assumed; the bulk of their forces seems to be still north of Yoannina.

Metsovon Pass reported taken by SS Adolf Hitler.

Rumors of formation of new Government and capitulation of Greece.

In the evening, talk with ObdH who feels there is some tension between us. Well meant, but nothing will be changed by it.

21 April 1941.

0800: Leave with Housinger, Mueller-Hillebrand and Senior Aide in Heinkel plane of OKW Staffel (my personal plane had a crack-up in Belgrade).

1400.: Visit to Hq Twelfth Army. Itinerary Belgrade - Sofia (stop-over) - Saloniki. Plan to continue to Larissa was cancelled when we learned in Saloniki that C in C of Twelfth

Army was already flying back to Saloniki, and his C of S had flown on to Yoannina to conclude the armistice negotiations with the Greek Epirus Army.

1600. : Talk with Field Marshal List: The CG of the Greek Epirus Army has surrendered to the German High Command with the explicit understanding, that he was not surrendering to the Italians, who had been defeated by him.

Of German troops, SS Adolf Hitler has entered Yoannina after crossing the Metsovor Pass. Truce already in effect. It has turned out that the entire Greek Epirus Army is still north of Yoannina. List has given orders

- a) for SS Adolf Hitler to advance to the Greek frontier in Albania, and occupy the roads leading into Greece, and
- b) for the Greeks to evacuate Albanian territory, then lay down their arms and march to PW collecting points, in compliance with the instructions of Twelfth Army Hq. Details will be worked out by Gen. Bieler, CG, 73rd Div., as deputy for C in C Twelfth Army.

1800 - 2000. Flight round Mt. Olympus and tour of Saloniki.

Evening at Hq Twelfth Army. New orders from the OKW are received. It would appear that at the time when the OKW gave the order to conclude the capitulation negotiations, the Fuehrer thought he might manage to confront Mussolini with the accomplished fact. That fell through. Mussolini telephoned directly to the Fuehrer and demanded Italy's participation. So the Fuehrer ordered that the capitulation concluded by Twelfth Army should not become effective pending his approval. This was to give the Italians an opening for appearing as partners in conclusion of the capitulation. Such a political maneuver makes the German Field Marshal and C in C Twelfth Army look foolish in the eyes of the Greek Army, and, furthermore, lays the foundation for a systematic falsification of history, designed to create the fiction that it was the Italians who forced the Greeks to capitulate.

As a matter of fact, there was no contact between the Greeks and the Italians at the moment of capitulation, as stated explicitly by the Greek CG. Capitulation became necessary solely for the reason that German troops had appeared athwart the Greek line of retreat. This falsification of history, evidently now in the making, is indignantly protested by C in C Twelfth Army, who insists that the German Wehrmacht communique must give an accurate account of the actual situation in order that German troops would receive the credit due to them for their achievement.

I discuss with List the inaccuracies in von Richthofen's reports to the ObdH, which belittles the achievements of the Ground Forces.

Overnight (21/22) at Saloniki Hq Twelfth Army.

22 April 1941.

In the morning, talk with List. He again emphasizes that he concluded the capitulation negotiations on the direct order of and on the lines laid down by OKW, and bitterly speaks out against the OKW's subsequent action in repudiating the completed surrender. On the whole, reiteration of last night's arguments.

0800 Departure for Larissa. Thrilling flight over the Tempo Valley. Larissa airfield gives the impression of a fairground. There is a constant coming and going of bomber formations and transports. Thousands of men are waiting, working or resting. No enemy far and wide.

Side trip to Second Armd. Div. Talk with Veiel (CG) and Quast (Ic). The Div. is closing up toward Larissa. Materiel is in good shape, casualties gratifyingly low.

Back to the Airfield: Talk with Greiffenberg, Bieler (CG, 73rd Div.). The Italian Armistice Commission, for whom Jodl had been waiting and now will accompany him to Yoannina, has arrived. Talk with Speth, Liaison Officer to the Italian Army in Albania: He says that the Italians had lost contact with the Greeks yesterday, and that they probably started off tonight following reports of armistice negotiations. (Heavy Italian losses.)

1000 Start of return flight: Larissa - Kozani - upper Aliakmon Valley - Lake Kastoria - Lake Ochrida - Debar - Skutari - Adriatic coast as far as mouth of Marena River - then in clouds over Mostar - Sarajevo - Brod - Lake Balaton to Wiener Neustadt. Arrived 1430.

News that transfer of GHq postponed because of the negotiations in Yoannina. So back to the old place.

1700 Talk with ObdH, who describes the agonizing seesaw during my absence. My suspicion that the Fuehrer, against our warnings, tried to get around the Italians in the negotiations from the start, is confirmed. Apparently he hoped to doublecross his "friend". When the scheme misfired, the muddle started. Incidentally, it is reported the Fuehrer had Field Marshal List expressly informed that he would have acted the same in List's place. Such pats on the back behind the scenes do List no good, as long as he remains publicly disavowed.

The question of an airborne operation against Corinth to prevent destruction of the Canal is once more raised by the OKW with fretful nervousness.

Exchange of views on the Peloponnese. I do not believe that the British are going to defend it. They would have no ports, that are needed as bases.

1800 Report stating that OKW has ordered Air Force to prepare VIII Air Corps for an immediate airborne operation against Corinth. Fuehrer will give word when to start.

That, of course, implies the risk of missing the critical moment.

Quite interesting are the Hungarian demands for compensation of all war costs and their claims to the Yugoslav booty, which would be a credit to a Jew.

2000. Telephone Talk Keitel (OKW)/Obert: The Fuehrer does not give up the idea of letting the Greeks and Italians settle their war between themselves west of the line Pindus Mountains - Achelooos Valley, and to seal this line by German troops. He will not make his decision contingent on Jodl's return. The SS Adolf Hitler must be taken back to the Metsovon Pass.

2100. Gen. Greiffenberg Hq Twelfth Army (on phone):

- 1.) Orientation on impending directive along lines of conversation with Keitel.
- 2.) Hq Twelfth Army reports:
 - a) The Greeks agree to sending a parlementaire to the Italian front.
 - b) Greeks and Italians agree to a demarcation line running west along the Kalamas river from a point 5 km north of Yoannina.
 - c) SS Adolf Hitler has been ordered to withdraw behind this demarcation line.
 - d) Greek CG or a plenipotentiary will arrive for final signing in Army Hq, Saloniki, tomorrow noon. Gen. Jodl will remain in Saloniki until that time.
 - e) (in response to my question). Hostilities between Greeks and Italians have not yet ceased everywhere.

23 April 1941.

(Departure from
Wiener-Neustadt).

Negotiations with the Italians and Greeks dragged on till noon. In the afternoon at last the capitulation was signed. Earlier, however, the Italian Radio blared out reports of the capitulation as an accomplished fact, causing annoyance in the OKW.

Our troops push close to the Thermopylae Pass via Lamia, and strike at Euboea from the Volos area. In the Thermopylae Pass, the enemy is still holding, but apparently only with weak rearguard elements. Tanks abandoned in the Lamia area were burned out by the British.

Up to noontime, there is a continuous seesaw as to whether or not we should move GHq. A decision is finally reached when I declare that I would go.

The reason for my insistence is the North African situation. It is worrying me, and the pertinent information is available only at Zoppelin. * Rommel has not sent us a single clear-cut report all these days, but I have a feeling that things are in a mess. Reports from officers coming from his theater as well as a personal letter show that Rommel is in no way up to his operational task. All day long he rushes about between the widely scattered units, and stages reconnaissance raids in which he fritters away his forces. No one has a clear picture of their disposition and striking power. Certain is only that his troops are widely dispersed and that their striking efficiency has considerably deteriorated. The piecemeal thrusts of weak armored forces have been costly. Apart from that, his motor vehicles are in poor condition from the action of desert sand. Many of his tank engines need replacing. Air transport cannot meet Rommel's senseless demands, primarily because of lack of fuel; aircraft landing in North Africa find no fuel there for the return flight. In view of all this, it is essential to have the situation in North Africa cleared up without delay. After giving thought to the matter, I decline flying down myself. It would not do for me to go there merely for fact-finding purposes. If I go, I want to have authority to give orders. ObdH has his private objections on that score and pretends difficulties with the Italian High Command. The real reasons of course are others, but perhaps it is better to dispatch Maj. Gen. Paulus. He has good personal relations with Rommel from way back when they served together, and he is perhaps the only man with enough personal influence to head off this soldier gone stark mad. Representatives of Oper. Sec., Org. Sec., Gen. Qu., as well as Capt. Loyke and Soltmann, of the Navy, would accompany him.

Say good-bye to Irmingard, 1600, - 1900. Return flight to Berlin, above the clouds (up to 5,000 in altitude; very cold) in Heinkel machine of the OKW courier Staffel.

Evening at home. Georg Seiderer** happens to have dropped in.

24 April 1941.

50th anniversary of Moltke's death. Return to Zossen.

0830. Leave Berlin.

0930 : Arrive at Zossen. Guard lined up for review; honor company of Guard Bn. Double sentry in front of my house; all flags out; flowers.

0950.: Conference with OQu I.

Following our phone talk from Wieser-Neustadt, OQu I has made the following preparations for sending aid to Rommel:

I.) Alerted:

- a) Five Bns. from several Divs. in the ZI issued special equipment for desert service and additional carts and some motor vehicles.

- b) Eng. Training Bn. specially equipped as Assault Eng. Bn. and fitted for desert service.
- c) Two Coastal Artillery Bns. (533rd and 523rd) with 15 cm guns.

Timetable for fitting these units for desert service:

- 2 May: Eng. Training Bn. and 533rd Coastal Artillery Bn.
- 7 May: III Bn., 347th Inf. Regt., and 523rd Coastal Arty. Bn.
- 12 May: Two Inf. Bns.
- 17 May: One Inf. Bn.
- 20 May: One Inf. Bn.

- 2.) Maj. Gen. Paulus will be accompanied by Staff Officers. Departure 25 April, evening via Rome. Duration of absence estimated at 8 - 10 days.

Outcome of conference: Preparations are approved. Railroad movements for getting Fifteenth Armd. Div. to Naples must be speeded up, so that Rommel's most urgent requirements would be actually on hand at Naples, when needed. It may become necessary to establish a Hq at Naples, to supervise these troops.

Liss reports on enemy situation in Eastern Mediterranean. Distribution of forces:

Greece: 4 Inf. Divs. $\frac{1}{2}$ Armd. Div. Elements of (first) Cav. Div. (mecz.) (some shipped out).

Tobruk: 1 Inf. Div. Elements of $\frac{1}{2}$ Armd. Div.

Solum: 3 Inf. Divs. Elements of $\frac{1}{2}$ Armd. Div.

Mersa

Matruh:

Nile Plain: 1 Inf. Div. plus one Inf. Div. being activated and two Egyptian Divs.

Palestine: 1 Inf. Div. Elements of (First) Cav. Div. (mecz.)

Irak: 3 Inf. Divs.

Yote: 1 Inf. Div.

Abyssinia: 6 Inf. Divs.

21 Inf. Divs. 2 Armd. Divs. 1 Cav. Div. plus three Divs. not available for immediate commitment.

OQu I: Appraisal of situation:

We have reached a crisis, not at Tobruk, but rather at Solum. Enemy in Tobruk at the least matches Rommel's strength and is

even superior in artillery, but we may hope to contain him. A decisive attack is out of question at the time.

If Rommel is beaten at Solum, which is quite possible in view of the mounting reinforcements brought in by the British, he will probably have to raise the siege of Tobruk. That would be highly undesirable, particularly for propaganda reasons. Now, the only way to help him effectively would be by committing the Air Force. Sending more ground troops has little value, for they would only encumber operations of the Africa Corps, which are predicated on high mobility. Air Force, however, is severely hampered by the low state of fuel stores in Africa.

Up until 5 May we are unfortunately quite helpless, and can only sit tight and hope that Rommel will manage to pull through. After that date, the Fifteenth Armd. Div., moving on schedule, will begin to come in.

Sending airborne troops to Africa seems pointless, for they would be immobilized there *. Better keep them for Crete; such an operation would relieve Rommel very effectively.

Instructions for Paulus:

- a) Get a clear picture of the situation: Disposition of forces, striking power, terrain conditions, ammunition situation, supply, care of wounded. What are the possibilities for defensive operations if Solum should be lost?
- b) Make Rommel understand that our resources for sending aid to him are very slender. Find out his intentions in the light of present circumstances.

Heusinger:

- a) Teletype to OKW, transmitting telegram from Rommel. (significantly addressed to OKW), in which he reports increasing pressure round Bardia and for the first time hints at possibility of serious reverses.
- b) Teletype to Rommel spelling out to him that he cannot count on any help and so must shape his decisions accordingly.
- c) Distribution of forces in Yugoslavia: new German-Italian demarcation line.
- d) Jurisdictional questions regarding the new Military Commander: Executive Power must remain vested in CG, Second Army.

During the day several telephone consultations with ObdQ on the situation in North Africa. At first he frantically cast about for a workable plan, but finally resigned himself to acceptance of the fact that we could not do any more than what has already been done.

25 April 1941.

Thermopylae Pass has been taken. The British are fighting apparently with portions of two Divs., of a total strength of about three regimental combat groups. Our Mt. troops (5th and 6th Mt. Div.) play a decisive part in the advance. The Thermopylae road is demolished in several places. No reports available on previously claimed crossing to Euboea.

Putting into effect surrender of the Greek forces seems to have run into a snag north of the demarcation line. In that area there is still a full Division, which seems to be disbanding itself to escape the Italians. South of the demarcation line, collecting and disarming of prisoners seems to be proceeding in good order. Now, of course, SS Adolf Hitler cannot strike south (Gulf of Patras) except with reconnaissance forces. Lemnos occupied.

The parachute operation against Corinth is scheduled for tomorrow.

At our request, OKW has released to us, as of today, two air transport groups, which will be ready in Naples tomorrow and can be used to ferry over the Engineers of Fifteenth Armd. Div., to be followed by Rifle units of the Div. They will fly to Derma, via Tripoli.

Gen. Buhle:

- 1.) Activation of new smaller units (independent Bns., etc.) for North Africa.
- 2.) Preparations for Barbarossa are proceeding according to plan. Motorization of units not yet entirely assured. Uniformity of armament (MG 34, Lt. Field How. 18), will be accomplished by May.
- 3.) Old-type 21 cm How. for Guderian; they are better for Armd. Groups than the new type which takes longer to get ready for action.
- 4.) Replacements for the elements of Fifteenth Armd. Div. lost by torpedoing will be ready around middle of May.
- 5.) Partial motorization and filling up of 22nd airborne Div. will perhaps be completed by next fall.
- 6.) No more furloughs after 5 May, when maximum railroad schedule goes into effect.
- 7.) 900th Brigade* very weak as yet, only 2 Bns., with complements!
- 8.) Special : Field Bns.** Belong under BdE, not the Field Army.
- 9.) Technical Emergency Service *** will be integrated in Field Army after start of Barbarossa.

von Thomé: Report on inspection of Armd. Divs. in Second Army. On the whole, good impression: Little wear and tear of vehicles low expenditure of ammunition. Maintenance and state of repair good, but rubber track blocks badly worn by mountain roads (1 Div. 1900 rubber track blocks). Three weeks will be sufficient for rehabilitation of all units. Resupply of spare parts was difficult due to the speed of operations. Commanders want supply by air (3 Junker transports for each Armd. Group). He inspected Fourteenth, Eighth and Eleventh Armd. Divs., and 60th and Sixteenth mot.; 60th mot. made a particularly good showing.

von Bernuth: Report on chemical smoke demonstration. Results seem to be quite promising if for both river crossings and area blanketing.

Training film program Motion-picture units for Africa.

- Gercke:
- a) Lagging performance of railroads. - Coal shortage.
 - b) OKW request for rail transportation for Seventh Air Div. and 22nd airborne Div. turned down.
 - c) Barbarossa: On the whole progress is good.
 - d) Railroad situation in the Southeast. Bridge across Sava River at Belgrade will be restored by middle of June.
 - e) Railroad program "Otto" completed; improvised, but geared to full capacity.
 - f) Road program for "Otto" completed.

26 April 1941.

Morning situation: In North Africa situation seems somewhat eased by beating back of British tank attacks at Solum. At Tobruk enemy continues sorties. Our Air Force seems to have scored successes. Italian submarines, capable of operating only during night time, however, cut into supplies for Tobruk.

In Greece, our advances continue. Thebes taken. Advance toward Corinth (Fifth Armd. Div.). Parachute operation in progress. Bridge blown up. Offer of Greek Commander-in-Chief to form a new Government.

Kinzel: Russia: Overall situation unchanged since 1 April. Since that date strength in the West has been increased by 10 Divs. Expanded peacetime Army (about 170 Divs.) may now be regarded as being up to war strength. It is doubtful whether supply units have been activated. Trains are constantly moving up additional materiel (e.g. 250 trains to the Vilna area), to all evidence to bring equipment up to war strength; up to now many Divs. were still short, especially in artillery. Krebs reports that many units still have very large shortages in equipment.

As to personnel, complaints are heard on lack of commanding officers. Regiments are being commanded by young Majors,

Divisions by Colonels. Strengthening of the Western front (by arrival of 10 new Divisions) is noticeable above all round Bialystok and Lwow. Behind the front, which is very close to the western border, are stationed four Armd. Groups of varying strength:

Bessarabia
Near and to the west of Zhitomir.
Vilna.
Pskov.

CQu IV: If U.S.A. entered the war now, we would have to reckon only with the peacetime Army, i.e. at most five Inf.Divs., two Armd. Divs., one Paratroop Bn, one or two Marines Divs., 30 Bomber Squadrons, 10 Reconnaissance Squadrons, 20 Fighter Squadrons.

Wagner (Gen Qu) with Finkh:

- a) Readying and allocation of truck columns for Barbarossa. As result of activation of new MT. Regts., drawn from resources of industry and Nat. Soc. Motor Corps, our requirements seem to have been amply met. Of the old MT Regts. two, i.e., 605th and 616th, are at present in the Vienna area, and one (602nd) in Saxony, for overhauling. The distribution plan provides for allocation of transport to Armd. Units, Armies and Forward Gen Qu Hqs. *.

Allocation of transport:

Barbarossa:	AGp. South	15,880 tons) including Forward Gen Qu Hqs.
	AGp. Center	25,020 tons	
	AGp. North	12,750 tons	
	Gen Qu Reserve	13,590 tons	

Libya 2,190 tons

Southeast 480 tons

West 2,970 tons

To be made available
from various sources
(Chief of Ordnance,
Construction Program East,
Snow Clearing Southeast)

2,040 tons

74,920 tons

- b) Fuel situation. Request additional 10,000 cubic meter ** for training purpose from OKW.
- c) Lack of truck replacements. Gen Qu has nothing. All goes to the newly activated units.
- d) Future organization of the Southeast under C in C Balkans.

Noon report: Greek Commander-in-Chief's offer to form Government is supported by all Commanding Generals of the Greek Army. Corinth has offered surrender.

Heusinger: Last daily reports. -- Transfer of units from the Balkans. -- Notes for report to Fuehrer.

27 April 1941.

(Sunday, Berlin).
Athens taken.

Morning reports indicate new advances of Fifth Armd. Div. against enemy rearguards on two roads leading to Athens.

Greece: Embarkation of enemy troops * on the east coast of Attica, at Piraeus and on the Peloponnese continues. Highly effective attacks by our Air Force on enemy transports at sea. The parachute operation has been successful and Corinth is taken. West of Pindus Mountains, SS Adolf Hitler is advancing southward through Arta. Consultations between Italy and Germany on the formation of a new Government under Greek Commander-in-Chief.

Libya: Arrived by air: 1 Bn., 2 Rifle Cos of Fifteenth Armd. Div. (46 airplanes).
Scheduled for today: Remainder of Rifle Bn., 2 Eng. Cos. of Fifteenth Armd. Div. (50 airplanes).
Another Rifle Bn. and Oasis Assault Cos to follow later.
Afterwards replacements for lost portions of MG Bn., before 6 May.

Other reports during the day:

Athens occupied by Motorcycle Rifle Bn. of Second Armd. Div. Enemy retreating to Peloponnese. SS Adolf Hitler crossed Gulf of Corinth and took Patras after short fighting. An eight-ton bridge has been struck across Canal of Corinth.

28 April 1941.

Morning situation: Capture of Athens, Corinth, Patras confirmed. OKW directives on occupation of Crete. Argument with OKW over transfer of 22nd airborne Div. to Greece by trucks. Using our road transport for this purpose would rob us of 602nd MT Regt. for Barbarossa, where it has been apportioned among the Armd. Groups.

Operation "Mercur": **ObdL will have operational control of airborne troops and air transport units operating already in the Mediterranean theater. Army only will have to hold in readiness reinforcements including a Mixed Tank Bn.

Navy makes all preparations for sea communications. Protection of communications etc. jointly with Italian Navy.

Libya: The first reinforcements ferried over in planes have arrived. A situation estimate by Rommel describes the situation as tense, but despite the alleged inefficiency of the Italian troops he has decided to attack Tobruk. He will concentrate all German forces for this task, leaving defensive operations around Solum to the Italians. In my opinion this is all wrong.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Experiences on Greek fortifications. Investigate and submit report on Greek and Yugoslav fortifications.
- b) Russian land mines. The Russians are said to have only old mines in wooden boxes. That I don't believe.-- Plastic mines render mine detectors ineffective.
- c) SS-ferries: Distribution and plans for use in Barbarossa. Very little seems to have been done in this respect. Assault boats: Distribution and use in Barbarossa.

Col. Ochsner: Report on chemical smoke demonstration on 7 and 8 April.-- Review of progress made in equipment and training of troops. Use of gas by Russians, and countermeasures.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Liaison between advancing spearheads and OKH through Liaison Officers equipped with shortwave sets, * assigned to these elements. Monitoring companies as relays.**
- b) Tele-communications through Hungary.-- Tasks in the Eastern Mediterranean - Barbarossa.

Gen. Buhle: 15,000 Polish peasant carts as of 10 May.-- 10 GHq AA Bns.-- 7,000 foreign legionnaires for Africa. ***

Gen. Brand: Distribution of coastal artillery on the various fronts.

29 April 1941.

Morning report: Tripolis-in-Peloponnese taken. The Italians now hold the islands of Korfu and Preveza. In Cyrenaika, the situation seems to have been relieved by the German thrust at Solum. Whether this has improved prospects for success of the attack on Tobruk remains to be seen. Airborne landing on Crete set for 17 May.

Gen. Brennecke: (C of S AGp. North). Brief discussion on the mission of his Army Group. No lateral diversion! Push straight ahead into the country! *
Report on progress of Gen. Staff work. Satisfactory.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Organization of Southeast after the end of the Balkans Campaign. High Command in Balkans to be assumed by Army Hq. 12. Under Army Hq. 12: Military Government Serbia, for administrative tasks, a new Corps Headquarters (reduced**) for control of troops (3 Divs.). Corps Hq XVIII for control of troops (3 Divs.) in Greece. Civil administration of Greece by Italy. Plenipotentiary German General in Bulgaria to take care of German interests (transportation, transit of troops, Quartermaster Service). Romania will be placed under C in C Balkans, as soon as operations based on Romania have started.

Major Deyhle (OKW): Report on tour to Army Hqs. 2 and 12. -- Danube shipping lane will be reopened early in May. -- Croatia wants to activate 37 Bns. (800 rifles and 16 MG each), as a beginning.

Heusinger:

- 1.) New orders to be issued to Army Hq. 12:
 - a) Ninth Armd. Div. (Lamia): tracked elements to depart from Florina-Saloniki as of 5 May. Land march elements *** will entrain at Belgrade. Arrive in Military District XVII # 27 May (joins Group Kleist in place of Fifth Armd. Div.).
 - b) Second Armd. Div. will follow Ninth Armd. Div. in similar manner early in June. Arrive in Military District ## III by 21 June (!). Will try to speed up movement by using sea route .
 - c) Fifth Armd. Div.: Redeployment uncertain now. Later to GHq Reserve.
 - d) Fifth and Sixth Mt. Divs., 164th Inf.Div. will stay behind in Greece for time being.
 - e) 50th Inf.Div. (Saloniki) and 72nd Inf.Div. (Katerini) to Central Moldavia, via Sofia. By rail, as far as possible; movement completed middle of June. 125th Inf.Reg. will remain for the moment. 46th Inf.Div. to be relieved by Bulgarians (report!) and shipped to Belgrade.
 - f) Withdrawal of Corps Hqs. created no difficulties. To stay behind: XVIII Corps Hq. and one other Corps Hq., for Serbia.
 - g) GHq troops begin to run off 4 May. Still some trouble with Army Hq. 12 over one Eng.Bn. and two GHq Arty. Bns.

- h) AAA in Greece is assigned to AGp. South. Must not get stuck in operation "Merkur".
- 2.) Liaison Service for Barbarossa. Liaison Officers with shortwave sets to the Armd. Groups ! Liaison Detachments for the Army Groups. Use OKH Monitoring Cos. *
- 3.) Eighth Armd. Div. now can revert to its original organization under Hoepfner (Czech equipment). Tenth Armd. Div. goes to Gudorian.

Luncheon with CO and Officers of Guard Bn.

OQu IV:

- a) Formation of Government in Greece: Duce asserts. Demands territorial safeguards, needed by Axis against later territorial surprises. Benzler and Italian negotiators. Is to be concluded today.
- b) Yugoslav shipping in ports goes to Italy, elsewhere to Germany.
- c) Rumored meeting Fuehrer/Darlan at Munich, middle of May.
- d) Current business, including methods of Air Force reporting and relations with Intelligence Officers. -- Movements of members of Attache groups.

von Ziehlberg:

- a) Routine Gen. Staff personnel matters. Switch Salmuth/Greiffenberg/Foertsch. **
- b) Reorganization of projected Liaison Staff North as a new Corps Hq (reduced), to serve as Hq for troops in Serbia.
- c) Liaison Officers for Operation Barbarossa.
- d) Awarding of Iron Crosses and out-of-turn seniority promotions of Gen. Staff Officers.

30 April 1941.

Morning situation: Libya reports lessened tension. Softening up operation for assault of Tobruk will start tonight, with main forces to attack on 1 May. In Greece, evacuation of the Peloponnese completed. 5,000 British captured. Mytilene planned for 4 May. Brief conference with ObdH: Question of switch Salmuth/Greiffenberg/Foertsch.

1500. Report to Fuehrer:

- 1.) Timetable for Barbarossa:

Transport Echelon III, peacetime railroad schedule,

8 April - 20 May: 17 Divs., GHq troops from ZI and West.

Transport Echelon IV A, maximum railroad schedule, 23 May - 2 June: 9 Divs. and GHq troops from West.

Transport Echelon IV B, maximum railroad schedule, 3 June - 23 June: 12 Armd. Divs. and 12 mot. Divs. from ZI, West and Southeast.

Greater speed impossible because of transportation difficulties and time needed for refitting of units. No possibility to shift in time: Two Armd. Divs. (Second and Fifth), one mot. Div. (60th).

2.) GHq. Reserves:

30 Divs., including 5 Divs. from West and Police Div. Of this total, 11 Divs. are at present still in the Balkans.

3.) Comparison of Russian and German strength:

Discussion of the expected border battles, especially in sector of AGp. South. Opportunities for Hungarian troops. Opportunities afforded by Pruth front, if we have enough troops.

Fuehrer:

a) Formula for talks with Hungary, Finland and Romania: "Major developments possible in the West. Hence protection of the East essential. Russia has treated us unfriendly on several occasions, and we had better provide against surprises". Talks may start probably around 23 May.

b) Need for safeguarding Ploesti,* Cernevođa . * *

c) Schobert will take over command six weeks before the start of operations, i.e. on 15 May at the latest.

4.) GHq. troops: Review of need to have all forces on hand for Barbarossa. The 10 cm guns and siege guns sent to Libya will be badly missed. Only one 10 cm Battery is to leave, while developments are watched. In case Tobruk falls, remainder will not be needed. Temporary shift of railway Btrys. from West to East (7 out of 17 Btrys.). Approved !

5.) Review of line-up on completion of movements: Fuehrer informed of activation of 15 Replacement Brigades. Recommendation to send to Holland only one Div. of the reserves of C in C West, as second occupation Div. (OKW order !) is approved. Replacement units must not be used for guard duty! (Holland). Improvement of 82nd Div. impossible (Keitel).

Fuehrer: Appraisal of British possibilities for landings in Portugal and Spain (Northern coast and from Gibraltar), perhaps

also Spanish Morocco.

6.) Miscellaneous:

- a) Final policy for occupation of Aegean Islands. Italians will do the Cyclades. We do Mytilene, Chios and Samos.
 - b) Divs. to stay behind in Greece.
Fuehrer: Captured guns for coastal defenses (British 9 cm).
Fuehrer hopes that less than 3 Divs. will do. Mt. Divs. must be freed for other missions.
 - c) Plans for reorganization of Balkans High Command. Military Government Serbia will be subordinate to it. (Fuehrer).
 - d) Outfit additional Armd. Corps for Libya. Required materiel by BdE.
In the evening Gen. Paulus reports from Libya:
- 1.) In the event that Tobruk falls, he will instruct Africa Corps: Secure Cyrenaica, along general line Siwa-Solum-Bardia with echeloned south wing to guard against enveloping attempts. No advance beyond line Siwa-Solum, except for reconnaissance forays, even if the enemy withdraws further eastward. Forces must be regrouped and filled up. Watch coast.
 - 2.) In the event that Tobruk holds out, he wants to instruct Africa Corps to prepare a position along the eastern border of Cyrenaica, with left wing at Ain El Gazala and deep echelonning on right flank; line is to be manned with newly arriving reinforcements. Investment of Tobruk will be upheld until onset of hot season or until the tactical situation at Tobruk or Solum make necessary the planned withdrawal to Ain El Gazala position.

1 May 1941. (All-out attack on Tobruk)
(miscarried !)

Morning situation:

- a) Mopping up operation in Serbia round Propastica set for 3 May. -- Occupation of Mytilene set for 4 May. -- Parade in Athens (with Italians) set for 4 May.
- b) 23rd Convoy has sailed. No air shipments possible yesterday. Remainder of 2nd Bn. of Rifle Regt. will be shipped only today.

Brief conference with ObdH about Crete (he wants to have some say about it and will talk to Fuehrer *) and Libya; my travel

plans to the Pruth front.

Heusinger:

- a) Basic military-political data of an operation against Spain, Portugal.
- b) Movement of GHq reserves to be scheduled so that units in West will be drawn upon as late as possible.
- c) Wishes of AGp North concerning shifting of Divs. No objections.
- d) Preparations in the West for "Seelowe". *

Order to Paulus: **

- 1.) I concur with proposed line Siwa-Solum, but possibilities of line Siwa-Mersa Matruh also should be studied. Under no circumstance should Rommel advance beyond Siwa-Solum line without order.
- 2.) Preparation of defense line on the eastern border of Cyrenaica is all right and, if necessary, could be held by skeleton garrison consisting of Italian Forces moved up for that purpose. Newly arriving German forces should not be immobilized in this line as long as there is a chance of using them for a new attack on Tobruk, protected by a covering force at Solum. Use only Armor at Solum.

Luncheon at Kopp's, afternoon at home in Berlin.

2 May 1941. (Outbreak of hostilities between Irak and Britain).

Morning reports bring nothing new except from Tobruk. The attack of 1 May has no doubt resulted in considerable gains at the important southwest corner and has breached the fortified lines against stiff resistance, especially by Australian troops. But for the time being it is doubtful that our forces are sufficiently strong to exploit this success and capture Tobruk. The 23rd Convoy with its precious cargo of tanks has reached Tripolis.

Operations on the Peloponnese are concluded. The take of British prisoners has risen to a gratifying figure. British losses in materiel seem to have been especially high.

ObdH on phone: Re Floesti, Cernavoda, Constanza and protective measures to be taken in connection with Barbarossa.

Field Marshal von Bock calls up concerning the switch Salmuth/von Greiffenberg. It is agreed that von Salmuth takes over XXX

Corps. Foertsch takes Greiffenberg's place.

Vogl (Armistice Commission) calls up:

- a) We get 3,000 - 4,000 trucks from French North Africa. Purchase Commission has left for Tunis. In return, the French want us to unfreeze the remaining trucks and release one Brig. General (Souhain) from prison camp.
- b) Combining transfer of the trucks with shipping vegetables to Tripoli is silly and would only delay the whole operation. It is essential for us to complete it with greatest dispatch.

Gen. Buhle :

- a) Organization of and directives for High Command Balkans and "German General at the Bulgarian Army High Command".
- b) Statement of policy by Gen. Staff regarding future development of the Engineer Corps.
- c) Allocation of the Polish peasants' carts from the Government General. About 2,000 for each Div.

Radke: Final disposition of the affair Tiedemann-SS * concerning Grebbe line and of the unsettled issue of the SS incidents in Poland. -- Soldier mail censorship. -- Case Mieth. -- ** Heuerberg-Wichung incident. ***

OQu IV: Situation in Spain: Former disinclination of the generals to Spain's entering the war seems to be waning. British pressure must have let up. Monarchist tendencies. -- Attaché tour to Rupel Pass. Russians, Turks, and Danes will be included. Return of Japanese Commission will not coincide with date of our attack. #

Hansen: New disposition of Turkish forces. Large elements in Thrace are being taken back to the Chataldsha Line. -- Troops in the Straits reinforced. -- Reinforcement of garrisons on the western coast not yet confirmed. -- Some troop movements from the interior to the southern coast.

von Etdorf: Latest plan for the territorial division of the Balkans provides for:

- 1.) An autonomous Slovenia under Italian protection. The German language enclave of the Gottschee is to be liquidated by exchanging the German inhabitants for Slovenes from the territory taken over by us.
- 2.) An autonomous Croatia under a Prince of the House of Savoy, with a coastal strip from Spalato to Cattero.
- 3.) Montenegro as well as an enlarged Albania, in personal union with Italy.
- 4.) A severely truncated Serbia, with a capital as yet undecided (Kruševac, Nish or Belgrade).
- 5.) Bor district ## under German rule. We also acquire mining concessions for non-ferrous metals in Croatia and in the territory annexed by Bulgaria.

- 6.) Bacska goes to Hungary, which also wants access to the sea in Croatia (free port) in return for relinquishing the triangle between the Drava and Mur rivers to Croatia.
- 7.) Banat, for the time being, remains under German rule. May be turned over to Hungary later on, if Romania could be compensated by the return of Bessarabia. (I)
- 8.) Saloniki is to become a free City (the Danzig of the Mediterranean.)

Liss submits intelligence digest on British Army in Greece.

Apparently Seventh Australian Div. had not yet arrived in the theater. (Only advance detachments were present, with the remainder in Tobruk and Egypt.)

Positively identified:

Sixth Australian Div.) with complete Arty, and
Second New Zealand Div.) three Regts. each
30th Brig. (Homeland), probably independent, plus 1 Armd.
Regt. (Second Armd. Regt.)

Prisoner take to date: 2,000 British from the U.K. (including many construction workers), 1,300 Australians and New Zealanders, 1,200 Cypriots, 1,350 Jews and Arabs, 150 Indians, 2,000 Yugoslavs.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Instructions regarding radio training and maintenance of radio discipline during the waiting period in the East.

3 May 1941.

Morning report indicates:

- 1.) The mopping-up operation in Serbia near Propastica turns out to be a minor matter, which seems to be running itself.
- 2.) Our troops operating from Attica have occupied the island of Skythos.
- 3.) Paulus radios that the Tobruk operation must be regarded terminated, bringing only inconclusive local gains . Troops in bad shape. He has instructed Rommel not to resume the attack unless it offers chances of a quick success without major expenditure of forces, i.e. if the enemy leaves of his own accord. For the rest, pursuant to our directives he has instructed Rommel to regard the holding of Cyrenaika his primary mission, regardless of whether or not he had Tobruk, Bardia and Solum. To this end he was to reinforce the line Giala-Solum with mobile forces forthwith, regroup and dispose his troops in depth around Tobruk, and prepare a defense line along the eastern edge of the Djebel (El Gazala and southward).

Whether the arrival of Fifteenth Armd. Div. will permit resumption of the attack on Tobruk, is contingent on developments in the near future.

Talk with ObdH: He approves Paulus' instructions. Telegram is sent to Rommel, confirming Paulus' instructions as an official order of ObdH. * — Prepare for sending to Libya: Two heavy Bns. requisitioned from OKW, 5 independent Bns. and replacements. — Speed up transfer of trucks from Tunis to Tripoli; send captured British motor vehicles from Greece to Libya.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Query regarding "Haifisch" & "Seeloewe". Answer: Must be geared to what is available on the spot. — Bordeaux Supply Base for Spain and Portugal. — Projected administrative set-up in Greece. — Advance supply bases probably will have to be established at Saloniki and Athens.

Heusinger:

1.) Navy: We have 12 destroyers: 3 in the Channel, 5 in the Baltic, 4 laid up for repairs. 30 Motor Torpedo Boats; bulk round Britain, rest in the Baltic. Use in Eastern Mediterranean too complicated because of need of setting up refuelling stations. For Crete, Italy will furnish $1\frac{1}{2}$ Motor Torpedo Boat flotillas.

2.) Army Group B. Russian airplanes reported over German territory.

3.) "Haifisch"—"Seeloewe".

4.) Army Hq 11 to Romania middle of May. At the same time CG, Second Army with skeleton Staff to Munich, to look after the Divs. in South Germany (which are being refitted after the Balkans campaign). Staff of Army Hq can carry on present duties under Corps Commander pending List's arrival. Army Hq 12 will not be installed as High Command Balkans until after conclusion of operation "Merkur".

5.) Redeployment from the Southeast:

SS Adolf Hitler, 25 - 29 May, from Saloniki.

Will have completed refitting by 21 June, and so come in time for jump-off of Group Kleist. .

Second Armd. Div. sails 14 and 15 May: Tracked components from Patras, wheeled components from Spalato. Refitting in Munich, beginning 31 May; ready to move from Munich as of 20 June; accordingly will be in time for the start, if needed. Fifth Armd. Div. will depart with tracked components from Saloniki, on 31 May, with wheeled components from Belgrade, on 6 June. Arrives in Mil. District III for rehabilitation on 25 June. Too late for jump-off.

6.) Disposition of Reserves:

	allocated	allocated
16 Divs. un-allocated *	2 roads	1
	2 roads	2
	2 roads	2 x 2 **
		AGp. North
		AGp. Center
		AGp. South
16 Divs. as of 10 July	7 Divs. prior to 10 July	7 Divs. prior to 1 July

Spot must be found yet for Second Armd. Div. !
Goes to AGp. South at early date.

4 May 1941.

(Sunday, Berlin)

Reichstag: Serbian Campaign.
Tribute to work of Gen.Staff.

OKW directives:

- a) Occupy the islands of Chios and Melos before start of "Merkur".
- b) Directive on preparations for a military operation on Iberian Peninsula in the event of British moves against Portugal and Spain (or Spanish Morocco). Our implementation orders *** were ready (e.g. Bordeaux Supply Base).
- c) Directive on conversations with Finland, Hungary, and Romania.

For Finland, with whom conversations are to start very soon, a program has been drafted, providing for OKW to initiate the talks, which then are carried on by the several branches of the Armed Forces. OKH's responsibility for talks concerning Finnmarken and Southeast Finland is still undefined.

By the end of May Hungary will be warned of the possibility of a Russian threat and told of our readiness for defense; this will be coupled with the request for getting set to step up her defense measures.

Romania will be informed only at the last possible moment, and even then we must speak only of defensive warfare.

It is apparent from various indications that both Horthy and Antonescu had hints of the plans directly from the Fuehrer, which these two gentlemen interpreted as pointing to an imminent German attack on Russia.

Paulus remains in Africa in compliance with my teletype message. I am glad he is there to act as a guardian of our ideas, which have also the blessing of the Fuehrer.

5 May 1941.

0900 Rabenau, Erfurth, von Ziehlberg: Proposals on development of the Reich Archives into a "Mecca" of German military historians.

Two plans are submitted:

- 1.) "Cowstable" ground plan, i.e. closed quadrangles with plain exterior, and
- 2.) Castle type, with more elaborate ground plan, especially a portico to the South, and a finely proportioned inner courtyard. The latter solution is more desirable in principle.

Questions of motion picture archives.

Questions of central information service.

Erfurth, Ziehlberg: Objective of military history research after the fall of 1941, when our job in Europe is completed.

Situation conference:

West: British react to our movements * to the West and anticipate imminent invasion.

Libya: German casualties 30 April - 3 May :

8 Officers, 102 NCO's and EM killed
16 Officers, 267 NCO's and EM wounded
1 Officer, 64 NCO's and EM missing.

24th Convoy has sailed with remaining tanks and vehicles of the units transported by air.

Southeast: Second Army: Mopping-up operation proceeding without losses. -- Misconduct of Hungarians in the Banat. ** -- Desertion to us of Romanian soldiers of Racial German extraction must be discouraged !

Twelfth Army occupied Mytilene and Chios, meeting only light resistance. 50th and 72nd Inf.Divs. have started redeployment.

Italy: The remainder of the islands, Naxos, Cyclades etc. will be occupied by the Italians. Proposal on demarcation line between the Italians and ourselves on the mainland forthcoming.

Gen. von Salmuth:

- a) Claims there is not enough photographic reconnaissance in the East.
- b) Border still guarded by Reinforced Border Guard Service. Are they to stay? Russians are getting cocky. Reply: Yes.
- c) Operational details.
- d) Personal matters: Handing over of functions and taking over of XXX Corps. ***

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Motor transport situation still tight, but better than a year ago (before campaign in the West).
 - b) Outfitting of Supply Troops for Barbarossa completed.
 - c) Combat Troops: Artillery: Ready except for 10 Arty. Bns., which are only partly mobile.
Not yet ready: Four 10 cm Gun Bns. ;) Activation not yet ordered because of
Two med.Fd.How.Bns.;) lack of towing vehicles.
AA and Siege Gun units, partially mobile * - ready.
- Engineers: Activations, as specified by Gen. Staff, completed. Of the 34 30-ton Truck Columns demanded for Engineer and Railway Troops, 20 are ready. Timber trailers for Engineers are still lacking. Equipment of Signal Troops with trucks and special motor vehicles still deficient.
- d) BdE thinks activation of units earmarked for Barbarossa would be completed by beginning of June. Whatever comes later is to be used as filler and loss replacements.
 - e) Two Med. Arty. Bns. for Rommel not before 20 May.
 - f) Directive for C in C Balkans.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Report on tour to Libya.

- a) Overall impression not bad. Morale good. Food situation good, health good; troops suffer from night cold; ammunition situation tight.
- b) Italians absolutely unreliable (shooting of two officers demanded, others ought to be put, before a court-martial).
- c) Coastal shipping all right as far as Bengasi; past that point only "in dribbles", but, in any event, possible. Absolutely safe and dependable is only the overland route, but it is continually harassed by enemy aircraft at night. As long as we have no AA and fighter protection for Bengasi, we cannot take a direct sea course to that port. **
A present Bengasi waterfront damaged by enemy air action, and unloading impossible; unloading at Tripoli hampered as result of waterfront explosions. ***
- d) As long as the British have Malta, Rommel cannot stage an offensive to the East.

Krumpelt: (OQu 2) # reports on his experiences in the Serbian campaign. Armd. troops show enormous rapacity ##. Good results obtained with bicycle-mounted. Regional Defense troops, which act as collecting organization right behind Armd. troops relieving them of prisoners and securing captured materiel.

Ehlfeld reports on plan for distributing coastal artillery: We must economize on the Balkans in order to be strong enough in the Baltic and the Black Sea, and have reserves for Spain. Transfer of Railway Artillery from the West to the East (Barbarossa) will weaken the West for about three weeks. *

Evening, 2000. - 2100. Conference with ObdH:

- a) Open questions Greece: Troop requirements and coastal artillery.
- b) Unsettled questions in Barbarossa: Talks with Bock, Reichenau, Kleist.
- c) Assignment for Army Hq 11. Directive.
- d) Army Hq 11 will be relieved by Army Hq 2 from all duties relating to the Mission in Romania, until such time when List will be available to assume his duties as C in C Balkans.
- e) Completion of building for Potsdam Military Archives must get priority.
- f) Loyke's report on Libya and Malta.
- g) OKW directive on Finland. Many obscure points.

Col. Krebs returns from Moscow, where he substituted for Koestring. He found the Russians very conciliatory. Russia will do anything to avoid war and yield on every issue short of making territorial concessions. Russian Higher Officers Corps decidedly bad (depressing impression). Compared with 1933, picture is strikingly negative. It will take Russia 20 years to reach her old level. Rearmament is in progress. New fighter planes, new long-range bombers, but pilot performance and ability is poor. Long-range bombers apparently concentrated close to German border. Shipments of construction material for fortifications are kept rolling to the border. However, there is no evidence of troop concentrations.

Warner (Gen Qu):

- a) Truck situation for Barbarossa. Least satisfactory in Seventeenth Army.
- b) Truck situation in Libya: Of French materiel we can expect: 250 serviceable trucks in about 3 weeks
1500 serviceable trucks in about 12 weeks.
Fifteenth Armd. Div. will have difficulties in getting spare parts for its numerous vehicle types.
Repair facilities in Libya too limited. An MT pool for desert service will be activated by end of June, and can be in operation in Bengasi early in July.
- c) OKW has at last released 10,000 liter of fuel for training purposes.

d) Bordeaux Supply Base for "Isabella". *

6 May 1941.

Morning conference: No significant news:

Reports from North Africa indicate that the British Fleet Air Arm has become remarkably active again. The story is that they were short of bombs for a few days.

Beginning 12 May, only X Air Corps, with 50 flights a week, will be available for ferrying troops to Libya. The value of these shipments is in any case problematic, for the troops arrive without any equipment.

Italians want to have the use of Tunis. Memorandum by Guzzoni. They maintain, that with the shipping situation being what it is, they could not hold Libya, let alone prepare an offensive, without that port. It becomes increasingly evident that without Malta we'll never have a safe supply route to North Africa. But the Italians hold that Malta cannot be attacked and so want us to mount a drive on Suez, via Turkey.

Question of the Attaché for Irak is discussed. Two officers are to proceed to Mosul by different routes.

Gen. Wagner (with Lt. Col. Wagner): Report on impression in Libya.

There was apparently serious concern for Solum and Tobruk, but situation has eased since the British withdrawal from Solum.

Supply: Shipping to Bengasi by the coastal route suffices only for current needs. No possibility for stockpiling.
Reasons: Getting supplies through to Tripolis contingent on naval and air protection, which at present is inadequate. Lack of air defense at Tripoli and Bengasi. Navy treats coastal shipping route as a secondary supply line instead as the vital main supply artery which it is.

Supply situation at the front: Ammunition on hand: $1\frac{1}{2}$ basic issues; generally sufficient; relatively lowest is ammo for heavy Infantry weapons (0.5 - 0.7 basic issue). Supply of tank ammunition good (2 issues) AA ammo supply has again improved (now $2\frac{1}{2}$ issues).

Rations: On the whole all right. Our field rations are said to be too rich for warm climate.

Fuel: Adequate; new tanker for bulk deliveries in prospect; tires, no complaints.

Spare parts: Requisitions are filled only up to 10-15%. Needed: Setting up of a spare-parts depot at Bengasi.

Relations between Germans and Italians in Rommel's Hq apparently rather strained; good in Air Force.

Rear Services hard to control because of enormous distances involved. An Admin. Hq is needed for Tripoli.

Naples apparently all right. Ample stocks.

Heusinger:

- a) Siege Gun Bns. for Tripoli (Libya).
- b) Parachute and Airborne Troops will not be available in early phase of Barbarossa because of operations on Crete.
- c) When Hansen leaves his post as Chief of Military Mission Romania, Speidel (Air Force) is to take over that agency as an Armored Forces Mission. Haufler can carry on his work as Ground Forces Mission, independently of Speidel.
- d) Outlook for giving AGp. Center one Div. from GHq. Reserves.
- e) Report of Second Army concerning revision of the southern boundary of the new districts to be incorporated into Styria and Carniola.

Koestring and Krebs: Review of Russian capabilities in face of impending developments. No important new viewpoints. Luncheon.

Lt. Col. Doerr, lately Liaison Officer to Second Italian Army calls en route, is going to Air Force Gen. Staff as instructor for two-week course on problems of ground operations.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Nothing essentially new to be learned from Southeastern Campaign.
- b) Build-up for "Barbarossa" well under way. Will pose no overwhelming difficulties. The individual Army Hqs already have their Rcn. Staffeln assigned.
- c) Close range Rcn. Staffeln have an average of 7 planes (Reserve of 120 Henschel planes).
- d) Long-range Rcn. Staffeln have 9 Me 111 (Twin-engine fighters). * Activation completed. Assignment to respective Army Hqs now under way. Distribution:

ObdH	2
AGps. South and Center, 2 each	4
AGp. North	1
Armd. Groups	4
Eighteenth and Eleventh Armies, for flanks	<u>2</u>

total: 13

3 night Staffeln,

grand total: 16.

- e) Truck situation has improved, but there are some weak spots still. We'll do the best we can with making up deficiencies from the Greek booty.

Major Hansen: Outcome of OKW conference on Irak. France agrees to transfer of arms from Syria to Irak (Mosul). German planes will get permission to land in Syria. Fuel must be supplied by France (Beirut). German bomber operations depend on delivery of this fuel. Dispatch of German Officer to Syria necessary.

Gen. z.b.V. Mueller, with Judge Advocate General.

- a) Order to troops along lines of last Fuehrer address to the generals. Troops must do their share in the ideological struggle of the Eastern Campaign.
- b) Questions of administration of justice in the AGp. Rear Areas.
- c) Easing of rules concerning channels for approving death sentences against army personnel during operations. *

7 May 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Greece: Greek prisoners are now being discharged. (Difficulties can be expected when the Italians enter the country.) Corinth Canal will not be cleared for another 20 days.
- b) Libya:
- 1.) At last a decent situation map; it shows that Rommel has broken up his units in a wild pattern and conducts a campaign with very scanty forces on a widely extended front which cannot be measured with European standards.
 - 2.) Tripoli: Air attack and explosions during the night of 3/4 May caused heavy damage and losses in the port. Unloading capacity of Bengasi considerably reduced and unloading of ships will be delayed: 24th Convoy cannot be cleared before 9 May. 25th Convoy cannot follow before 10 or 11 May.
 - 3.) Fourth Air Fleet (Greece) now takes over night operations against Tobruk.
- c) Irak: Local clashes with occasional use of arms over wide area; not a war as we know it. May last a long time! Combat action apparently only near Habbania, where Irak troops have been in the attack. German Mission being formed (probably Felmy, Niedermayer).

- d) Russia: Stalin becomes Chairman of Soviet of People's Commissars, which means strengthening of his position.

Gercke: 1.) Yugoslavia:

- a) Danube traffic now unobstructed. Danube, Tisza, Sava mined (being cleared).
- b) Bridge at Maribor will be completed probably by middle of June. Bridge Zemun-Belgrade can be expected for 10 June.
- c) In Belgrade we want a Hq with special powers, instead of a civilian Railroad Directorate.

- 2.) Hungary: Cooperation smooth. Frictions between Romania and Hungary can be settled by the Deputy of Chief of Transport. Road construction projects in the northern border area, which were originally shelved by the Hungarians, are now carried out by them of their own accord.

- 3.) Railroads and roads for "Barbarossa" making satisfactory progress.

- 4.) Build-up for Barbarossa: 17,000 trains. After completion of assembly, reserves will be moved plus 106 supply trains, daily, beginning 24 June.

- 5.) Air protection of railroads in "Barbarossa":

15 2 cm Railway AA Batteries (16 guns each):

AGp. South (from Air District VIII)	3 Btrys.
AGp. Center (from Air District II)	7 "
AGp. North (from Air District I)	5 "

- 6.) Spain. Irun bridge must be restored for "Isabella".

Col. Metz (C of S XIV Corps), calls en route and asks for transfer to another organization (wants a Rifle or Armd. Brigade).

OQu IV:

- a) Question of Anglo-Indian PWs (1,100 in North Africa). Ship to Germany. Will be used for propaganda purposes. *
- b) Darlan very accommodating in the Irak question. Only minor counter demands (asks that postcards be allowed in inter-zonal mail).
- c) Attaché tour, Mellenthin in charge, 11 - 22 May, Athens and Greek battlefields.
- d) Difficulties in the Crete operation ("Merkur"). One New Zealand Div. 40 airplanes; shore Btrys., etc.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Directive for C in C Balkans and subordinate Liaison Officers, etc.
- b) Coastal artillery for Barbarossa available middle of June:

3 Bns. for Baltic)
3 Bns. for Black Sea) without
3 Bns. GHq Reserve (plus) traction
3 more by middle of July)

For activation of GHq reserves we need the third Btrys.* of 211th, 15th, 223rd Divs. (light Btrys.), and 205th, 212th, and 218th Divs. (medium Btrys.), all in the West. Remaining Batteries get 6 pieces each.

- c) Medium GHq artillery: Ready by end of June:

4 10 cm Gun Bns.
2 med. Fd.How. Bns.

- d) Buy up French coastal artillery in Tunisia for North Africa (16 7.5 cm Gun Btrys. , 8 10,5 cm Gun Btrys., 12 22 cm Gun Btrys.).

Evening: Party given by Gen. Yamashita of the Japanese Army commission at the Adlon Hotel. Talk with Osterkamp, Leeb, Fromm.

8 May 1941.

Situation conference:

- 1.) Effective 10 May, the area west of the Pindus Mountains will be taken over by the Italians.
- 2.) Operational control for Crete. ObdL will have overall responsibility. Ground forces will operate under him, to the complete exclusion of OKH (Dangerous business!).
- 3.) A teletype from Army Hq 12 states that ObdH has authorized them to keep the following components of Fifth Armd.Div. until further notice:

One Motorcycle Rifle Bn. (was to ship out 31 May). There is no way of getting it replaced.

One mixed Tank Bn. which, however, has already been assigned to Seventeenth Armd. Div. (Guderian), and would leave a hole there. If this Tank Bn. is committed in Crete, it can be replaced in "Barbarossa" only by a group of five mixed Armd. Platoons (captured tanks), which are now being activated and will be ready for shipment as of 18 May.

Detachment of these elements renders Fifth Armd. Div. practically unusable, i.e., it reduces the Div. to a reinforced Armd. Regt.

- 4.) Redeployment of troops from the Balkans is proceeding according to schedule.
- 5.) Nothing new in Tripoli. Supply is the main problem, as before. Unloading capacity of Tripoli harbor still four ships at one time. Strong British convoy escorted by 2 battleships, several cruisers and aircraft carriers (apparently troop transports) reported between Gibraltar and Malta, moving East.
- 6.) Irak situation still hazy. Unconfirmed report of successful British sortie from Habbania. Darlan makes far-reaching offers:
 - a) German submarines and merchant ships may use bases on the African West Coast in return for release of small forces for West Africa.
 - b) Exchange of unreliable leading personalities in North Africa (including Nogues). Wants return of Giraud.
 - c) Arms in Syria to be released for Irak against replacement from sealed stocks, which Darlan would send to Syria.
 - d) Broad support for German activities in Syria. Permission to land, airfields, release of French planes for our purposes. In return: Easing of postal restrictions and interzonal pass regulations, and reduction of occupation costs.
- 7.) Railroad line Saloniki-Belgrade now operates on a regular schedule of 7 trains daily.

Crete: Air Force units for the operations:

XI Air Corps (without 22nd AB Div.)

VIII Air Corps:

Third Staffel, 121st Long-range Recon.Gr. }
Seventh Staffel, Second Tactical Exper. Wing } Recon.Staffeln

Hq Second Bomber Wing:)

I Gruppe, 2nd Bomber Wing)

II " 2nd " ")

III " 3rd " ")

IV " 26th " ")

(of X Air Corps)) 2 Bomber Groups

Hq 51st Bomber Wing:)

I Gruppe, 51st Bomber Wing)

II " 4th " ")

I " 1st " ")

II " 1st " ")

Hq	Second Divebomber Wing:)	
	I Gruppe, 2nd Divebomber Wing)	1 Divebomber
III	" 2nd " ")	Group
I	" 3rd " ")	
Hq	26th Long-range Fighter Wing:)	1 Long-range
	I Gruppe 26th Long-range Fighter Wing)	Fighter
II	" 26th " " " ")	Group
II	" 76th " " " ")	
Hq	77th Fighter Wing:)	
	II Gruppe 77th Fighter Wing)	1 Fighter
III	" 77th " " ")	Group
I	" Second Tactical Exp. Wing)	

Gen Qu Wagner:

- a) Early ruling on future administrative set-up of Army Hq 12 in Greece is imperative.
- b) Truck situation: Before start of "Barbarossa", 300 trucks will be received to cover in part the deficit of 1,430 vehicles in units, and 400 automobiles etc., to cover deficit of 1,256 automobiles.

After start of "Barbarossa": 1,500 trucks, 1,500 automobile, 500 motorcycles for allocation by Gen Qu every month.
- c) Rommel is crying for more supplies, especially ammunition. Shipping space is the bottleneck!
- d) Experiences in sector of Second Army in Yugoslavia: Advance Supply Point * system proved very good, if forwarded far enough. Organization of requisitioning must be organized at an early stage **. Determination of supply-roads to be built must take into account supply needs as well as troops movements.
- e) Items for OQu conference: Balkan experiences, signal communications in the Gen Qu service, dumps, maintenance of motor vehicles, Air Force supplies, supply arrangements for Armies in "Barbarossa", etc.
- f) Administrative Orders for C in C S. East.

Major Soltmann: Observations in North Africa. It is important to note that Indian troops apparently are poorly armed and very badly treated by the British. Indians show positive attitude toward Fuehrer.

Prisoner of war matters. Insolence of the British. Italians sneering.

Counterintelligence questions; counteract enemy espionage, expand our own.

Crushing verdict on Italians, who lack moral fibre and any interest whatever in the war.

Major von Merz: Observations in North Africa. Organizational questions. Substantially confirms what I have heard from other sources.

Maj. Gen. Paulus calls up from Catania. Crux of problem in North Africa is not Tobruk or Solum, but organization of supply.

Heusinger:

- a) Assembly of reserves. New schedule puts first reserves following directly behind Transport Echelon IVb. First and second wave already assigned to Gps., remainder is available for flexible planning. Overall picture satisfactory. We can make the Southern wing strong, and still have ample reserves for Center, which is very strong already, and for the Northern wing.
- b) Political instructions for Greece * have not yet come in. Remind OKW.
- c) Effective 15 May unit war journals must again be kept.
- d) Order of battle of "Combat Group North" of the SS: one full Div. mot. of three Regts., only one of which will not take part in operation "Silberfuchs".

Talk with ObdH, on his return, about conditions in Greece and operation "Merkur".

9 May 1941.

Situation report:

- 1.) Africa Corps reports loss of 53 Officers and 1,100 EM and NCOs in offensive operations at Tobruk. Very high.
- 2.) Rommel's distress calls for supplies are getting more urgent.
- 3.) Abyssinia: Italian resistance seems to be drawing to a close. British officially still reckon with 30,000 men.
- 4.) Situation in Iraq confused. It would seem even now that the attempted uprising against the British is about to break down.

Conference with ObdH: His notes on Greece:

- a) Elements of Fifth Armd. Div. staying behind in Greece for operation "Merkur".
- b) GHq troops for List; he must organize his own mot. units.

- c) List must arrange with Fourth Air Fleet for re-transfer of command of ground troops after landing in Crete.
- d) Date for "Merkur", 17 May, if serious resistance anticipated; otherwise, 11 May.
- e) Transfer of Army Hq 12. Location of new Hq still undecided.
- f) Bulgaria/Turkey: Bulgaria is already getting impatient to discharge her troops. As long as Turkey's attitude is not entirely clear, only furloughs can be authorized.
- g) Alleged high-handedness of the Bulgarians on the line Sofia-Nish-Saloniki (a Bn. is reported in Nish and Saloniki).*
- h) Relations of Greeks with Italians and with ourselves.
- i) Food situation in Greece. (First aid of 30,000 tons of grain. Mobilize Hungary and Turkey.)
- k) Greek Government has no money. Interim credits necessary.
- l) Development of situation on the Balkans (jurisdiction of C in C Balkans; status of the Italians).
- m) Army Hq 2 needs a mobile reserve in the final set-up.
- n) Seventh Air Div. will be moved from Bucharest to Greece by overland route, using 4,800 trucks!**

Paulus (on phone):

- 1.) He has talked with Italian Chiefs of Gen. Staffs of Armed Forces and of the Army. They assure him that all aid requested will be furnished.
- 2.) Fighter and AA protection for Bengasi is yet to be pushed through.

Guests at luncheon: Gen. von Greiffenberg, Gen. Scherer, Baentsch, Liss, Wanka. The latter reports on North Africa.

Afternoon, dentist. Afterwards Navy film: Submarines against the West (1700.-1950.)

Back in the evening and paperwork into the late hours of the night.

10 May 1941.

Situation report:

- a) Clamorings of the Africa Corps for supplies increase and grow more urgent.*** All we can do for them at the moment is sending a few more SS ferries (10 ferries are already

down there, together with 20 surf boats without motors).*

- b) Situation in Irak still obscure. British appear to be getting the upper hand.
- c) Conference Darlan/Fuehrer set for 11 May.
- d) Railroad situation in the East again tight. Backlog 500 trains in the East alone. Beginning 16 May no more trains will be run for less-than-trainload shipments.

Buhle: Africa:

- a) Foreign Legion: ** 2 Bns. and 1 Bn. Mt.Arty. possible in July.
- b) Add one Regimental Hq and one more light Artillery Bn. to Fifth Lt.Div. by end of June.
- c) Add one Rifle Regt. to Fifth Lt.Div. from an Armd.Div. earmarked for Africa, in exchange for MG Bn. (Convert to Armd.Div.)

Matzky-Mellenthin: Question of Attachés accredited to Balkan States. Foreign Office representatives at Army Hqs. Orientation of Washington attaché.-- Problems of Gen.Staff intelligence service.

Fellgiebel:

- 1.) Tele-communications in Southeast:

Sofia - Saloniki
Belgrade - Saloniki via Nish
Belgrade - Saloniki via Bitolji
Saloniki - Athens, 5 lines plus decimeter radio connection via Mt. Olympos - Euboea.

} all right.

- 2.) "Isabella": Keep ready 8 Cos of the Signal School.
- 3.) North Africa wants one more Corps Signal Bn. Can't be done. Perhaps smaller organizations to help them along.

von Ziehlberg:

- 1.) Special aide for Propaganda *** to ObdH, Schwatlo-Gescerding.
- 2.) Problem of decorations for Hq personnel and Gen.Staff Officers.
- 3.) Current business of Central Branch.

ObdH (on phone): Concern over supplies for North Africa. - Worries over thoroughness of preparations for operation "Merkur". - Stop redeployment of 73rd Div. as a precaution, in order to have reserves on hand in case "Merkur" fails.

11 May 1941.

(Sunday - Berlin).

Luncheon at Kopp's. - I meet Lutz (father).

1700.-1930., Paulus: Report on his 2½ weeks' stay in North Africa. Stopped in Rome and paid call to Mussolini.

Situation in North Africa unpleasant. By overstepping his orders, Rommel has brought about a situation, for which our present supply capabilities are insufficient. Rommel cannot cope with the situation.

12 May 1941. (The R.Hess affair breaks.)

Morning conference: Libya: Solum reinforced by one Armd.Bn. and one Motorcycle Rifle Bn. Italian submarine with 79 tons of ammunition en route to Derna, another one being readied.

Italy: Conference Guzzoni-Rintelen. Transfer of X Air Corps to Greece possible under Italian convoy escort. On the return voyage, the convoy will ferry over Second Armd. Div. to Taranto and then completes the transfer of the second half of X Air Corps. Loading of Second Armd.Div. for Taranto starts 13 May.

OKW conference, Salzburg (today 1800.):

- a) Operation "Merkur" and its repercussions on Barbarossa. We are asked to release for "Merkur": 2 mixed and 4 light AA Bns. We can release them only until 25 May, and at that only for the protection of the jump-off air fields.
- b) VIII Air Corps (Richthofen) was to be transported by rail to Oderberg; now Air Force wants rail shipment all the way to East Prussia in order to arrive in time for "Barbarossa". This means that we would need seven more days to complete assembly of troops for Barbarossa.
- c) Air Force has demanded 100 more materiel trains for the East. That would make another delay of two days. They will have to make up their minds whether or not they want to do "Merkur". The delay for Barbarossa resulting from this operation is very awkward. Since 23 May must remain the date for the start of the maximum railroad schedule, the time during which the Russians can react, is stretched to six weeks. In that period they could effect drastic changes in the disposition of their forces.

Conference with ObdH: Situation in Libya. - Form a new Hq:

"Commander of German Troops in North Africa". Question of head (Kirchheim, von dem Borne, Ehlert).

Gen. Osterkamp: Difficulties with meat supply. Hog population has dropped from 27 to 20 million. Since existing cattle holdings

are not to be touched, it will be necessary to check the drain on reserves. Meat consumption, also in the Army, will have to be cut even before start of campaign. Reduction from 1550 to 1350 gram in the Armed Forces, from 500 to 400 gram for the civilian population.

Heusinger/Gehlen:

- a) Report on Air activity against Suez Canal.
- b) Five mixed Tank Platoons for Crete leave 18 May and arrive in Saloniki, 23 May.
- c) Gehlen reports on final grouping for jump-off in "Barbarossa", and disposition of GHq reserves. Army Gps. North and Center have made their dispositions largely in accordance with our plans. In Army Gp. South, Reichenau has chosen a line-up, which does not effectively take advantage of the striking power of his Armor. The arrangement, whereby Kleist will not have control of the tanks until after the breakthrough, is fraught with danger. Reinforcing Seventeenth Army has produced good results.

Question of using long-range artillery in Seventeenth Army sector.

Gen Gu Wagner:

- a) Supply situation North Africa: At the moment, 6 steamers with a total of 6,500 tons, 16 medium-sized sailing vessels with 3,200 tons are operating the coastal route (capacity is 29,000 tons a month). The German Forces need 1,000 tons a day. Together with Italians 50,000 tons a month are needed.
Ration strength of German Forces 25,000 - 45,000.
Losses since 1 May: 2,500 tons on the coastal route to Bengasi.
- b) Military Hq Serbia: Conference at Agram. -- Reich Fortress Belgrade. -- Relationship between Army Hq 2 and Military Commander no simple matter. -- Troop requirements of Military Hq for partisan fighting. -- Beginning next August, Bor will produce copper at a rate of 40,000 tons a year (can be increased to as much as 80,000 tons).

13 May 1941.

Morning conference: Outcome of OKW conference at Salzburg on 12 May has been entirely satisfactory for the Army.

Of the 4 Light AA Bns. of the Army, only one will go to Crete. The question of how this loss is going to be made up to OKH is still open.

VIII Air Corps will not be shipped by rail all the way to East Prussia except for five trains; bulk goes only as far as Oderberg.

Of the 400 trains which Air Force finally wanted for moving materiel, only 100 will be run.

Redeployment of Second Armd. Div. by sea starts in 16 May, instead of 15 May.

"Merkur:" OKW teletype to Italy. Target date is 18 May, weather permitting. Responsible for the operation: Fourth Air Fleet with support of Army Hq 12 and Admiral Southeast. Italy furnishes Motor Torpedo Boat escort and provides protection of flanks against British naval attacks. Italy also furnishes mine-sweepers for Suda Bay.

Libya: One Light AA Bn. from Sicily goes to Tripoli, 2 are withdrawn from Sicily. No major action at Tobruk. Main British forces apparently assembled west of Tobruk. This means they are thinking only of defense! Enemy has a total of 11 Bns.

Italy: Favagrossa to become Economic Dictator (fuel control).

Irak: Italian fighter planes and MG for Irak arrive in Rhodes on 15 and 16 May.

Turkey and Bulgaria are negotiating about withdrawal of their respective forces from border.

France: Street demonstration in front of Army Hq 7 in Bordeaux.

Belgium: Strike in the coal mining district (50,000 out).

von Ziehlberg: Recommendations for new High Command Africa: C of S Gause; Ia, Westphal; Ic, Mellenthin; Ehlert* to be replaced by Wuestefeld.

Gen. Brand:

- a) Coastal Btrys. on Channel Coast: Progress seems satisfactory. More practice needed for firing on sea targets. Demonstration Battery! Fifteenth Army wants to activate 15 coastal Btrys. with captured materiel; guns are available. Seventh Army wants to organize 8 coastal Btrys. with captured enemy materiel. Trials with small mobile Observation Bns. for operational use in the sector of AGp. D.
- b) Heavy artillery in the East. No heavy artillery wanted in the Suwalki tip: Hq Seventeenth Army also objects to K 5 and K 12 guns. **
- c) Training of Arty. officer candidates. This summer still at Jueterbog. Later we need a new training center.
- d) R projectiles: ***4,000 on hand, current monthly production 5,000.

Radke:

- a) Rudolf Hess affair. Political blow of the first order. Danger of an extremist political course.
- b) Strength through Joy * activities in the East; Combat troops are taken care of by Army Hqs. Replacement Army, by Mil. District Hqs.

Conference in ObdH's office on latest reports from Army Hqs regarding jump-off preparations for "Barbarossa". No new viewpoints.

Other points discussed: International situation (Russian attitude in the Irak question). -- Situation created by Hess' flight. -- Wish to reinforce Fifth Light and Fifteenth Armd. Div. with 10 cm Guns.

Security forces in Serbia: After arrival of 15th Draft, mobile reserves will be organized, using captured enemy tanks where-ever possible. Troops not under command of Foerster, but under Army Hq 12. Instruction to this effect to Army Hq 12.

14 May 1941. (ObdH with) **

Morning conference: Nothing of importance. Air shipments to North Africa still going on. (Sheer nonsense). -- Werth is touring Hungarian border.

Gen. Leeb (Ord. Office): AT guns: Exchange *** 3.7 cm (2.7), 5 cm (3.7). Tapered bore tubes on old gun mounts. Maximum muzzle velocity of AT projectiles 1400 meter per second.

Inf. weapons: Longer life for rifle barrels by addition of chromium (MG).
Trials with 1.5 cm AT rifle (7.9 mm and 28/20 mm exist already).

Recoilless guns, Krupp and Rheinmetall: Owing to high powder consumption only as special-purpose guns.

Extension of range:

Lt. Fd. How. to 11,750) muzzle brake and special projectiles.
Med. Fd. How. to 15,000)
With Roechling projectile to 19,000.

Dora Gun (80 cm) range 40,000 m; now in early stages. Ready for operation spring, 1942.

Helicopter (improved observation): progress of development much too slow.

Sybel Ferry: 100 units ordered for AAA. #"

Motor vehicles for use in tropics: Tracks, Storage of ammunition ##; firing trials in the tropics necessary. Experimental station in Libya.

Flatbed trailers: Monthly output by fall, 1941, 50 units, i.e. equipment for one Regt. every three months. By end of year, rate of output will be stepped up to 100 units. — By end of April we shall have:

388 10-ton,
143 20-ton (plus 36 lacking tires).
On order: 700 22-ton trailers.

Czech 4.7 cm gun on Renault SPM: 18 May, 60 ready (Paris).

Fuel trailers for tanks with built-in pump: By 10 June, 1,860 units (increase range of tanks 100%).

Dieherrenfurth:* Gelan (chemical agent causing paralysis)
1 Oct 1941.**

Tank building program: Engine bottleneck.

AA gun production program: Output 1,000 AA guns, one million projectiles a month.

French chemical warfare agents: Nothing new. Our effects not reached. Bacteriological warfare agents (cattle plague).

von Bernuth: Organization of Officers' Training (program for post-war setup).— Current matters.

Buschenhagen: reports on operation "Silberfuchs". Conversations with Finns have not yet started, because OKW wants to keep all strings in its own hands. Timing is so complex, that coordination with the Barbarossa schedule appears impossible. The whole undertaking is an expedition, not an operation.— It is a shame to waste the men allocated for this purpose.

Biele: List of Divs. showing level of readiness for operations. Motor vehicle situation in the mot. and Armd.Divs. (We shall be lucky if they get all the equipment together in time; training of the Divs., equipped last will be incomplete in any event.)

Situation report on Africa Corps: Very high tank losses.— Drivers for trucks bought in Tunisia.—

Report from 22nd AB Div. Their demands cannot be met at the moment. Solution of the problem is off in some future when there will be enough transport Staffeln to ship by air all mot.Divs.

BdE is forming for Government General 4 Brigades of 6 Bns. each, without artillery etc. from Replacement Reserve II,*** in order to replace the two Divs. of the 15th Draft.—

Serbia 1 - 2 Bns. can be made mobile with 12 - 13, 30-ton, truck columns released by Gen Qu: 10 Tank Platoons are being prepared. — No coast Defense Bns. available to Army Hq 12 for manning captured enemy guns; must be furnished by Army Hq 2. — Military Police army patrols.

von Ziehlberg proposes Hanstein (Army Hq 10) for out-of-turn seniority promotion. Von Blottnitz, XVII Corps Hq, is to be relieved.

Conference with ObdH on results of conference at Fuehrer's:

- 1.) Hess case. Attempted unification of the Germanic races.
- 2.) Fuehrer concurs with OKH measures in Tripolitania.
- 3.) Set-up in North Africa is to be revamped by attaching a "German Chief of Staff" to Gariboldi's Hq.
- 4.) General review of political situation produces nothing substantially new. (Spain, Northwest Africa.)
- 5.) Continuance of operations in Libya next fall is believed to require 4 Armd. Divs. and 3 mot. Divs.

Radke: Press report on Yugoslav Campaign.

Wagner:(Gen Qu): Shipping situation in the Mediterranean can be eased by using tonnage available at Marseille.

15 May 1941.

Morning conference: Number of strikers at Liège has decreased (only 35,000 as against 50,000).— Naples so crowded with German troops, that further inflow must be stopped until outflow runs more smoothly. — One supply vessel for Lemnos torpedoed by the British. — Hq of the Italian Army Group Albania will be deactivated 25 May. Army Hq 9 takes over command.

- OQu IV:
- a) A shipment of German ammunition has arrived in Irak on the Bagdad Railroad (Rahn reports). Enthusiastic reception.
 - b) Two German Staffeln in Rhodes ready to take off for Irak. Advance parties in Syria.
 - c) Personnel changes in Romania (Chief of Gen.Staff, War Minister).

Chief of Transportation:

- a) Railroad situation unsatisfactory. Gercke will send personal letter to Minister of Transportation.
- b) Ever new changes in transport requisitions. — Civilian freight mixed with army freight.
- c) In Bulgaria, 100 railroad trains with Army freight are standing around with no one knowing their destination. (60% Air Force shipments.)

- d) Army cannot build railroad line to Athens. Viaduct, which would tie up 500 meter of military bridge equipment, must be built by civil contractors.

- OQu IV:
- a) Section Foreign Armies West must stay behind in Berlin during Barbarossa. Liaison officer.
- b) Exchange of OQu IV with corresponding Air Force organization (Col.Schmidt) requires Liaison Officer.

Chief Op. Sec. (OQu I): North Africa:

- a) French grant permission to use sea route to Tunis area (small port). Tunisia trucks may then be used to trans-ship cargoes.
- b) Fuehrer holds we would need 4 Armd. Divs. and 3 mot.Divs. for continuation of operations against Egypt.
- c) New command set up in North Africa. Under "Chief of the German General Staff at the Italian Hq": Commander of the Rear Area, Coast Defense, Defense of Desert Oases.
- d) Preparations for conference with Army Group Rundstedt on 19 May.

Conference with all OKH Section Chiefs: Case Hess !

- I. Fuehrer's account of events to the ObdH is in agreement with the second, more detailed press communiqué.
- 1.) The Fuehrer was taken completely by surprise.
- 2.) Facts previously known:
- a) Hess' inner conflict growing out of his personal attitude toward England and his grief over the fratricidal struggle between the two Germanic nations.
- b) Depression brought on because Fuehrer had barred him from active war service; repeated requests to be sent to the front had been denied.
- c) Mystical tendencies ("visions", prophecies, etc.).
- d) His daredevil flying, which had prompted the Fuehrer to bar Hess from any flying.
- 3.) New facts discovered:
- a) Since August last year, Hess had a standing order for reports on weather over England.
- b) Attempt to procure radio direction information through Terboven in Norway (radio traffic).
- c) Systematic training by Messers-mitt, after Udet had refused.

- d) Planning of technical preparations for flight (reserve fuel tanks).

4.) Chronology of events:

- a) Saturday: Fuehrer received package containing documents and put it aside, thinking it was some memorandum. Later opened it and found a letter informing him of the plan, and explaining the reasons. Glasgow was given as his destination. Wanted to visit Duke of Hamilton (President of the British Veterans' Association *).
- b) Consultation of Fuehrer with Reich Marshal and Udet to determine if Hess was likely to reach his destination. The result being affirmative and with the British bound to exploit the incident, a brief communique was issued to the press. Ribbentrop sent to Rome to inform Il Duce (separate peace offer).
- c) Meeting called of all Reichsleiter and Gauleiter and documents relative to the case read to them.

II. All present are requested to pass on this information and deny all divergent versions.

1230. Conference in Gen Qu's office with the Chief Supply Officers of the Armies in the East:

- a) Ruling on relations between Adv. Gen Qu Hqs and AGp. Hqs.
- b) 60-ton truck columns must not follow the advancing troops too far forward.** Keep roads free (supply artery to the Zi). No 60-ton truck columns on secondary roads***)
- c) Armd. Groups are echeloned in great depth! # Supply arteries secured by Advance Combat Teams of the Inf. Corps.
- d) Traffic control must be organized more uniformly. (Separate briefing!)
- e) Establishing of ammunition etc. dumps near border should not be overdone. Consequence of accumulations of excessive stocks is pointed out; jamming of railroads, etc.
- f) Truck column requirements of Chief of Eng. and Chief of Signal Corps. (Separate briefing.)
- g) Road building in Army area not yet what it ought to be. (Separate briefing.)
- h) Indoctrinate lower Gen Qu agencies and brief them on impending missions. - Measures to combat hoggish hoarding by units. ##
- i) Maps and road information service; reporting on prisoners and booty.
- k) Briefing about Hess case.

- von Ziehlberg:
- a) Speth recalled from Italian Army Group Albania.
 - b) Replacement for Metz - Bluemke. See ObdH.
 - c) Gause to be promoted to General. * --- Summoned to report for briefing.
 - d) Alternate GHqs (Spala and Reichshof).** Preparations for transfer to Askania.***

- Heusinger:
- a) Col. General Grauert shot down near St. Omer.
 - b) Solum reported lost.

Afternoon in Berlin, Bulgarian Legation (King's name day). - Evening with Kloenne # at Adlon Hotel.

16 May 1941.

Situation conference: West: Number of strikers in the Verviers and Huy districts has again increased (51,000). Food shortage.

Mediterranean: Canal of Corinth again navigable for ships drawing 6 meter (at low tide 5 meter). Air Force drops 15 ton of bombs on Suez Canal (including 10 mines from lowest altitude).

Irak: German auxiliary cruiser destroyed in Persian Gulf.

Damascus: 2 Ju 90; 16 Me and He planes and ## 27 carloads of arms and ammunition. More German planes in Rhodes.

Fighter Experimental Wing assigned to submarine hunt in the Aegean.

North Africa: 14 May. Rommel has informed Air Force Commander Africa that he plans to concentrate the bulk of his forces near Solum, and will leave siege of Tobruk to the Italians. Air Force Commander has refused to order requested shift of Air Forces to the area west of Solum.

15 May. Solum attacked by 5 Rifle Bns., 2 light Arty. Bns. (horse) and 1 medium Arty. Bn., Armd. Rcn. Bn., Antitank and Armd. Bns. (1-3).

Crete: Preparations under way. The small island of Antikythera is to be occupied (jump-off basis for Crete). No positive information available on conditions in Crete and the difficulties likely to be met.

All AAA. except one Bn. probably will get out of the Crete operation in time for "Barbarossa". AA MG Bn. must be assigned for the Crete operation, but substitute will be furnished by 22nd AB Div.

Second Armd. Div. sails from Patras as scheduled. Difficulties caused by excess loading.

The situation of the British in the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming progressively more difficult as regards available forces. Irak ties down British forces, instead of sending them to the theater. Palestine is in a state of unrest, Abyssinia is not yet liquidated. The situation at Tobruk appears to be so difficult that high stakes are risked to raise the siege (attack on Solum).

OQu I: OKW proposal for command set-up in North Africa has been received. An utterly vague ambiguous concoction! Counter-proposal.

Col. Spalke:

- a) Arms deliveries to Romania: First instalment, 15 June; Second instalment, 15 September (4.7 AT guns with ammunition, etc.).
- b) Food situation in Romania fairly good. Good crops in prospect. Acreage sown to wheat larger than before.
- c) Armament economy: Problems of manpower and capacity.
- d) Supply of oil drums: 10,000 drums by June. Zinc for drums from Hungary.
- e) Political currents.

von Ziehlberg: Current reassignments.

Jacob: 1.) Progress in preparing equipment: First Sybel ferries; 58 for August, 100 later. — After assembling in Vienna, they will take two weeks to get to Braila, arriving 20 June. Can operate 16 hours at 25 km an hour before refueling. Form a bridge 800 meter long.

24 ferries made up of Danube bridges form bridge 600 meter long.

5 Assault Boat Cos, 81 boats each.

One for each Armd. Group.

One Co. as reserve for Southeast.

Also one detachment on Channel Coast.

Mines: Rommel 25,000 T, 15,000 S Mines*.

Three Army Gps.: 295,000 T, 496,000 S (i.e. 3 T mines or 2 S mines per linear meter of frontage in East), plus stocks in depots: 288,000 T, 497,000 S mines and the mines carried by Engineer units.

Reserves of barbed wire are ample.

Emergency bridge construction materiel sufficient for jump-off.

2.) Road-building organization.

- 3.) Required for Danube bridges in Hungary: One Construction Bn. from the ZI. plus one Eng. Co. from Replacement Army.
- 4.) Army Hq Norway: Engineer Officer and Construction Unit from the West Wall.
- 5.) Russian mines: Instruction leaflet will be issued.

Paulus:

- a) New Libya see mem. Counterproposal to OKW.
- b) Position of OQu I. At present apparently overworked, but no reason for radical change.
- c) Operational orders for "Haifisch". I am against referring to individual Divs., because this deception would only create confusion on our own side.

Liss: a) New information on disposition of British forces in Irak. Latest reports on Tobruk.

- b) British air raid on Syrian airdromes; French defense; British leaflets dropped in Syria.
- c) Gen. Dentz' attitude in Syria very friendly toward us. British Consul expelled.

Major Heymer (Long-range Rcn. Staffel of the Africa Corps) reports on his work in North Africa. Nothing substantially new. (Evening at the Officers' Club, with Bogatsch).

17 - May 1941.

Situation conference: Libya: Solum retaken by Africa Corps, also Sidi Suleiman. 100 prisoners. On the Tobruk front successful engagements of assault detachments (some prisoners, tanks destroyed, etc.).

Greece: Fuehrer orders occupation of Antikythera. Army Hq 12 thinks, this would compromise surprise. "Merkur" probably will be postponed to 20 May.

Suez: 13 May: Shipping:

Suez outer roadstead	256,000 ton
Suez harbor	200,000 ton
Port Ibrahim	72,000 ton
Port Said	118,000 ton

Syria: British air attack on Damascus. French ground and air defense in action against the British !!!

West: Strike situation unchanged. The strike leaders have been called together. Settlement expected for Monday. Cause is exclusively the food situation (potato shortage).

East: Transport echelon III for "Barbarossa" starts moving on 21 May. Totodate average of 300 trains daily.

- Buhle:
- a) Status reports: Eighteenth Div.mot.; Thirteenth Armd. Div. Training of these Divs., activated at the last moment will be rather sketchy; have no unit training.
 - b) Additional personnel for Army Hq 10 and AGp. D.
 - c) Fourth, Tenth, Seventh Armd. Divs. will get their fourth Armd. Companies yet before start of "Barbarossa".
 - d) Observation Btry. for North Africa; tide them over with small detachments for Tobruk; a full Bn. next fall.
 - e) Transfer of replacement units to France not before 15 July. Must do without them if "Isabella" comes off earlier.

Matzky/Schildknecht: Review of changes in Russian dispositions in the border area (Western Russia), from the beginning of the war todate, by three-month periods.

Paulus - Heusinger - Pistorius: Draft of operational plan for "Isabella" (Army Group D) with suggested modifications; ten-day alert period.

Heusinger:

- a) OKW has again been asking for a second Div. for Holland. We have not got it.
- b) 169th Div.(destined for Finland) entrains for Stettin, beginning 23 May.
- c) Finland: No progress to report.
- d) Request of 22nd Div. cannot be granted. Div. should apply for reassignment to Ground Forces. We cannot move their ground elements * behind them.
- e) Crete postponed to 20 May. - Fuehrer insists on occupation of Antikythera, against advice of Air Force.
- f) Regt. Brandenburg details one Bn. each to AGps. Center and South, 2 Cos. to AGp. North.**
- g) Subversion plans for Ukraine and Baltic States.

Evening conference with ObdH on his return from the East. Important points:

AGp. North: Preparations for Oesel. Bridge construction material will do in a pinch.--- Bring up supplies on the Niemen river as far as Kowmo. - Collect barges for Niemen bridges beginning 20 May (2 bridges at Memel; 3 bridges can be built of other materials on hand.)

General matters:

- a) Refugee problem --- Evacuation of border regions?!
- b) Tighten border protection (S mines.)
- c) Evacuation of 60,000 children. *
- d) Evacuation of Reich Labor Service girls and of the Labor Camps (must be freed for military occupancy).

Army Gp. Center frames its orders in accordance with our ideas. Inactive fronts secured by mines. Regrouping toward the right wing is in progress. Inf. reserve close to the front, mot. reserve kept in rear. AA protection along the Vistula very thin.

Army Gp. South: Seventeenth Army wants no heavy artillery for the jump-off. Reserves will be put behind left wing. What shall we do about Slovakia? (2 Divs.)

Proposed Zero Hour: 0305 hrs. No coups de main before.

Air Reconnaissance: Rowehl is urgently wanted.

18 May 1941. Berlin. ("Mother's Day").

No substantial changes in situation. Solum Fort Capuzzo again in our hand.

Private Correspondence. --- Visit from Adenauer.** Gerti calls with her children. --- Evening at theater "Veilchenredoute".***

19 May 1941.

Situation report: Russia: Ban on all travel by foreigners and indigenous non-residents in the border districts.

Belgium: Strike has spread to Hasselt (54,000 out now).

Libya: 26th Convoy again turned back to Palermo. --- Casualties at Solum apparently alike on both sides. Enemy lost much material.

Irak: Reinforcements for the British at Habbania have arrived, apparently from the West.

Gen Qu: Review of OtdH's findings on eastern tour, which have bearing on Gen Qu. SS units for Rear Areas. The missions requested by these units must be refused. # The first 120-ton column has arrived from Tunis.

Conference with ObdH on plans for "Isabella". ObdH holds that concentration of forces in the South will rouse comment in France. Other items:

- a) MT situation in the Armd.Divs. activated last. - Decides to move them by road instead of by rail, to give them at least good road march training.
- b) Strike in Belgium.
- c) Hanstein's out-of-turn promotion delayed.*

Buerker (Ing.Sec.): Ordered to go immediately to the Armd.Divs. which are coming out last, to find out, what could still be done for their training (allocation of fuel, etc.).

- Heusinger:
- a) No basic directives from OKW on command set-up in Romania, since the question has not yet been discussed with Antonescu.**
 - b) OKW dismisses our recommendation on a "German Chief of Staff in the Italian Headquarters" and wants, instead, to give Rommel a second Chief of Staff supposed to run the rear services for him. Idiotic!

1500.-1730. Conference at ObdH, with von Rundstedt/Sodenstern, later Reichenau/Heim, then also Kleist/Zeitzler***and, finally, von Schobert. Questions relating to assembly of AGp. South. No fundamental difficulties with High Command of Army Group. Lively arguments with von Reichenau, who at last decides to group the three center Corps under Kleist's command right from the jump-off. Only tentative discussion on dispositions with Schobert, since we still have not received any political directives on the command set-up. (Von Schobert will get his instructions at Obersalzberg on Thursday). Afterwards short talk with Heim.

Paulus (on phone) about his conversation with Jodl on the command set-up in North Africa. All the Fuehrer cares about is that Rommel should not be hampered by any superior Hq. put over him. Jodl will send us another plan.

Col. Schaeffler (Chief Artillery Officer OKH): Use of heavy artillery in the sector of AGp. South. -- List needs a Coastal Arty. Bn. for Crete.

Evening: Receive "directive" with orders for Greece and C in C Balkans.

Gen. Wagner reports on a conference with Thomas, Fromm and Gercke, (afternoon), at which it came out that OKW now thinks it can furnish only 16 fuel trains, daily, instead of the 22 expected. Also the Com Z fuel depots in the East, which should be 50% full, are said to have dropped to a 20% level.

20 May 1941. (Attack on Crete).

Morning conference:

- 1.) 0500. - 0713. Landing on Crete prepared by bombing attack. Subsequent unopposed drop of paratroops and landing of gliders on Chania, Rethymnon and Iraklion airfields. The "airborne landing" of airborne troops will not come off before tomorrow.
- 2.) First echelon of Second Armd. Div. (3 ships) has landed at Taranto.
- 3.) Unconfirmed reports that British Second Chief of the Gen. Staff, Gen. Haning, has taken over command in Egypt.
- 4.) Syria: The French on the border are getting set to fight the British.
- 5.) In recognition of the French attitude in the Syrian question, Germany will return 80,000 prisoners.
- 6.) Maribor Tunnel reopened for traffic. Bridges at Maribor and Belgrade will be reopened by 15 June.
- 7.) Difficulties in fuel supply during July. In August, oil will be delivered to theater of operation directly from Romania, across the Pruth river. - Italy's needs are filled by OKW at the expense of our own quotas. Gasoline supply for civilian use is bogged down.

Bulle:

- 1.) Truck situation: French trucks are praised. Tools and spare parts as yet not in sufficient quantities. - The mot. units will not be ready in time. Extension of assembly date will not be necessary. Only in the case of Fourteenth and Eighteenth Divs. it may perhaps be necessary to set a later date for departure (which would not be serious).
- 2.) "Isabella" Divs. will be 100 % equipped with mortars and antitank rifles by 20 June. Artillery will be re-equipped with Lt. How. 18 and med. Fd. How. 18 by 20 June.
- 3.) Corps Hq LIV will be ready by 1 June (Romania).
- 4.) "Armd. Replacement Division" Barbessa: Refitting feasible within four weeks after start of operations.

Col. General Fromm:

- 1.) Loss replacements : 90,000 in Field Replacement Bns. 475,000 in the Replacement Army (less 90,000 for Air Force, leaves 385,000). Anticipated losses in the initial border battles: 275,000; for September 200,000. This would leave nothing for October, unless we induct age group 22 on 1 August (last reserve). Forty percent

of age-group 22 is in the Labor Service, sixty, in civilian occupations. Should not be called before the end of the year (Nov.), when men can be released from the front to replace them. We can take the risk of having no trained reserves in October.

- 2.) Fuel situation: June requirements covered, 10% short for July. In August the situation will be relieved by direct deliveries of fuel from Romania to AGp. South.
- 3.) Current problems of his Section.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- 1.) Replacement for Signal Replacement Bn. of Fifteenth Armd. Div. lost at sea arrived in Naples.
- 2.) Two Cos, for Rear Communications ready in Germany by 15 June; can be in North Africa early in July.
- 3.) Various current matters.

Col. Gause: (ordered to North Africa) reports. Since situation precludes decision on his assignment at this time, I furlough him to Berlin.

Gen. Hiner, being in Berlin, calls on me. Reviews conditions in Hungary. Gets briefing on line to be followed in the coming months.

*

von Thoma: Traffic control.-- Fifth Armd. Div. still tied up.-- Good work of the Tank Maintenance Groups. -- Preparations for the East: Ethylization center to adjust octane number for our purposes by addition of benzol. -- Track blocks made of Buna rubber. -- Collection of booty in Greece. -- 3690 tanks are now at the German front. -- Spare parts supply for Barbarossa.

von Etzdorf: France: Cooperation in Syria. -- Cooperation in North Africa. -- Supply line via Toulon (?!)** - Cooperation in West Africa. -- North Africa: Use of port of Bone. In return: New regulation of travel into restricted zone (officials, industrialists, farm managers.)-- Easing of traffic restrictions for Demarcation Line. -- Furloughs for Prisoners of War (up to 100,000 at a time). - Occupation costs (prompt negotiations, aiming at reduction from 15 to 12,5 billion franc). Coastal Btrys. in North Africa. -- Improvements of the Navy. -- Specialists for North Africa.

Plan to tie Turkey closer to us by a p... Transit to Syria (against Turk). Papen protests against his mission. ***

Japan: Matsuoka warns he will have to take a "zig-zag course". American offers to Japan. - Also: Status quo for Philippines. Offer of mutual undertaking not to enter European conflict (defense only).

Rome: Visit of our Foreign Minister: Hess -- Darlan -- Japan.

Spain: Crisis apparently put off for the moment. Concession to the Falange (two new ministries).

Crete: Dropping of paratroops (2 Regts.) seems to have been successful, but strong enemy resistance seems to have developed soon afterwards at Chania. Airfields, on which airborne forces were to land, are reported to have been rendered unserviceable.

21 May 1941.

Morning reports: In Crete the situation is satisfactory. More paratroops have been dropped. Stubborn British resistance in some places. Report of landing of Mountain Infantry has not been confirmed. No new information on disposition of British troops in the Middle East. Situation still strained and forces as widely dispersed as ever. Report of British in Irak advancing on Bagdad (Al Falluja) are unfounded.

Col. Ochsner: Report on eastern tour. — Armies want flame oil ammunition and HE ammunition, at ratio of 1:1. — Enforcement of safety regulations for Rocket Projector Troops.* Each Rocket Projector Bn. now includes one Btry. of the new rocket projectors with 6,000 meter range. — Preparations for new Decontamination Service. — Channel for reporting of intelligence on enemy chemical warfare service. — Dogs as gas detectors.—

Enemy intelligence: Britain is preparing flame oil for defense of beaches.

Russia is activating Ossoaviakhim** to fight parachutists. Reported to have prepared 7% gas ammunition. France: Preparations for bacteriological warfare (cattle plague).

Heusinger:

- a) At request of Army Hq 12, Fifth Armd.Div. will be left in Athens for a few more days.
- b) Letter to Jodl on pending questions, e.g., on undesirability of having German forces strike from Hungary, as such a move would be at the expense of the main concentration of AGp. South***.
- c) SS-Ferries: 6 for Africa Corps (newly arrived), 44 for Black Sea; 25 ferries coming off the line in June will go to AGp. North for Baltic.
- d) Let AGp. Center have Corps Hq XXXIII or Corps Hq XXXV (reduced !). Then they will get no Corps Hq later on with the GHq reserves.

- e) Changes in plans for road movement for Barbarossa, due to delays in arrival of trucks for newly activated Armd. Divs.
- f) Inquiry relating to preparatory work for new Rules of Sea Warfare: Limited or unlimited blockade zones on high seas? I am for latter alternative (Bluff).

von Ziehlberg: Personnel matters (among others, von Loeffelholz, Army Hq 9).--- Ban on flying for higher officers within range of enemy fighters. --- Transfer of GHq to Askania. --- Conference of Chiefs of Staff after the Whitsun holidays.--- Current business.

Army Hq 2: reports on the possibility of unrest in Croatia and requests ruling on whether they could use German troops at own discretion. Reply: Use troops only at the request of Croat government authorities, unless our military interests are involved.

Gen. Bogatsch (with Ziehlberg): Allocation of courier planes for Hqs (reasonably satisfactory).

(with Buhle:) Allocation of motor vehicles to air reconnaissance and signal units.
One light AA Bn., which was assigned to Ground Forces for "Barbarossa", is being taken away and goes to Crete.

Gen. Wagner (with Baensch):

- a) Sea route for supply base Baltic:
Memel: 2 convoys of 5 ships of 300 tons each.
Koenigsberg: 4 convoys of 5 ships of 300 tons each.
Also river barge trains of 15 - 20 ships of 75 - 100 tons each, for Memel river.

- b) Message procedure in Quartermaster service.

Wagner alone:

- a) OKW directive on Greece. --- OKW directive on Rear Areas Barbarossa. --- Order of battle of Himmler's SS Army.
- b) Supply columns: The organic Troop Supply Columns have all arrived in first half of May.

In second half of the month (20 - 30 May), we shall get the 30-ton truck columns.*

Ready before start of operations: 60-ton truck columns.**
After start of operations: 8,000 tons (616th Regt.) (OKH reserve) plus additional 4,000 tons.

- c) Fuel for training purposes: One quota (equal to 100 road kilometers) released for each mot. Div.
- d) Noticeable drop in the clothing output (by one-third).
Very heavy drain on stocks.

- e) Are Field Hospitals to become GHq troops? Chief Army Surgeon is against it. However, the Divs. must be compelled to relinquish their Field Hospitals. Once this policy has been established, they may be compensated by Corps and Armies.
- f) Issue of Iosanthin. Efficacy: If used within five minutes no injury; within 10 minutes, injury is light, after 15 minutes, ineffective.

Gen. Paulus calls up from Paris: Outcome of conference with C in C West, on the whole conforms with my demands. * I instruct him that in locating troop reserves, account must be taken of fact that the West-East railroad system might be in use both ways at one time.**.

Heusinger: Crete: 4 Mt. Bns. have landed in Crete. 2 west of Chania, 2 near Iraklion.

Situation at Chania improved. Town encircled. Contact established between isolated paratroop groups. Attempted sorties repelled.

Air transport hampered in area west of Chania where landing field is unserviceable. The transport planes land on the beach where they cannot take off.

Rethymnon in our hands. No reports received on Iraklion.

British naval forces northeast of Crete have disappeared, west of Crete still on the spot (under attack by our planes).

Shipments by sea will start tonight.

Army Hq 12 thinks that the show in Crete may drag out quite a while .

During the night a signal indicates that two transport vessels of Second Armd.Div. have struck mines in the western end of the Gulf of Corinth.

22 May 1941.

Morning conference: Second Armd.Div. (which sailed from Patras) reported to have lost in sinking: 122 tanks, 200 motor vehicles, 29 motorcycles, 1,328 men.***

Crete: Troops landed: Malenes: One Assault Regt. (Gen. Meindl), one Paratroop Bn., one Mt. Inf.Bn.

Chania: 5 Bns.

At Malenes and Chania our troops are opposed by 6 New Zealand Bns. and one Arty.Regt.

Rethymnon: Town apparently not yet taken; the Bn. set down by us may be in trouble by now.

Iraklion: 3 Paratroop Bns., Airfield and town apparently taken.

Libya: Rommel states he cannot take Tobruk with the forces now at his disposal.

France: has 214,000 tons in the Western Mediterranean.

Belgium: Strikes dying down.

Syria: Reported invasion of Syria by DeGaulle's troops highly doubtful.

Irak: Mosul attacked. No British at Al Falluja.

Egypt: Attempt to get Chief of Egyptian Gen.Staff, who is collaborating with Germany, out of the country. Attitude of Egypt on the whole not friendly to Britain.

Transp. Chief: Situation improved. Easing in the East. Shipment of gasoline to Com Z depots now included in supply program of Field Army, as requested by BdE.

Buhle: Considers replacing lost elements of Second Armd. Div. with Tank Demonstration Bn., originally earmarked for Seventeenth Div.

Maj. Westerberg (Photo Sec. in staff of Chief Air Officer): Submits air photographs taken by Rowehl's Staffel in the Russian border area. They clearly show extensive construction activities for strengthening border defenses (especially anti-tank ditches). Numerous cable trenches indicate preparation of a continuous defense position.

The photos corroborate our view that the Russians are determined to make a stand at the border.

Maj. Schildknecht (Foreign Armies East) reports on disposition of Russian Army along German border. For the most part closed up to front.

Defense build-up comprises three major groups:

Baltic: One Army Gp. of two Armies, with one group of operational, and one group of strategic reserves in the rear.

Center: One Army Gp. of three Armies, with one group of operational, and one group of strategic reserves(?) in the rear.

South: One Army Gp. of three Armies, one group of operational reserves.

Independent Pruth front: One Army Gp.

Heusinger: Reports from Greece:

- 1.) The announcement of loss of tanks off Patras has proved erroneous. The tanks of Second Armd. Div. have already been landed at Taranto. The losses seem to be largely in light and med. Artillery of the Div. Very hard to replace because of shortage of prime movers. Personnel losses: morning figures confirmed.
- 2.) The transfer of the light AA Bn. to operation Crete was ordered by Army Hq List and cannot be reversed at the moment. Must try to get replacement for "Barbaroosa" from Air Force.

3.) Situation in Crete seems rather complex. The British are in undisputed command of the sea north of Crete and seem to have scattered or sunk a convoy of small craft attempting to make the crossing. Reinforcements for Crete can therefore be sent only by air. It now looks quite doubtful that the Air Forces committed in Crete would be available for "Barbarossa" at the appointed date. Perhaps it will be necessary to postpone start of "Barbarossa".

Buhle:

- a) Artillery replacements for Second Armd.Div.: A Bn. now nearing completion, re-equipped with light Fd.How., plus Demonstration Bn. of 900th Brig. Med. Arty will be allocated when Div. goes into actions.
- b) 1,800 fuel trailers for Tank III will be ready by 9 June; trailers for Tank IV not until later in June.
- c) 100th Armd.Brig. will be reasonably mobile by 15 June.
- d) Eighteenth and Seventeenth Armd. Divs. will complete outfitting just about in time. Seventeenth Armd.Div. has 240 different types of motor vehicles !
- e) Activate a Rocket Projector unit in Replacement Army, for "Haifisch".*
- f) Improvements of Army Group D, "Isabella".
- g) Regulation of furloughs to Biarritz.

von Glaise-Horstenau: Situation in Croatia. Croats want their Army to stay in country; clamor for partial motorization. Also want transport for civilian economy. Glaise's future role. Future strength of the Croat Army: 3 Mt.Divs., 2 Inf.Divs., 6 Air Gruppen of 22 planes, each.

Maj. Ehlert: Have a serious talk with him on the reasons for his separation from the Africa Corps.

Heusinger: One Bn. of Fifth Mt.Div. wiped out in crossing to Crete. Current questions (med. Arty. for Kythera on Sybel ferries). Probable necessity to postpone date for Barbarossa.

von Ziehlberg: Commission for Irak. Recommendations for out-of-turn promotions.

Evening to Berlin:

23 May 1941.

By plane (with intermediate landing at Brieg) over Galicia, Tatra (Zakopane) to Cracow, Hq AGp. B. Sightseeing. Evening at Hq, AGp.B.

24 May 1941.

Conference with AGp.B:

- a) Depth of left wing of Seventeenth Army.
- b) Send XIV Corps through Seventeenth Army sector to widen Kleist's jump-off frontage.

1000. - 1200. Ride to Reichshof.*

Conference at Hq First Army : Disposition of forces. ---
Employment of artillery (heavy Artillery).--- XIV Corps will go into line through IV Corps.
Meet the Gen.Staff Officers.

By plane from Debica to Lublin via Bilgoraj - Zamoss - Chelm and Wlodawa. Arrive 1700.

Conference with CG III Corps (von Mackensen).

Evening with Gen. Staff Offs. of III and IV Corps (Vierow) at Hq III Corps.

25 May 1941. (Sunday).

Ride with Faeckenstedt (C of S III Corps), later joined by Wagner (LV Corps) from Lublin (0700 to Krystinopol, through Chelm, Hrubieszow, and Sokal. At Sokal, Triebe (C of S, XXXXVIII Corps) reports and Heim (C of S, of Staff, Sixth Army) joins us.

Inspection of jump-off terrain of III and XXXXVIII Corps. It has the peculiarity that movements must directly follow road network.

Problems resulting from lack of cover for assembly of artillery.

Conference with Heim: Jump-off of XIV Corps alongside XXXXVIII.

Return from Krystinopol via Hrubieszow to Zamosc. From there, to Berlin by plane; arrive 2000.

2000. - 2100. Talk with Gen. Paulus on the airfield. Overnight in Berlin.

26 May 1941.

Arrive Zossen 0900. Discuss with OQu I and Op.Off. on material for conference with the Finns.

0900.- 1000. Gen. von Tippelskirch calls (30th Div.). Bluenke reports (new C of S XIV Corps). Meyer-Ricks reports out (off with Irak Commission).

1130. Conference with ObdH on Finland.

1230. Welcome of Finns, headed by Chief of Gen.Staff, Heinrichs.

Luncheon.

After luncheon conference with Finnish Gen.Staff:

Alonglines of OKW conference: Operational possibilities are discussed. Attack west or east of Lake Ladoga. With appropriate disposition for assembly, they strike east of Lake Ladoga on a 6 Div. front.

Mobilization near border camouflaged, in rest of the country only after passage of German troops for operation "Silberfuchs" (16 June).

Hangoe: The Finns must do this by themselves.

Aaland: This is likewise a job for them; at least they must make all preparations on this assumption. (German help needed: 2 Regts.)

Long-distance call from Gen.Vogl (Armistice Commission) about negotiations with France. No important news.

Fromm on phone. Re Holland: He told Keitel that 82nd Div. will have its equipment by 1 June, the same as all Divs. of the Sixth Draft (i.e., without Inf. guns and only part of the AT Bn.). The Div. has been issued 6,000 bicycles. Trucks prepared. -
Relocation of Replacement Units.

Afternoon: Talk with ObdH about Finland. -- Occupation in Holland. -- Command set-up in North Africa. -- Tour in Eastern border area.

27 May 1941.

(S.S.Bismarck sunk).

Situation conference: S.S.Bismarck under heavy attack by superior British naval forces in the Atlantic. Reported to be making only 7 knots (down from normal 30). At noon, British report that Bismarck has gone down.

27th Convoy sailed for Libya(Coastal artillery).

Thasos and Samothrake turned over to the Bulgarians.

Situation on Crete improved. The Western part of the island now cleaned up; eastward advance continues.

OKW insists that original date for Barbarossa must stand: No objections on the part of the Army, except that AAA might not be ready; 2 mixed AA Bns. and 3 light AA Bns. still engaged in Crete. The 2 mixed Bns. were taken out of Army Hq 11, the three light Bns. out of Armd.Divs. Air Force must make up deficiency!
Air Force, however, will have a hard time keeping the date.

Italy will touch bottom of her oil supplies unless oil deliveries can start early in June. Total required: 260,000 ton.

100,000 are to be shipped by rail.*
5,000 through Canal of Corinth
25,000 from Germany. The remaining
60,000 have yet to be found.

Count Sponeck (CG, 22nd Div): Discussion of status of 22nd Div. In order to be committed as airborne troops, they need 1,400 planes. Since that number is not unavailable, it would be inexcusable to let the Div. hang around idle. Submit proposal to OKW.

Gen. Brand: a) Idea of Fuehrer about mixed med.Artilletry Bns. (runs counter to our experience and the wishes of the troops).
b) Report on tour in East, AGp.B.
c) Miscellaneous minor matters (including level of training of GHq Artillery).

OQu IV:

- a) With Chief of Attaché Sec.: Various Attaché questions. Hungary, Krabbe.
- b) French Transitional Army (Memorandum).
- c) Negotiations with Darlan: 75 per cent of the French materiel frozen in Syria is to go to Irak; vehicles, port facilities, railroads, roads.

Movement of supplies to Irak to be handled by French in French ships from Cyprus waters. Training for Irak under French in Syria. ** Exchange with us information on British in Middle East.

North Africa: We are getting 1,740 trucks now, 400 more later. French take our supplies to North Africa in their ships and forward them to Libyan border. Bizerte will be available for our use.

French med. guns, including ammunition, for us in North - Africa. West and Equatorial Africa: Dakar available for German naval operations, effective 15 July.

- d) Spain: Mobilization takes 8 days. Alert period for march readiness 12 hours. Ammunition for one to three months (varying for different weapons); tight on AA ammunition. Fuel supplies for 2 months. Fighting quality of Spanish troops against British supposed to be good.
- e) Portugal: Will fight better against the Spanish than against the British.

- Gen. Buhle:
- a) Second Army Div.: Replacement of Artillery with newly activated units by 1 July; likewise Bridge Cpls. from GHq Reserve.
 - b) Activation of four Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Hqs for East, as specified by OKW. *
 - c) Conclusion of drive to reduce number of types of motor vehicles. A flop.
 - d) 82nd Div. Condition, filler replacements before going to Holland. Report to OKW.
 - e) Activation of four Divs., Sixteenth Draft; 6 Bns. of 4 Cos. (Regional Defense troops) begins 15 June. Activation will take two weeks.
 - f) Other current business.

Col. Heusinger: S.S. Bismarck. -- 22nd Div. -- Paulus' conference on "Haifisch" and "Isabella" in Paris (ground disposition). -- Weather prediction for the East for period from now until next fall. -- Armored trains. -- Preparedness for defense in the East. -- Other current questions.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Selection of personnel for Liaison Staff Finland and Liaison Staff Bulgaria. -- Preparations for C of S meeting.

28 May 1941.

Newly promoted officers in Gen.Staff (Majors) introduce themselves.

Situation conference:

Crete: Paratroops seem to have suffered high casualties. -- The Italian want to make a landing with one reinforced Inf. Bn. and tanks from the Rhodes base on 28 June.

22nd Div. OKW wants to transfer 22nd Div. to the ZI. The Div. can be assembled either in Bucharest or in Troppau by 26 May. If the Div. does not belong to us, we are not interested in it. (Braunschweig out of question.)

Syria: French flyers from North Africa en route to Syria, with intermediate landing at Catania.

U.S.A.: "Fireside talk" by Roosevelt: State of unlimited emergency.

Lt. Col. Radke: SS Div. Reich will go to the southeastern theater by motorized movements across Germany. *

Fieldpost censorship must be instituted because military matters are being discussed in letters.

Civilian morale in the ZI bad : a) in Party circles: Hess case; shortcomings of Party leaders; lawlessness (religious orders). ** b) General population: Religious question. -- Relations with Russia. -- Failure to strike blow against England.

Current business.

Gen. Stumme (XXXX Corps) calls en route. -- Col. Buelowius reports out (Co. of Regt.).

Schwatlo-Gesterding: Propaganda questions. -- Press. -- Entertainment films and documentaries.

Heusinger - Bork: Repercussions of "Mercur" on "Barbarossa": 2 mixed and 4 light AA Bns. unavailable because of Crete.

The 2 mixed Bns. belong to Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. Must be in Saloniki for shipment by 8 June, to be in time for "Barbarossa." Need no rehabilitation.

The 4 light Bns. went to:

Seventh Armd. Div.
Nineteenth " "
Second " " (lost at sea)
Fifth " " (Crete).

These Divs. are GHQ Reserve and therefore not required for the jump-off. Probably there won't be any chance to get them replaced.

VIII Air Corps must leave Romania on 7 June, in order to reach Suwalki by 20 June.

Lt. Col. Stieff: Observations made on tour in Greece: Hq Twelfth Army -- Crete Development slower than anticipated by Air Force. Air Force was quite off in assessment of enemy: they expected the British to bolt.

British are in undisputed command of the sea. We are in equally undisputed command of the air.

Mistakes of tactical planning: Troops were set down, in three equal forces, in three places. Lack of reconnaissance of the landing area (olive groves). Landing of planes very difficult (olive groves, mountains).

Sailing of first sea-borne echelon was timed too late, to begin with, and then postponed once. This robbed us of the element of surprise.

Critical stage was over on 25 May. Gen. Ringel has situation under control. Most urgently needed: heavy weapons.

British were expecting airborne landing since 26 April and made effective preparations for defense, especially against parachute attacks. This explains our very heavy losses. Combat strength of Seventh Air Div. down to $3\frac{1}{2}$ Bns., from 9 Bns. Assault Regt. lost 50 officers and 1000 men, killed.

Transport considerably depleted. Out of 600 transport planes, 170 unserviceable, mostly total loss.

Losses in Convoy 1 were 500 out of 2,300 (Fifth Mt.Div., light AAA).

Hq Twelfth Army ventures no estimate of the duration of fighting, as that largely depends on what the British are going to do. During night of 24/25 May, they brought five freighters to Suda, and two freighters to Iraklion; it is not known whether with reinforcements or supplies, or for evacuation.

Twelfth Army thinks it will be necessary to keep elements of Fifth Armd.Div. in Athens for time being. Atmosphere in the city critical. The Italians are not doing anything about it, nor have they started any arrangements for looking after the country. *

Also says it must keep six GHq Bridge Clns in Greece (for Crete). Wants to leave 164th Div. in Saloniki, Sixth Mt. Div. in Athens, and Fifth Mt.Div. in Crete.

In order to hold Crete against any British attacks, it is essential to secure domination of the Aegean from the air.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Africa. Logistical planning for future operations. Offensive by middle of October (?).
- b) Greece: Ideas on future administration of the Saloniki district, which is to remain under military occupation.
- c) Gas warfare.
- d) Needs of 22nd Div.

General Ott:

- a) Report on his activities as CG XXX Corps in Greek Thrace. Personnel difficulties in 50th Div.
- b) Questions of organization: Infantry can get improvised equipment for hill country operations, i.e. 250 pack saddles per Regt. This works only for minor operations of short duration. For major operations they would be lacking Mt. Artillery.

He wants more smoke ammunition issued to troops. That is a question of long-range planning by supply organization, not one of changing basic issues.

von Bernuth -- Buerker: Findings on return from inspection of the new mot. units, activated the last. They will just make the jump-off (as Org.Sec. reported). Inspection of Security Division gave gratifying impression. Command has the right idea about their mission. Mobile.

Use of radio direction beams for night ground operations in Africa (840 sets ordered for delivery next fall).

29 May 1941.

Situation conference: Crete: Suda Bay cleared. --- First tanks landed at Kastelli. --- Iraklion airfield not yet mopped up.

Rintelen reports: Italian Eleventh Army has 12 Divs. ready for occupation of Greece, of which 1 Div., for Attica, and 1 Div., for Peloponnese are available at once. Italian crack Guard Regt. is also assigned to the Peloponnese.

British attack on Sfax. British air attack on convoy.

Syria: Hansen reports: France is changing her plans from defense of the Lebanon Mountains to defense of the southern border, i.e. defense of the whole of Syria. Strength of French forces: 50,000, mostly colored troops, 40 fighter planes from the homeland, 3 destroyers, 3 submarines. British: 50,000 in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. British are anxious about Cyprus.

Irak: According to Hansen's report, situation not unfavorable, but no decisive turn for the better yet. Lack of fuel.

Keitel (Personnel Div.): Officer reserve small. --- Problem of the officers of the 100,000 men Army, who feel slighted. (As a matter of fact, their promotions have not been slowed by the influx of E-officers.) * Reactivation of E-officers. --- Problem of decorations. -- Members of former ruling houses in the Armed Forces. --- Officers reserve pools will be set up directly in AGp. Rear Areas.

Gol. Ochsner: Safety regulations for Hv. Rocket Projectors. --- Radio direction beam (170 transmitters, 800 receivers); training required. --- Use of poison gas in "Barbarossa".

Gen. Wagner: Railroad tractors (three for each Army and Armd. Gp.)*--- Tank spare part depots, 400 tons are carried by AGps. for each Armd.Gp. In addition a depot for parts in short supply near Magdeburg (parts will be flown to the front). --- Field Hospitals must become GHq troops.

Conference with ObdH: North Africa (Cause assignment settled). -- Greece (C in C Balkans). -- Meeting of Cs of S, 4 and 5 June.

Calls: Col. Gause, appointed "Liaison Officer at Italian High Command Libya". -- Kinzel, prior to taking off for Finland.

30 May 1941.

Morning conference: In Crete, things are now starting to run smoothly. The British are trying to make a getaway from the south coast. The Greeks are offering capitulation. The Italian have landed in the eastern part of the Island. Large take of prisoners and materiel, including a satisfying number of guns.

22nd Div. will revert to Ground Forces after all. Ruling of the Fuehrer.

Irak: Owing to deficient preparation and the impossibility of sending effective support, the Irak show, which is more in the nature of a political uprising than a conscious fight for liberation, must eventually peter out. Whatever the outcome, however, it did force the British to spread themselves critically thin, both during the Crete operation, and at a time when our situation in North Africa was rather precarious.

Transport movements for build-up are proceeding in gratifying manner.

Fuehrer's decision that 22 June date will stand.

- Buhle:
- a) Jurisdiction of Army Mission Romania. -- Official instructions.
 - b) Conversion of med. Arty. Bns. in most Armd. Divs. to mixed Bns.
 - c) Current business: Jurisdiction of List. -- Field Hospitals as GHq troops, etc.

OQu IV: Current matters.

- Heusinger:
- a) 20 SS-ferries are going to be assembled in Gdynia starting 15 June.
 - b) "Haifisch" and "Harpune". *
 - c) Proposals by AGp. North and Center on disposition for jump-off.
 - d) Current details.

von Ziehlberg: Current personnel matters. -- Reassignments. -- Decorations.

31 May 1941.

Morning conference:

- a) Strike in Belgium. -- Local food strikes continue.
- b) Sinking of ship in Piraeus harbor, allegedly due to spontaneous combustion.
- c) Fifth Armd. Div. (less one Armd. Bn., 1 Motorcycle Rifle Bn., 13th Rifle Regt.) will start movement on 7 June.
- d) Ban on reconnaissance flights along the Eastern frontier lifted.
- e) Situation in Irak is taking a progressively bad turn. Any decisive military help by us is out of question. But this does not mean, the end of trouble for the British in that corner of the world, even if they return the old government to Baghdad.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) with Col. Baentsch:

- a) Supply preparations for AGp. North. Result of Baentsch's tour in the East.
- b) C in C Balkans and administrative problems in Greece.

Gen. Bogatsch (with Gen. Buhle): Motor-transport in Air Reconnaissance units very difficult. Try to remedy situation by taking some away from ground troops.

Col. Speth (C of S LIV Corps) reports completion of his mission in Italy and assumption of new post.

Heusinger: After talk with OKW: 22nd Div. now under exclusive OKH control. Holland gets one Div. out of our Northeast line.

Report to OKW in reply to their inquiry concerning North Africa.

Evening at Kopp's in Belitz.

1 June and 2 June 1941. (Whitsun)

Whitsun. Work in Berlin. On Whitmonday, visit the Kopp's in Belitz, with Gerti.

3 June 1941.

During the morning, visitors:

Ht. Col. Doerr reports as new C of S LII Corps Hq. Major Abelein, to express his thanks. Lt. Col. von dem Borne, C of S, Africa Corps; comprehensive discussion of situation and divergent views.

- OQu IV:
- a) General political situation all over the world.
 - b) Joint action by Axis Forces on Roosevelt's speech.
 - c) Turkey: Since we are no longer interested in arms transit to Irak, it will probably be possible to conclude a non-aggression pact and a guarantee treaty.
 - d) Greece: Pro-German public sentiment is cooling. Reasons: Arrival of Bulgarians and Italians; alleged harshness of German occupation troops; food problem. British agents.
 - e) Ireland: German bombs on Dublin.
 - f) Russia: Stalin had a conversation with the Finnish envoy, stressing good relations. Offers 20,000 tons of grain.
 - g) Italy: After Starace, Sebastiani, Mussolini's party secretary for many years, has been fired also.

- Op.Sec.:
- a) 22nd Div. now under our control. — Fuehrer will soon have conference with Antonescu.
 - b) 719th Div. from Northeast line to Holland; 710th Div. to Norway.
 - c) Coastal Artillery: 3 Bns. for Eleventh Army (Black Sea Coast). Initial location at Galatz. 3 Bns. in East Prussia prepared for Russian Baltic ports (will go by sea). Coastal artillery for Murmansk and Archangelsk.
 - d) Captured enemy tanks: Six Platoons are leaving for Serbia. Six Platoons for Crete are in Saloniki.
 - e) Syria: Fuehrer order: Stop troops alerted for shipment. Commission will stand by.
 - f) Greece: Peloponnese will be occupied immediately by the Italians; Thessaly on 8 June, Attica and Euboea on 12 June.

- Gen. Jakob:
- a) Industrial plants may now be built in the Rhine defense zone near Kehl.
 - b) Distribution of Sybel and SS-ferries.
 - c) Construction Bns. for Navy.

4 June 1941.

Meeting with Army and AGp. Cs of S:

Morning: Eastern questions with Eastern Cs of S: Only noteworthy items: Teamwork of Inf. and Armor at jump-off; Artillery preparation.

Afternoon: General questions with all Chiefs.

Evening: Social at the Gen Qu Officers' Club.

Strike: Lille, 80% of the French coal mines.

5 June 1941.

Lille strike situation unchanged. Very inconvenient now !

Morning: Conference with the Western Cs of S. On the whole, we go over old ground. It would probably be a good idea to establish once for all the number of "ideal" vehicles that would be needed in the "ideal" situation". *

Gen. Fellgiebel: Current matters: Assignment of radio bands Decimeter circuits in the East. -- Demands of CG of Railway Troops. -- Italian radio traffic can be intercepted. -- Direction beam equipment. -- Signal communication lines running through Sweden. **

Talk with ObdH: Visit of King Boris of Bulgaria. -- ObdH's talk with Rosenberg. -- New Balkans set-up; Hq List, Fuehrer is afraid the British might emulate on the Channel Islands our airborne landing in Crete. -- Russians (Romania).

Wagner, Gen Qu:

- a) Rosenberg and territorial divisions in the East.
- b) Air transport: Out of 500 transport planes used for Crete 250 cracked up (130 total loss). Two Transport Groups will be deactivated. Twelve groups of 40 planes each, totalling 480, will remain. Of these, 8 groups of 40 each, totalling 320, are allocated to "Barbarossa". Available for troop and supply shipments (distributed among Air Fleets). Another 42 planes might come in from production.
- c) Effective 1 June, the Air Force will get no more automotive tires from Army.

6 June 1941.

Morning conference:

East: Increasing Russian air activity.

North Africa: British again getting frisky, especially opposite Bengasi; aircraft carrier reported en route.

Navy: In sea battle resulting in the loss of the SS "Bismarck", the ship was under simultaneous attack by 50 torpedo planes, 12 of which were shot down (great work!). It appears likely that acoustic torpedoes were used. British apparently have a radar instrument with 35 km range (ours has only 20 km).

Navy: SS Prinz Eugen ready to go to sea in 8 days. SS Luetzow will carry out feints from Norway. SS Scharnhorst now completed, will probably leave for the Atlantic through the Channel, under cover of diversionary maneuvers. * SS Hipper will be ready in July, SS Gneisenau in October. Tirpitz now on shakedown cruise, will enter service in August.

Romania: Increasing Russian movements along the border. --- Communist propaganda.

Hoelter: Liaison Staff North, reports. Briefing on cooperation with Finns.

Kralle: Formerly Attaché in Hungary, calls before leaving for Madrid.

Conference with Col. General Guderian:

Armor has its main task not at the jump-off, but finds it in exploitation of the breakthrough. All strength must be conserved for the tasks that follow. At jump-off, maximum advantage must therefore be taken of Inf. support. 267th and 293rd Inf. Divs. must be placed under control of Armd. Group 2. They will be committed not as Divs. but rather as regimental teams without trains, under the command of Armd. Divs. An order to this end will be issued by the OKH at once.

Maj. Gen. Buhle:

- a) Tank repair centers for period after conclusion of "Barbarossa." We have one for German tanks (Warsaw or perhaps also Mil. District VIII) and one for Czech tanks. Setting up repair centers for other Divs. which must be taken out of the front, would require 10 days, but that is about the time it takes for a Div. to be shipped back.
- b) New Balkans set-up. New directive (Nr.31) and supplement on political function. **

- c) Reorganization of the Army after fall, 1941.
- d) Army set-up Bulgaria.
- e) Questions relating to Army officials.*
- f) 22nd Div.; special equipment for airborne operations will remain under guard in Romania for time being.
- g) AAA situation improved. All that is lacking now are some prime movers and truck columns.
- h) Table of Organization authorized for Commandant of British Channel Islands.
- i) 16th MG Bn. becomes static on the Channel Islands.
- k) Rest leaves in North Africa.

Heusinger - Stieff Ruling scale of maps for daily reports in "Barbarossa."

Dankwarts: Report on strike situation at Lille: Obviously politically inspired by Britain, De Gaulle movement and America (money). But the basic reason probably is the food situation, for which the German Ministry of Economics, more than anyone else, is to blame.

Measures taken by Military Government sound and energetic, without need to resort to arms. The main thing is to get the food situation ironed out promptly. Local Government agencies, police and employers are cooperating with us. The peak seems to have been reached, and the strike movement may be expected to fold up in about 8 days.

Heusinger:

- a) All AA Bns. have been recalled from Greek theater.
- b) GHq AA Bns. will be fully motorized.
- c) Mine Clearing Bn. already on way to AGp. Center. Will be employed as a unit under Hoth.
- d) Styria, etc., keep the old borders with Croatia.
- e) Latest estimates show that all troops in Naples will be transferred to North Africa in June, leaving only one Coastal Arty. Btry., one Field Hospital, etc. Six convoys with four Italian and one German ships, each.
- f) Hungary: Requires 12 days to complete assembly of troops. Our intentions will not be divulged before middle of June. Hence, an Hungarian attack cannot come off before B plus 5 ** or B plus 6; provided, that is, that they mean to be in on it. Our preparations then have to be this: Fourth Mt. Div. and 125th Inf. Div. will be moved as GHq. Reserves to AGp. South; 294th Div. which will be ready to ship out by 18 June, can be sent to Presov***,

where it would be unloaded, beginning 20 June, to constitute the link between Romania* and Hungary; again provided that Hungary is serious about joining the attack. If not, the Div. will be moved behind AGp. Center, as GHq reserve.

Kinzel: Reports back from his visit to the Finnish Gen.Staff.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen.Staff personnel matters.

7 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) At Solum, the British seem to be building up a new concentration. Something seems to be up also in the direction of Sidi Suleiman.
- b) We shall not approach Slovakia before middle of June (same as Hungary).
- c) Maximum railroad schedule on net west of Elbe river will be cancelled effective 16 June, 0000 hours. Likewise in occupied territory.
- d) 150,000 Croat workers will come to Germany (for war industries).
- e) Gen Qu reports supplementary requisitions for 190 trains for period between 17 and 23 June. That again!

Inspection of CP motor caravan (organized by Central Branch).
30 office vans.

Lt.Col. Sperl, C of S L Corps calls. Reports on experiences in Serbia.

Col. Ochsner: Employment of smoke in Africa. (British are using phosphorus).. Ammunition issued for "Barbarossa".

Col. Kinzel, Heusinger, Hoelter: Kinzel's report on tour to Finland. Conversations with Heinrichs. The Finnish High Command has squared their plans with ours, and seems to be going at it with every ounce of energy.

V Corps (Fins) , with two Divs., is assigned to the Kandalaksha operation.

Asland will be handled by one Inf.Regt., which is not needed elsewhere.

For Hangoe they have set out one Div.

Assembly of troops:

On border facing Leningrad 4 Divs.
North of Lake Ladoga 2 Divs.
In central sector 5 to 6 Divs.
(Operational group for offensive east of Lake Ladoga)

Reserves: Helsinki 1 Div.
Turku 1 Div.

(Would be available for follow-up.)

Time requirements: Mobilization and assembly, 12 days, including five days' warning on contemplated direction of attack.

The following target days have been fixed:

10 June: Call-up of Border Guard and third Bns. of Army units.

15 June: Mobilization of V Corps.

20 June: Ready to cross over to Aaland and attack Hangoe.

Full mobilization only after we open hostilities. They can start operations when we have crossed the Dvina.

Finnish Gen.Staff urges attack east of Lake Ladoga.

Col. Baentsch: Report on inspection at AGp. South. Assignment of MT Regt., disposition and employment in AGp. South. Points for briefing of QM Hqs in impending tasks.

Keitel OKW (on phone):

- a) Crete cannot be made an exclusive Air Force domain. Question of Executive Power.
- b) In Finland, Army Hq Norway can only look after its own, and cannot take care also of the southeastern operation.* An assignment for Erfurth.
- c) Fuehrer's talk with von dem Borne on North Africa. Tactical details.
- d) Keitel's talk with Cavallero. Italy's plans for shipping troops to Africa are reaching too high. What the theater needs are not large masses of troops, but small contingents of crack troops with the best of equipment. Africa is a problem of logistics and equipment, not of mass concentrations.

Importance of protecting unloading operations in Benghazi (coastal artillery, escort planes, fighters, AAA).

Increase in Africa Corps' artillery fire power. — Safeguarding of coastal shipping lane and cutting of British supplies to Tobruk.

General Bogatsch:

- a) Presents Rowehl's latest reconnaissance photos. Some gaps left around Kovno.

- b) Timing of long-range reconnaissance. Staffeln must be held back at first; probably will not start operations before second day, in AGP. Center.

von Bernuth (with von Ziehlberg):

- a) Relationship of "Staff School" to War Academy entrance examination in peacetime. Gen.Staff must insist on the special preparation and administrating of the Academy examinations. Selection of future Gen. Staff Officers must remain in our hands. The scores given by Staff School naturally will have to be given due consideration. On the other hand, the graduates' rating sheets will have to incorporate criteria which can serve as basis for the selection of War Academy candidates.
- b) Academy courses starting next fall. Hard to tell as yet whether emphasis will be put on training of young Staff Officer Candidates, or on refresher training of World War I Gen.Staff Officers. The latter courses will be necessary in any event.
- c) Motion pictures. Assignment of Motion Picture units. Developments in color films.
- d) Defense measures against flame throwers.

Evening at Kopp's in Belitz.

8 June 1941. (Sunday).

British invade
invade Syria.

Berlin. -- Leyherr comes for a visit. -- Color pictures taken.

9 June 1941.

By air to front. Warsaw (von Hobe*), Biala, Brest-Litovsk and Tilsit. Return via Frisches Haff -- Danzig -- Gdynia.

Conferences with Cs of S XII Corps (von Waldenburg) and XXXXVII Corps (Bamler), and the Div. Gen.Staff Officers. All know their jobs and are in high spirits. Preparations for 22 June completed.

The imposing vastness of the spaces, in which our troops are now assembling, cannot fail but strike a deep impression. By its very nature it puts an end to the doctrine of "Tuchfuehlung" **. The Division as a self-contained operational unit becomes a dominant factor. All the work of decades ***, which was undertaken to train the Div. Commanders for independent leadership, must pay dividends here. Artillery support at

the jump-off will not be spectacularly strong, but must do. Engineer work and signal communications seem to be well prepared.

10 June 1941.

Situation conference:

North Africa: The British have finished regrouping their forces at Solum; not yet clear whether for defensive or offensive operations. (Radio intelligence has located one more Div. Hq and one more Regt.)

Crete: Command set-up still unsettled. On top of all the combat missions which Air Force must carry through from its Crete base, they insist on having administrative control. (On his own authority, the CG of XI Air Corps has styled himself "Governor".)

Balkans: Transfer of GHq troops from Saloniki to Eleventh Army is slow. Russians report presence of seven German Divs. in Moldavia.

Syria: Minor advances of British. The French view the situation optimistically.

Turkey: Conclusion of pact likely.

Croatia: Reported to be about to join Tripartite Pact (15 June, in Italy).

Heusinger:

1. 1.) Finland: Reinforcement of Border Guard between 10th-13th June. Mobilization: Troops allocated to Hangoe and Aaland operations, 12 - 20 June. -- V Corps (Northern Group), 15 to 25 June. -- Bulk of Army, 16 to 28 June.
- 2.) 710th Div. (second occupation Div. for Norway) will be shipped between 14 and 17 June.
- 3.) "Haifisch II" * cannot be carried out in the form planned by High Command West, because Navy has not got the required shipping available for immediate tasks.
- 4.) Crete-Greece: Foolish plans of OKW in Crete, for which they want 4 Regts. Put up strong opposition! Also, we must get out again one of the Mt. Divs. tied up in Greece.

Major Hansen reports on his tour in Turkey, Syria and Irak:

Turkey: Popular sentiment on the whole is favoring us. The Turks went over to England because they were afraid of the Italians. Realizing now, that their fears are unfounded, they would like to come around, but must wait a while for

the public to get used to this change of front. The Turks have no political claims for the future.

Irak: Impotent as a military factor. Internal situation chaotic. British forces in that theater will remain tied up for some time to come.

Syria: Dentz apparently a good soldier and determined to resist. Popular sentiment in the southern part of the country anti-British, in the North it seems to be partly pro-De Gaulle. Forces available in the South against British: 20 Rifle and 6 Arty. Bns.; ought to be enough.

OQu IV:

- a) Preparations for intelligence service in "Barbarossa". All intelligence sources must be cleared through Ic officers.
- b) Preparation for intelligence service in future operations in Eastern Mediterranean.
- c) France: Exploit channels for exchange of information on Britain.
- d) Exchange of cables Boetticher/Foreign Office.
- e) Conversation Fuehrer - Duce. Apparently an exchange of general ideas, without binding commitments. (Switzerland disgusting.)

Radkre:

- a) Propaganda organization for "Barbarossa".
- b) New enemy campaign for undermining German morale by personal attacks on high army leaders on the radio (slurs on von Bock).
- c) Memorial Cemeteries and Soldiers' Monuments in France.
- d) Current matters.

11 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Delay in transfer of units from Army Hq 12 to Army Hq 11 affects: 2 med.Arty. Bns., 2 Eng.Bns. Arrival by 22 June now is doubtful.
- b) Eastern front all set. Build-up proceeds according to plan.
- c) Troop shipments running on schedule. Railroad accidents in the ZI will not affect them appreciably.

d) Strike in Belgium has collapsed.

CQu I:

- a) Deception measures in West and East. No suspension of mail services in West now. Measures must be stepped up during July and possibly August. *
- b) Operations on the periphery of "Barbarossa" theater.--- Preparations.

Gen. Erfurth reports as C of S Liaison Hq North. Briefing on operational and personnel questions.

Adm. Schuster (Admiral Balkans) reports on Crete and Aegean, and inquires about "Barbarossa" (southern wing).

Luncheon with Gen. Ott, Gen. Paulus.

Gen. Wagner: Report on trip to Rome. Favorable impression of Italy and of Rintelen's work. The talks in Rome strongly indicate that build-up of stores may become possible during June. In terms of present strength of Africa Corps, the over-all supply picture is as follows:

On hand	Ship in June
Ammunition: 4 issues (1 with troops)	5
Fuel: 6½ consumption quotas (bulk with troops)	50
Rations: 15 daily allowances (mostly Benghazi)	20-30

Required shipping space 44,000 tons.

These transport requirements, plus what the Italians need, can be supplied only by putting 20,000 tons to work on the French route Toulon -- Bizerte and then Gabès -- Zarzise -- Tripolis. Of course, this means reloading at several points.

Efficient operation can be assured only by establishing in Rome an agency equipped with sweeping powers, to route required supplies through France, Naples -- Tripoli, Naples -- Benghazi, or Taranto -- Peloponnese -- Benghazi, according as shipping and naval and air escort become available. Such a powerful agency does not exist as yet. Aerial and coastal protection necessary to insure safe operation of the routes must be furnished by Air Force and Army.

12 June 1941.

Situation conference:

North Africa: Minor changes in enemy dispositions, furnishing no clues to offensive intentions. Still, an attack need not be ruled out. It may well develop in the coming month.

bright nights.

Fifth Lt. Div., having now been taken out of line, is held in readiness for counterattacking southeast of Tobruk. Will work together with elements of Fifteenth Div., which were also withdrawn.

Syria: Local British advances, mainly along coast; in this sector, Dentz has no means for striking back.

Turkey: Will not intervene in Syria. It looks to them that Dentz has little chance to hold out long. Britain has not todate approached Turkey to take positive action in the fighting in Syria.

22nd Div., with Arty. and trains will arrive in operational area between 20 and 25 June.

Gen. Konrad: Reports back after illness. -- Dietl's wishes concerning Air Force support for "Silberfuchs" -- Uniformity in procedure for enemy reports in Air Force and Army. -- Exchange of information between the two Branches of the Armed Services and its organization. -- Exchange of maps. -- North-African supply problem and what Air Force can do for it.

- Gercke:
- a) Personnel questions: Recommendation for promotion of Bork and Ludwiger.
 - b) Railroad operation. Allocation of cars for industry and coal distribution satisfactory in spite of maximum railroad schedule.
 - c) Motor trucks for operations on RR tracks: Available 174. Can pull 3 trucks, with through-brakes.
 - d) Construction of bridge near Edirne makes no headway, because Turks want their own contractors to do the work. We are interested in having the work done quickly, for we may need that railroad line next fall.
 - e) Organizational questions: "Inspectorate of Railway Troops" is necessary also in wartime. Some Brigade Hqs required for control of these troops.

Inspection of CP motor caravan: One van for ObdH, one van for Gen.Staff.

Fellgiebel reports on his tour in the East: Suggestions:

- a) Dummy movements in Hungary and Romania, in coordination with AGp. South.
- b) Hqs must be instructed on proper radio procedure for traffic between rear and forward CPs.

Gen Qu:

- a) Organizational set-up of "Armed Forces Commander Southeast".* -- Relationship between Military Commander "Serbia" and "German General Bulgaria". Take Army Hq 2 out of theater.

- b) Organization of supply services for Africa. Transport dictator.
- c) Road-rail automobile and rail prime movers.
- d) Issue no more orders involving basic changes prior to "Barbarossa".

Op. Sec.:

- a) Briefing of Corps Hqs of GHq reserves. Reception Hqs; assembly and transfer to front. *
- b) Improve defense preparedness of Channel Islands.
- c) Ninth Armd.Div. has difficulties getting equipment together. Second Armd.Div. will help out, but as a result will complete own outfitting later than scheduled.

13 June 1941.

Situation conference:

Tobruk: Solum unchanged. Pavia Div.** has taken over southern front at Tobruk. Fifth Lt. Div. taken out of line.

Romania: Readyng of ships for Bessarabia. Dismantling of tracks on railroad bridge.*** Radio communication with Navy. *#

East: Movements on schedule.

Syria: French reports sound somewhat better now; apparently British advance along the coast and south of Damascus has been checked.

General Bogatsch:

- a) Missions for close-range reconnaissance Staffeln. I won't let him use also the OKH Staffeln at the start; their turn comes later.
- b) Allocation of AAA to Armies.

OQu IV (at first with Mellenthin): Position of Attachés in relation to the "German Generals" (in Bulgaria etc.,) Military Missions etc. Intelligence Center under Rohde in Middle East.

Col. Ziegler: (C of S XXXXII Corps) drops in while here for briefing of Corps Hqs of the GHq Reserves.

General Thomas (Armament Economy Office): Fuel reserves will be exhausted in fall. Aviation gasoline will be down to one-half, regular gasoline to one-quarter, and Diesel and fuel-

oil to one-half of requirements.
Cooperation with Armament Economy Office.

Political questions: Operational plans cannot be tailored to suit economic planners.

OQu I: Dissension regarding relocation of replacement units in the West are settled between Army Hq 1 and BdE.

von dem Borne, Heggenreiner * and Rommel are ganging up on Gause in his new post.

Gen Qu: C in C Balkans; legal and administrative tasks.

Buhle: a) Report on Eastern tour. Divs. on the whole in better shape than last spring. Very satisfactory over-all impression.

b) Repair facilities for Armd. troops. How much static and mobile?

c) Special Bn. Irak — To be formed with volunteers. **

Conference with ObdH after his return from the East:

a) Over-all impression satisfying. Troops in good shape. Operational planning generally well thought through. Open questions: Timing of attack. Some of the Corps want dawn instead of 0330.

What to do in the event that enemy attacks before we strike. Proclamation to troops on attack on Russia. Must set forth reasons! ***

b) Review of the situation created on the Balkans by the new OKW order (with Gen Qu present).

c) Review of general situation.

Heusinger: Report on Eastern tour with ObdH. His impressions parallel those of ObdH.

Gen. Paulus: a) How to overcome the difficulties confronting the mission of Gause's Staff in Gariboldi's Hq.

b) Shift of replacement units of BdE to France.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

a) Dummy Radio traffic in Hungarian territory prior to "Barbarossa". Consultation with the Hungarians on 18 June.

b) Radio communications during shifts of CPs.

14 June 1941. (General conference in
Fuehrer's Office).

Reports on "Barbarossa" by the CGs Army Gps., Armies and Armd.
Groups.

1100 : Falkenhorst together with Stumpff (Air Force) report
on "Silberfuchs". Northern Group, B plus 7; Southern Group,
plus 9.

1300 - 1400. : Report of CGs. Armies and Armd. Gp. of AGp.
South. The question of control of Romanian Army is clar-
ified. Up to the start of offensive operations, Antonescu
will formally exercise supreme control in Romania. Army
Hq 11 will be attached to him as his "working staff", and
thus will be in actual control, but orders to the Romanian
troops must be issued through Antonescu. -- In this set-up
the "Army Mission" will act as liaison staff between Army
Hq 11 and Antonescu. Hungary will not be taken into
confidence, but merely advised that Hungarian defense
measures must take into consideration the mounting strength
of Russian forces on her border.

Slovakia will not be informed for the time being. On start
of hostilities, their Army Command will be requested to get
their troops ready to move, in order to be able to repel a
Russian advance into Slovak territory. (Employment
desirable on the Russian border south of Seventeenth Army.)

After luncheon, the Fuehrer delivers a lengthy political
address, in which he explains the reasons for his intention
to attack Russia and evolves his calculation that Russia's
collapse would induce England to give in.

1630 - 1830 : Report on measures in the Baltic (Adm.
Schmundt), afterwards AGp. North and Center.

Prolonged debate on the dangers which threaten GHq * from
the Bialystok salient. Minefields !**

It has now been decided to advance Zero Hour from 0330. to
0300.

15 June 1941. (Sunday, Berlin).

Farewell visit to Gerti. -- Visit to Farbfilm-Foto*** to take a
look at the color photo taken at home. -- Visit by Koppen-
berg. #

16 June 1941.

Situation report:

- a) Superior British forces, striking far to the south and southwest, have been attacking Solum since Sunday morning. British throw in 150 - 200 tanks. Enemy has air superiority. 60 tanks knocked out, also 11 airplanes. Tank battle southwest of Capuzzo. All attacks have been repelled.
British are transferring airplanes to the Eastern Mediterranean. Intensified British submarine activity in the Mediterranean (embracing Aegean).
- b) Operations area of Russian Navy. Russian patrol activity at Hangoe and on the western end of the Gulf of Finland.
- c) U.S. Navy shifts its main concentration to the Atlantic.

Jakob:

- a) Turun-Magurele bridge dismantled (11 June), will be moved to Cernavoda* and replaced by large ferry.
- b) Sybel ferries have arrived at Cernavoda.
Constanza: 23 ferries under construction (number to be increased to 47). Will not be ready before 25 June.
- c) Mine detectors for Eleventh Army.

Conference with Field Marshal List in ObdH's office regarding appointment of "Armed Forces Commander Southeast".

- Buhle:
- a) Reinforcement of Channel Island defenses: 3 22 cm Btrys., 3 15 cm gun Btrys., 6 siege gun-18 Btrys.
 - b) Assault guns and Tank IV. Use of assault guns as substitutes for lacking tanks IV.
 - c) Question of furloughs in Africa. 2% of furloughs in ZI, 3% in African rest centers. Replace married personnel.**
 - d) Replacement situation: By 1 October Replacement Army will be 450,000 strong. Anticipated normal attrition losses (sickness, discharge for unfitness, etc.) 150,000. This leaves 300,000 plus 70,000 in Field Replacement Bns., a total of 370,000, as replacements for battle losses in "Barbarossa".
 - e) Current business. Also expression of views on organization program of Railway Engineers.

Briefing of Liaison Officers at Army Gp., Army and Armd. Gp.Hqs.

Afterwards Heusinger for current business; current matters turned over to Paulus.

Buhle: Get ready 900th Brigade. Will be committed around

Ostrolenka, under tactical control of AGp. B, to guard against any Russian breakout attempt from the Bialystok salient; otherwise GHq Reserve.

17 June 1941.

By plane to Wiener Neustadt -- Belgrade -- Bucharest (conference with Army Mission and Attaché) -- Constanza -- Danube Delta -- Bacau (Moldavia) and to Hq Eleventh Army.

18 June 1941.

Tour by plane and car along northern and eastern border of Romania. Defense positions. In the evening conference in Eleventh Army Hq. At dinner I meet the Romanian War Minister.

19 June 1941.

Rain during the night causes severe floods which complicate ride to Bacau airfield in the morning. Take-off delayed. Flight above clouds (4,000 m) to Budapest, where we are received by Gen. Werth; luncheon and conference. -- By air to Bratislava (conference with Gen. Ott and Military Attaché Becker). -- Return flight to Rangsdorf.

20 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) North Africa: Defensive success at Solum. Two enemy tank brigades at least badly crippled (200 tanks). X Air Corps transfers the following new units to Africa: 1 long-range fighter Staffel, and 2 divebomber Staffeln.
- b) East: Assembly of troops proceeding according to plan. Weather favorable. Rivers partly below normal.
- c) Replacement units in Mil. Districts II and III go to XX and XXI on 23 June, from Protectorate to Mil. District I * on 15 July.
- d) Molotov wanted to see the Fuehrer on 18 June.

Heusinger:

- a) Fuehrer concerned about area west of Augustow,* and about Romania. Augustow: Use SS and 900th Brigade, Romania: Parts of 5th Armd. Div. are to be sent over (Fuehrer's wish). Actually only components available are: two-thirds of 13th Rifle Regt. and 2nd Bn./31st Armd. Regt. Movement from Athens to Romania will take 8 - 9 days. For now they can go to Saloniki (2-3 days).
- b) East: Squabble between AGps. North and Center about jump-off time. Protection of Vistula bridges (AAA). SS Adolf Hitler will not be ready in time. Tracked components leave on 22 June, others not before 25 June.
- c) Romania: New Command set-up. Hq of Romanian Third Army steps down.**
- d) 46th and 294th Divs. in Belgrade area ready to be shipped. Move 294th Div. to Saxony.
- e) AGp. South wants 4th Mt. Div. No! May follow up as GHq Reserve behind Seventeenth Army in its drive on Jaroslav.

Gen. Oehquist: Wishes of the Finnish C in C.

- 1.) Want to receive request of German High Command to start Ladoga operation at latest possible date.
- 2.) Operation east of Lake Ladoga is the one they want.
- 3.) Seven days' alert notice for start of operation (five days only in an emergency). Something new!
- 4.) Finnish High Command wants to have V Corps freed as soon as possible for operation Ladoga. Other items of information:
 - a) Difficult food situation.
 - b) Mobilization starts on 18 June. Completed 28 June.

Gen. Bogatsch: AAA protection of Vistula bridges. First use troops available on the spot. Nothing must be taken from the weak AAA of Ground Forces, at least not in the first days.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Transfer of GHq. Current Gen. Staff questions.

Conference with ObdH on my travel impressions and on "Barbarossa". No important new viewpoints.

In the evening we receive the Fuehrer proclamation to the troops for "Barbarossa". A longwinded manifesto, surprisingly in a predominant political tenor.

Late in the evening von Ziehlberg still has some reports on personnel matters (Ia, VI Corps).

21 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Codeword "Dortmund" * has come through.
- b) Materiel position of SS Adolf Hitler has improved. Div. may yet get ready in time.
- c) Losses at Solum are on a reasonable scale: Total 560 men, with proportion of killed considerably lower than at Tobruk. Number of missing large, but that is probably inevitable in such desert battles.
- d) Hungary has effected certain improvements in her border defenses (AT guns).
- e) The SS destined as security force on border north of the Bialystok tip, will go to Arys.**
- f) Syria: Situation not unfavorable. Attitude of French airmen is becoming increasingly pro-German.

Gen. Brand, Gen. Buhle:

- a) Artillery developments. Gen. Staff comments on development program of Chief of Armament.
- b) Brand reports on his inspection tour: Artillery assembly in the East.
- c) Ratio of combined German and Romanian artillery to Russian is as 2.2 : 2.9.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Current organizational matters.
- b) Tank developments program next fall (Schell).
- c) Experiences gained in refitting Armd. units after the Southeast operation.

Gen. von Kirchheim:

- a) Experiences in North Africa. Suggests forming of Camel Transport columns (6,000 camels equal to two 30-ton truck columns).
- b) Disbanding of Colonial Staff.
- c) Personal impressions on relations between certain personalities in North Africa.
- d) Requirements for attack on Tobruk: 9 Rifle Bns., 3 Combat Eng. Bns. 30 Rocket Projectors Btrys.

Maj. Gen. Paulus: Reorganization of office routine after start of operation. (Written instructions for internal Gen. Staff service).

Gen. Matzky: a) Britain: 42 combat-fit Divs. and 7 newly activated Divs. in the homeland.

- b) Resources for moving British troops to Senegambia.
- c) Time required for shipping one British Div. by sea: 3 weeks (assembly, loading and unloading) plus voyage.
- d) Rhode team for collection of intelligence in the Middle East installed in Ankara.
- e) Individual Army officers on special missions will be subordinate to the Military Attaches.
- f) 25 Romanian highschool graduates will enter the German Army as officer candidates.

Wagner - Baentsch:

- a) Possibility of transport difficulties in the Lublin corner. If necessary, make adjustments in troop transport ports.
- b) Suspension of Fieldpost from the ZI to the Army between B plus 1 to B plus 5.
- c) Oversea Staff (an OKW creation which in that form comes too late and is ineptly organized).

Wagner alone:

- d) Conferences of Gen Gu in France: "Attila", "Haifisch", "Isabella".
- e) French political situation. (Intrigues by our political agencies make Darlan's position very difficult.)
- f) Test mobilization of "Resurrection columns" was a full success. *

Heusinger:

- a) Thirteenth Rifle Regt. for Romania? (arrives Saloniki 25 June, could reach Romania 29 June) OKW's interest slackening.
- b) Il Duce offers for Eastern operation: One Corps Hq, 2 Cav. Divs., 1 mot. unit (to operate on the Balkans?),**
- c) Slovakia: No political steps intended.
- d) Air Force (Waldau) reports that it is ready.
- e) ObdH would like to have 164th Div. in "Barbarossa". Now "marooned" on Greek islands. Will not arrive in time. Could be used in Anatolia operation. Will be offset by a Div. of Fifteenth Draft.

Enemy intelligence: Heightened Russian alertness reported in some places (manning of positions facing VIII Corps).

Finnish mobilization proclamations reported to have been posted.

Conference schedule in "Barbarossa":

In my office: 0900 and 2000.
ObdH: about 1000 and 2100.
Report to Fuehrer after conferences.

Balance of strength:

Germany ("Barbarossa" front):

102 Inf. Divs. (incl. 4 lt. and 2 Mt. Divs.)
19 Armd. Divs.
14 mot. Divs. (incl. 4 SS Divs.)
5 Special Divs. (i.e., 3 Security Divs. and 2 Divs.
Fifteenth Draft
1 Cav. Div.

Total 141 Divs.

Russia (entire European Russia)

154 Inf. Divs.
25 $\frac{1}{2}$ Cav. Divs.
37 moto-mcz. Brigs.

Total 213 Divs. (rounded figure).

THE CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA.

22 Juni 1941. (Sunday) 1st Day.

The morning reports: indicate that all Armies (except Eleventh) have started the offensive according to plan. Tactical surprise of the enemy has apparently been achieved along the entire line. All bridges across the Bug river, as on the entire river frontier, were undefended and are in our hands intact. That the enemy was taken by surprise is evident from the facts that troops were caught in their quarters, that planes on the airfields were covered up, and that enemy groups faced with the unexpected development at the front inquired at their Hqs in the rear what they should do. More effects of the surprise may be anticipated from the assaults of our Armor, which have been ordered in all sectors. The Navy reports that the enemy seems to have been taken by surprise also in their zone of action. His reactions to the measures of the last few days were of a purely passive nature, and he now is holding back his naval forces in ports, apparently in fear of mines.

Paulus communicates to me 1100. State Secretary von Weizsaecker's appraisal of the situation: Britain will at first feel relieved by the news of our attack on Russia and will rejoice at the "dispersal of our forces". But a rapid advance of German troops will soon bring disillusionment, for the defeat of Russia cannot but lead to a marked strengthening of our position in Europe.

As to Britain's readiness for an accord with us he has this to say: The propertied classes will strive for a settlement leaving us a free hand in the East, but it would involve renunciation of our claims to Holland and Belgium. If these tendencies are to prevail, Churchill has to be overthrown, as he relies on the support of the Labor Party, which is not interested in a peace concluded by the propertied classes. Such a peace would bring the propertied interests back into power, whereas the Labor Party wants power for itself. The Labor Party therefore will continue the war until the propertied class is entirely eliminated. Under what conditions it would eventually be willing to come to terms with Germany, cannot be predicted. Probably vehement opposition to National Socialism, by reason of strong Jewish influence and Communist connections. For the time being, in any case, the Labor Party will not be disposed to put an end to the war.

In the Far East, an attack by Japan on Britain appears unlikely. Both Japan and U.S. will endeavour to keep from being drawn into the war. It is in Germany's interest to keep both out of the conflict; otherwise the war, both in duration and resources would be entirely out of control, and the making of an eventual peace would be infinitely complicated.

Kinzel, Matzky:

- a) Russian operational mot. Reserve Group Pskow has been located south of the Dvina river(!), 300 km southwest of the area where it was originally believed to be.
That's just right for us!
- b) Identity of various Russian units confirmed. Russian radio signal: Staff Third Army wiped out, send long-range fighters.
- c) Situation in Syria is becoming critical. Damascus fallen, British mot. forces advancing on Palmyra from the east.

1200. Report that Russians have resumed international radio communications, which were interrupted this morning. They have asked Japan to act as intermediary in the political and economic relations between Russia and Germany, and are in constant radio contact with the German Foreign Office.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): reports on war situation at sea. Russians surprisingly passive.

1330. Op. Sec.:

- a) Air Force reports 800 enemy aircraft destroyed (First Air Fleet 100, Second Air Fleet 300, Fourth Air Fleet 400). Leningrad sea approaches mined without losses. Own losses so far 10 aircraft.
- b) AGp. Center reports wild flight on the Brest-Litovsk - Minsk road. Russian command organization in complete confusion.
- c) AGp. South reports that own patrols have crossed the Prut river between Galatz and Husi and Jassy without encountering any resistance. Bridges are in our hands.

Afternoon: Reports on advances especially north of Brest-Litovsk (Hoth) and of Armd. Gp. 4 (Hoepfner).

Italy declares herself to be in a state of war with Russia.

The over-all picture of the first day of the offensive is as follows:

The enemy was surprised by the German attack. His forces were not in tactical disposition for defense. The troops in the border zone were widely scattered in their quarters. The frontier itself was for the most part weakly guarded.

As a result of this tactical surprise, enemy resistance directly on the border was weak and disorganized, and we succeeded everywhere in seizing the bridges across the border rivers and in piercing the defense positions (field fortifications) near the frontier.

After the first shock, the enemy has turned to fight. There have been instances of tactical withdrawals and no doubt also disorderly retreats, but there are no indications of an attempted operational disengagement. Such a possibility can moreover be discounted. Some enemy Hqs have been put out of action, e.g., in Bialystok, and some sectors so are deprived of high echelon control. But quite apart from that, the impact of the shock is such that the Russian High Command could not be expected in the first few days to form a clear enough picture of the situation to make so far-reaching a decision. On top of everything, the command organization is too ponderous to effect swift operational regrouping in reaction to our attack, and so the Russians will have to accept battle in the disposition in which they were deployed.

Our Divs. on the entire offensive front have forced back the enemy on an average of 10 to 12 km. This has opened the path for our Armor.

In AGp. South, Group Kleist was able to get its northern and central Corps moving in the noon hours. If, as seems likely, they reach the Styr river still today, they will have to fight it out with the enemy mot. Group east of the Styr tomorrow and the day after. The outcome will be decisive for their operational freedom of movement.

In AGp. Center, the right wing of Armd. Gp. Guderian (Third and Fourth Armd. Divs.) was for a time held up in difficult wooded terrain (which I believe could have been avoided) and will start rolling on the Brest - Minsk motor highway toward evening, if all goes well. The northern wing (Lemelsen) has pierced the opposing enemy forces and has gained operational freedom of movement. The two coming days will show in what way Guderian can dispose of the enemy mot. forces round Minsk. Once they are beaten, the operational success of this Armd. Group is assured.

North of Bialystok, Armd. Group Hoth scored quite a remarkable success. It has pushed through the forest and lake country to the Njemen river. The important crossings near Olita and Merkinė have fallen into our hands intact. Advance elements of eight Divs., thrown against it have been scattered and there is no organized enemy resistance in front of it. Full operational freedom of movement appears to have been achieved in this sector.

In the area of AGp. North, Armd. Gp. Hoepfner has battled its way to the Dubissa river and captured two crossings intact. Here the enemy will be able to throw fresh forces against us from his depth in the next few days.

The Army Gps. are pursuing their original objectives. Nor is there any reason for a change. OKH has no occasion to issue any orders. The time is not ripe yet for a decision on how to employ Eleventh Army. Our assault troops have crossed the Prut river at various points and have seized the bridges. But there are no signs that the Russians are yielding the area between Pruth and Dniestr.

Slovakia has offered for immediate commitment an Armd. Gp. in the strength of about a reinforced Regt., to be ready at Presov by 23, evening. The offered Group is accepted and assigned to Seventeenth Army. In addition, two Divs., to be brought up to war strength immediately, will be available by 25 June. They, too, will go to Seventeenth Army.

Hungary, which has stationed 2 Brigs. on her border and 3 Armd. Brigs. behind them under VIII Corps Hq, has closed her frontier. On the political side we make no request to Hungary. If the soldiers want to join us, let them prevail on their politicians to do so.

Air Force reports 850 enemy airplanes shot down. This number includes entire bomber squadrons, committed without fighter escort, which were taken on and destroyed in the air by our fighters.

23 June 1941. 2nd Day.

The morning reports of 23 June and the concluding daily reports for 22 June, which came in during the night, indicate that an enemy attempt at disengagement must be expected. AGp. North even believes that the enemy may have made this decision as far back as four days ago.

The assumption that considerable portions of the enemy are further in the rear than we assumed, and are partly being taken back even now, is corroborated by the fact that our troops, although they had to fight for it, did penetrate the border areas to a depth of as much as 20 km on the first day, and by the absence of any large take of prisoners and the singular absence of any major artillery activity; another indication would be the withdrawal of mot. Corps in the direction of Minsk.

In front of AGp. South also the enemy appears to be falling back eastward from the Hungarian border, in order to get his forces out of the pocket. The fact that troops are moving frontward in some places does not argue against these inferences, for these are spots where a rapid advance of German troops would compromise the withdrawal, e.g. opposite Armd. Group Hoth and Kleist's northern wing, and in the IV Corps sector of Seventeenth Army.

In view of all this we must adhere to our plan for the operations north of the Pripet Marshes, that is, to push the two Armd. wedges of Guderian and Hoth on Minsk and pinch off the Bialystok pocket. Prospects of success are good. If we succeed, the hole torn into the entire Russian front will be so large and elimination of so many enemy Divs. will have changed the balance of strength so greatly in our favor that we shall have full operational freedom.

The situation looks more difficult in the sector of AGp. South, because in abandoning the original plan of operation, based on Romania *, we have thrown away our best strategic opportunity. We shall have to confine ourselves to probing for the soft spot and then drive an Armd. wedge through it as hard as we can. At the moment this soft spot seems to present itself on the motor highway in Kleist's central sector, north of Tarnopol.

1200 Himer (on phone): We gratefully accept every kind of Hungarian cooperation, provided it does not strain our road and rail communications with Romania.

1400. By plane to Elbing, and then by car to new Hq. * *

Development of situation: In AGp. South, in Romania, the Russians are attacking our Prut bridgeheads and are making reconnaissance forays against the Romanian Cavalry from Cernauti. That's very good ! ***

In Seventeenth Army sector enemy resistance seems to be slackening in the direction of Lwow. In Sixth Army sector, the faulty development of Thirteenth Armd. Div. has had the result that Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd. Divs. could not start off and are now waiting on the northward highway, until the Infantry has cleared the way for them. The farthest advance has been made by Eleventh Armd. Divs., after battling it out with enemy tanks. Unfortunately Thirteenth Div. is not now behind it. Another Div. will be moved up, but what a loss of time !

In AGp. Center everything goes according to plan. Hoth has made the farthest advance, whereas Guderian is being checked again and again. This occasions a discussion with AGp. B, as to whether Hoth should continue his drive on Minsk, or had better strike at once farther north, for Polotsk. As a matter of fact, von Bock, from the start, had objections against a joint operation by the two Armd. Gps. in the direction of Smolensk, and wanted Hoth to strike farther north. That, however, would have put an almost impassable strip of water and marshland between Hoth and Guderian, enabling the enemy to beat the groups separately. Such a possibility merits consideration all the more as the Russians are the originators of the idea of quick mass concentration (Budjonny), and inasmuch some reports of withdrawals would indicate that the Russians might be attempting to concentrate Armor far in the rear.

The over-all picture is best characterized by the report from Fourth Army: The enemy in the Bialystok pocket is not fighting for his life, but to gain time.

I very much doubt that the enemy High Command really has unified and organized control of the situation. It rather looks as if the local withdrawal movements both of the Ground Forces and of the Air Force are being carried out under the pressure of our advances, and that it is impossible at this time to speak of a planned withdrawal.

The only exception is perhaps the enemy in front of AGp. North. Here a withdrawal, probably behind the Dvina river, seems in fact to have been prepared long ago. We cannot yet see through the reasons for that. Perhaps the Russians thought we might demand disputed Lithuania and so were preparing to abandon the country to us. In spite of these preparations the enemy has remained in his positions near the border around Bialystok; this can be explained only by the deficient and plodding working of the Russian Command machinery.

At the evening situation conference, the question is discussed whether Hoth and Guderian should continue to drive on Vitebsk and Orsha. In any case Hoth's right wing must advance to the high ground around Minsk. If necessary, he must wait there for Guderian. ObdH discusses the situation in these terms with Field Marshal von Bock.

Midnight: Talk with Paulus and Bogatsch on having the OKH air Staffeln carry out reconnaissance on the upper Dvina and the upper Dniepr.

24 June 1941. 3rd Day.

Situation: The final reports for 23 June and today's morning reports confirm the picture we gained so far.

The enemy is making a stand almost everywhere in the border area. Our troops do not fully grasp this because resistance was disorganized and relatively ineffective in consequence of the tactical surprise achieved. In the country traversed by our tanks there are still substantial active enemy forces broken up in smaller groups. The number of prisoners, which on the first day ran to about 2,000 in every Army sector (i.e. a total of about 10,000), will increase only in the next few days, when the drives of our Armd. wedges will have taken full operational effect. There are no signs of an operational withdrawal of the enemy. Only in the North an attempt is being noted to take back forces; this may be done with a view to building up a Russian Dvina front, which might compel us to move over Hoepfner's Armd. Group nearer to Hoth, so as to cross the Dvina in its upper reaches. *

The supply situation is taking a normal development. The first Advance Supply Points are being moved forward. Fuel and oil consumption very high. Expenditure of ammunition low.

Losses in wounded and killed are moderate. Remarkably high officer casualties.

Bogatsch: Submits report on Air effort. On the whole the same picture.

Wagner: reports on supply. Decision: Bulk of MT Regts. will advance toward Smolensk.

Fellgiebel: Digest of radio intelligence: The operational Reserve Groups surmised north of Schaulen, around Minsk and around Shepetowka, far from moving eastward, are even shifting forces to the battle front. Only isolated front Corps opposite AGp. Center are being taken back in small bounds.

Gercke: Change of gauge of railroad track east of the frontier has been started, as planned. *

1530. ObdH returns from the Fuehrer:

- a) Fuehrer is worried that our ring around Bialystok is not close enough.
- b) The Italians, who will send one Corps to Romania, must in no case be allowed in the Crimea. **
- c) Spaniards (Spanish Legion). Nothing definite yet about activation and arrival, but it will be best to equip them with arms ourselves.

Lt.Col. Kahlden, Liaison Officer to Hoth's Corps, reports.

Noon: Vilna, Kovno, Kedainiai taken. Interesting historical coincidence that Napoleon also took Vilna on 24 June.

The picture in the course of the afternoon is as follows:

AGp. South is advancing against counter-attacks, especially strong in IV Corps sector, north of Lwow. Very heavy enemy casualties. New heavy enemy tank! The right wing of Seventeenth Army has reached its objective, the high ground of Mosciska. Armd. Gp. Kleist now has 4 Armd.Divs. in line and has reached the Styr river. The enemy throws into the battle all reserves available in the rear, so that there is a chance that we might smash the entire enemy force in the Ukraine in the battles of the next few days. The stubborn resistance of individual Russian units is remarkable. Bunker crews have blown themselves up with their bunkers, rather than surrender.

In the sector of AGp. Center closing of the ring east of Bialystok, in the Minsk area, is nearing completion. Hoth, who against von Bock's opposition, has been ordered by OKH to strike through Molodeczno toward the high ground north of Minsk, is only 30 km from Minsk. He now stands in the rear of the last enemy Reserve Group which was thrown from Minsk toward Baranowichi against Guderian's advancing Armd. Group and, supported by reinforcements brought westward through Slazk, has engaged him in the Slonim area. If Guderian makes headway in the direction of Baranowichi, in the next few days the ring will be completely sealed. Air Force must prevent any eastward retreat of the forces coming from Sluzk.

In the further development of the battle, Fourth Army must advance its left wing Corps toward Volkovysk, and Ninth Army its right wing Corps (XX) toward Lunna, in order to

form an inner ring of Infantry around Bialystok; this ring must be made as tight as possible by moving up additional Infantry from the west.

The time necessary to complete this will be utilized to allow the components of Guderian's and Hoth's Armd.Gps. to close up on the high ground around Minsk. Meanwhile strong Advance Combat Teams can secure the crossings on the Upper Dniepr at Mogilev and Orsha, and on the Upper Dvina, at Vitebsk and Polozk. Continuation of the offensive by the combined Armd. Gps. toward the high ground northwest of Smolensk only after consultation with OKH.

Army Group North has to fight off strong enemy tank attacks almost along its entire front; the only exception is the sector of 291st Div., which is advancing on Libau. These attacks are probably maintained by III Russian Armd. Corps, originally in the area, and by several *noto-moz* Brigs. Nevertheless the strong right wing of AGp. has forged ahead to Vilkomir. Here, too, the Russians are fighting stubbornly and doggedly.

Generally speaking, it is now clear that the Russians are not thinking of withdrawal, but are throwing in everything they have to stem the German invasion. Throughout this effort, the High Command seems to remain entirely in the background. The reasons are not clear, but the absence of any large-scale operational reserves probably precludes its effective intervention. That the Russians had adapted their plans to an all-out defensive near the border, is also demonstrated by the large quantities of stores which were to be the logistical basis of the plan.

As to the previously known operational reserves, we have as yet no clear idea of the whereabouts of Armd.Gp. Pskov, which is reported to have been moved forward to the area between Schaulen and the Dvina river, but apparently has not as yet been committed against AGp. North. Such a policy would be in keeping with Russian tactics, always to keep back some forces against the possibility of the breakdown of the enemy attack.

The course of the entire battle evolves gratifyingly according to plan. A new feature in the sectors of AGp. South and AGp. North are the new heavy Russian tanks, reported to be armed with 8 cm guns and, according to another, but untrustworthy, observation from AGp. North, even 15 cm guns.

The enemy air force is completely out of the picture after the very high initial losses (reports speak of 2,000).

After the evening conference with ObdH the following orders are issued:

- a) Eleventh Army must get ready to attack (time needed: 5 days).
- b) 900th Brigade is made available to AGp. Center to

complete the ring circling Bialystok.

- c) Liaison Staff North receives instructions that Finland must make all preparations for starting offensive east of Lake Ladoga. The operation must be on a front of at least 6 Divs., with main weight on left wing and objectives deep in enemy territory.

Prolonged discussion as to the most efficient command set-up for continuance of operations by AGp. Center. Should Armd. Gps. 2 and 3, which probably can no longer be controlled by AGp. Hq, be placed under command of Fourth Army Hq? Second Army Hq then would take charge of the investment of Bialystok. Or should Guderian assume command of all armored operations? -- Talk with OQu I and Gen Qu.

I believe it would be impossible for Fourth Army Hq to direct the offensive of Fourth Army and at the same time conduct the operations to reduce Bialystok. Since von Bock cannot get through to Minsk on his signal communications, the best plan would be for von Kluge, as he once did in the West, to take over control (in addition to Infantry, i.e. the two Corps on the right wing of his Army) of the two Armd. Gps. together with responsibility for their supply. It might be desirable to leave Supply Officer Fourth Army at Bialystok, under control of Second Army Hq, which will be in charge there, and reassign Supply Officer Second Army to Fourth Army instead.

I object to putting Guderian in command of the combined Armd. Gps.

Sweden will raise no difficulties about transit of 163rd Div. through Swedish territory. Entraining at Oslo may start on 25 June, evening. Authorization will also be given for our planes to fly across Sweden. Russian planes will be fired at.

25 June 1941. 4th Day.

Review of the situation in the morning generally confirms the impression that the Russians have accepted the great border battle and are taking back only those positions of the front, which are being pushed back under the enormous impact of our attack.

This, for instance, is the case in the sector of AGp. North. It is hard to tell whether I Armd. Corps (Pskev), which in the last few days was moved across the Dvina river to the area south of Riga, has been committed against Leeb's northern flank, in its entirety or only in part. Certain is, that III Armd. Corps, which had been in this area from the start, has been beaten by Reinhard's Armd. Corps, and that von Manstein's Armd. Corps has advanced so far to the

east that the Russians have been compelled to take their forces behind the Dvina. They are trying to do this by striking at us with their Armor, and meanwhile run a large transport movement from the north to the far bank of the Dvina, between Riga and Jakobsstadt.

On the front of AGp. Center., the inevitable critical situations develop, which are the normal accompaniment of any turning movement preparatory to a battle with inverted front. The Russians are making strong, if uncoordinated attempts to gain elbow room by attacking in the direction of Grodno, in the north, and on the front of Fourth Army, in the south, and so check the sweep of our eastward drive. These attempts have failed everywhere, despite an occasional critical situation in VIII Corps, whose western wing is being attacked also by strong Russian Cavalry. But it is necessary to supplement the pressure by Fourth Army, from the south toward Volkovysk, by corresponding counter-pressure by Ninth Army, from the north, in order to form an inner encircling ring of Infantry Corps south of the confluence of Szczara Njemen rivers, while Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. form an outer ring by linking up at Minsk. This will keep the enemy bottled up in the Bialystok pocket and prevent repetition of what happened on the Bzura in the Polish Campaign, that is, his pressing eastward (toward Novogrodek), which would delay and hamper liquidation of the pocket.

The attempts of the encircled enemy to fight his way back to Minsk through Slonim have resulted in local crises at Slonim (Seventeenth Armd. Div.).

In the sector of AGp. South, the enemy is bringing new forces toward Kovel from the east by rail and toward Rovno, by motorized movements. West of Rovno, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd. Divs. are still in aggressive action to force their way to the Styr river. On reserved roads in the central sector, Eleventh Armd. Div., which is now followed by Sixteenth, has got as far as Dubno across the Styr. Against this Div., the enemy already yesterday brought Infantry on a broad front from the south. It seems that he is moving new forces also from south and west against von Briesen's Corps, and IV Corps which now is slowly gaining ground toward the east after heavy fighting; The purpose apparently is to absorb the beaten elements and build up a new front - perhaps on the line Sambor - Lwow - Dubno. It is worth noticing that High Command of this front has moved Hqs up front, to Tarnopol.

Morning conference with ObdH shows full agreement of views.

AGp. Center must be instructed to go out to meet right wing of Fourth Army (VIII Corps), so as to form an inner encircling ring.

Conference ObdH with Fuehrer: Fuehrer is now less worried about the eastern closing line of the Bialystok pocket.

Bogatsch: Our air reconnaissance will cover the area between Pskov, Dvinsk, Rositten, Dvinsk, Upper Dvina and Upper Dniepr, Kovel.

Finnish Gen. Oehquist comes in for orientation on our ideas concerning the conduct of the Finnish offensive east of Lake Ladoga, and is informed of the instruction issued to Erfurth. *

Major von Below reports on his assignment as Liaison officer to Guderian. He confirms that 45th Div. suffered unnecessarily high casualties at Brest-Litovsk.

Order to Gen. Brand (Arty.):

- a) Collect data on effect of the "Karl" gun at Brest-Litovsk.
- b) Investigate conduct of Commander of 45th Div. at Brest-Litovsk.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) receives instructions to adapt supply arrangements to the following new command set-up in AGp. Center:

- a) CQu 4 is placed under Hq Second Army (the encircling Army).
- b) CQu 2 will make preparations for establishing a supply base at Minsk, and later become part of Hq Fourth Army.
- c) Fourth Army assumes control of Armd.Gps. 2 and 3.

Telephone talk with AGp. Center (von Tresckow): Swing 28th and 161st Div. southward, to have the ring east of Bialystok closed by Infantry Corps.

Detailed data are coming in on new Russian tanks, now committed on the front:

Weight 52 tons; front armor 37 cm (?), side armor 8 cm. Armed with 15,2 cm gun and 3 MGs. Crew of five. Speed: 30 km per hour; range 100 km.

Vulnerability: 5 cm AT gun penetrates at lower seam of turret. 8.8 cm AA apparently also penetrates the sides (still doubtful).

Another new type is reported with a 7.5 cm gun and 3 MGs.

1800. Gen. von Greiffenberg (C of S AGp. Center) reports on the execution of my order given to Tresckow. 28th and 161st Divs. will be turned southward in the direction ordered, to close the ring round Bialystok. Correspondingly, V and VI Corps of Ninth Army will move to the right, against the line Lida-Vilna. In order to prevent a gap to AGp. North, 900th Brig. will move to the left wing near Vilna. This meets our specifications. It is characteristic that Field Marshal von Bock expressly demands a written order, as he does not agree with us. (He does not want to do anything about the pocket forming to the south, and would rather press on to the east.)

OCq:IV reports on the Fuehrer's letter to Il Duce of 21 June, immediately before the start of "Barbarossa". Noteworthy points in that string of disjointed ideas:

Attack on Russia explained on grounds of Russian troop dispositions. Lessons drawn from Crete operation: In attacking an island air strength must be employed to the last plane.

War against Russia is aimed at England.

Syria will not be able to hold out long.

Attitude of France doubtful. Italy is requested rather bluntly to keep herself ready against France.

Egypt cannot be attacked before next fall. In that undertaking, Italy must be prepared to safeguard her western border in North Africa and if necessary also launch an attack in westward direction. Stepping up of submarine warfare in the Mediterranean is demanded.

Evening situation:

Russian strength front of Eleventh Army is estimated at 11 or 12 Divs. -- Eleventh Army can be ready to attack on 2 July. Air raids on Constanza are becoming heavier. -- German fighter Staffeln have been brought in for protection of the oil fields. -- Braila and Galatz also were attacked by Russian planes.

AGp. South: The battle has not yet reached full strength; it will be a few more days. Kleist has taken Dubno after hard fighting. Tank battle west of Luck still going on. Troop movements from the east through Kovel and Rovno, also movements to the front at Tarnopol and points west. Slovak Divs. (Corps Hq and 2 Divs.) ready around Presov on 28 and 29 June for assignment to AGp. South. Hungary's cooperation would be desirable, but Hungary wants us to extend an official request. That the Fuehrer does not want to do for political reasons.

AGp. Center: Situation at Slonim has been resolved. Action by 29th Div. mot. has freed Seventeenth Armd. Div. at Slonim for operations toward Minsk. Third Armd. Div. has started drive on Sluzk. Eighteenth Armd. Div., with parts of Third, has taken Baranovichi. Situation south of Grodno stabilized. Attack repulsed. Hoth has taken Voloshin and thus gained a foothold on the hill mass of Minsk.

AGp. North: In various sectors of the front local encirclement of strong enemy elements reported. Orderly movement at good pace in the planned direction. Hoepfner continues northeastward through Vilkomir.

In the evening an order is issued to Army Gp. Center on sealing the Bialystok pocket and on preparations for the new command set-up. By this order Hq Second Army (with OQu 4) will take over command of the encircling forces. Von Kluge will assume control of the components of Fourth Army, which are not needed for this job, viz., Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 (together with OQu 2, who is directly briefed by Gen Qu on building up an intermediate supply base around Minsk).

Later in the evening we receive a Fuehrer order on direction of operations of AGp. Center and South. It betrays concern that we are operating too far in depth. The old refrain!

But that is not going to change anything in our plans.

26 June 1941. 5th Day.

The closing situation on 25 June and the morning reports of 26 June show:

AGp. South is advancing slowly, unfortunately with considerable losses. The enemy on this front has energetic leadership. He is continuously throwing new forces against the tank wedge, attacking frontally, as before, and now also the southern flank, and, on the railroad to Kovel, apparently also the northern flank. The latter attack will hardly develop to anything serious, but the southern flank at present is still vulnerable, because we do not have sufficient forces available to give it adequate Inf. protection. (the conveyor belt system would be necessary here *), and also because Armd. Corps von Wietersheim, which is still far in the rear, cannot get to the front at the moment because the bad roads are crowded with vital supply traffic. It will be the overriding task of OKH to maintain a steady flow of reinforcements behind AGp. South.

AGp. Center: Development just as desired. Situation at Slonim cleared up. Guderian now is in a position to continue the attack with his right wing on Bobruisk, through Sluzk, and with the bulk of his forces through Baranovichi. Hoth, with 3 Armd. Divs. in front, is making good progress toward Minsk, so that the ring in this area probably will soon be closed and concentration of a strong armd. force for the thrust on Smolensk would appear assured.

The inner ring is closing according to plan. It seems that we might not be able to close it around Piaski, through Volkovysk, and would have to include the area around Novogrodek. For it is in that direction that enemy elements threatened with encirclement apparently are still trying to escape. Behind ** them, however, Hoth has already advanced toward Minsk, so that there is no danger of their escape. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to eliminate these forces with Inf.Divs. alone, without having to call on Hoth's Armd. Gp.

AGp. North is advancing eastward according to plan, encircling enemy elements in its path. The reported rail movement to Jakobstait (through Riga) seems to be without any special significance.

A very large retrograde rail movement from Schaulen to Riga is new evidence that the Russians are swinging back their entire northern wing.

Gen. Fellgiebel reports that signal communications to Minsk, through Kovno and through Baranovichi could be set up in

three days. This would make it possible for Hq AGp. Center to follow the eastward moving front.

Gen Bogatsch: Detailed air observations. Our reconnaissance organizations keep closed up to the front. Sporadic attacks on our airfields. -- Distribution of AA conforms with situation. -- Reconnaissance missions for OKH Staffeln.

Lt. Col. von Ziehlberg: Personnel matters. -- Clausius affair* (was Briesen's C of S).

Bogatsch: Important development: Heavy retrograde movements have been observed since this morning:

- a) 0720. : Minsk -- Borissov (20 trains), Minsk -- Orsha (10 trains) moving eastward. On the parallel motor highway dense motorized movements (two columns abreast) in same direction.
- b) 0645.: From Molodechno to Polotsk: 10 trains going east.
- c) Enemy air strength: In sector of AGp. South 1,200; Center 400; North 300 planes.
- d) At Orsha large tank and vehicle parks. Photographs show over 2,000 tanks, reconnaissance cars and trucks.

1415 Report AGp. North: Monitored radio signal from Eighth Armd. Div.: Dvinsk taken after hard fighting. From Armd. Gp. 3, through Liaison officer: Increasing enemy pressure on south flank impedes advance. Armd. Gp. 2 has taken Sluzk.

1815. Confirmed report passed on to Fuehrer: Eighth Armd. Div. penetrated into Dvinsk at 0800., occupied town at 1250. after hard street fighting (railroad bridge and vehicular bridge).

The evening reports indicate no important new developments.

In the sector of AGp. South the expected attack of strong tank forces against the south flank of Armd. Gp. 1 has started. Local enemy successes, but apparently no crisis. Armd. Gp. 1 is under direct tactical control of AGp. By moving Thirteenth Armd. Div. behind Eleventh Armd. Div., Armd. Gp. has shifted its main concentration to the right shoulder. Moving Armd. Divs. to the south flank from the rear has been initiated.

In AGp. Center, the attempts of the enemy to escape from the Bialystok pocket to the northeast or east, are now becoming strongly felt, as are those in the direction of Armd. Gp. Hoth's right flank. It will be necessary not only to push east with elements of Guderian's right wing, (Third Armd. Div.) which now has reached Sluzk, but also to send other elements (Fourth Armd. Div.) northward into the area between Baranovichi and Minsk, in order to seal this last gap through which encircled enemy elements

are escaping, and simultaneously to crack the Minsk barrier. Orders to this effect to AGp. Center.

In the sector of AGp. Center, extensive rail and road evacuations from Minsk and Vilejka toward the east and northeast. Evidently strong mot. elements are being taken back in order to build up a mot. Group in the area west of Moscow.

In the sector of AGp. North the enemy is falling back behind the Dvina river. Strong wedged-in enemy elements are causing our Inf. Divs. a lot of trouble even far behind the front.

For the first time our radio intelligence picture shows Moscow functioning as operational High Command.

Finland has been attacked by Russian air forces (10 ports and airdromes). She considers herself in a state of war with Russia.

Hungary has been attacked by the Russians from the air in the vicinity of the frontier. An official declaration of war is not intended, only retaliation for the air attack.

Croatia has made known its desire to participate with military forces in the war against Russia.

Romania: Russians have made a local thrust and started construction of a bridge across the northern arm of the Danube Delta. Our fighters attack Odessa, inflicting heavy losses.

27 June 1941

6th Day.

Daily reports of 26 June and morning reports of 27 June present the following great picture:

In the sector of AGp. South, von Kleist has not only repelled all enemy thrusts against his south flank, but his right wing has even gained ground toward the southeast. The front has moved a little eastward and with its 3 Armd. Divs. is now strong enough to warrant expectation of major advances soon.

The Russian formations thrown against the south flank have apparently been scraped together pell-mell. The Zhitomir Group probably has been committed against Kleist's front, the Russian Armd. Gp. Cernauti against his south flank. The Russian Armd. Group Tiraspol, transferred from Southern Bessarabia some days ago, is being moved northwest by rail and probably will soon turn up in front of Kleist's right shoulder, to be thrown into the battle as a last resort. After that we shall have smashed everything that can be brought to bear against AGp. South by the Russian Command in the Ukraine (which, one must admit, is

doing a pretty good job), and we shall then be free to swing to the south in order to force the enemy still holding around Lwow and on the Hungarian border to a battle with inverted front. This probably will come about at the time, when the Romanian assault army will just be ready to come out to meet us.

In the sector of AGp. Center everything is going as anticipated. The Bialystok enemy is moving more and more to the east. Our western front slowly follows him. Concentrations in the Novogrodek area, whose presence is now becoming more strongly felt, are pressing on Hoth's right flank and make it necessary for elements of V Corps (Ninth Army) to turn south, since enemy forces have also appeared north of the Njemen river. Fifth Div. thus detached from V Corps, will be replaced by 161st Div. VI Corps is being moved to the front well to the south of Vilna, and in its place 900th Brigade is thrown against Vilna, in order to safeguard the gradually widening gap to AGp. North.

AGp. North is moving strong Armor to Dvinsk and pushes Reinhard's Armd. Corps on Jakobstadt. The left wing of the Inf. Corps is advancing on Riga. Thus everything is proceeding according to plan. The penetration at Dvinsk has set off heavy panic movements on the enemy side. The impression is that strong forces are streaming east away from the Dvina.

On the whole, therefore, the picture is satisfactory in AGp. South as also in AGp. Center, though by now it is high time for Second Armd. Group to make headway on Minsk. In AGp. North the situation is very satisfactory.

At the morning conference, ObdH shows irritation because various movements in the Army Group sectors did not come off as agreed upon yesterday between ObdH and the Cs in C South and Center. This is the natural consequence of interference in the command of Army Gps. and Armies. Back here we cannot have a clearly detailed picture and so should confine ourselves to assigning broad missions and not try to direct the movements of individual Corps or even Divisions. At the front, under the pressure of events road conditions, etc., things take a different turn and the result is the erroneous impression that OKH orders are being ignored.

OKH air reconnaissance effort is employed over the strategic triangle Orsha, Vitebsk, Smolensk, in order to ascertain whether the enemy elements streaming back from Minsk and Polotsk are being formed into a new operational group between Minsk and Moscow. The plan may exist, but the capabilities for carrying it out appear to me slight.

Col. Ochsner:

- a) Report on the effectiveness of the Rocket Launchers in the assault on Brest-Litovsk. Apparently very satisfactory.

- b) Review of potentialities of bacteriological warfare against Britain (foot-and-mouth disease) and by Britain against us (cattle plague).

Gen. Himer (on phone, 1245): Hungary has announced on the radio that she is in a state of war with Russia. The Hungarian Gen. Staff knows nothing of a state of war.

Two days ago the political authorities inquired at the German Foreign Office whether Hungary's participation was required. The reply of the Foreign Office is still outstanding. It is not believed that the military authorities could readily comply with OKW and OKH's proposal that Hungary come in on her own accord. The Hungarian Gen. Staff has assembled the Mobile Corps (two mot. Brigs. and one Cavalry Brigade) in the neighborhood of Marmoros-Sziged and is standing by for employment on the right wing of the Hungarian Carpathian front. I tell Himer that the Carpathian Mountains cannot be forced by armor alone. To accomplish this it would be necessary to attack along the entire front. We would welcome a Hungarian thrust toward Kolomea-Stanislawow. I tell him to discuss these possibilities with Laszlo.*

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance and air situation. No important news. Emphasis on reconnaissance in the direction of Smolensk.

New reports: AGp. South: On Kleist's right wing, Sixteenth Armd. Div. has reached Krzemianiec. Here the Armd. Div. thrusts into the soft spot prepared by yesterday's air assault. Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth Divs. in tank battles between the Styr river and Rovno.

AGp. Center: Seventeenth Armd. Div. has reached Stolpce in its advance on Minsk.

1400. Keitel (OKW) on phone: Fuehrer wants to throw the whole weight of Armd. Group Hoepfner on Dvinsk. Possibilities of a crossing at Jakobstadt problematic.

As soon as there is a chance, Jakobstadt to be opened for the Inf. Corps from the rear by a raid on the northern bank.

Hoepfner's Armd. troops, massing for thrust on Dvinsk, are at the earliest to push through to Ostrov from the east bank of the Dvina, safeguarding the flank toward Jakobstadt, in order to prevent escape of the Russian forces in the Baltic area to the country south of Lake Peipus.

1420. phone talk on this subject with ObdH (who is at Hq AGp. North): He tells me that only 36th mot. Div. is being sent against Jakobstadt, while the bulk of Hoepfner's Armd. forces is striking for Dvinsk.

At noon to Angerburg and motorboat ride across Lake Mauer.

Heusinger, Grolman, Koerner: Moving of the last wave of GHq Reserves to the front. They must be so disposed that we get one Armd. Div. (Second Div.) and one mot. Div. (60th Div.) and three more Inf. Divs. behind AGp. South, the other reserves behind Center, between North and Center. Later on we shall need reinforcements on the Lower Dniepr and the dry route * Orsha - Vitebsk - Polotsk. One Div. must be sent to Romania.

Buerker (Tng. Sec.): Experiences in Crete -- Information Pamphlet for air Transport. -- Utilization of radio direction beams (Mt. Troop School, Engineer Corps.)

Wagner (Gen Qu) reports large dumps captured at Dubno (AGp. South). Oil and gasoline in larger quantities. 42 21 cm Hws. 65 MG, 95 trucks, 215 tanks, 50 AT guns, 18 Btrys.

Evening reports indicate crumbling of enemy resistance in front of AGp. South and distinct withdrawal movements in front of the Seventeenth Army. Accordingly, already at noon, C in C AGp. South ordered Seventeenth Army to attack forthwith in pursuit of the retreating enemy. Seventeenth Army has ordered main pursuit effort in direction Zloczow, Armd. Group 1 has ordered penetration beyond the Horyn river, without regard to flank and rear security.

In the sector of AGp. Center the operation continues to develop according to plan. The enemy has abandoned Bialystok. As a result the western end of the pocket is getting narrower and the enemy is trying to fight his way out to the northeast and southeast in the Novogrodek and Roszna areas. Apart from creating local tensions, these attempts are fruitless.

AGp. North is reinforcing and expanding the Dvinsk bridgehead and continues to press on to the Dvina river with Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies.

28 June 1941. 7th Day.

Daily reports of 27 June and morning reports of 28 June in the main only verify the reports received yesterday.

In the sector of AGp. South the impression is gained that the strong local efforts of the enemy are only attempts at extricating himself, and not an operational or even strategic disengagement. A singular feature is a railroad movement from Znitomir toward Kiev, for which we have no reasonable explanation.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the inner ring is now closing east of Bialystok; in the Bialystok Forest, southeast of the town, there is violent fighting which quite unexpectedly has engaged the entire central portion and parts of the right wing of Fourth Army.

The outer ring, formed by the Armd. Gps., is strained to breaking point north of Novogrodek (Hoth); between Minsk and Baranovichi it is still not closed. Fourth Armd. Div. is now advancing from the area of Sluzk on Minsk, to close this gap.

The movements of AGp. North continue to develop according to plan. In front of the right wing of Busch's Sixteenth Army, an enemy group of several Divs. is still fighting; let us hope it will be cut off soon, before it manages to get across the Dvina. With Armd. Group Hoepfner far in their rear, and newly arrived GHq reserves being moved up behind the left wing of Strauss' Army, to the south, there is a chance that this enemy group, too, will be liquidated while still west of the Dvina.

1100 Field Marshal von Leeb (on phone): AGp. North has arranged with AGp. Center that it, instead of Center, will move Hq I Corps to the area north of Vilna, where it would remain at disposal of OKH. It also wants to place 206th and 86th, instead of 253th and 206th Divs. under this Corps Hq*. Such a change makes no difference to OKH, and proposal is approved.

Gen. Wagner reports on supply situation:

- a) The most urgent task now is to build up the supply bases Minsk, Molodeczno (3 July) and Dvinsk. Some sections of the railroad lines can be utilized for the purpose, using Russian rolling stock. Assigning railroad operating organizations to the Armd. Gps. has been a great success.
- b) Distribution of Security Divisions remains as planned. Movement from the rear initiated; needed particularly in Minsk area.
- c) At Tauroggen we have found enormous food stocks (export organization); e.g. 40,000 tons melted butter, 20,000 tons bacon, very large quantities of meat and of tin-sheet for canning. Will be turned over to State Secretary Backe. **

Also at Kovno the large food depots and processing plants of private industry were captured intact. They had been guarded by Lithuanian Home Guards.

Reports at noon: Center: Minsk taken. Guderian's right wing close to Bobruisk. In the sector of AGp. South, the Russian Eighth Armd. Corps is advancing behind our Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. from Brody on Dubno. We can only hope that that way it is walking right into destruction.

Gen. von Greiffenberg (on phone):

- a) We settle the procedure for bringing up GHq Reserves on the boundary of AGps. North and Center.
- b) Build-up of the supply bases Molodeczno and Minsk.

Bogatsch: Air observations show tanks assembling north and east of our Dvinsk breakthrough.

Gen. Brand: Report on the fighting at Brest-Litovsk (31st Div.) Heavy Rocket Projectors and the "Karl" gun very effective, but defense was conducted by numerically superior, fanaticized troops, which accounts for the heavy casualties in 31st Div. Commander apparently is not at fault.

Keitel (OKW) on phone: Use Rocket Launchers in Eleventh Army? (Fuehrer is considering the question.) -- I give a brief review of recent progress at the front.

Noon: Major von Below (Liaison Off. Armd. Gp. 2) returns and communicates Guderian's statement that he would ask to be relieved from his command if he is placed under Field Marshal Kluge in the new grouping of Armd. forces.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Order of battle of Italian Divs. destined for Eastern theater. -- Poor in Div. troops.
- b) Fifth Armd. Div. will be ready:
First echelon (reinf. Inf. Regt.)
not later than 9 July
Supply elements for first echelon " " 15 July
Entire Div. " " 1 Aug.
- c) Replacement situation: Casualties heaviest in Seventeenth Army; normal in all other Armies. On the whole, losses are slight compared with those in World War I.
- d) Procurement and assignment of Polish peasant carts for GHq Reserve Divs.
- e) Subordination of Mil. Hq in Government-General under AGp. B must be promptly removed in view of changed conditions. * *

Reports: Rovno taken. -- We have broken into Libau. -- Bobruisk reached. -- Substantial elements of Russian First Armd. Corps positively identified on Eighteenth Army front.

Gen. Paulus (OQu I): Organizational problems in North Africa. (Best arrangement would be to form an Armd. Group Rommel under Italian High Command.)

Evening reports confirm the withdrawal of the enemy forces opposing AGp. South. For the past two days uncoordinated motorized movements have been running from southeast and east to the rear of the slowly crumbling front. Apparently the enemy is making an effort to organize resistance in the previously known fortified line Novograd Volynskij - Proskurov - Dniestr. But in taking back his forces to that line he is consuming much of his strength in counter-attacks. Seventeenth Army is at the gates of Lwow.

Kleist has taken Rovno.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the desperate attempts of the enemy to break out from the Volkovysk and Novogrodek pockets cause many tight situations, which necessitate e.g. in Fourth Army sector, a northward thrust of XII Corps, in Ninth Army, a southward thrust of V Corps. But these tensions will be overcome. The gap between Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Groups is still not entirely closed, but Guderian has arrived with his right wing at Bobruisk, and has perhaps still a chance to strike quickly across the Dniepr at Mogilev or Rogachev. That would be a decisive success.

AGp. North reports Dvinsk bridgehead expanded, and Jakobstadt taken by left wing of Armd. Group Hoepfner. The Dvina bridge at that town, however, has been blown up by the enemy. AGp. North has trouble with the many scattered enemy groups roaming the forests, some of them still with their tanks, which burn and loot villages. Application of effective counter-measures is frustrated by the expanse of the country and the limitation of our manpower resources. Libau has been taken. Motorized movements are reported from the Lower Dvina to Leningrad, the purpose of which is unclear.

What strikes one in all these battles is the singularly small number of prisoners compared with the large booty (including fuel), e.g. 35,000 prisoners along with 1,300 tanks.

29 June 1941.

8th Day.

Summary of the daily reports for 28 June and the morning reports for 29 June:

Army Gp. South reports still heavy fighting. On the right shoulder of Armd. Gp. 1, behind the sector of Eleventh Armd. Div., a deep penetration by Russian Eighth Armd. Corps in our lines, apparently has caused a lot of confusion in the area between Brody and Dubno and temporarily threatens Dubno from the southwest. This would have been very undesirable in view of the large dumps at Dubno. Also in battle zone of Armd. Gp. 1, enemy elements with tanks are still active behind the front, sometimes covering even large distances.

We must continually keep our minds on what must be done to arrive in time at a practical disposition for the operations of AGp. South. The present disposition is not particularly adapted to the impending tasks. In the next moves, the main objective of Army Gp. must be to break through the Russian rear position on the line Belokorovichi - Novograd Volynskij - Mogilev Pod. - Mouth of the Dniestr, without engaging in major frontal attacks, and then swing south still west of the

Dniepr. Two points are suitable for a breakthrough. One, in the north, where the main effort should be made, is between Novograd Volynskij and Zhitomir. The other, further to the south, which can be tackled with a smaller force, though it must be strong enough to effect a breakthrough, is in direction of Starokonstantinov, where there seems to be a gap in the fortified line. If we succeed in punching through here, the northern assault wing can swing south on this pivot with cover against Kiev and the north.

AGp. South must now regroup its forces for this breakthrough through the Russian rear position, which we must anticipate the Russians will be able to reach and man with the frontally retreating front armies as well as with reserves, which they can move up on a fairly undisturbed railroad network. For this breakthrough Armd. Gp. 1 must be furnished with Infantry (which apparently was deliberately excluded when Armd. Gp. 1 and Sixth Army were split off from each other). Also, Seventeenth Army will have to dispose its forces in greater depth and will transfer some of its Divs. to Sixth Army and Armd. Gp., in order to give sufficient strength to the right wing, which will be open to attack from the north, i.e. from the eastern part of Polesia*, after it has passed through the Rovno area. Additionally, Artillery and Engineer and Signal troops must be placed suitably to fit into the new plan for the assault on the Russian rear position. Op. Sec. has been instructed to discuss these plans with AGp.

In AGp. Center, the situation continues to develop as anticipated. The Fuehrer's worry that the Armd. forces would overreach themselves in the advance has unfortunately prompted ObdH at a conference with AGp. Center to refer to Bobruisk as nothing more important than the objective in a flank cover. Guderian, however, quite soundly from the operational point of view -- is advancing on Bobruisk with two Armd. Divs. and is reconnoitering in the direction of the Dniepr; he certainly does that not just to cover the flank, but indeed in order to cross the Dniepr as soon as there is an opportunity to do so. Were he not to do that, he would be making a grave mistake. I hope that he will take the Dniepr bridges at Rogachev and Mogilev still today, which would open for him the road to Smolensk and from there on the country to Moscow. This is the only way right off to get around the dry gap between the Dniepr and the Dvina, now fortified by the Russians, and so block the way to Moscow for the enemy forces in the gap. Let us hope that CGs. of Corps and Armies will do the right thing even without express orders, which we are not allowed to issue because of the Fuehrer's instruction to ObdH.

AGp. North by now should be strong enough at Dvinsk to push ahead on Ostrov, perhaps also facilitate construction of a bridge at Jakobstadt by a raid in that direction. The withdrawal movements by rail and road, which are reported to be rolling day and night from Riga toward Lenin-grad, are probably for the most part evacuations. It seems the Russian High Command is abandoning Lithuania,

perhaps also the other Baltic states. Radio intelligence reports transfer of the high Hqs to the rear.

Bogatschi: Air reconnaissance furnishes no important new information, mainly because of bad weather. Trench digging at Orsha - Vitebsk.

Talk with Keitel (OKW) (on phone) again indicates that the Fuehrer is worried:

- a) About the tight situation of Armd. Gp. 1 south of Dubno.
- b) About the threat from the Pripet Marshes.
- c) About the possibility that AGp. Center might strike too early beyond the line Minsk -- Bobruisk, before the "pocket" is completely liquidated.

I give him reassurance on all these points.

Reports from all fronts confirm previous indications that the Russians are fighting to the last man. Sometimes treacherous methods are used, especially where Mongolians are among the troops (Sixth Army, Ninth Army). A singular note is, that as a rule only very few soldiers are taken with captured Battrys, etc. Some let themselves be killed, while others run away, get rid of their uniforms and try to make their way back as "peasants". Morale of our troops everywhere is described as very good, also where they had to go through hard fighting. Horses very tired.

Gen. Ott (Inf.) reports in particular on his impressions on the battlefield of Grodno. Now, for once, our troops are compelled, by the stubborn Russian resistance, to fight according to their combat manuals. In Poland and in the West they could take liberties, but here they cannot get away with it. Enemy air effort against our troops appears to be on a very minor scale.

1700 Keitel (OKW) informs me that a Group of long-range fighters will strike today in front of AGp. South.

Messages: Left wing of AGp. North has penetrated into Riga with the Advance Combat Team of I Corps. Another Advance Combat Team, of VIII Corps, is following up. Railroad bridge intact, road bridges destroyed.

Evening situation: In the sector of AGp. South, an unexpected battle has developed south of Dubno, in which Sixteenth Armd. Div. joined from the south (after abandoning the high ground of Krzemieniec), 75th Div. from the west, Sixteenth mot. Div. from the northwest, 44th Div. from the north and 111th Div. from the east. The enemy involved is Eighth Armd. Corps. The situation at Dubno evidently is tight.

Also in the northern part of this sector, a lot is happening on the northern flank of Armd. Gp. Kleist. All attacks by the (tentatively identified) Russian XVII Corps from the Pripet Marshes were repelled. Behind Thirteenth Armd. Div., forming the spearhead at Rovno and advancing as far as the

Horyn river, follows 25th mot.Div. Fourteenth Armd.Div. covers the north flank, and is in turn followed by 298th Div.; behind this Div., XVII Corps is moving up from Kovel.

Near Lwow the enemy is taking back his front step by step to the east. Here for the first time many bridges are found destroyed.

In the central sector of AGp. Center, a wild medley of Divisions is busy sealing the inner ring around the enemy, who is breaking out in all directions. The outer ring, formed by the Armd. Divs., is closed, but still fairly thin, of course. It will take several days before the disposition of our forces, which in its present form is the outcome of the developing of the situation, can be sufficiently reorganized to allow us to continue the attack toward Smolensk on the dry route Orsha - Vitebsk. (Not before 5 July.)

AGp. North everything is pressing in the ordered direction, toward the Dvina, as planned. All crossings have been occupied by our troops. At several other sites bridges have been struck by Armd. Corps Reinhardt. Of the enemy forces which originally opposed AGp. North, considerable body of Infantry must still be south of the Dvina. Only a small proportion will succeed in escaping east through the lake country between Dvinsk and Minsk, in the direction of Polotsk.

Air reconnaissance has not been very productive today because of bad weather.

New plans. AGp. South - as has been discussed with them - will have to strike with a strong northern wing for the big Russian rear position north of the Dniestr. This northern wing will be on a wide enough front to take advantage of any gaps, and deep enough in order to cover the flank toward the north and, on wheeling southward later on, have sufficient strength to have forces to protect the wheeling wing toward the north (Gomel) and Kiev.

It is a question whether the tank spearheads of the northern wing will manage to break through by themselves; if not, and if they must wait for their Inf. components, a decisive success cannot be expected before 10 to 15 July.

AGp. Center wants to place Armd. Groups 2 and 3, which will certainly take at least until 5 July to reform (for supply reasons alone), undervon Kluge's Fourth Army Hq and reinforce the Army with two or three Inf. Corps. The Divs. still tied down in the battle of the pocket in the rear, will be moved up by Army Hq 2 (instead of Army Hq 4) and by Army Hq 9.

AGp. North wants to advance with Armd. Gp. 4 from Dvinsk on Ostrov and Opochka, on 2 July, so as to cut off the area south of Lake Peipus. Perhaps this operation could be started even earlier on 1 July. The Inf. Divs. will not be

able to cross the Dvina in any strength before 3 July.

Enemy intelligence: In the South on the front of AGp. South, there are no reports of new frontward movements of the enemy. It must be assumed that all Armd. commands operating south of the Pripet Marshes were committed in the attacks of the past days against the front of AGp. South. (Their designations are absolutely different from what we thought they were, e.g.; Cav. Divs., mot. Brigs., etc.) On the Romanian front the enemy is believed to be withdrawing behind the Dniestr.

On the front of AGp. Center, enemy road movements are reported south to Smolensk (formation of a defense group for Moscow); the railroad movement from Dvinsk to Pskov is still in progress; probably many evacuation trains. High Hq shifted to the rear from Dvinsk to Rositten. *

Hungary reports that the "Carpathian Corps" will be ready to start operations on 2 July. Command set-up is still to be clarified. Control by AGp. South would seem the best arrangement.

Italy communicates order of battle of the Corps of 40,000 men, slated for operations in Russia.

Slovakia participates with two Inf.Divs. and one mot. Brig.; the latter is already committed on the right wing of Seventeenth Army.

Spain wants to send a "Legion": 15,000 men. They will be assigned to Rombertow ** (Warsaw), where we shall issue them arms.

In Norway, Dietl's Corps has started out from Petsamo towards Murmansk. Air raid on Murmansk.

Finland presents a new plan of attack conforming to our wishes. It provides for an offensive on a front of at least 6 Divs. east of Lake Ladoga. A German Div. recently brought over from Norway is to be moved behind this important wing, to strengthen it. It will be supplied by Falkenhorst's Army, but operated under direct control of Field Marshal Mannerheim.

In the afternoon, my three adjutants offer their congratulation on my birthday.

30 June 1941. 9th Day.

The situation last night rounded out by early reports in the morning, presents the following picture:

In AGp. South, the fight continues successfully despite local crises. The enemy allows himself to be pushed back step by step.

Lwow was taken by First Mt. Div. this morning, at 0430.

XIV Corps is not yet in line, but its arrival can be counted on in the course of the day. The situation at Dubno is straightened out. Still, Sixteenth Armd. Div. and Sixteenth mot. Div. were not inconsiderably delayed by the episode, and 44th, 111th, and 299th Divs., which were brought up behind Third Armd. Corps, will be stalled for some days; this greatly delays and hampers the follow-up of Infantry behind III Corps. There is, however, an endeavor on all hands to make up for this dislocation in every possible way.

No arrivals of new enemy reinforcements from rear areas are reported on the Army Gp. front. Most likely, the enemy has already committed the greater part of the forces he was able to muster.

In AGp. Center, cleaning out of the "pockets" is tying down considerable forces. Army Gp. must in particular see to it that Infantry forces are brought up behind Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. around the pocket. Bringing together the forces, including Inf., for a strong northern wing in continuing the offensive past the line Mogilev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Polotsk, will be the joint concern of AGp. Center and OKH.

AGp. North is sweeping ahead with its Inf. Corps to the Dvina. It has announced that its initial mission, viz., to beat the enemy this side of the Dvina, has been completed. Its next mission, viz., to push through to the high ground northeast of Opochna with a strong right wing, is well prepared by the disposition of Army Gp.

Bogatsch brings no important new air observations. The rearward movements to Leningrad, behind the northern wing, continue. Between Vitebsk and Orsha, fortifications (anti-tank ditches) are being built in great haste. In the Pripet Marshes, the situation is still somewhat obscure. Apparently the enemy is pulling out some of his strength, but we probably must still reckon with one Inf. Corps and some Armor.

To celebrate my birthday, the men of my lower staff held a formal review early in the morning and offered their wishes before breakfast. The breakfast room was decorated for the occasion. ObdH sent red roses and strawberries, accompanied by a very cordial letter. At the morning conference, Paulus made a speech. Congratulations by ObdH, who told me that the Fuehrer's visit in the afternoon is primarily on my account.

Other well-wishers: Scherer, Hq Commandant, accompanied by a man of the guard unit, who brings a bunch of wild flowers; von Ziehlberg, Loyke, Gehlen, Gen. Keitel (Personnel Div.), von Etzdorf, Frau von Brauchitsch, on the phone.

1300 Major Nagel (formerly in Moscow) is briefed as Liaison Off. to Fourth Army (von Kluge), which now takes over control of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3.

Order to AGp. South: Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 will secure line Rogachev -

Mogilev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Polotsk with combat forces * at the earliest.

Afternoon (1630) Visit by the Fuehrer to the camp.** Report presented at ObdH's house. Afterwards tea.

Report by me on progress, with estimate of the situation and the resulting operational possibilities.

The Fuehrer stresses the following points:

- a) Mastery of the Gulf of Finland must be secured at the earliest. For only elimination of the Russian Navy will give us free communications through the Baltic (iron ore shipments from Lulea). After seizing the Russian seaports from the landside, we must allow three to four weeks for all enemy submarines to be positively out of action. Four weeks mean 2 million tons of iron ore.
- b) Ukraine: Significance for food supply and industry.

He attaches great importance to reaching Leningrad as soon as possible with the Inf. Divs. of AGp. North, but Armor need not wait for their advance. He does not see clear yet whether Leeb's strength, especially his Armor, is sufficient for the purpose. He expects that after reaching Smolensk in the middle of July, we would not be able to take Moscow by Infantry assault before August; Armor alone cannot do it. The time it takes for the Inf. to get to Moscow, he believes could be utilized by our Armor to make a clean slate in the north. Then we could mass Armor east of Moscow. Speeding of gasoline supply to Hoepfner and Hoth is emphasized.

At tea, the conversation turns mostly to purely political subjects: European unity as a result of common war against Russia. -- Britain's domestic political scene: Possibility of Churchill's overthrow by Conservatives with a view to forestalling a Socialist-Communist revolution in the country. Lloyd George, Hoare. -- Possibilities of improving our relations with Turkey are viewed optimistically. Also Afghanistan and other small nations will actively collaborate with us if they feel they need not be afraid of Russia any longer. Continental character of Germany's future mission is emphasized, without renouncing claims to a colonial empire, which might include Togo and the Cameroons, plus the Belgian Congo. East Africa desirable, but not essential.

Evening Situation: Slow but steady developments in all Army Gps. In AGp. Center, however, enemy forces have broken through Guderian's Armd. Gp. between Slonim and Minsk. This is awkward, but probably is of no major importance. In AGp. North, the Riga railroad bridge appears to have been blasted by enemy elements, who penetrated into our lines in the confused fighting.

Hoepfner thinks he will be ready to advance on 2 July. Coming behind him, AGp. North will be ready to cross the Dvina on 4 July. Both reports that he likewise will be ready to continue advance on 2 July. But Guderian is still lagging behind, south of Minsk, where his forces are partaking in the encirclement of the Novogrodek pocket. He so will take several days longer than the others to get ready for new operations. Irrespective of these plans, Guderian's right wing could secure the Dniepr crossings at Mogilev and to the south.

Air Force is being reinforced in the sector of AGp. South and on the Romanian front. In AGp. South, very effective action by our Air Force against enemy Air Force and enemy columns retreating before our troops (as many as three columns abreast are reported). A total bag of over 200 aircraft shot down during this day. Enemy reported to be already reduced to sending very old four-engine models into the battle.

1 July 1941. 10th Day.

Situation: In AGp. South, Seventeenth Army is having good going. On its left wing XIV Armd. Corps is coming to the fore and is gaining freedom of movement toward the east. The Dubno episode seems to be over. The Russian VIII Corps is bottled up. Some of their tanks seem to have run out of fuel; they are being dug in and used as pillboxes. On the northern wing, Fourteenth Armd. Div. and 25th mot. Div. are following behind. Moving of the Inf. Divs., which will be needed both for attack at the front and for flank cover to the north and east in case of a turning movement to the south, is not at all proceeding well. AGp. South will need some vigorous prodding to get action. Eleventh Army believes to have positive indications of a systematic withdrawal on its front. I don't believe it is so. I, too, am almost certain that the enemy will try to defend his rear position, but a planned withdrawal would have required a long-range decision, and we have no reason to believe that such a decision was ever taken. The enemy is just being pushed back by us.

Russian atrocities at Lwow.

In AGp. Center further progress has been made by Ninth Army and Armd. Gp. Both in the build-up for the new attack. Progress is less in Fourth Army and Armd. Gp. 2. In the case of the former the reason is that it has to bear the burden of liquidating the Bialystok pocket; in the case of the latter, the delay is due to the fact that Armd. Gp. 2, in disregard of its orders, has neglected to attend to the mopping up of the territory traversed by it and now has its hands full with local enemy break-throughs. To our surprise, nothing is heard from the area around Bobruisk which only yesterday was the focal point of Russian anxieties, with

SOS signals to all forces in the vicinity and finally the hasty and extremely costly commitment of Russian planes. Either our troops are not getting anywhere, or they want to surprise us with big results. -- A teletype order is necessary to make AGp. Hq move one Div. toward Pinck, for protection of the right flank.

In AGp. North everything is going according to plan, except at Riga, where the Advance Combat Teams of I and XXVI Corps seem to have had some trouble; the situation was saved by the timely arrival and crossing of a reinforced Inf. Regt. The railroad bridge evidently is a total loss. 291st Div. has been detached to take Windau and clean up the country west of Riga. The new attack of Armd. Gp. 4 from the line Dvinsk -- Jakobstadt is set for 2 July.

The Hungarians will launch offensive against the line Kolomea -- Stanislawow on 2 July.

Eleventh Army has set 2 July as the date for its attack. It expects the Russians to withdraw behind the Dniepr. Disturbances have broken out in Romania, involving also some localities in the assembly area. (Iron Legion?)

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance in the sector of AGp. South no longer shows any large-scale movements. Heavy concentrations of immobilized railroad cars have been observed everywhere. A possible explanation is that the trains, which are arriving in closest succession, are simply left standing on the tracks by the Russians, with only the locomotives going back to fetch more trains. A striking feature in the southern sector is a heavy concentration in the Proskurov "bastion", forward of the Russian rear position, and a certain loosening up around Cernauti.

In sector of AGp. Center earlier reports of troop concentrations in the Orsha-Vitebsk-Smolensk triangle are confirmed. The enemy assembly area seems to extend as far as Mohilev, in the south.

We still have no completely clear picture about what is going on in the Gomel area and the Pripet Marshes.

In AGp. North, no new observations.

Transport movements from the east, perhaps also from the west into the Nevel area, apparently intended for the build-up of a defense line in the corner between the Dvina and the old Russo-Estonian border.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) The supply situation in AGp. North is satisfactory. Armd. Gp. 4 will start operations on 2 July with a full issue of ammunition and fuel for 400 km. By 7 July, the bulk of Army Gp., will have on hand in the Dvinsk supply base, in addition to complete issues to the troops: one additional full issue of ammunition, three fuel quotas and two days' rations. (Start of operations by

this AGp. scheduled for 5 July.)

In AGp. Center 17,000 tons of supplies, in addition to the hand supplies of Armd.Gp., will have been accumulated in dumps, representing a total of 24,000 tons. An advance detachment of Krumpel's staff goes to Minsk to prepare everything. The stockpile is to be increased to 73,000 tons (one issue of ammunition, five fuel quotas, five days' rations).

AGp. South reports considerable booty found at Lwow; including fuel in surface and underground dumps. By 1 July, several large Forward Supply Points will be moved closer to front, including one to Rovno.

- b) Fuel situation: Estimated daily consumption 9,000 cbm, or, 250,000 cbm. per month, i.e., 22 trains daily. Actual consumption has been 11,500 cbm. per day, or, 330,000 cbm. per month, quite a lot more than expected. About one-third of this comes out of booty. Daily requirements until 6 July, 7 trains; beginning 6 July * we shall again need 14 trains, daily.
- c) Pacification of the Rear Areas is a matter of serious concern. Owing to our method of advance, our communication lines are liable to serious disruption by isolated enemy elements. The Security Divs. alone cannot do the job in this vast territory. It will be necessary to detach combat Divs. for these operations.

Gen. von Waldau (Op. Chief Air Force): We review the probable lines of development and the operational tasks resulting from them. OXL planning for the massing of air strength* is again in an absolute muddle, due to misconstrued talks of the Fuehrer with ObdL.

The Air Force has greatly underestimated the numerical strength of the enemy. It is quite evident that the Russians initially had far more than 8,000 planes. Half of this number probably has already been shot down or destroyed on the ground, so that numerically we now are about equal with the Russians. But Russian flying efficiency cannot nearly compare with ours, owing to the poor training of their pilots and crews, and that is why entire enemy squadrons, or large parts of them, get shot down so often in combat, as, for instance, happened yesterday over Dvinsk and Bobruisk.

At present, Air Force estimates Russian air strength opposite AGp. South, at 800 to 1,000 operational first-line craft; in AGp. Center, at 400 - 500; and in sector of AGp. North, at 400 - 500. In the battles of the last few days, the Russians have been using obsolete planes side by side with latest models.

Gen. Oehquist (Finland): Orientation on our plans for the impending operations. -- Discussion of Finnish operations. -- Experiences with the Russians.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. --
Decorations for GHq personnel (10 July and 1 August). *

Evening reports indicate that Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 could start off on 3 July. Approve date, Some features of the plans of AGp. South cause me to ring up their Hq, in order to emphasize the necessity for feeding more Inf. Divs. into the northern wing.

Allocation of Inf.Divs. to the Commanders of AGp. Rear Area is being arranged.

Concern about the threats that may develop from the Pripet Marshes for the inner wings of Army Gps. Center and South, prompts issuance of an order directing initiation of joint supervision and offensive mopping up of the area. According to radio intelligence and air observations we must reckon with 2 Corps Hqs, with 7 Divs.

2 July 1941. 11th Day.

Eleventh Army launches offensive from Romania, Fourth Armd. Gp. from Dvinsk, in direction of Cpochka-Ostrov. Also the Hungarians start operations.

In AGp. South, the situation reports prove the correctness of my view concerning the northern wing of Armd. Gp. 1. Only yesterday, on 1 July, Russian Inf. from Pripet Marshes west of Rovno, made quite a deep penetration into the flank of Armd. Gp. 1, in the general direction of Dubno. I do not think this penetration imperils our operations, but the nearby Inf.Divs., which I would like at last to move up behind the Armd. spearheads in an eastern direction, are again kept back to deal with this enemy thrust.

In AGp. Center, the Bialystok pocket is in the final stages of liquidation. ObdH now is worried about the Novogrodek pocket.

In AGp. North, I Corps should better not move off to the east.** Parts of it must first clean out the forests south of Riga. 291st Div. must comb out the northern part of the coast, west of Riga.

Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance shows something new: A movement, apparently from around Odessa, towards and east of Kiev, and then to the north. Air also confirms earlier reports of dense movements from the east in the direction of Orsha-Vitebsk and, further north, in the direction of Naval.

The resulting picture would indicate that in addition to the new group, assigned to the defense of the dry route Orsha-Vitebsk, whose sector extends perhaps to Mohilev in the south and to Polotsk in the north (Dvina bridges there are blown up), another new group is being built up northeast of

the triangle formed by the old Russo-Estonian* frontier and the Dvina .

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) The base at Dvinsk will be ample to maintain our Inf. Corps up to the line OPOCHKA - Marienburg, and the Armd. Gp. as far as Leningrad.
For that purpose we need:
From Kovno to Dvinsk, 10 trains, daily.
From Siauliai, 6 trains, daily, until 6 July, and
12 trains, daily, after that date.
In addition to trains, 14,000 tons of trucking space.
(Is available !)
- b) In AGp. Center, big fuel depots were found near Baranovich and Molodeczno.
- c) Question of tank replacement. On hand: 35 tanks 38 (Czech), 50 tanks III.

Additionally, to form a unit (materiel only) at Sagan:
35 Tanks 38 (Czech), 71 Tanks III, and 30 Tanks IV.

By 15 July we shall have received from new production:
60 Tanks III, 30 Tanks 38 (Czech), 15 Tanks IV.

By 30 July additional 60 Tanks III, 30 Tanks 38 (Czech),
15 Tanks IV.

Field Marshal von Leeb (on phone):

- a) Necessity to comb out forests south of Riga; 271st Div. turned off to the area.
- b) von Leeb wants to move up XXIII Corps** behind his right wing under his command, whereas we have already assigned the Corps to the neighboring Ninth Army. This wish cannot be complied with. Ninth Army itself is very much interested in moving this Corps to the front along AGp. boundary line.

At noon ObdH is called to the Fuehrer:

Apprehensive about the Novogrodek pocket. The Fuehrer thinks the ring must be contracted and tightened, and wants it bolstered with reserves. It seems there was still some discussion about launching the new operations by Armd.Gps. 2 and 3, which have already been authorized by us.

There they go worrying again.

ObdH makes various suggestions on how to compress and crack the pocket. He wants to use Eighteenth mot. Div. and Tenth Armd. Div., which belong to the assault wave of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3, set to strike on 3 July. I object. I call up AGp. Center to discuss that with Greiffenberg.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone! In reply to my talk with his Chief of Staff he states: An enemy breakthrough from the forest pocket of Novogrodek to the northeast is highly unlikely. Behind Fourteenth mot. Div., 900th Brigade will be brought up from Vilna tonight. Pressure on the front of Fourteenth mot.Div. is also eased by arrival of 161st Div. on its right wing. Moreover, the northeastern edge of the forest area has been amply mined by Hoth.

Of V Corps, 35th and 5th Divs. have reached the forest region. VIII Corps, south of the Njemen, has crossed the Baranovichi-Lida railroad.

The situation is more difficult for Fourth Army and Guderian. Armd. Group 2 is under order not to withdraw any units from the encircling ring, without orders.

Armd. Groups 2 and 3 are ordered to push their inner wings ahead to the forest edge (eastern edge of the big forest), if the situation permits. The process is most difficult between the big forest and Slonim. This area would afford the enemy with the best operational opportunities; but there are no signs that he is trying to take advantage of them. This Novogrodek pocket cannot be compared with the Volkovysk pocket, where the enemy suffered very heavy losses. Any unit that escaped into the Novogrodek pocket, is badly mauled, and the enemy has no ammunition nor food. This accounts for his passivity. *Nevertheless it will be impossible to prevent some smaller enemy bodies seeping through to the southeast.

IX Corps has already crossed the Szczara river and will reach Molczadz tomorrow.

XII Corps is one day's march, LIII Corps two days' marches behind schedule. But advance elements of these Corps are already committed next to Regt. Grossdeutschland to reinforce the ring encircling the Slonim area.

Fighting on the southern outskirts of Minsk. Von Kluge cannot move up his troops.

After this conversation, I report briefly to ObdH and talk with Jodl (OKW) to ease the Fuehrer's mind.

Major Golling (Liaison Off., Armd. Gp. 4) reports. Hoepfner is nervous that Inf. Corps behind him might be moving across his lines of communications. It will be impossible to avoid that. There also seem to be certain differences in von Leeb's and Hoepfner's views of what the next moves should be. That, however, depends on our directives, which have not yet been given, but are due now.

Armd. Gp. 4 must proceed to block the gaps south and north of Lake Peipus and encircle Leningrad. von Leeb's Inf. Corps must sweep Estonia clear of enemy forces and occupy the coast, meanwhile pushing all forces they can spare on Leningrad and the southeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, and guarding their right flank against Nevel.

Computation of enemy strength. My own computations and those of Foreign Armies East show:

On the fronts of von Leeb and von Bock, 15 to 20 Inf. Divs. and about 6 Armd. Divs., of which three may have been withdrawn (mauled?). To these 3 front Divs. must be added, new:

1 (18th) from Moscow
3 from Volga-Ural
4 from Siberian Railroad
1 from Crimea

12 Armd. Divs. plus Divs. in

Estonia and Leningrad.

Estimated total tank strength, 15,000, or 35 Armd. Divs., of which 22 have been identified. In the Far East are five Divs., which leaves eight Divs. unaccounted for (Third in the north, one from Moscow area, and Sixth Div. of II Corps). Excluding the three Divs. in parentheses, five Divs. would be left available as operational reserve.

Evening reports.

AGp. South: A heavy enemy attack was repulsed with severe enemy losses, west of Rovno; III Corps (northern wing of the Armd. Gp.) temporarily stalled; central sector and southern wing advancing. In Romania, the Pruth river has been crossed and our forces have penetrated about 12 km into enemy territory. On the front of Seventeenth Army, the enemy is effecting a planned withdrawal, apparently under cover of strong Armd. forces. Our Divisions are in close pursuit.

In AGp. Center strong elements of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 have started to move forward in order to be as close as possible to the Dniepr and Dvina line on jump-off day (3 July). Good progress. Stubborn enemy resistance on the Beresina is broken by Armd. Gp. 2. The other components of Army Gp., after the close of the Bialystok battle, are regrouping for a new offensive against the line Mhilev-Polotsk. The ring encircling the forest pocket east of Novogrodek is now complete.

In AGp. North, Armd. Gp. 4 has started operations and advanced halfway to Pskov. The Inf. Divs. are following close behind.

At the Fuehrer's Hq they now seem to be reassured about the situation in the Novogrodek pocket. Start of new offensive by Armd. Gps. is approved.

3 July 1941. 12th Day.

Daily reports of 2 July and morning reports of 3 July indicate that the enemy fronting Eleventh Army has apparently withdrawn behind the Pruth river, but is still fighting strong rear guard actions. Our advance is slowed by pouring rains, which turn roads into bogs.

The Hungarians are still fighting at the mouths of the mountain passes and have made no important advances. Seventeenth Army, where two Slovak Divisions have been introduced on the right wing, is pressing on "in pursuit" behind the yielding enemy. This pursuit is repeatedly checked by counter thrusts of individual enemy groups, mostly against the flank and as a rule with tanks. Tarnopol is taken.

As a result of this advance, Seventeenth Army has developed greater depth, which is all to the good, and now has its main concentration on its left wing, in conformity with the basic operational dispositions of Army Gp. Next to it, Sixth Army with its main concentration on the right wing, has continued its southeastward movement in good formation. This puts its main weight between Ninth Armd.Div. and Sixteenth Armd.Div. on the right, and III Corps (11th, 13th, 14th Armd.Div.), on the left. AGp. so has developed a definite wedge pointing at Berdichev. To the north, Armd. Gp., that is, its left wing (III Corps), is still severely hampered in its movements by attacks from the Pripet area, which the enemy now is launching west of Rovno.

This threat to the northern flank from the Pripet area has been a matter of concern for days. Everybody is vying for the honor of telling the most hair-raising tale about the danger from the north. Foremost are the radio intelligence people, who claim to have located a large number of enemy troops, namely three Armd. Corps and two Infantry Corps under the command of an Army Hq. This assertion is baseless and therefore dangerous. The events over several days do show that there are enemy forces in this maze of swamps and forests, but they certainly are not stronger than 2 or three Divisions; there cannot be any doubt that they include some mot. elements and tanks. The attacks are conducted in a manner which plainly shows that their command is completely confused. Also the tactics employed in these attacks are singularly poor. Riflemen on trucks abreast with tanks drive against our firing line, and the inevitable result are very heavy losses to the enemy. Such desultory attacks cannot be regarded as a threat to our operations. Nevertheless it would be intolerable to allow this factor of uncertainty to persist unchallenged on our flank. It must be removed by offensive action and systematic combing out of the marshes.

In AGp. Center, the Novogrodek pocket has been further contracted and sealed, as agreed upon yesterday. The moves of Second and Ninth Army are continuing according to plan, and with forced marches, in order to introduce Infantry with greatest rapidity behind the Armd. Gps., which are launching the offensive today. Both Armored Gps. have already started off. Guderian forced the Beresina river this forenoon, Hoth's left wing reached the Dvina northwest of Polotsk by noon.

In AGp. North Hoepfner advanced but slowly, owing to very bad weather which give him the worst road conditions. Still,

his left wing is already midway between the Dvina and Pskov. He has been directed by teletype orders issued last night, to occupy the areas between Velikie Luki and Lake Ilmen and between Lake Ilmen and Lake Pskov, with a view to safeguarding them toward the east, and to advance northward beyond the line Lake Ilmen-Lake Pskov only on order of OKH. The latter advance will have the twofold aim of closing the gap between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus, and of cutting off Leningrad between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies, by forced marches, are moving on in excellent formation, with a strong right wing behind Armd.Gp., toward the Dvina. On the Army Gp. boundary close contact is maintained with the vigorously pushed left wing of Ninth Army.

Enemy intelligence (Kinzel and Bogatsch) brings no important findings. In front of our southern wing (AGp. South) the enemy has ceased reinforcing his front. In Center (triangle Orsha - Vitebsk - Smolensk) there is still some movement, but with the movement which apparently came from the Caucasus brought to a close yesterday, it is on a much smaller scale than in the past few days. In the "dry route", trench digging is in progress. Owing to bad weather there are no new developments in the Nevel Group.

The enemy situation in the Pripet Marshes remains obscure. We must not overrate the strength of this enemy. On the whole, with no more signs of enemy activity in the Novogrod-ek pocket, we may be fairly sure that the enemy in the Bialystok sector, who was estimated at 15 - 20 Divs. by a captured Russian Corps CG, is annihilated except for some negligible remnants. On the front of AGp. North we may also figure with 12 - 15 Divs. completely wiped out. On the front of AGp. South the enemy's withdrawal and the crumbling of his front certainly cannot be interpreted as a disengaging movement planned by his command; it must be explained by the fact that his troops have been cut up and for the most part scattered by our unceasing, massive blows.

On the whole, then, it may be said even now that the objective to shatter the bulk of the Russian Army this side of the Dvina and Dniepr, has been accomplished. I do not doubt the statement of the captured Russian Corps CG that, east of the Dvina and Dniepr, we would encounter nothing more than partial forces, not strong enough to hinder realization of German operational plans. It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks.* Of course, this does not yet mean that it is closed. The sheer geographical vastness of the country and the stubbornness of the resistance, which is carried on with all means, will claim our efforts for many more weeks to come.

Future plans:

- a) For the continuance of the Russian operations it will be of primary importance to gain a new jump-off line

between Smolensk and Moscow, and another bast around Leningrad. From here we could proceed to the capture of Northern Russia and the industrial region around Moscow, and subsequently, in conjunction with AGp. South, of the Donjets industrial region.

Once we are across the Dvina and Dniepr, it will be less a question of smashing enemy armies, than of denying the enemy possession of his production centers and so prevent his raising a new Army with the aid of his gigantic industrial potential and his inexhaustible manpower resources.

- b) As soon as the battle in the East changes from an effort to annihilate the enemy armed forces to one of paralyzing the enemy economy, our next tasks in the war against Britain will come to the foreground and require preparation:

Preparations must be made for the offensive against the land route between Nile and Euphrates, both from Cyrenaica and through Anatolia, and perhaps also for an offensive from the Caucasus against Iran. The former theater, which will always remain dependent of the quantities of supplies we can bring across the sea, and so is subject to incalculable vicissitudes, will assume a secondary role and for the most part will be left to Italian forces. We will have to assign to it only two German Armd. Divisions (Fifth light and Fifteenth), which will be brought up to full strength and reinforced by small additional complements. As an initial move for the operations through Anatolia against Syria, possibly supported by a secondary thrust from the Caucasus, we shall have to initiate concentration of the necessary forces in Bulgaria, which at the same time may serve as a means of political pressure to compel Turkey to grant transit for our forces.

- Wagner (Gen Qu): a) Summary of casualty reports, booty reports etc.
b) Organization of Rear Areas and assignment of troops to these.
c) Review of plans for moving forward our supply bases after the Dvina Dniepr line has been gained.
d) Spare parts for tanks and tank replacements.

1200: Through ObdH and Op. Sec. we hear again the usual buzzings from the Fuehrer's Hq. Now again the whole place is in a state of jitters, because the Fuehrer is afraid that the wedge of AGp. South now advancing eastward might be threatened by flank attacks from north and south. Tactically speaking, of course, this fear is not at all unwarranted, but that's what we have Army Corps CGs for. What is lacking on top level is that confidence in the executive commands which is one of the most essential features of our command organization, and that is so because it fails to grasp the coordinating force that comes from the common schooling and education of our Leader Corps.

I call up AGp. South (Lt.Col. Winter, Ia) to make suggestions on how the threat to the northern flank could be removed once and for all by employing Advance Combat Teams and moving the GHq Reserves toward Rovno. Any threat to the southern flank, which will soon effect a link up with the Hungarians, must be forestalled by Seventeenth Army with its own forces, by organizing Advance Combat Teams amply equipped with AT units and obstacle construction material.

1600 AGp. South reports compliance with my suggestions. It is really heartwarming to see the readiness with which the Field Marshal and AGp. Commanders cooperate with us and adopt our ideas.

Casualties. Total for period 22 - 30 June: 41,087 (or 1.64% of actual strength of 2.5 million).

Killed: 524 O, 8,362 NCO and EM

Wounded: 966 O, 28,528 NCO and EM

Officer casualties:

Wounded 3.3% (Campaign in West 3.10%)

Killed 7.2% (" " " 4.85%)

Missing 1.5% (" " " 2.00%)

4 July 1941. 13th Day.

Situation: South: Eleventh Army is advancing slowly. Difficult road conditions, owing to recent rains. The Mt. Brigs. of the Romanian northern front have started the attack against Cernauti.

The Hungarian right wing has reached the northern rim of the Carpathians.

In spite of difficult road conditions, Seventeenth and Sixth Armies are getting on well. Main weight on the inner wings. On the northern wing of Sixth Army, our safeguarding measures against the Pripet Marshes are beginning to show results. The enemy is withdrawing in the Marshes to the east before our pressure from southwest and west, but at the same time is bringing reinforcements from the east. We must expect that Reischau will feel continued pressure on his left shoulder, at first from the area north of the line Rovno-Korez and later from the area between Korosten and Kiev.

Center: The right wing (Third Armd. Div.) of Guderian's Armd. Gp. has crossed the Dniepr at Rogachev, establishing so far only a bridgehead. Further north Armd. Gp. has forced the Beresina at the destroyed crossings and is battling its way to the Upper Dniepr.

The northern wing of Armd. Gp. Hoth has reached the Dvina at Drissa, where it is encountering stiffer enemy resistance. Road conditions difficult. High tank casualties from bad roads. Hoth reports 50% combat strength.

Second and Ninth Armies are pressing on behind Armd.Gp. in rapid marches. But owing to the delay in the encirclement operations at Bialystok, the distance between them and Armd. Gp. has become so great, particularly behind Guderian, that special measures will be necessary to bridge the gap. Combined Advance Combat Teams of the Inf. Corps must be moved ahead behind Guderian's Armd.Gp.

Von Bock has moved his Hq to Baranovichi. Von Kluge who, on our orders and over their objections, assumed command of the two Armd.Gps., has moved his Hq to Minsk.

North: Armd.Gp. Hoepfner is advancing rapidly, and is approaching Ostrov with its left wing. Right wing encountered stronger opposition shortly after crossing the Dvina, but thanks to Field Marshal von Leeb's foresight, Inf. forces were brought up here in time (on trucks), so that this enemy constitutes no threat; on the contrary, he is already being forced back by the troops originally on the scene. During this fighting, the Commander of 121st Div., Gen. von Lancelle, was killed. The bulk of the Inf. Corps is advancing briskly and has started crossing the Dvina. On the northern wing, almost an entire enemy Division was captured in the forests north of Riga.

Enemy: On the front of AGp. South local resistance, which leads to formation of pockets, in some places; but on the whole we discern distinct withdrawal movements, covered by armored counter-thrusts. Some troops are still arriving through Kiev from the east, but to all appearance they do not represent a large-scale coordinated movement. The large number of trains cramming the railroad stations and some eastward train movements probably must be interpreted as evacuation measures. Movements of fresh troops toward Korosten are observed, but apparently they are not on an operational scale.

On the front of Center the situation is unchanged. Movements run from Smolensk to Orsha, but also in the opposite direction. The large quantities of railroad cars around Bryansk seem less an indication that the Russians are forming an operational reserve - they would not have sufficient forces for that - than, merely the accumulation of rolling stock used in the forward movements of the last days, left on sidings for technical reasons.

In North, two movements are reported on the way from the area around Moscow. One is running into the area west of Velikie Luki, i.e. between Hoth's and Hoepfner's inner wings, the other one is swinging northward around Lake Ilmen, to the vicinity of Pskov.

Over-all picture: The situation supports the assumption that the enemy does not have sufficient forces left for a sustained defense of the line running from the old Russo-Estonian frontier along Dvina and Dniepr to the south. This theory is borne out also by a Russian order, intercepted yesterday, to the effect that the Dvina river will be held only by groups concentrated at the crossings. *

As our Armies advance, any attempt at further resistance probably will soon collapse and we shall be confronted with the question of reducing Leningrad and Moscow. It remains to be seen whether Stalin's proclamation calling for a people's war of all workers against us, will be successful. On the result depends the method by which we are going to sweep the enemy out of these extensive industrial areas. The main thing is to deny their use to the enemy at an early date.

As to the date when the Finns will strike, a decision will have to be made today : (6, 7, or 8 July).

Col. Ochsner reports on the outcome of his tour to the fronts of Ninth and Sixteenth Armies:

Some units still show a certain reluctance about using smoke. Heavy Rocket Launcher and Do Projector * apparently highly effective wherever employed. The ammunition still seems to have some bugs.

Question of propaganda about the new flame ammunition. I am against it. It would only afford later opponents an opportunity to prepare counter measures.

At noon the first break in many days, which allows me to spend an hour on horseback.

Gen. Wagner, Gen Qu:

- a) Settling cooperation of "Gen Qu Command Post" Chiefs with Ba. TO.**
- b) Difficulties in supplying AGp. North by rail (Siauliai).
- c) Transport situation at present permits maintenance of offensives in
 - AGp. South: Armor to Kiev, Inf. to the line Zhitomir-Berdichev.
 - AGp. Center: Armor within close distance from Moscow**;
 - Inf. across Dvina and Dniepr.
 - AGp. North: Armor to Leningrad, Inf. to area Velikie Luki - Dno' - Pskov - Dorpat.

Gen. von Thoma reports on observations on his tour to front of Armd.Gp. 3:

- a) In fighting the enemy's giant tanks, 10 cm 8,8 cm AA and 5 cm AT guns are very effective.
- b) Tanks I are a liability for the troops and should be taken out for home defense, coast defense and training purposes.
- c) Very tough fighting with Russians. Only few prisoners are taken.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters -- Preparations for transfer of GHq.

Evening reports from the South again indicate that we are advancing along the entire front. Road conditions, which must be very difficult in some sectors, are slowing the advance. The Drohobycz oil fields have fallen into our hands with very little damage. On the northern wing, the attacks against the north flank have ceased.

In Center, crossings over the Dniepr have been forced in heavy fighting at Rogachev by the right wing of Guderian's Group, and over the Dvina, at Drissa, by Hoth's left wing. Elsewhere the two Armd. Gps. are battling their way to the Dvina and Dniepr against occasionally stubborn enemy resistance. The Inf. Corps are following in rapid marches all along. All is quiet in the pocket west of Minsk.

In North, Hoepfner has pushed as far as Ostrov * while beating off attacks against his flank just north of the Dvina. The heads of Inf. columns are crossing the Dvina river.

Enemy intelligence report on the whole contains nothing new. Only one observation is striking viz. unusually larger numbers of trains crowding the stations around Briansk and Orel, and trains moving northward in this area. Normally such a picture would indicate a build-up of an operational reserve, but the enemy does no longer have enough strength available for such a policy. In any case, a close watch will be kept on these movements.

5 July 1941. (14th Day.)

Situation: The entire front is advancing in accordance with our intentions. In AGp., South, in the Southern Ukraine, road conditions are very difficult as a result of cloud-storms, and rate of advance is slow. Apparently the enemy now is withdrawing eastward from the Pripet Marshes opposite Reichenau's left shoulder. In consequence, GHq Reserves can be moved eastward beyond the line Dubno - Luck.

In AGp. Center, Guderian's right wing (Model) has held its bridgeheads at Rogachev. But the central sector of the Armd. Grp., fighting all the way, is making little headway between the Beresina and the Dniepr. In addition to the Drissa bridgehead, Hoth now has gained another firm foothold at Ulla, on the northern bank of the Dvina, upstream from Polotsk. -- The "pocket" west of Minsk is slowly burning out. Since yesterday morning 52,000 Russians have surrendered.

In AGp. North Hoepfner's Armd. Gp. is sweeping the area assigned it clear of the enemy. The Inf. Corps are closing

up a satisfactory rate, especially on the right wing.

Report on enemy situation. Our troops have more or less lost contact with the enemy on the fronts of Seventeenth and Sixth Armies. Air reconnaissance shows that the enemy is retreating in disorder before Seventeenth Army and the Hungarians, with several columns packed together on one road in some instances. We may assume that these movements are withdrawals, getting mixed up with refugee columns. Enemy AA protection generally covers the rear position west of Kiev, enemy fighter protection covers the area round Kiev. Behind the northern part of the position parallel troop movements and arrival of troops from the north.

On the front of AGp. Center, confirmation is obtained on unloading of troops round Orsha, from where they move westward to Guderian's front. AA protection makes itself felt west of Orsha, fighter protection round Orsha and to the east. Strong fighter cover above Briansk and Orel. The enormously large number of railway cars left standing on the sidings has again been observed. The purpose of these accumulations of rolling stock and of the movements into this area, apparently from the south, is not clearly understood. Operational reserves? Group for a flank thrust?

Air reconnaissance again confirms the existence of an enemy concentration round Velikie Luki. No indications that it has been committed in the fighting. It might become effective against Hoepfner's right flank, as well as against Hotin's left flank, especially if the latter should strike eastward from his crossing points at Drissa and Ulla. The enemy's fighter cover is above Velikie Luki, his AA protection is moved further west in the direction of Dvinsk.

Enemy's command set-up is as follows:

Russian AHq	8)	
	27)	forming AGp. Northwest
	11)	
Russian AHq	13)	
Unidentified)	forming AGp. West
new AHq)	
Russian AHq	5)	
	6)	
	12)	forming Southwestern Front
	2)	
Odessa Army)	

Heusinger (1300):

- a) A teletype from Erfurth indicates that on orders of OKW (apparently the Fuehrer himself) the last Regt.* of 163rd Div. now moving up behind Heinrich's assault group, was diverted for Falkenhorst's combat group at Salla. Apart from the fact that this Regt. cannot be

of any help in the Salla operation, the Div. as a result is disrupted and its striking power impaired where it was needed most. This clearly shows up the dubiousness of this entire Murmansk operation, which serves only political ends and is open to gravest censure from the operational point of view.

- b) In the episode with the Mongolians hordes (allegedly Stalin's bodyguard) trapped behind the front of Sixth Army, 168th Division is reported to have broken down completely. Relief of COs is demanded.

Wagner (Gen Qu) and Gercke (Transport Chief): Discussion of train requirements for supply and of the most practical procedure for cooperation between Gen Qu and Transp. Chief. (North needs 14, Center 21, and South 12 trains; overall planning by Transp. Chief; details of execution, by BvTO.)*

Buhle (Org.):

- a) Condition of Divisions. 168th has lost part of its Artillery! Cav. Div.: condition of horses good; organization has proved unworkable ! **
- b) Suitable for new missions (i.e., possible employment on Balkans, etc.)***:
- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| From Armd. Gp. 1: | 5th, 11th, 16th, 14th Armd. Divs. |
| " " " 2: | <u>3rd</u> , 4th, <u>17th</u> Armd. Divs. |
| " " " 4: | 1st Armd. Div. |
- Those underlined are the best suited. All other Armd. Divs. have French vehicles or Czech tanks.
- Also available: 16th, 20th, 60th mot. Divs. All other mot. Divs. have mixed or French vehicles.
- c) Africa: Two new Field Repl. Bns., i.e., 3,000 men, needed; adding 5% normal furloughs, makes a total of 5,000 men to be sent over.
- d) Chenillettes ## and Renault trucks lost in operations.
- e) Requests from Army Hq. Norway for Northern Norway, where signal equipment and supply installations have been diverted (!) ##
- f) Croat Legion: 1 Regt. of 6 Bns. Activation in Croatia 10 July. Will not be at training centers before 20 July; then training; ready for commitment by middle of August.

Situation in the evening: In South, advance slowed by terrain difficulties and enemy opposition. The report that AGp. South has lost contact with the enemy, is not confirmed. Armd. Gp. Kleist seems to have punched through the enemy defense system. In Center, a victory of Guderian's and Hoth's outer wings is in the making. Very bad roads. In North, the attempt of the enemy to build up a front against Hoepfner with forces hurriedly thrown together, does not seem to come off. The "intentions" set forth in the AGp.

reports are in line with the ideas of OKH.

ObdH back from tour to AGp. Center, Army Hq 4 and Armd. Gp. 2:

Eighteenth Armd. Div. suffered heavy losses in the forest area. -- PW problem is beginning to get troublesome. -- Insecurity of Rear Areas. -- Population movements on the roads.

OKW interfered in the moving of 163rd Div. to Finland with a direct order by the Fuehrer. The Division was supposed to go to Heinrich's group east of Lake Ladoga and is now ordered to go "as a whole or in part" to the Salla front. Reason: SS Brigade "Nord" committed at Salla, has been a failure.

C of S, AGp. South sends an interesting situation estimate. It shows how widely AGp. South, which has decided to direct its main effort against Berdichev (non-existent gap in the fortified line) diverges from our plan (main concentration on the northern wing).

6 July 1941. (15th Day.) Sunday

Situation: The final reports last night and the morning reports bring no important news.

In AGp. South, the situation of Armd. Gp. 1 develops generally fair, both at the front and on the northern flank. The right wing of Sixth Army has come up against an enemy front consisting of field fortifications laid out in difficult terrain, east of Yampol. Seventeenth Army has generally made fair advances, Eleventh Army only slight ones. It is still an open question whether the enemy will succeed in the timely organization of unified resistance in the fortified line west of Kiev, on which we now have accurate air reports. The energetic leadership of the enemy south of the Pripet Marshes would make this appear quite likely; against it is the attrition of forces bled by the recurrent counter attacks and the disruption of withdrawal movements by our air effort.

In AGp. Center, the only change from last night's situation is that Seventeenth Armd. Div., north of Eighteenth, without any orders has started moving away from Minsk, and that strong elements of Fourteenth mot. Div., which was in the "pocket" guard", has been set in motion behind Hoth.

In AGp. North, the forward movement of the Infantry right wing north of Dvina is thoroughly satisfying.

Gen. Bogatsch:

a) Air observation shows nothing new of any importance as regards enemy movements.

- b) Photographic reconnaissance furnishes the explanation for the huge number of cars standing on sidings in the Briansk-Orel area. In this area the Russians have enormous, evidently brand-new industrial plants with vast railroad sidings. To all appearance they represent rolling stock factories and major railroad shops.

Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern (C of S AGp.

South) on his situation estimate submitted on 3 July. OKH Reserves were brought up behind the northern wing (III Corps) not because of any anxiety about the flank in the Rovno area, but with a view to supplying III Corps in its further advance with ample Infantry against any possible threat in the area north of Korosten from the direction of Mozir, thus giving III Corps freedom of movement toward Kiev or to the southwest.

Army Gp. states its intention to advance with III Corps on Kiev in order to form a bridgehead. The other elements of Armd. Gp. 1, after breaking through at Berdichev will strike west of the Dniepr through Byelaya Tserkov in the direction of Kirovograd, while the strong forces concentrated on the inner wing of Sixth and Seventeenth Armies, after breaching the line at Berdichev will drive on in southeastern direction for tactical cooperation with Eleventh Army in the encirclement of the enemy.

Gen. Ott reports on visit to front. (VII and XXXIX Corps.) He

describes pillbox fighting which he witnessed at VII Corps (heavy howitzers are very effective against them; also gasoline poured in ventilator shafts). In sector of XXXIX Corps, heavy losses were sustained by First Mt. Div. Morale of troops very good; all are imbued with a sense of superiority over the enemy.

It was good to see the general convictions among our troops that they can get the better of the enemy tanks. In some instances, enemy crews are reported to abandon the tanks, in others they keep on fighting until they are burned to death in their tanks. As over against the campaign in the West, our troops seem at last to have learnt to make effective use of their heavy Inf. weapons against a stubbornly resisting enemy.

Inf. Supply ~~Clinics~~ have proved very useful. — Everybody wants semi-automatic weapons and telescopic sights. — Close combat training has paid its way.

Russian attack method: three-minute artillery barrage, then pause, then Infantry attacking as much as twelve ranks deep, without heavy weapon support; the men start hurrahing from far off. Incredibly high Russian losses.

Casualties up to 3 July:

Wounded	38,809	(including 1,403 Officers)
Killed	11,822	(including 724 Officers)

Missing 3,961 (including 66 Officers)

Total losses about 54,000 = 2,15% of 2,5 Million.

The large number of medical casualties, (almost 54,000), practically equalling bloody casualties, is quite remarkable.

Larger proportion of officer casualties than in preceding campaigns.

Proportion officer casualties in the Russian campaign to-date: 3,8% wounded, 6,6% killed, 1,7% missing.

In the Western Campaign: Officer casualties were 3,1% wounded, 4,85% killed, 2% missing.

In the Polish Campaign: Officer casualties were 1,95% wounded, 4,6% killed, 1,35% missing.

In the afternoon, long talk with Gen. Gause, OKH Liaison Off. to - Italian High Command Libya, summoned from North Africa.

Summary:

a) Personal relations are complicated by Gen. Rommel's character and his inordinate ambition. The desired relationship of mutual confidence between Gause and Rommel has not been established. Rommel's character defects make him extremely hard to get along with, but no one cares to come out in open opposition, because of his brutality and the backing he has on top level. The Italians at first met Gause with suspicion, but now are friendlier. Incidentally, Roatta's insincerity also was an aggravating factor in this connection.

This obviously bungled situation might be rectified by modifying the mission of Gause's staff in the process of changing the command set-up (formation of an Armd. Gp. Rommel).

b) The situation at Bardia and Solum continues tight. The British have withdrawn after their last defeat, but it appears entirely possible, that they might repeat their attack toward the end of July. The weather then is said to be no worse than it was at the time of the last attack, when the British used 400 tanks and 2 Inf. Divs. By the end of July they may be in a position to put into the field 600 tanks and 3 Inf. Divs. It is a question whether the German forces then will be able to hold, for even at the last British attack it was touch and go. If there is another offensive, we shall have to reckon with attacks out of Tobruk, too.

c) The problem of transport now as ever is the dominating factor in the North African situation. Nothing has materially changed. We now do use the direct route to Bengasi, but German-Italian shipping space is

visibly diminishing. Strangely, Gause thinks it would be possible to substitute land transport for our dwindling shipping tonnage. I thoroughly disagree.

Evening situation.

South: In Romania * there has been a sudden change to optimism. Eleventh Army is reported to be advancing briskly and has pushed Advance Combat Teams toward the Dniestr in the XI Corps sector. A surprise thrust is planned against the bridge at Mogilev Podolsky. XXX Corps is to continue its attacks. The Romanians are to swing eastward south of the Dniestr. With road conditions improving, Seventeenth and Sixth Armies are pressing on in frontal advance. The northern wing of Armd. Gp. 1 is fighting inside the enemy positions.** The German Divs. advancing in the Pripet area are moving ahead at a fair pace, without enemy contact.

Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is encountering stiff opposition on its right wing, at Rogachev. Attack from the direction of Gomel against its right wing. On its left wing there is still fighting between the Beresina and the Dniepr. Central sector of Armd. Gp. is on the Dniepr.

North: Highly gratifying progress. Hoepfner has gained more ground to the north and has inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Sixteenth Army is moving to the right, to safeguard the right flank already now. Eighteenth Army is turning off its left wing northward, to occupy Estonia.

Finland: Unchanged. Of 163rd Div., only the last Regt.*** has been detached to Salla.

7 July 1941. (16th Day.)

Situation: South: Yesterday's optimism in Eleventh Army, has vanished. XI Corp is again held back. The reasons are not apparent. Seventeenth Army is getting along well and is concentrating its Advance Combat Teams against Proskurov. Wietersheim's Corps, leading the Army, has spread itself surprisingly far to the south (road conditions?).# Sixth Army continues to advance, led on its left wing by Armd.Gp. 1, of which only the southern wing appears to have made any sizeable penetration into the enemy position west of Minsk,## whereas its northern wing is still fighting in the pillbox line. The Inf. wing of Sixth Army on the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes is advancing nicely.

The enemy is trying with all means to extricate his forces out of the pocket in the process of being formed by Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. It seems that he is retreating behind the Dniepr, but we have no conclusive

evidence as yet. The numerous movements in the rear area between the Dniepr and the position to the west could well be shipments of materials and the concentration of large reserves, which would have to be assembled in the area south of Kiev, if he intends to hold the position.

Center: The enemy on our Dniepr front is still fighting hard and stubbornly against Armd. Gp. 2 at Orsha, and is shifting reinforcements from the south to the Dniepr Line.

On the Dvina front, Hoth's left wing has gained elbow-room on the northern bank of the river and, by swinging up-river, is endeavoring to move its entire front across the river. This situation offers the big chance for carrying forward our operation. Second and Ninth Armies are following closely behind the Armd. Gps.

North: Operations are proceeding according to plan, which means that a strong right Inf. wing is taking over flank cover against Nevel, thus freeing Armor for the regrouping against Leningrad.

Enemy: Apart from our uncertainty about enemy intentions in the South -- is he or is he not retreating behind the Dniepr -- there is still the open question whether the observed larger enemy movements in the Briansk -- Orel -- Kursk area are for the purpose of massing strength or are destined for the evacuation of industries. Radio intelligence indicates that there are still four enemy Corps Hqs in the Pripet Marshes in front of Reichenau's left wing. However, we have no clear idea of the location of the combat troops, as XVII Corps, advancing through the marshland has lost contact with the enemy.

Summary: At the moment the best chances of success are on the front of left wing of AGp. Center (Armd. Gp. 3). To the north, the enemy group Velikie Luki is less active than one would have expected after the large movements to that sector in the past few days. Since, moreover, the right wing of AGp North is advancing well, and so holds this enemy group in check, Hoth may have a chance to roll up the Vitebsk positions from the north, and so open up a great operational opportunity.

If the enemy in the South falls back behind the Dniepr, such an opening might prove very valuable, since it could initiate a north-south operation east of the Dniepr.*

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance We are beginning to run short of aircraft for long-range reconnaissance. OKH Staffeln take over the Estonian area to relieve AGp. North. In return, AGp. North does reconnaissance in the area between Leningrad and Moscow for us. OKH aircraft continues to cover the area Briansk -- Orel -- Kursk and the Pripet Marshes.

Lt. Col. Buerkner (Eng. Sec.) reports on current business of his section. New Artillery School to meet replacement requirements for Artillery officers. -- Courses for selection of

officer candidates from NCO ranks. -- Analysis of results of final examination of Officer Schools, for selection of War Academy candidates. -- Supply of periodical military publications to the front will be suspended during operations.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Trunk-line net-work is well organized up to Dvina and Pripet line; there is of course the gap made by the Pripet area.
- b) Withdrawal of signal units from the "Barbarossa front" for eventual assignment to Libya and Syria.
Refused for the present !

Heusinger comes with a report that the breakthrough in the central sector of AGp. is now under way. Eleventh Armd. Div. is clean through the enemy positions east of Polonnoje and is pushing right through fleeing Russian columns in the direction of Berdichev. Sixteenth Armd.Div. is at Starokonstantinov (fighting in progress). Ninth Armd.Div. now is engaged in a major tank battle at Proskurov. -- Question of future command set-up. On the northern wing unified command is necessary for VII, XXIX, III (mot.) Corps. Sixth Army and Armd. Gp. 1 must swing to the south-east. Eleventh Army has crossed the Dniestr near Mogilev (railroad bridge has been made usable for the crossing). 22nd Div. had heavy losses by a tank attack.

1700 Message that Eleventh Armd.Div. has reached Berdichev. A very gratifying success. Whether this will furnish an adequate basis for the enveloping movement to the south-east, is not yet quite clear at the moment.

1900 Talk with Heusinger on consequences of the breakthrough to Berdichev for our plans. Bridgehead of Eleventh Army across the Dniestr has been lost again (only parts of Regt. Brandenburg).

Situation in the evening: The movement in AGp. South seems to be getting on very well. The possibility of an operational breakthrough is developing. Nothing new from the fronts of the other Army Groups. Rain has started again in AGp. Center. Resistance by numerous stray enemy elements west of the Dniepris also reported.

ObdH back from AGp. North brings nothing new. Good impressions of morale and efficiency of troops.

2300 Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern (AGp.South) on next moves. The thing tomorrow is to move Armd. Gp. Kleist in such a direction, that we can turn to form the "inner ring" forthwith, resorting to an "outer ring" only if we are compelled to do so. The trouble is that the farther Armor penetrates into enemy territory in such a case, the quicker our Infantry loses contact with them and the enemy forces marked for destruction escape in masses through the resulting gaps.

8 July 1941. (17th Day.)

Situation: On the Romanian front our offensive is advancing slowly. Seventeenth Army is pressing on. Armd. Gp. 1 wants to move XIV Corps to Eleventh Armd. Div. in order to use it for the encirclement of the enemy in front of Seventeenth Army. III Corps is fighting its way through the fortified line at Zvyagel and to the south. Sixth Army is pushing on close behind.

AGp. Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is battering its way to the Beresina, partly against aggressive enemy resistance. It reports bitter enemy counter attacks with tanks particularly against its northern wing from the direction of Orsha. Advance elements of Armd. Gp. 3 have crossed the Dvina at several points and are fighting for maneuvering space in the direction of Vitebsk while repelling counter-attacks from the north. The Inf. Armies are following, with strong forces on the outer wings and commendable depth in center.

AGp. North is fighting hard and soon will have gained freedom of movement to the north (Armd. Gp. 4), and now is committing Inf. arriving from the right wing, to replace the forces of Armd. Gp. 4 detached for covering the east flank.

The Inf. Armies are pressing on in rapid marches on a wide front and with great depth, with their Advance Combat Teams following closely behind the Armor. On the left wing of Eighteenth Army, it was possible to use sections of the railroad in moving Inf. quickly to the north, into Estonian territory.

1100 Kinzel: Review of enemy situation:

Of 164 identified Rifle Divisions, 89 have been totally or largely eliminated;
46 Russian Combat Divs. are on this front.
18 are tied down in other theaters (Finland 14, Caucasus 4).
11 are possibly still in reserve, in the rear.

Of 29 identified Armd. Divs., 20 have been totally or largely eliminated; 9 still have full fighting strength.

The enemy is no longer in a position to organize a continuous front, not even behind strong terrain features. At the moment the apparent plan of the Red Army High Command is to check the German advance as far to the west as possible by draining our strength with incessant counter attacking with all available reserves. In pursuing this policy they evidently have grossly overestimated German losses.

Meanwhile we must reckon with the attempt to activate new units, with which they might eventually stage an offensive. The plan of a large-scale disengagement is nowhere discernible.

Activation of new units, certainly on any larger scale, will fail for lack of officers, specialists and Artillery materiel. This holds particularly for their Armor, which even before the war was sadly lacking in officers, drivers and radio operators, as well as signal equipment.

In the individual Army Groups, the situation works out as follows:

North, which at the start of the campaign was numerically equal to the enemy, definitely outnumbered him after annihilation of numerous enemy Divs. on its front; this superiority applies to both Inf. and Armor.

Center which was stronger from the start now has a crushing superiority and can maintain it even if the enemy, as is expected, should bring new units to that front.

South, which in the beginning was noticeably weaker in numbers, now has equal strength, due to the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, and soon will add numerical to tactical and operational superiority.

1230 Report to the Fuehrer (at his Hq):

ObdH first presents the latest tactical reports. I follow with an estimate of the enemy situation and an operational appraisal of our situation, and review the operational questions on which a decision must now be made: Continuance of the encircling operation in AGp. South. Start in AGp. Center of the battle of envelopment with strong outer wings against the Dniepr - Dvina line, calculated to crack the triangle Orsha - Smolensk - Vitebsk. Conduct of operations by AGp. North against Leningrad and start of operations by the Finns. A discussion follows.

Result:

- 1.) The Fuehrer has in mind the following " perfect solution", which should be aimed at:

AGp. North accomplishes with its own forces the missions assigned it in the original operational plan.

AGp. Center, by a pincer attack, will force the last organized resistance group north of the Pripet Marshes out of the overextended Russian front and thus opens the road to Moscow. Once the two Armd. Gps. have reached the areas assigned to them by the operational plan,

- a) Hoeh can be halted (to assist von Leeb, if necessary) or else continue operating in an eastern direction, e.g., with a view to investing Moscow, but not proceeding to an assault of the city).
- b) Guderian can strike in a southern or southeastern direction, east of the Dniepr river, cooperating with AGp. South.

2.) It is the Fuehrer's firm decision to level Moscow and Leningrad, and make them uninhabitable, so as to relieve us of the necessity of having to feed the populations through the winter. The cities will be razed by Air Force. Tanks must not be used for the purpose. "A national catastrophe which will deprive not only Bolshevism, but also Muscovite nationalism of their centers."

3.) Details:

a) The draft operational plans of the Army Groups are approved. An added feature is the stressed importance on cutting off the Leningrad area from the southeast and east with the strong right wing of Hoepfner's Armd. Gp. This idea is sound.

b) After destroying the Russian Armies in a battle at Smolensk *, we shall block the railroads across the Volga, occupy the country as far as that river and, after that, proceed to destroy the remaining Russian industry centers by Armd. expeditions and air operations.

c) Preparations must now be made for housing our troops during the winter. Our troops must not be quartered in villages and towns, because we want to be able to bomb them at any time in the event of uprisings.

d) Reduction of the Italian contingent for the East is opposed (it was to be reduced in favor of Libya). A special point should be made of giving the Italian troops a big reception on arrival. With Italian troops at the German front, a visit by Mussolini to the Fuehrer's Hq may be expected.

4.) Tanks: The Fuehrer explains why he is keeping the new tanks coming off production concentrated in the ZI. He wants to make sure that we would have brand-new equipment for the missions still ahead, for these will again extend over thousands of kilometers. The tank losses suffered since the beginning of the campaign therefore necessitate a reduction in the number of Armd. Divs. The personnel so freed will make up the crews for the new tanks in the ZI. He envisages the following operations:

a) Norway: Safeguarding of the "Norwegian flank". Required for this purpose: two Armd. Divs. Could use captured tanks.

b) Anatolia. Against the British land route in the Middle East. For this purpose we need at least four Armd. Divs. One of these (2nd Armd. Div.?) should be sent as soon as possible to the Bulgare - Turkish border, as a warning to Turkey, which is again getting too frisky.

- c) Spain /Portugal. Against the potential British threat. To counter this threat, at least four Armd. Divs. are required. One should go to France soon, to bolster our prestige there and show the world that Germany still has forces available over and above what is needed in the Russian theater.
- d) In North Africa we shall confine ourselves to reinforcing the German Divs. there, improving supply and establishing a supply base. (Raise number of Tank Bns. in Armd. Div. to three.)

After we plead the urgent requirements of the front, Fuehrer releases from the tanks stored in the ZI: 70 tanks III, 15 tanks IV and the Czech tanks as materiel replacements for the Russian front.

Wagner (Gen Qu) reports on supply situation. It is fairly satisfactory everywhere. The railroads are handling more freight than we ever dared hope. Only on the line Brest-Minsk results fall behind expectations. The objectives of the next operations are logistically assured.

For the time being we have sufficient 60-ton Truck Cms.; rest days for attending to maintenance, so as to avoid excessive wear of the tracks, are necessary and we can afford them.

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance: New heavy transport movements toward the Dniepr near Orsha, from the direction of Moscow and Briansk (1 - 2 Divs.).

Apart from rearward railroad movements in northeastern and northern direction on Hoepfner's front, no movements of operational significance.

Evening situation: New development: On the northern wing of AGp. South, the "Stalin Line" has been breached by III Corps. Advances continue in all other sectors.

In AGp. Center, fighting is still going on in the approaches to the Dniepr (Guderian). The offensive will start on 10 July. Hoth has made further good progress on the northern bank of the Dvina in the direction of Vitebsk.

Particularly gratifying are the advances of AGp. North, where Armor on the defensive front facing east is now being relieved by Inf., and Armd. Gp. is concentrating against the north. Hoepfner had made good strides in the northward advance, and has reached Pskov. On the western wing of AGp. (Eighteenth Army) Ullersperger has taken Paernu with the bridge intact. The entire AGp. is pressing on behind Armd. Gp. 4 in forced marches and with Advance Combat Teams far ahead.

Orders are issued to AGp. North on the next moves against Leningrad; to AGp. South on the closing of the pocket now forming on Seventeenth Army front and the advance of the northern wing on Kiev; to Finland, with the request to launch the offensive on 10 July.

Presentation of air photographs by the two pilot officers who flew over Briansk, Orsha and Gomel to day. (Long-range Recon. Staffel of OKH).

9 July 1941. 18th Day.

Situation: South: Eleventh Army is forging ahead to the Dniestr according to plan, and is preparing for a crossing at Mogilev. In this operation the balance of strength is as follows:

The German XXX Corps (5 German, 3 Romanian Divs.) is opposed by three enemy Inf. Divs. (elements) and II Armored Corps (2 Armd. Divs., one mot.Div.). The German XI Corps (three German Divs., one Romanian Cav. Corps) is opposed by one Russian Division drawn up on both sides of Mogilev.* On the flank of both Corps we must figure with two Russian mot. Divs. and elements of two Inf.Divs. This means, that apart from Armor, the German-Romanian assault force is stronger. The Romanians are fighting surprisingly well.

Seventeenth Army is advancing eastward against the Stalin Line ** in good and deep formation. Marching slowed down by cloudbursts and fatigue of our troops.

Sixth Army is pushing its right wing behind Armd.Gp. 1 on Berdichev, impeded by the transverse movement of XIV Corps, which is shifting from the south to Berdichev. Armd. Gp. 1 now has breached the Stalin Line with III Corps at Zvyagel, and is advancing on Zhitomir with three Armd.Divs., one behind the other. The northern wing of Sixth Army is following closely, with the objective Kiev.

Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is closing to the Dniepr, according to plan. On the northern wing, very bitter enemy counter attacks from the direction of Orsha against Seventeenth Armd. Div. Our troops repulsed them, knocking out 100 enemy tanks, with minor own tank losses but more serious losses in men. This engagement held up Seventeenth Armd. Div. and kept it from catching up with Guderian's main attacking force south of Orsha. It will now be relieved by Twelfth Armd.Div. of Armd.Gp. 3. Second Army is closing up behind Armd. Gp. 2 with Advance Combat Teams and follows with its Corps in good formation. Armd. Gp.3, north of the Dvina, is in rapid advance on Vitebsk and is now fighting 7 km west of the city. The enemy is bringing up reinforcements from Smolensk to Vitebsk by rail and on trucks, Ninth Army is closing up behind Hoth with remarkable speed and in good order. Also von Leeb's right wing is forging ahead with strong forces north of the Dvina in the direction of Hoth's left wing, to protect his flank in case of counter attacks from the direction of Nevel.***

North is advancing and closing to Pskov. Eighteenth Army, which yesterday took Paernu, now has also captured Fellin.

Enemy: The large transport movement from the southeast and east to Smolensk, noted yesterday, is beginning to show its effects around Vitebsk. At Smolensk, where dense transport movements have arrived from three directions there seems to be a major traffic jam; the lines are choked with trains which apparently cannot be unloaded. Motorized movements from the east toward the Dniepr on both sides of Mogilev. No new developments in the sector of AGp. South.

AGp. Center submits a final report on the twin battle Bialystok - Minsk. AGp. states its opponents were four Russian armies, comprising 32 Rifle Divs., 8 Armd. Divs., 6 moto.-mcz. Brigs. and Cav. Divs. Out of this total it has destroyed 22 Rifle Divs. 7 Armd. Divs., 6 moto.-mcz. Brigs. and 3 Cav. Divs. The remaining Divs. were severely crippled by very high bloody losses. Figures counted up to 8 July: 289,874 prisoners (including several Corps CG and Div. Commanders); 2,585 captured and destroyed tanks (including heaviest types); 1,449 guns; 246 airplanes. Also large quantities of small arms, ammunition and vehicles.

Radio intelligence shows the following enemy command set-up (from north to south*):

Russian AGp. Northwest, with 8th, 27th, 11th Armies (from north to south).

Russian AGp. West, with 22nd, 20th, 13th Armies.

Russian AGp. Southwest, with 5th, 6th, 12th and 2nd Armies and one Armd. Gp.

Report:

- a) Armd. Gp. 3 has taken Vitebsk. Twelfth Armd. Div. and 900th Brig. are now following up in that direction.
- b) Appearance of a strong and still growing enemy group between Orsha and Vitebsk has prompted an order from Army Hq to Armd. Gp. 2 to put off planned attacks temporarily and instead take over cover of the left wing against enemy attacks and assure contact with Armd. Gp. 3. Armd. Gp. 3 is continuing in the attack.

Gen. Oehquist reports on his trip to Finland. Only minor local changes in the disposition of troops. Plan of attack entirely in line with our ideas. Road network east of Lake Ladoga thin; roads narrow. Air raid damage very small. Morale of the Finnish people is good. Troops are keen to attack.

OQu IV: Military-political matters:

Japan's intentions still obscure. Having first tried to whet Japan's appetite for Singapore we now are busy needling her against Russia. The new policy will take some time to show results.

In France, relations between Abetz and von Stuelpnagel are strained on the question of the volunteers.

Sweden still very reserved. Seems to be disposed toward a pact with Germany, but for the time being has no intention to join the Tripartite Pact.

From Faruk (Egypt) a report has been received that Britain is making preparations for a move from Irak into Iran to seize the oil wells and advance to the north. This sounds quite plausible, for besides giving Britain a better defensive position in the event of a German advance across the Caucasus, it enables her to build up, on Iran territory, an air basis for attacks on the Caucasian oil fields. Moreover, Turkey would then be bounded by British-held territory along her entire southern and eastern frontier and thus could be kept under pressure.

Elaboration of the necessity to capture Gibraltar soon and to begin preparations immediately. I don't think, this is correct. Preparations cannot be made until directly before we march in, that is, when we positively know that we are going to do it. Otherwise Britain simply lets the Spaniards starve to death.

U.S. has the following forces available for immediate action: 6 Inf.Divs., 2 Armd.Divs., 2 Cav. Divs.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Exchange of high power radio equipment between Armd. Gps. and Advance Gen Qu Hqs. -- Activation of signal formations for the Africa Corps. -- No new findings by radio intelligence.

1700 Heusinger: Current business:

- a) Further offensive operations of Fourth Army: Guderian must not be rushed, but should attack only when ready and with definite concentration on one wing, best probably south of Mogilev.
- b) Allocation of GHq Reserves. Part of them (now in AGp. South) must be used for pacification missions in the areas traversed by our advancing Armies.
- c) Exchange of views about the future organization and distribution of forces in occupied Russia after the Russian Armies have been destroyed. Winter preparations must be initiated now.

Gen. Buhle: Rating of Divisions by casualty figures. -- Availability of tanks and activation of new Divisions out of new production. -- "Rehabilitation Bns." * have proved a good idea. -- Radio direction beams for Africa. -- Armd.Divs. may be replenished with personnel from Inf. Divisions (best from Divisions held back for occupation duty). -- Replacements: The Field Replacement Bns. are largely used up by now.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Organization in North Africa when Armd. Gp. Rommel is formed. Use Gause's Staff in organizing Hq of Armd. Gp. ObdH wants the Armd. Gp. activated as soon as possible.
- b) Questions of the organization of road construction during the operation. I think that we must have a check-up on how plans are being carried out in the Army areas.

Evening situation: In AGp. South, no reports have come in from Eleventh Army and the Hungarians. Seventeenth Army's advance is slow because the roads are rainsoaked. Sixth Army is slowed down for the same reason; its northern wing is being moved round the southern edge of the Pripet forest area and will continue north when it reaches Korets. The forest area will be crossed directly only by mounted patrols. Reason: Run-down condition of the horses.

The burning question now is the further employment of Armd. Gp. 1. AGp. states its intention to strike with its northern group (III Corps) for Kiev and with the bulk of the Armd. Gp. for Belaya Tserkov, and then to push in southern or southeastern direction.

In the meantime the Fuehrer has called up ObdH and told him that he wants Armd. Gp. to swing the elements which have penetrated to Berdichev, to the south, in the direction of Vinnitsa, in order to effect an early junction with Eleventh Army. At the evening situation conference with ObdH, this leads to an agitated exchange about the direction in which Armd. Gp. 1 ought to be moved. My standpoint is as follows:

We must on no account ignore Kiev. There is so much evidence of enemy confusion, what chances to take Kiev by some sort of surprise thrust: look good; the enemy is building several ponton bridges there, which means that he is preparing a retreat precisely on Kiev. If this estimate, however, should prove wrong, then we must use no armor in the battle for Kiev. All Divs. moving behind Thirteenth Armd. Div. in the direction of Zhitomir could then be brought to bear advantageously against Belaya Tserkov and help block the roads and railroads leading to the Lower Dniestr.

For the Armd. forces advancing south of III Corps (not.), the immediate objective is Belaya Tserkov, in order to strike from there to the south (not to the southeast at first) in the direction of Uman, into the enemy's rear. In that case it will be indicated to direct the right wing of Eleventh Army toward Uman. Should it become necessary to advance from Berdichev toward Vinnitsa i.e. on the inner ring, the Armd. Divs. following behind Eleventh Armd. Div. could always do that on their commander's own initiative.

Thus the ring to be formed will run from Berdichev through Belaya Tserkov and to the sector of Eleventh Army. Sealing the ring is the primary objective. Kiev and the Dniepr crossings south of Kiev are secondary objectives.

ObdH outlines this scheme to the Fuehrer. He does not object, but apparently is not yet converted and emphasizes that he expects nothing from the Kiev operation.

AGp. Center: Armd. Gp. 3 has broken through the enemy's Dvina position in the direction of Vitebsk. Enemy movements from Vitebsk in the direction of Velizh and slackening of enemy pressure round Senno suggest that the enemy might be trying to disengage. I don't see it. Nor, in my opinion, can the reported heavy movements of the enemy from Orsha to Smolensk be interpreted as a positive indication that the enemy is abandoning the dry route Orsha-Vitebsk. In order to exploit the success of Armd. Gp. 3, to the fullest extent, XXIII Corps, with 3 Divisions and the Training Brigade (900th) are being moved behind it.

Owing to the easing of enemy pressure around Senno, the attack of Armd. Gp. 2 can be launched as planned, namely, on 10 July, with line of departure from Stary Bykhov to the north. Second and Ninth Armies are continuing their advance.

AGp. North: Armd. Gp. 4 is approaching the line Porkhov-Pog, but will not push beyond this line in the direction of Leningrad before LVI Corps has moved closer to XXXXI Corps by swinging northeast.

Eighteenth Army is to detach elements for a northward drive on Dorpat (airport). The right wing of Sixteenth Army will remain in the offensive in order to cover Armd. Gp. 3 against enemy attacks from the direction of Nevel.

Conference with Heusinger and Paulus on direction of the battle of encirclement of AGp. South. Their ideas are in substantial accord with mine.

Telephone conference with Gen. von Sodenstern (C of S AGp. South) on my ideas concerning direction of the battle of encirclement. I give explicit orders not to turn initially southeast from Belaya Tserkov, but to let strike toward Uman to effect encirclement.

They should make a try at Kiev but, if surprise is not achieved, must not risk Armor against the city.

10 July 1941. (19th Day.)

Finns launch offensive.

0130 ObdH calls. The Fuehrer has again rung him up. He cannot put his mind at rest for fear that Armor might be committed

against Kiev and so needlessly sacrificed (Kiev has 35% Jews, we won't get the bridges in any case). The encircling ring is to run from Berdichev through Vinnitsa to Eleventh Army.

Accordingly, the following order goes out to AGp. South: The Fuehrer does not want Armor to be brought to bear against Kiev, beyond what is necessary for reconnaissance and security. Furthermore, he wants the immediately available forces of Armd. Gps. 1 to strike from Berdichev on Vinnitsa in order to link up with Eleventh Army as soon as possible and encircle the enemy forces fronting Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies. Only those forces of Armd.Gp. 1 which are not needed or not adapted for this purpose will strike for Belaya Tserkov and then to the south.

Total of Army casualties (excl. medical casualties) up to 6 July, 1941:

Wounded 42,755 (1,588); killed 13,869 (829); missing 5,010 (81); total 61,634 (2,498).

Figures in parenthesis refer to officers; they are not included in the totals.

Situation South: Slow progress. Russian II Armd. Corps (two Armd.Divs. and one mot.Div.) attacks from Kishinev into the flank of the Romanian Fourth Army in the direction of Jasy and Balty. The attacks are repelled. A Russian Cav. Corps is reported further to the south. Plans of Eleventh Army remain unchanged. No new developments elsewhere in AGp. South.

Center: Guderian: Third Armd.Div. has been relieved by Cav. Div. and three Advance Combat Teams, and so is free to join the assault group. Attack on Stari Bykhov has started at 0500. (Later report: lodgement gained on eastern bank; bridge construction in progress at noon). At Shklov, Eleventh* and Seventh Armd.Divs., reinforced by Seventeenth Armd.Div. will attack on 11 July. Enemy at Ulla is trapped. Vitebsk railroad bridge is not destroyed. Hoth's left wing unchanged.

North: Stiffening opposition on front of the northernmost elements of XXXXI Corps. Otherwise operations continue according to plan.

Enemy situation: Many trains standing on the line between Vinnitsa and Kiev. Between Vinnitsa and Kalinovka alone, 10,000 railroad cars and 40 locomotives. Yesterday, between 0620 and 1800 retrograde movements from Orsha to Smolensk. Many trains standing still. Two more enemy Divs. have arrived from the Caucasus since 8 July.

Over-all picture introduces no new elements in our estimate.

1100 ObdH calls up from Hq AGp. South:

Early this morning, ObdH received the following teletype

from the Fuehrer:

"I think it advisable and necessary, on reaching the line Zhitomir - Berdichev, to swing the leading elements of Armd.Gp. 1 promptly to the south in order to prevent the enemy from retreating over the Bug river and to the south of Vinnitsa and, if possible, by thrusting across the Bug, effect a junction with Eleventh Army. -- The rear elements of Armd.Gp. must protect this movement against attacks from Kiev, but will not make any attack into the city. Should it become apparent that there are no large bodies of enemy troops left to cut off west of the Bug, Armd.Gp. 1 will be massed for an advance on Kiev and the Dniepr line to the southeast. Investment must be executed in such a way as to bar enemy reinforcements from reaching the city from the northwest."

Field Marshal von Rundstedt's analysis: Overtaking the enemy in pursuit means striking far ahead. If the ring runs through Vinnitsa it becomes too close. Seventeenth Army has completely lost contact with the enemy, which means he has already withdrawn far to the rear. On the other hand, Army Gp. believes that there are substantial enemy forces in the area southwest and south of Belaya Tserkov, which seem to be moving on Kiev and to the area southeast of the city. In taking Belaya Tserkov, we should be astride the retreat routes to Kiev. von Rundstedt hopes to engage large enemy forces there, and then to be able to advance in a southwestern direction, to link up with Eleventh Army.-- If this should prove inadvisable, we still would have two courses of action open to us: either advance in a southeastern and southern direction, west of the Dniepr, or across the Dniepr at Kiev and to the southeast and then drive on east.

This conception of Army Gp., with which ObdH agrees, differs from the solutions envisaged by the Fuehrer. It is a compromise between the two alternatives outlined by the Fuehrer. ObdH will make no decision that would not have the Fuehrer's approval. It is now up to me to get the Fuehrer to agree.

1130 After unsuccessfully trying to get the sleeping Fuehrer to the phone, I have Field Marshal Keitel called and explain the plans to him, emphasizing:

- a) that OKH has been directed by the Fuehrer to destroy the largest possible portions of the enemy west of the Dniepr, so as to prevent any possibility of a coordinated operation by large enemy forces east of the river, and
- b) that the capabilities of Eleventh Army must be rated so low that no plans could be made which rest on Eleventh Army as a dependable partner in a paired attack.

1230 Phone call from OKW (Christian): The Fuehrer approves the proposed plan, but wants us to make sure that nothing untoward happens on the north flank of Armd.Gp.

This answer is transmitted to ObdH at 1300.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone:

- a) Success of Guderian's attack; they are already building a bridge.
- b) Hoth is in Vitebsk with two Armd.Divs. This afternoon yet he wants to continue the drive with these two Divs. from Vitebsk, and with Twelfth and Thirteenth Divs., south of Vitebsk.
- c) Guderian will attack north of Mogilev on 11 July.
- d) The commitment of Fourth Army Hq complicates the command set-up.
- e) Condition of the troops: Morale excellent. Horses are worn out.
- f) Air action against railroad installations in the rear: Our urgings have caused bad feelings. That will straighten itself out.
Air reconnaissance : Of the long-range Rcn.Staffeln of Army Gp. (apart from those at Armd.Divs.) one has only three operational craft left, the other one is down to nothing. Night Rcn.Staffel has two craft in operating condition. In the circumstances, Air Fleet has offered to combine Army and Air Force reconnaissance. I emphatically advise against such an arrangement and recall the controversies between ObdH and ObdL before the start of the offensive.

Col. Metz (Liaison Off., Eleventh Army). Report on situation on the Romania front: Road conditions very difficult. -- Russian tactics the same as in other sectors of the eastern theater; excellent in camouflage. -- Bad luck of 198th Div., where Inf. went ahead without waiting for its AT Bn., and ran into heavy enemy tank attack.

Description of the Russian Dniestr position. Ultra-modern installations, partly with steel cupolas. Behind it, on the railroad line Vinnitsa-Odessa a new position is under construction; the materials are brought to it by rail. Three more days will be needed to reach the Dniestr river, then two days to prepare for the attack. Accordingly the attack could not very well start before 15 July.

1700 ObdH returned from AGp. South. Short review of what he learned; nothing essentially new.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Material on Russia's economic production (new maps).-- Report on conference at Hq AGp. North.
- b) AGp. North: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the Dvina.
AGp. Center: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the line Borrisov-Dniepr.
AGp. South: Situation at present not yet settled enough for firm planning.

- c) Cooperation of the AGp. Eng. Commanders with the OQu on road construction is apparently not quite what it ought to be.
- d) Worries about volume of traffic on railroad line to Minsk (has dropped off badly in the last few days).
- e) Sixty-ton Truck Clms. have 25% losses.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Enemy situation: Shifting and reduction of forces on front of AGp. Center. Clogged lines in the South.
- b) Strength of enemy air force: Of about 1,500 operational planes, about 500 are estimated to be committed on each of the AGp. fronts.
- c) Enemy AAA concentrated in triangle Vitebsk-Orsha-Smolensk, at Gomel and north of Korosten-Kiev.
- d) Major concentration of enemy planes: Lake Ilmen; north and south of Smolensk; Korosten; Kiev; Vinnitsa; Uman.

von Ziehlberg: Clausius affair.-- Decorations (Iron Cross, Cross of Merit, Bulgarian decorations).-- Current matters.

Evening situation:

No new developments in AGp. South. Intentions in line with today's conversation with ObdH.

In AGp. Center all battles are still in progress. Intensive enemy movements; for the time being one would be inclined to interpret them as troop movements to hard-pressed sectors of the front, rather than withdrawal movements.

Enemy rear position located on the Sozh river line. Air Force has for the first time succeeded in destroying important enemy railroad lines.

Later reports from Armd.Gp. 2 strengthen the impression that the enemy is withdrawing at least part of his forces from the Dniepr front, to the east. Movements observed on roads and railroads.

AGp. North. No important news. Intentions unchanged. Thrust on Leningrad and Estonian ports, with Sixteenth Army covering the east flank in the line Velikie Luki - Porkhov.

11 July 1941. (20 th Day)

Situation South: Russian pressure on Schobert's right flank and right wing has apparently resulted in a weakening of the Romanian contingent. Eleventh Army reports that it regards

these elements disabled for attacking. A "new operation" against Kishinev is considered necessary. We shall have to watch that this "operation" is limited at most to LIV Corps, and does not result in dissipation of strength.

Center: Guderian's attack has started and come through. We have no reports on Hoth's planned attack at Berdichev, but the over-all enemy situation indicates that hastily gathered elements is all the enemy can put up against us. It has been learned that broken Divs. withdrawing from the front are filled up with partly untrained replacements rushed to the front, and immediately committed to battle again. At Nevel the enemy has set up a big straggler collecting point which is feeding to the front-line Divs. totally disorganized masses of men, without officers and NOC's. Under these circumstances it is clear that the front, which also has no more reserves left, cannot hold much longer, despite the attempt to give that front apparently at least a backbone of energetic leadership by introducing a number of new tactical Hqs (AHQs). These new Hqs cannot make their presence felt and desperately radio thru the whole ether to establish contact with their Divisions. I do not share the opinion that the enemy in front of AGp. Center is falling back (this opinion evidently originates in the Armd.Gps., not at AGp. Hq). He is making an effort to hold, but he is cracking in the attempt.

But there is one question which neither this battle of Smolensk will settle for us and that is the question of the enemy's Armor. In every instance, large bodies, if not all, manage to escape encirclement, and in the end, their Armor may well be the only fighting force left to the Russians for carrying on the war. The strategy of that war would have to be visualized on the basis of operations by two or three major and perhaps some subsidiary groups of Armor, supported by industrial centers and peacetime garrisons, and by the remnants of the Russian Air Force.

North: Enemy attacks against Hoepfner have been beaten back and preparations are made for continuing the drive to the area southeast of Leningrad, with a strong right wing. In the Estonian theater, more advances against merely local resistance. At last we have succeeded in rousing in AGp. North some interest also in Dorpat. On the right wing, there is more tough fighting against the enemy group apparently based on Nevel, but this does not seriously interfere with the movements of AGp. for massing in a northward direction.

Enemy: Air Force now seems to have succeeded in wrecking Russian railroads also far to the rear of the enemy communication zone. The number of lines with immobilized railroad transport is growing most satisfactorily and the good work is being continued. A striking feature are heavy concentrations of rolling stock in the area east of Gomel (Unecha), as well as to the west and southeast of that point. These concentrations seem to consist largely of trains loaded with vehicles and tanks. Either this is an attempt to supply new materiel to crippled Armd.units or an attempt to shift

Armor.

In the area south of Kiev the large accumulations of railroad cars on the railroad lines probably must be interpreted as a blocked large-scale withdrawal movement, which I think is more of the nature of an industrial evacuation, than a troop movement. The enemy is evidently trying to by-pass the blocked lines by routing movements through Odessa and the North. But heavy jams can already be seen on the lower reaches of the Dniepr also (e.g., 34 trains south of Cherkassi).

Field Marshal Keitel calls up at noon. Anxieties of the Fuehrer:

- a) Ninth Armd.Div. and SS Div. "Wiking" are closing up too slowly.
- b) The frontal battles of II Corps on von Leeb's right wing, which he wants to have cut short by action from von Bock's left wing. (As a matter of fact, the two Army Gps. do have perfect cooperation.)
- c) Hoepfner's operation (Armd.Gp. 4). He is afraid that it is losing contact with its own Inf. in its heedless push on Leningrad.

Gen. Bogatsch brings the latest aerial photographs. They verify the facts outlined under the heading "Enemy" above.

Col. Ochsner reports on his tour to Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. Facts worth noting:

- a) Russian air action at the Dvina crossings, southwest of Vitebsk.
- b) Enemy has good leadership. He is fighting with fanaticism and dogged determination.
- c) Our Armor has considerable losses in personnel and materiel. Troops tired.
- d) Leaflet propaganda highly effective.
- e) "Do" Rocket Projector is highly praised. Individual Btrys. go along with advance detachments. -- Large-caliber Projectors are not much used. Ammunition difficulties.
- f) Report that the border area of the old Russian frontier was dotted with barracks and airdromes of the most modern type. Demonstrates Russian gas protection and detection equipment.

Col. Heusinger: Current matters in Op. Sec. -- Supply getting tight in AGp. Center. -- Sector assigned to Italians: between Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. -- Bridge at Giurgiu.

Telephone talk with Gercke and Wagner: I know about the supply troubles in AGp. Center. But the reason is not the limited

capacity of the railroad, but failure to unload supply trains (Russian rolling stock). In AGp. area, four trains for the Air Force, three trains with Engineer construction materials, and five trains for Armd.Gp. 3 have not been unloaded, with the result that rolling stock runs short. A Gen.Staff Officer of the Transp. Chief's Office will fly to the front tomorrow, to look into the situation. Quite apart from all this it seems that Eckstein's cooperation with Greiffenberg in Hq AGp. Center stands in need of some improvement.

I suppose the crisis will be resolved within two days.

Evening situation: South: The advancing wedge of Armd.Gp. 1 is subjected to heavy attacks from the south and southwest at Berdichev, and from the north at Zhitomir. Thirteenth Armd.Div. has penetrated to Kiev's inner ring of fortifications and turned southward.

Center: Guderian has crossed to the eastern bank of the Dniepr at both points of attack. The enemy is falling back. Hoth at Vitebsk is subjected to furious attacks from the southeast and east and is repelling them. South of Vitebsk, his Twelfth and Seventh Armd.Divs. have reached the Orsha-Vitebsk highway. On the northern flank his forces, put across the Dvina, are gaining elbow-room for him.

North: Hoepfner has made some frontal advances; and now, with the Inf.Divs. arriving from the rear having replaced the Armor on his flank, he is concentrating his forces northward in the direction of Dno. The Armies are following up. Dorpat, for which, alas, only a weak Advance Combat Team was detached (and that too late), is in flames. What a pity about that fine old German city!

Enemy:

- a) The quality of the Russian frontline units is progressively deteriorating. Badly mauled Divs., in many instances, have been reported filled up with untrained replacements.
- b) The best Generals have been sent to lead the Armies at the front: AGp. Northwest, Voroshilov; AGp. West, Timoshenko; AGp. Southwest Budyonny.
- c) Over-all picture:

In the sector of AGp. South, the enemy is trying to check Eleventh Army and Armd.Gp. 1 by counter attacks. In the sector of Seventeenth and Sixth Armies, rear guard fighting is reported. In the sector of AGp. Center no evidence of a general withdrawal, notwithstanding individual disengaging movements. In AGp. North, on the front of Armd.Group, fierce opposition of strong rear guards supported by planes and tanks. The bulk of the enemy forces apparently is being taken back to the east.

12 July 1941. (21th Day)

Situation: In Afp. South, in the sector of Eleventh Army, the enemy now seems to be falling back behind the Dniestr also in front of the Romanian wing. As to mobile troops, the commands involved are II Armd. Corps (2 Armd. Divs., one mot.) and one Cav. Corps of four Divs.

On the front of Seventeenth Army it has been established that the enemy is making no attempt to hold the Stalin Line.* Advance Combat Teams of the Army have penetrated into these positions.

Sixth Army has made progress on its southern wing; on its northern wing at Zvyagel, it has beaten off the attacks from the area around Korosten and apparently thrown back the enemy.

Armd. Cp. 1 is engaged in a battle around Berdichev, into which the enemy keeps throwing new elements from the south-east, south and southwest, for the most part Armor. Among these have appeared some units which evidently belonged to the Russian Fifth Army (Mozir) until now.

Fourteenth Armd. Div. has closely followed 13th Armd. Div., reaching out to the south of Kiev in the direction of Belaya Tserkov.

Center: Guderian is across the Dniepr in force. Now he must brace himself for a heavy attack from the south.

Hoth, at Vitebsk, has had to repel bitter attacks from north and east. Also his forces following up along the Dvina are constantly subjected to attacks from the north, from the area around Nevel and Velikie Luki. The enemy elements still fighting south of the Dvina, have been engaged by the Advance Combat Teams of Ninth Army, which, I am pleased to note, is following closely behind, Hoth.

Second and Ninth Armies are following up.

North: On the right wing, continued stubborn enemy resistance (group formed by forces at Nevel). Very difficult terrain.

Elsewhere in this sector the advance continues according to plan. Hoepfner, whose spearheads are growing increasingly tired and weak, has made no substantial advances in the direction of Leningrad. Army Cp's. report that the enemy is "withdrawing" in front of their eastern flank, probably must be taken only in a tactical sense.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air observation shows the effect of our interdiction effort against the enemy railroad system deep in the rear. Dense detouring movements and traffic jams in the railroad network south of Kiev. Jams in the area south of the line Orsha - Smolensk. Choked masses of rail-

road transport in the area between Vitebsk and Smolensk. Intense AA defense in the area around Vitebsk and to the south and southwest, and south of Berdichev.

Gen. Paulus submits aerial photographs of Kiev. The reported bridge constructions require very cautious interpretation: One of these bridges is apparently only under construction, and at present no more than a ponton bridge; two other bridges give the impression of being special installations, perhaps with narrow-gauge lines, for construction projects. A possible explanation is that plans were made for extending the fortifications of Kiev on the eastern bank and that the narrow gauge lines served this purpose. In any case, one does not get the impression of unusually extensive preparations for a large-scale withdrawal.

Reports (Kinzel, 1145):

- a) A field order by Timoshenko threatening court-martial for anybody talking of retreat.
- b) The enemy is moving new forces against both wings of Fourth Army.
 - 1.) From the direction of Gomel, where previous reports located a group of Russian Inf. Divs. which had not been in action so far, a road movement, 100 km long, is in progress in the direction of Mogilev.
 - 2.) It has been learned from a captured Russian order that the new Russian Nineteenth Army, comprising 6 Divs., is to be detrained east of Vitebsk. The Divs., whose Div. numbers are given, were previously on the front of AGp. South. The document, dated 8 July, contains the orders for AAA to safeguard the detraining area.

Reporting out as CO, Guard Bn.: Lt. Col. Kaumann, 3rd Bn. of 284th Inf. (96th Div.)

Reporting in as JO Guard Bn.: Major Mathes (from 162nd Div.).

Gen. Brand (Arty.) reports on his tour to AGp. South:

- a) Enemy Artillery activity slight. Mostly in direct support of Inf., sometimes broken up into platoons. No central fire direction. Fire with air and sound observation poor, with direct observation good. Effect of projectiles good, also moral effect. Many modern Artillery instruments of a design unfamiliar to us.
- b) Very bad roads make it difficult for the Artillery to follow the advance. Condition of horses varies; in some units severely strained. On several occasions Artillery was completely immobilized by rain for 24 hours.

- c) Mobility of Ground Forces AAA improved by allocation of prime movers. But they have no Supply Clms. Good results against pillboxes. Also successful in air defense.
- d) Partly mobile Heavy Howitzer Bns. are merged to make one Bn. mobile. Decision on employment of the remainder only after the fall of Kiev.
- e) In pillbox fighting, Artillery was not very successful, because there was not enough time. But good results in other places. No bursting layers.
- f) Anti-tank fighting: Only one tank type encountered with 130 mm armor; all others not over 70 mm. The heaviest tanks were knocked out by 10 cm guns; less often by 8.8 cm AA guns. Also lt. Fd. Hows. have put out 50-ton tanks with AP projectiles, at 40 m range. Russian tank drivers reported showing little driving skill. Many track failures. Crews nervous when under Artillery fire.
- g) Improper allocation of 15 cm Guns, which were erroneously put under Div.
- h) Karl Gun * arrived at the front heavier than anticipated. Maximum weight 61 tons. This complicates rail transport and road travel (roadbeds collapse).
- i) Report on Island Fortress Kronstadt, which covers also the land approaches with its guns. The individual forts are built on small islands and so are very difficult to attack.

1400 ObdH calls up! The Fuehrer is again nagging about the slow development of the attack on von Leeb's right wing, and demands that Nineteenth Armd.Div. strike northward to encircle the enemy. In reply I explain: I am by no means advocating any eastward race of the two Armd. Gps. It is quite clear to me that Hoth might have to swing northward with a considerable body of his Gp., to get into the back of the new Russian Nineteenth Army and Group Nevel, and that Guderian might have to swing southward, to encircle the new enemy appearing on his southern wing, perhaps even to push on down to the Kiev area, in order finally to encircle and defeat the Red Fifth Army which keeps popping up in the south. But the prerequisite for either move is that Hoth and Guderian break into the open to the east and so gain freedom of movement.

1800 Heusinger:

- a) Planning on continuance of operations with the object of preventing frontal retreat of the enemy and ensuring liquidation of the largest possible enemy force. The operations are evolved from ideas outlined by me to ObdH, and crystallize first of all in plans for a new drive by Armd.Gp. 3, aiming at liquidating the concentration

of 12 to 14 Divisions now opposing von Leeb's right wing. By taking advantage of the marshland extending southward from Lake Ilmen, which is traversed by very few roads, we should be able to cut off the enemy facing von Leeb's forces. Accordingly, we should have to dispose Armd.Gp. 3 in such a manner that notwithstanding its original mission to reach the area northeast of Smolensk, it would be in a position, by advancing on Velikie Luki and Kholm, to cut off the enemy elements falling back before von Leeb's right wing.

Applying his scheme of thought to the area south of the line Orsha-Smolensk, the northern wing of Armd.Gp. 2 would have to strike for Yelnya, the southern wing, for Roslavl. This southern part would have to be followed in echelon formation by the Cav. Div., relieved by Advance Combat Teams.

- b) Report on intentions of AGp. South:
The recurrent threat to the northern flank from the direction of Korosten has prompted the decision to push this enemy in a northward direction, away from the advance and supply route Zvyagel-Zhitomir. Von Reichenau wanted the entire III Corps for this mission. Von Rundstedt decided that Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler be placed under his command, while Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs. remain in Armd.Gp. to help carry out investment of Kiev from the south. This decision must be approved despite the consequent temporary disruption of the Armd.Gp.

1900 von Bernuth (Liaison Off., AGp. South). Report on situation:

- a) At Korosten, a small group put on an attack from the north, on 11 July (elements of three Divs., which were destroyed). On 12 July, the attack was resumed by considerably larger forces. Units filled up with recruits with two weeks' training. Signs of severe demoralization: White flags ! Attack in mass assaults, under enormous losses.
- b) Berdichev: Eleventh Armd. Div. and 60th mot.Div. have passed to the defensive in the face of heavy enemy attacks from east and south; Sixteenth mot. and Sixteenth Armd.Div. are gaining ground only slowly. -- Air reconnaissance and captured maps indicate existence of concrete road from the area between Zhitomir and Berdichev to Skvira. -- Armd.Gp. hopes to be able to bring the tank battle at Berdichev to a conclusion by 13 July, evening. -- Notwithstanding these enemy attacks, withdrawal movements are going on in direction of Kiev.
- c) Enemy on front of XXXIV Corps is holding tenaciously in the Stalin Line. Further to the south, the situation is still obscure. Although the Stalin Line is manned, Artillery has not yet become active.
- d) Eleventh Army will attack with XI Corps on 15 July, with XXX Corps probably not before 17 July; the enemy is

evacuating the area between the Pruth and Dniestr.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Question of lateral communications. Next lateral communication line east of the Dniepr.
- b) Methods for overcoming technical difficulties in the use of short waves.
- c) Opposition to attempt of Police to take over control of radio counter-intelligence.
- d) Results of radio intelligence. (Nothing new)

Evening situation: South: Eleventh Army has reached the Dniestr. Eased on the right flank. -- The Hungarian mot. Corps is to be assigned to Armd. Gp. Then the Italians will be inserted between Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies.

Center: In Guderian's sector, good progress. Also Hoth is getting on well and is expanding his front to the north. In doing so he is anticipating our wishes.

North: Movements of First and Sixth Divs. are severely hampered by bad roads. Resistance on front of right wing of Sixteenth Army appears to be weakening.

Air Stepped-up enemy activity on front of AGps. South and North. Attack on enemy air-bases ordered for 13 July.

Distribution of enemy air strength: On front of AGp. South, 1.043 planes, which are now scattered all the way to the area east of the Dniepr. On front of AGp. Center, 700, with the bulk in the Orel - Moscow - Vitebsk area. No report on North, on account of bad weather.

von Greiffenberg (AGp. Center) on phone:

- a) Orientation of our ideas concerning further employment of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3.
- b) He reports that components of the Hq of the Russian Thirteenth Army have been captured. Interrogations of prisoners as well as maps make it clear that our attack across the Dniepr took the enemy completely by surprise. The Army was under orders to defend the river line.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) on phone:

- a) Report on his flight to AGp. South. Highly satisfied. Armd. Gp. has enough fuel to carry it as far as Kirovograd, and enough ammunition to fight its way across the Dniepr. Continuous supply assured. Motor vehicle maintenance service deserves special praise. Large repair shops have already been set up at Tarnopol, Shepetovka and Pivno.

- b) Center: Situation is still tight. C of S, AGp. is now personally looking into the matter. Misguided initiative on the part of subordinate agencies and lack of compact centralization have resulted in the freezing of rolling stock. It is expected that this situation will be cleared up soon.
Supplies will maintain Armd. drive to Moscow, Infantry as far as Smolensk (?). -Need 2,000 tons of 60-ton Truck Clms.
- c) North. Supplies adequate. Roads very bad.

13 July 1941. (22nd Day.) Sunday.

Situation: AGp. South: In Eleventh Army, pressure on the right flank is perceptibly slackening, as the Russians are falling back before the Romanian (Fourth Army). Now only local Russian attacks.

Seventeenth Army is following in frontal advance; the Stalin Line is said to be held only by weak forces. Contrariwise, reports coming in during the day indicate increasing Artillery fire. According to prisoner statements, the troops in the positions are a jumble of ill-assorted units.

Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1: Fighting at Berdichev continued and let up only toward the evening. It is not yet clear where the enemy, who attacked with strong Armd. forces, has disappeared to. The enemy penetration west of Berdichev has been wiped out. Our hopes, however, that Eleventh Armd.Div. might continue its swift advance in the direction of Belaya Tserkov has been disappointed. Further northward at and to the east of Zhitomir, repeated enemy attacks were repulsed at great cost to the enemy. Thirteenth Armd.Div. and, behind it, Fourteenth Armd. Div. have reached the area west and south of Kiev.

In AGp. Center, Guderian's attack is developing surprisingly well. Misdirection of some units in initial deployment (Third and Seventeenth Armd.Divs.) is being straightened out. No clear picture yet on employment of the Cav.Div., which should be on the right wing.

Hoth is making gratifying progress east of Vitebsk, gets on well further northeast, but is almost at a standstill on his left wing (Nineteenth Armd.Div.).

AGp. North, has made only slight advances, owing to condition of the roads. The right wing is still attacking, without making headway (II Corps). Some progress in Estonia, but resistance there is stiffening noticeably. More Inf. is closing up in the direction of Lake Ilmen.

1230 Report to Fuehrer (in his Hq): After ObdH reviews the advances made by the Armies, I report:

- 1.) In the enemy front, which is weakly held or manned by troops of dubious value in some sectors, but surely has no thought of giving ground, now that the new leaders have taken hold, we can make out the following grouping of forces:
 - a) Leningrad: Defense group consisting of forces hastily gathered up and strengthened by improvisations; showing no operational activity. As a first step, it will have to be cut off by a thrust into the Lake Ilmen and Lake Ladoga area.
 - b) Nevel-Volikiye Luki. This group is about seven Divs. strong, including fresh troops, some of which arrived from the Ukraine and from the interior of Russia in the past few days. It has taken in also some battered units, veterans of the border battles, which were filled up at the straggler collecting point at Nevel. This group is strong and it would pay to mount a special operation to destroy it for good.
 - c) Orsha - Vitebsk - Smolensk. This group includes the enemy elements opposing Armd.Gps. 2 and 3; it has been reinforced on several occasions lately. Nineteenth Army, now in progress of formation east of Vitebsk, also belongs to this group; it is doubtful whether the enemy will be able to complete organization. The group will be attacked and destroyed by the offensive of the Armd.Gps. merged under Fourth Army Hq, which was planned as a pincer movement but for the most part is taking effect as a frontal assault.
 - d) Group Gomel. Has not been attacked by us so far. Substantial portions seem to be moving against Armd. Gp. 2. Calls for no major attention, save that Armd. Gp. 2 must cover its right flank against it.
 - e) Group Korosten (about four Divs.) comes from the Pripet Marshes. It comprises elements which opposed our XVII Corps in the early border battles, and is reinforced by mot. forces. Its strength is occasionally put at as much as 4 Corps Hqs, but I have my doubts; the estimates are based on radio intelligence (deception?). This group as well as the one at Gomel can be cut off only in the course of the development of our movements, that is, with AGp. South also across the Dniepr, and Armd.Gp. 2 cooperating from the north. For the present we must confine ourselves to containing it.
 - f) Group Kiev. It must be liquidated by the envelopment operation started by AGp. South west of the Dniepr, or, if we see no prospects of success here, by envelopment east of the Dniepr.

- 2.) Next objects: We shall temporarily halt the dash toward Moscow by AGps. 2 and 3, with the object of destroying a maximum of enemy strength on the present front. To this end Armd.Gps. 2 and 3 will be headed for the area northeast and southeast of Smolensk in such way as to enable Gp. 2, by striking for Velikie Luki and Kholm, to cut off the enemy group mentioned under b), and Gp. 3, to swing southward.

In AGp. South, Sixth Army will try with 25th mot. Div. and SS Adolf Hitler to destroy parts at least of Group Korosten, and concurrently, with the bulk of Armd.Gp. 1, by pushing the enveloping tank wing on Belaya Tserkov, to liquidate the enemy southwest of Kiev.

The Fuehrer approves the plans submitted. Particulars stressed by him:

- a) A quick advance to the east is less important than smashing the enemy's military strength.
- b) AGp. North must see its foremost object in breaking through north of Lake Ilmen, to close the gap to Lake Ladoga, and south of Lake Ilmen, to block the route at Staraya Russa.
- c) The enemy Group opposite the right wing of von Leeb's AGp. (referred to above under b) must be attacked from the rear by mot. forces of Armd.Gp. 3. Leeb must not be allowed to become too weak. Can we give him reinforcements?
- d) Terror raid on Moscow is essential in order to prevent orderly evacuation of Government agencies and give the lie to enemy propaganda, which is speaking of exhaustion of German offensive capabilities.
- e) Transfer of Second Armd.Div. will be stopped. Political reasons dictate its presence in the West.

Gen. von Greiffenberg (on the phone): C in C of his AGp. holds that the chances are very good for our tank spearheads to smash through to Moscow. Their immediate objective would be the high ground northeast and southeast of Smolensk. He objects strongly against detaching forces in northeastern direction; sees no chance of cutting off any substantial bodies of enemy troops. All forces must be kept together to strengthen the thrust to the east.

A teletype received in the afternoon (addressed to ObdH, over von Bock's signature) develops the same ideas.

ObdH rings up shortly after noon: Since we left, the Fuehrer has been harping away on the following line:

There is a large gap between Zhitomir and Thirteenth Armd. Div., he thinks. Concentration of weight in the zone of action of Thirteenth Armd.Div. is making no progress. Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler must be moved to Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs.; they in turn would have to be relieved by Advance Combat Teams, pushed into the area northeast of Zhitomir, which, for this purpose, must be temporarily combined into a force directed by Army or Army Gp.

This plan for solving the problems of Army Gp., with which ObdH is not at all in sympathy, has prevailed because nobody around there is capable of standing up to von Reichenau's obstinate aggressiveness. Advance Combat Teams must, therefore, be combined, with a twofold purpose:

- a) Protecting the north flank of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs.
- b) Relieving Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler.

The matter is discussed between Chief of Op.Sec. and Army Gp., which must report what measures it will take.

These ideas are communicated to ObdH during the afternoon in a written order of the Fuehrer (!) (Passed on verbatim to AGp. South).*

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Report on over-all condition of Armd. troops: Average tank losses, 50%. Personnel losses are equal to the strength of the Field Repl.Bns., which now have been completely absorbed. Six personnel Repl. Transfer Bns. for Armd.Gps. 2 and 3 will arrive in Warsaw on 20 July.
- b) Activation and reorganization program for fall, 1941.
- c) North Africa: Composition and order of battle of troops. Most of what is destined for North Africa, is now ready, but facilities are lacking to accelerate shipments. Fuehrer orders them equipped with Heavy Inf. Guns on selfpropelled mounts, which will be ready in September. ObdH insists on his demand, that both Armd.Divs. in North Africa should get third Tank Bns. Where we should get them is a mystery to me at the moment.
- d) Finnish requests for ammunition.
- e) Request of Army Hq Norway for Transport and Signal units can be met on a restricted scale.

Lt. Col. Kitschmann reports as Military Attaché at Kabul.

OQu IV: Current questions, including position of the Military Attachés on the Balkans in relation to List.

Bogatsch:

a) Air reconnaissance on the whole furnishes only confirmations: Choked railroad lines south of Kiev. -- Troop movements from Gomel to the north (on foot). -- Heavy road movements west and east of Smolensk largely to the east (transport Clms.) but some also to the west (troop movements). -- Troop movement to the western end of Lake Ilmen, from the northeast.

b) Total losses in Army Rcn. planes since 26 June:

Staffeln. of Armies and Armd.Gps.	He 126	24%
	FW 189	15%
Long-range Rcn.Staffeln	JU 88	33 1/3%
	Me 110	39%
Night Staffeln	Do 17	20%
	Fi 156	13%

Losses are for the most part replaced from materiel reserve, but delivery always lags several some days.

Evening situation South: At Berdichev, situation has eased. No progress south of Kiev, where Thirteenth Armd.Div. is reported to have run out of AP ammunition.--- Enemy attacks from the direction of Korosten again successfully repulsed.

Center: Further progress of Armd.Gps. 2 and 3. The enemy Group at Gomel has not yet become active.

North: Road difficulties slow advance. Inadequacy of measures against enemy in Estonia necessitates an OKH order to have one Division strike in the direction of Dorpat.

Syria: Cease-fire. Signs of demoralization reported among French troops.

Irak: Heavy British troop concentrations in the north-east and east, in order to make Iran more tractable on the subject of establishment of a British air-base against the Caucasus.

AGp. South reports that the attack of Eleventh Army will probably not come off before 17 July.

Distribution of the enemy air force: Observed in front of enemy air force.
AGp. North 354 enemy airplanes.
" Center 640 (distributed in great depth).
" South 1,500
Total ca. 2,500

14 July 1941. (23rd Day)

Situation: South: The attack into the northern flank at Zvyagel turns out to be an all-out offensive which has made local gains and even compelled us to commit Twenty-fifth mot. Div. and SS Adolf Hitler, to drive the enemy to the north, away from the Zvyagel-Zhitomir highway, which he had already crossed. This road is the only supply and communications line to III Corps sector. Its being temporarily under enemy pressure was the reason for the ammunition shortage in Thirteenth Armd.Div. yesterday.

The battle around Berdichev, which at times was very bitter and turned into wholesale slaughter of the senselessly attacking enemy, is now also abating. Eleventh Armd. Div. has 2,000 casualties (!) Army Gp. thinks that the enemy was so severely beaten, that Eleventh Armd.Div. could start its eastward thrust today yet. In conjunction with the latter, Sixteenth Armd. Div., next northward, is to strike against Belaya Tserkov.

Thirteenth Armd.Div. has destroyed the two railroad lines running into Kiev from west and south. Fourteenth Armd. Div. is following up closely. A reinforced Bn. of Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and a Regt. of SS "Wiking" are following behind Fourteenth Div. The rest of SS Wiking* is following Ninth Armd. Div., which is striking for Belaya Tserkov, from Zhitomir.

Center: Guderian's attack has made astonishing progress. Some of the enemy are running away in wild flight, some are making a stand. On the south flank, we have the first signs of a developing enemy counter attack, which will come from the previously reported Gomel group.

Hoth's central sector has made great strides with his right wing (Twelfth Div.), in heavy fighting. His left wing, (Nineteenth Armd.Div.) is still immobilized.

North: The drive of the southern group now seems to be making progress. Hoepfner has taken Reinhard off the road to Leningrad, moving him to the west, into the area east of Lake Peipus. This creates a gap between him and Manstein, who is striking at Novgorod (seat of Voroshilov's Hq). The Divs. of Eighteenth Army are following up at a good rate in the direction of Pskov.

Over-all picture: The big battle in the South must be fought out by Army Gp. with its own resources. AGp. Center had better look after its right flank. On its left flank, the advance of the right wing of the Sixteenth Army offers the chance of achieving a partial success west of Nevel. To take advantage of this opportunity, the operations of the Army Gps. must be closely intergrated. In the central sector of Sixteenth Army, another battle of encirclement is developing, which may lead to final destruction of the remnants of a Russian Army (two Divs).

fighting west of the big marsh area. AGp. North must do everything to keep its forces from dispersing and to mass them for the main thrust against Novgorod.

Talk with Gen. von Greiffenberg (on phone): Coordination of AGps. Center and North in the battle of Nevel. Nineteenth Armd.Div. must be pushed on Nevel, but from there not any further in the direction of Velikie Luki before the battle of Nevel has been brought to a successful close.

South of the Nevel battlefield, another battle of encirclement is developing at Polotsk. Here it is important not to tie down the Inf. of V and VI Corps, and to move them on as quickly as possible in a general eastern direction.

Talk with Field Marshal von Leeb (on phone): The subject also is coordination of the Army Gps. in the battle of Nevel. He is particularly anxious that Nineteenth Armd. Div. should become effective against Nevel soon.

Brief review of the situation on the fronts of Army Gp.: It is necessary for Inf. to close to Lake Ilmen in order to mass a maximum of strength in the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Ladoga.

Gen. Oehquist: Erfurth sends me a telegram stating that von Mannerheim is showing a certain passive resistance against the idea of an operation east of Lake Ladoga, which accounts for the insufficient strength of the attacking wing; this prompts me to dispatch Gen. Oehquist to Finland to clear up the situation. There are some misunderstandings, it seems.

Col. Gall (C of S, Hq Mil. District I) reports. He has a whole lot of minor worries about prisoners of war, mine clearing, dismantling of border fortifications, etc. His report gives a most distressing picture of German soldiers in Lithuania looting and sending their loot home.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Movements on the railroad line Leningrad - Bologoye, mainly in direction Leningrad, day before yesterday, and in direction Moscow, yesterday. Dense traffic on the Bologoye - Moscow line in northwestern direction, yesterday. These movements may indicate either a build-up at Bologoye or evacuation of Leningrad. The line must be watched and disrupted.
- b) The Orsha - Smolensk - Vitebsk railroad line is completely choked with trains. Little traffic from Viazma-Briansk to the east.
- c) On the Kiev-Kursk line, few moving trains; stations clogged with rolling stock (waiting troop trains or industrial movements).

- d) On the Kharkov-Kursk-line, industrial movements, apparently deliveries of tanks and motor vehicles.
- e) South of Kiev fewer standing trains, less traffic in the direction of Dniepropetrovsk.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Road Construction Organization: Manpower requirements at the front make it necessary to transfer units of the Totl Organization. (Inform Transp. Chief.) Totl forces will have to be increased to enable them to do all the work in the steadily expanding occupied area.
- b) Bridge at Giurgiu will be replaced by Herbert ferries (material from Belgrade).*
- c) Lanninger** loading ramp for unloading at beaches.
- d) Russian mines.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu): South: Sixth Army can fight the battle for Kiev and the Dniepr with its own resources. It needs no additional transport from OKH. Seventeenth Army has enough to last it to Vinnitsa. Armd.Gp. is supplied up to Kirovograd. Eleventh Army finds large enemy stocks.

Center: Situation still tight. Volume moved by railroad line still insufficient. Fourth Army have enough to maintain them to the east of Smolensk. (Requirement 11 trains.)

In Second Army, supplies will not last far beyond the Dniepr, for the bulk of its troops, in Ninth Army, not far beyond the Vitebsk area.

North: Armd.Gp. 4 can be maintained up to Leningrad, as can be also some of the Infantry; the bulk will have just enough to reach the area around Lake Ilmen and Lake Pskov.

CbdH is back from AGp. South, where he discussed operational plans at Hqs Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1. Details related by him show how hard the fighting is, but on the whole there is nothing substantially new.

Evening. Guderian has been amazingly successful: Smolensk was reached as early as 10 o'clock this morning. Hoth's left wing also reports remarkable advances. I am baffled by the report that Hoepfner's left wing (Reinhard's Div.) is rushing on to Narva, with the right wing concurrently advancing on Novgorod (von Manstein's Div.). This splits his Armd. Gp. in two and prevents developing of any real striking power.

The fact that the Russians are still roaming the area between Pruth and Dniepr, on Schobert's flank, brings on a long discussion regarding the need for protecting the oil region. To my mind, there is no such threat.

Gen. Brennecke (on phone): He says the splitting of Hoepfner's Armd. Gp. was necessitated by road and terrain conditions on and west of the Pskov-Leningrad highway. For the time being, AGp. will not allow Reinhard to break out of his bridgeheads across the Luga river.

The unusual movement executed by AGp. preparatory to the attack beyond Fellin is explained on the grounds that a) 217th Div. rushed off to the west * and) with the enemy at Dorpat believed to be weak, the plan has been adopted for an envelopment through Fellin (where railroads can be used) that would cut off his retreat to the Narva area. Following a talk of the Fuehrer with ObdH (it must again have been on a rather sharp note) dealing with Hoepfner's movement, which displeases the Fuehrer. I request Brennecke to give me an estimate of the situation in writing, which I could present to the Fuehrer.

These futile telephone conversations continue until long past midnight; they only accomplish killing in field commands any desire to shoulder responsibility and waste everyone's time. The Fuehrer's eternal meddling in matters, the pattern of which he does not understand are becoming more than anyone can stand .

A Fuehrer order comes in, fixing the future total strength of Armd. Forces at 36 Armd.Divs. of 3 Bns. each, and 18 mot. Divs.

15 July 1941. (24th Day).

Situation South: Eleventh Army has gained elbow room on its right flank, but the enemy is still holding out south of the Dniestr.

Sevanteenth Army has made local penetrations in the Stalin Line, but is under counter attack.

Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1 have regrouped on their right wings, west of Berdichev.

The movement on Belaya Tserkov from Berdichev and Zhitomir has got under way and is already within a few kilometers of the objective. (Ninth Armd.Div., behind it two-thirds of SS "Wiking!")

West and south of Kiev the situation of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs. reinforced by mot. Infantry, is unchanged. At Zvyagel and to the east, the enemy has been pressed back so that the Zvyagel - Zhitomir road is clear again. Second Armd.Div. has been ordered halted; the other GHq reserves are following behind center and northern wing of Army Gp.

Center: In the territory passed through by Armd.Gps. 2 and 3, numerous local centers of resistance have become

active and must now be liquidated. On the left wing, the situation at Polotsk is now gradually coming to a head. Here, and west of Nevel, the formation of pockets is becoming discernible. At Polotsk, a number of Inf.Divs. can now be freed to follow up behind Hoth.

North: Hoepfner has been halted on the line reached today. The gap between his two Groups is now being filled by an Inf.Div.; he will have to wait for I Corps to come up behind von Manstein, before he continues his drive on Novgorod.

Enemy situation: The over-all impression is that the enemy, responding to the Commanders and probably also to British efforts, is doing all he can to prevent being pushed back any further to the east. The Russian troops now as ever are fighting with savage determination and with enormous human sacrifices. We can make out:

- a) A group at Leningrad, probably based on the marshlands southeast, south and southwest of the city, which is attempting to throw a wide defense ring around the city and the industrial region.
- b) A new group in formation apparently between Kalinin and Rzhev which, securing its flank with the marsh and lake country, will have the mission to close, at Ostashkov, the gap between that area and the Moscow Group. The defense positions at Rzhev are quite formidable.
- c) The Moscow Group in the area Sychevka-Vyazma, west of Kaluga, which has the mission of blocking any advance on Moscow.
- d) A central reserve, which apparently is maintained in readiness on trains in the area Bryansk - Orel - Gorbachevo - Sukhinichi. It is probably the source of the forces fed into the counter attacks against Guderian's right shoulder.
- e) The small Gomel group.
- f) The Korosten Group, and
- g) the Kiev Group, which embraces the entire region west of the Dniepr down to the Black Sea.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reports confirm the existence of the enumerated groups. In Group b), enemy positions have been reported on a 40 km front. In group c), between Vyazma and Gzhatsk, the positions extend over an 80 km front, with some systems five lines deep. A rail movement can be made out from the area around Bryansk in northwestern direction, which originates in the group mentioned under d) (mobile operational reserve on railroad trains).

Disruption of the railroad movements by our air effort makes itself felt in the Leningrad area and between

Smolensk and Moscow, also around Bryansk and especially in the sector of AGp. South. The bridges at Kiev are damaged; the bridge at Cherkassi has been badly hit.

Phone talk with Gen. Brennecke (C of S, AGp. North) to comment on the situation estimate submitted by him:

- a) The mission of Army Gp. is not to capture Leningrad, but at present merely to cut off the city.
- b) The enemy forces round Dorpat are estimated by OKH at two Divs. Brennecke thinks they are less.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) The new Fuehrer program for the activation of Armd.Divs. Before next fall, eight Divs., including Second and Fifth in the total.* Of this number, four must be fitted for service in the tropics.
- b) Personnel, motor vehicles and complementary units of one Div. mot. and one Inf.Div. make up about two Armd. Divs. of, initially, 2 Armd.Bns., 1 Rifle Regt. of 3 Bns., and 1 Motorcycle Bn.
- c) In order to activate the six Armd.Divs. scheduled for fall, 1941, in the Fuehrer program, we must, if we understand "fall" to mean end of October, free within the next four weeks: Two Armd.Divs., two mot.Divs., two Inf.Divs., i.e., two existing Armd.Divs. and the makings for four new Divs.
- d) Two hundred trailers for heavy Chemical Mortars must be ordered.
- e) Condition reports and losses. The condition report of SS Norway plainly shows that the Commander of this unit was fully aware of its weaknesses.

Gen. Ott reports on his tour to Eleventh Army. The reason for what happened to 198th and Twenty-second Divs. was that, owing to bad roads, their AT commands were not with them when they were hit by the Russian tank attack. His opinion of the Romanian troops is not very complimentary, but he would not deny that they are trying hard.

Basic Fuehrer Directive on new T/O and T/E. Program of 14 July 1941.

Report: Polotsk taken (XXIII Corps); reported to be a fortress.

Wagner (Gen Qu) with Op.Chief and OQu I:

- 1.) Review of capacity of a supply base Minsk - Molodeczno, serviced by railroad lines operating at full capacity, for continuance of operations of AGp.Center.
Conclusions:

Center has 45,450 tons of 60-ton Truck Clms; from this total we must deduct one-third laid up for repair, leaving 30,700 tons for continuous operation. Transp.

Chief guarantees 14 trains with 6,300 tons, daily, for base Minsk - Molodeczno. This is sufficient to maintain:

- a) Operational Group for offensive in the general direction of Moscow or in southeastern direction:

4 Armd. Divs.
3 mot. Divs.
10 Inf. Divs.
GHq Reserves

or,

4 Armd. Divs.
4 mot. Divs.
6 Inf. Divs.
GHq Reserves

or,

6 Armd. Divs.
5 mot. Divs.
3 Inf. Divs.
GHq Reserves,

computed at T/O strength require $8\frac{1}{2}$ trainloads.

- b) Remainder, for which supply can be maintained only as far as the Upper Dvina and the Upper Dniestr*:


5 Armd. Divs.
5 mot. Divs.
25 Inf. Divs.

requiring $5\frac{1}{2}$ trainloads.

60-ton Clms. for Operational Group	26,000 tons
" " " " remainder (distribution only)	2,500 tons
Still needed for transloading at Varena**	<u>1,600 tons</u>
Total	30,700 tons

- 2.) Effective 25 July, OKH can turn over to the Wehrmachts-Befehlshaber the Rear Area of AGp. North up to the Dvina, exclusive of Riga and Dvinsk.

Housing (with OQu I): Operational disposition of enemy forces. My opinion (see today's entry under enemy situation) is shared by both. But it must always be remembered that this disposition is hypothetical rather than actual, for the enemy is short of troops. Paulus suggests that the mission of the Kalinin group may be not only to secure the gap between Moscow and Leningrad, but also, to attack the flanks of the German forces advancing on Moscow, in conjunction with the Bryansk group kept mobile in trains. The great picture of the enemy groupings then would be as follows:



The evening situation, in AGp. South, show slow advances toward Kishinev on the flank of Eleventh Army and breaching of the Stalin Line by the right wing of Seventeenth Army. The enemy is falling back before the right wing of Sixth Army, whereas on the front of its left wing, the pressure from Korosten is now so uncomfortable that Army Gp. wants to shift its weight to clear out this trouble spot. Armd. Gp. 1 has started operations out of Berdichev and striking from Zhitomir, has reached the immediate vicinity of Belaya Tserkov, while III Corps, curiously, has not made any progress, and it is still at its old spot.

Center: In the breakthrough area, a number of quite substantial enemy groups have been isolated; it will not be possible to liquidate them before the Infantry, which is marching without a break, has arrived. There will be many tight situations before these enemy groups have been disposed off. In front of the center of our breakthrough, many supply Clms. seen to be flight from Smolensk toward Moscow.

North: has now taken disposition in conformity with our wishes. The encircling movement by its right wing is slowly developing. The northern wing is closing up. Request for Artillery against Russian coastal fortifications.

Enemy: Heavy movements of columns (mot. and horse-drawn) from Smolensk to the east have the character of a rout. The same to the southeast.

Number of enemy aircraft observed: North, 208; Center, 855; South, 626. Major variations in these figures need not be interpreted as real shifts in the main concentration; discrepancies probably are due to incomplete information on individual areas.

Political: The French have sent us notes announcing that they regard the basis on which the military agreements were concluded as fundamentally changed and accordingly wish the Armistice Treaty superseded by a new agreement which expressly guarantees the sovereignty of France.

There is talk of a Cabinet reshuffle in France. (Interior, Pucheux, Foreign Affairs, Benoist-Mechin; Huntziger, as before). Weygand still at Vichy.

An armistice has been concluded in Syria.

16 July 1941. (25th Day)

Situation: South: Enemy is evacuating Bessarabia. -- Seventeenth Army has broken through the Stalin Line on its entire front. -- The breakthrough wedge, which points at Kiev, is being attacked from the north. -- The Korosten enemy group has ceased attacking, and has passed to the defensive. Artillery is still strong, but there are no more tanks. Railroad movements from this group to Kiev.

Center: From the Gomel area, a force of seven Divs. is attacking the right shoulder of AGp. Center. This is the entire strength of the Gomel group which thus is pinned down for the moment. In the area passed through by Guderian's and Hoth's breakthrough there are still many enemy groups in fighting condition, which makes it necessary for our Armor to attack in all directions. Even west of the Dniepr there are still some active enemy groups.

Hoth's right wing has reached the big concrete highway to Moscow, near Yartsevo, while Guderian's left wing has battled its way to the sector of Smolensk. Here, then, the inner wings have linked up. Hoth's left wing apparently has pushed into an area only weakly held by the enemy. To check him the enemy may be forming a new enemy group in the Rzhev area.

On the northern wing of Army Gp., Nineteenth Armd.Div. has reached Nevel, but the planned junction with 12th Division has not been achieved, and so this pocket on the Army Gp. boundary has not yet been closed.

North: Regrouping continues in preparation for the drive with main effort against and beyond Novgorod, but is still hampered by the local demands on Sixteenth Army, which so is very slow in releasing troops for the northward thrust.

Radio intelligence indicates presence at Dorpat, of 3 enemy Divs. opposing our advance unit, I Corps (!). This situation is intolerable. Army Gp. will at least have to do something about this.

Enemy situation: Over-all picture: On the front of AGp. South, the enemy is softening. His front is crumbling before Seventeenth Army; here, it seems, he has nothing left in the rear. I do not believe that here there is any coordinated plan for withdrawal behind the Dniepr. Possibly the Russian Divs. falling back from Southern Bessarabia will show up yet deep in the rear of the crumbling front. It remains to be seen whether the enemy will try to bring parts of his strong Korosten Group to bear against our spearhead, through Kiev.

On the rest of the front the enemy no doubt intends to hold fast. I am entirely inclined to believe that the retreat movements from Smolensk to the east were momentary phenomena only. We have no clear picture yet of what is going on around Bologoye (southeast of Lake Ilmen) where unloading and movements of troops have been observed. Is an enemy group, gathered up in other places, forming in the Rzhev area? What about the Bryansk group? Does it really exist and what is it doing?

Gen. Brennecke (AGp. North) on phone:

- a) Reports on the pocket now being formed by Twelfth and Nineteenth Divs. on both sides of Army Gp. boundary.
- b) The situation at Dorpat. He receives instruction to move 93rd Div. to the Dorpat front with all available means and to report on compliance.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reports on 15 July:

- a) In front of the Seventeenth Army, positive withdrawal movements to Zhmerinka and north, on 16 July, p.m.
- b) North of Uman, 38 trains blocked; tanks are being unloaded and driven off eastward.
- c) Bridges at Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe attacked by our Air Force.
- d) Area east and southeast of Kiev no important road movements.
- e) At Zhlobin and Rogachev the enemy is on the western bank of the Dniepr. The enemy is crossing the river; very much Artillery.
- f) Railroad movements from Moscow now go only as far as Viazna, and from Bryansk only as far as Roslavl.
- g) Last night mot. movements from the east toward Yartsevo.
- h) Moscow area: little railroad traffic.
- i) West of Staraya Russa, heavy AAA. Road from Staraya Russa to Dno is described by the Air Force as serviceable, by the ground troops as non-existent. Perhaps only the eastern section has been finished so far.

- k) On the road leading from the western end of Lake Ilmen to Luga, horse-drawn and mot. movements. At Luga, AAA.
- l) Enemy air action against Reinhard's Corps and the Divs. on the eastern shore of Lake Peipus. East of the Lake, heavy fighter and AAA defense.

The whole pattern of the enemy air effort indicates clear-headed and aggressive leadership.

Lt. Col. Radke: Current business of his section.-- What is to take the place, in citations for bravery, of the individual's name, which now must be omitted from Wehrmacht communiques on order of the Fuehrer?

Maj. Buerker: Report on his tour to Tenth Armd.Div. The stubborn resistance of the many isolated enemy elements scattered behind our advance brings about many critical situations, but notwithstanding this, our troops feel self-assured and superior. However, the striking power of the Armd.Divs. is slowly declining. When the current objectives have been reached, a break will be necessary in order to give the units a rest, and if advisable to merge and refit several units. Gulerian thinks he can do that in three to four days. I believe much more time would be needed. The supply system of AGp. Center will not be functioning at full capacity before 25 July. By that time the Armd.Gps. will again be ready for new operations.

The performance of Regt. "Grossdeutschland" does not seem to satisfy higher Hqs.

Evening situation: South: Kishinev has fallen. Operations of Army Gp. continue according to plan. Before Kiev, situation seems to have tightened as a result of ammunition shortage. Enemy attacks III Corps from the north.

Center: The enemy front is breaking up into a several groups, with our Armd. Divs. cutting through between them. This complicates the picture for direction of operations. Local crises may yet develop, especially on the right wing of Armd.Gp. 2 and in the center of Armd.Gp. 3.

North: Movements are proceeding according to plan. At Dorpat, the enemy is regrouping for defense.

Air situation: In the South, the enemy air force is being taken back behind the Dniepr. In front of AGp. Center the enemy is apparently intensifying his air effort.

17 July 1941. (26th Day)

Situation: No important changes.

In AGp. South, the situation is developing along its logical lines. The enemy is attempting, with local forces, to counter the encircling moves against his northern wing at Belaya Tserkov and southeast of Berdichev, but by and large he appears to concentrate on extricating himself from the pocket developing between Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies.

On the northern flank (Korosten-Kiev), the jumble of enemy units previously reported in the area between Korosten and Kiev has been reinforced by two new Divs., one coming from the Caucasus.

What I cannot understand is the inaction of Thirteenth Armd. Div., which seems to be doing nothing about the enemy reported to be retreating right past it from Korosten in the direction of Kiev.

AGp. Center: Formation of the pockets is proceeding consistently. Guderian's right wing seems to have again full freedom of movement in the direction of Roslavl. Quite far to the rear, the enemy is trying to turn the situation by launching attacks into Guderian's flank and, further back, against Second Army, but without success.

AGp. North: Here, too, the formation of pockets is developing. On the right wing, at Nevel, the junction with Hoth's left wing has not been quite accomplished yet. Also in this sector, enemy elements appear to have escaped to the east and are now moving in the direction of Velikie Luki. The "eastern front"* shows another promising pocket in the Opochka area; some enemy bodies initially got away to the east, toward Khelm, but appear to have returned to free their encircled comrades.

Situation of Hoepfner's Gp. unchanged. I Corps is closing up in rapid marches.

Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance shows:

- a) Confirmation of our picture of the situation on the front of AGp. South. Clogged railroad lines in the area west of Cherkassi.
- b) Mozir: AAA. -- Moving lights on the Pripet river, apparently troops crossing to the other bank.
- c) Gomel: Large quantities of rolling stock and locomotives on sidings. AAA and searchlights. Airdrome (fighters).

South of Mogilev, east of the Dniepr, no enemy movements to the north.

- d) From the area Gomel -- Bryansk -- Roslavl -- Dovsk, no movements.
- e) Continuous retrograde movements from Roslavl on Yukhnov, last night. From Yartsevo, heavy traffic to the east, through Vyazma. At Vyazma, AA searchlight concentration.

Message: Eleventh Army has started its attack, leading with XI Corps, as planned, and has crossed the Dniestr.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- 1.) Rosenberg is Reich Minister for Occupied Territories. Under him four Reich Commissars: Lohse, for the Baltic States; Kasche, for Russia; Koch, for the Ukraine; Schickedanz for Caucasia. As soon as the tactical situation permits, the Four Year Plan will set up its organization in the occupied territory. An agreement has been reached with Himmler, clarifying when the Police will get its instructions from the Reich, and when from Rosenberg.
- 2.) Transfer of western portion of Rear Area AGp. North to the Reich Commissar for the Baltic States. Between 18 and 25 July, the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Baltenland will take over the area from AGp. North. Basic questions of command organization (coast defense, control of troops). -- Transfer instrument receives signature.*

3.) Supply situation:

North: Assured until 18 July. Main supply base Riga. Action radius: Armd. Gp. 4, as far as Leningrad; Armies, to the line Lake Ilmen - Narva. One-half issue ammunition, two fuel quotas, 2 days' rations.

Center: On 15 July, Dniepr base had: one-fifth issue of ammunition, one-half fuel quota, one half day's rations. Troops have three-quarters issue of ammunition, three fuel quotas, 7 days' rations. Action radius: Armd. and mot. Divs., as far as Smolensk, Inf. to the eastern banks of Dniepr and Dvina. To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied by us.

Bulk of 60-ton Truck Clms. still on the shuttle run between frontier and Dniepr. Scheduled to be taken off as 20/23 July.

South: On 15 July, Seventeenth Army used up one-half to three-quarters issue of ammunition, more than that for their light and med. Fl. Hqs. Temporary interruption of railroad line at Tarnopol (washouts); shuttle service already in operation, as far as Berdichev.

Casualties: Total from 22 June to 13 July: 92,120 = 3.68%.

Officer losses in per cents of NCO and EM losses: Wounded, 3,4; killed, 3; missing, 1,7.

Major Schuchardt, formerly Paris, assigned to post at Ankara, reports to me. Situation in France. Nothing significantly new.

Col. Kinzel:

- a) Railroad service in Russia: Material was abused even in peacetime, and probably will be all the more so under war conditions. Captured documents indicate that railroad situation is catastrophic. Railroad movements confused; they show no clear pattern, one reason perhaps being that we cannot watch them continuously.
- b) Probable disposition of enemy forces, after the current battles have been fought. Of course it is impossible to foresee everything in detail, but we may assume that after the cleaning up in Estonia there will be available:

Front of AGp. Leeb:

Around Leningrad: 15 Inf. Divs. and 2 Armd. Divs.
Around Bologovo: 3 Inf. Divs. and $\frac{1}{2}$ Armd. Div.

Front of AGp. Bock:

Opposite Hoth *2 - 3 Inf. Divs.
Opposite Guderian's
northern wing and center *2 Inf. Divs. and 1 Armd.Div.

Opposite Guderian's southern
wing 4 Inf. Divs. and 1 - 2 Armd.Divs.

Between Bock and Rundstedt,
in the area around Gomel * 3 - 4 Inf. Divs.

AGp. Rundstedt:

North of Kiev, opposite northern wing
of Sixth Army and Armd. Gp. 1 8 Inf. Divs. and
1 Armd. Div.

Opposite right wing of Sixth Army,
Armd.Gp. 1 and Seventeenth Army *2 Inf. Divs. and
1 Armd. Div.

Opposite Eleventh Army 8 Inf. Divs.,
1 Armd. Div. and
1 Cav. Div.

This would add up, on the enemy side, to a total of about 50 Inf. Divs. and 7 Armd.Divs. (apart from Cav. Div.).

In the groups marked *, I consider the estimates distinctly on the high side.

ObdH, back from AGp. North, relates:

- a) Enemy air superiority. The strength of our frontline Divs. has greatly declined.
- b) Eighth Armd.Div. had to be taken back. SS has moved up and is covering its flank. I Corps starts its attack

today at 1600 and will take pressure off the flank; it is under tactical control of Armd. Gp. 4.

- c) Attack at Fellin (Eighteenth Army) set for 18 July (perhaps not until 19 July).
- d) Intentions: First bring to a conclusion the actions now in progress on the right wing, then regroup for attack with one Corps south of Lake Ilmen, with two Corps northward along Lake Ilmen, with one Corps between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus, and with one Corps along Lake Peipus (eastern shore). One Corps must then watch the area north of Army Gp. boundary, and, if necessary, take aggressive action.
- e) On 25 July we shall probably be able to attack across the line Novgorod-Narva.

Major Count Stauffenberg gives a highly informative report on his visit to Guderian's Group. Peculiar character of the breakthrough battles demand great skill in maneuvering Armd. Div. Troops subjected to great strain. Striking power is gradually diminishing, self-assurance is continually growing. Third Armd. Div. !

Evening situation South: Crossing successfully accomplished by Eleventh Army. Also the Romanians, crossing on its left wing, have reached the eastern bank. Seventeenth Army, in wedge formation, has pushed into the depth of the enemy position. Eleventh and Twelfth Armd. Divs. of Armd.Gp. 1 are now abreast of Ninth Armd.Div., and Armd. envelopment movement can be started. Must move 75th and 111th Inf.Divs. up to III Corps. SS Adolf Hitler will replace Third Armd.Div., which in turn will strengthen the Armd. enveloping wing. --- Advance at Korosten.

Center: Enemy pockets are beginning to show up more clearly. Guderian is gaining ground and his forces have linked up further east. Southeast of Gomel, troops are being detrained on the open tracks. Enemy is falling back under pressure from Cav. Div. --- Trouble at Hoth's and Guderian's boundary.

North: Report shows nothing significantly different from ObdH's account. Coastal blockade Btry. on shore of the Moon Straits taken back because of threat from the landside.

Gen. Wagner reports on result of Baentsch' tour to AGp.Center: Organization now running smoothly. Railroad difficulties will be resolved.

North: Six more ships en route to Riga. AGp. North is all right and can temporarily help out Ninth Army (rations).

Situation: AGp. South's operation is becoming increasingly shapeless. The front against Korosten still absorbs large forces. The appearance of new, strong enemy forces attacking from the north near Kiev, compels us to move Inf.Divs. to that sector, to relieve and replace Armor (III Corps). This pins down greater strength on the northern front than is desirable. The turning wing of Armd. Gp.1, too, does not seem to get started on its southward drive. It is still hanging back around Berdichev and Belaya Tserkov. Meanwhile, the breakthrough wedge of Seventeenth Army has advanced so far that right wing of Sixth Army (operating under Armd.Gp. 1) might as well be switched from the encircling operation, for which it was slated, and sent on eastward to the area south of Kiev, to be on hand for the Dniopr crossing.

The Fuehrer has now given orders to take Odessa. For that mission we have only Hansen's Corps with two German and several Romanian Divs. This move which, I agree, is necessary, would divert strength from the big envelopment now initiated.

In AGp. Center, the Armd. Divs. are reforming for the fronts to be established to the northeast and southeast. Inf.Divs. are moving close behind. The organizations forming the rings around the pockets are continually changing, and it will be interesting to see how long this can go on without impairing the tightness of the encirclement. On the southern wing, east of Mogilev, the enemy keeps up his heavy attacks, which is precisely what we want him to do (Fifth Russ. Army).

North of the line Smolensk-Orsha, on the northern wing of Army Gp., the northernmost pocket seems to have been securely closed by Twelfth Inf.Div. moving down from the north and linking up with Nineteenth Armd.Div. Tension seems to be easing also in the process of forming the other pocket, but we cannot be quite sure yet.

In AGp. North no important changes. At Opochka, the enemy is struggling to extricate his encircled units by attacking us from the outside; he is being repulsed.

At Gdov (eastern shore of Lake Peipus), a "Special Division" has been captured; it is composed of, respectively, a unit of women, of convicts, and of Communist Youths.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Photographs of Moscow. Very extensive industrial installations, with vast railroad system. Strong AAA defense. Numerous balloon barrages, no fortifications.
- b) Photographs of Bologoye; according to captured documents a supply center (Artillery parks, Chemical Defense depots).
- c) 1.). Observed enemy movements (from north to south): From

Staraya Russa and Velikie Luki to Bologoye.

- 2.) West of Moscow, Vyazma is apparently the railhead for supply of troops.
- 3.) South of the line Smolensk-Moscow movements to the northeast (evacuations?).
- 4.) Vast train movements from the West to Kremenchug.
- 5.) Reconnaissance east of the Dniepr unfortunately unavailable; the same for area around Bryansk.

Gen. Fellgiebel

- a) Extension of the OKH trunk line first to Belaya Tserkov to be continued, according to the development of the situation, either northward to Kiev or across the Dniepr, south of Kiev.
- b) Regulation of signal communication service in the areas of the Civil Commissars for Occupied Territories, to be set up under Rosenberg.
- c) Findings of radio intelligence confirm data extracted from captured documents and PW statements.
- d) Moscow's role as center of the Russian communications system. With the elimination of Moscow, the entire Russian communications network collapses.

von Greiffenberg:

- a) Over-all mission: Smash all enemy forces that can be reached now. We must be sure to finish the job. On this account, and to ensure thorough mopping up, the area conquered must be safeguarded from incursions; further extensions only insofar as necessary to consolidate these gains.
- b) Possible future tasks: Form frontal group with Ninth Army and right wing of Second Army; on its northern wing, Armored Gp. 3. Another group for turning movement to the southeast, comprising the bulk of Second Army (inner ring) and Armd. Gp. 2 (outer ring). Movements of reserves and bringing up of GHQ Reserves must conform with these ideas. What should be the command organization for this operation?
- c) Direction of the mopping-up operations in newly-conquered territory. Cover right flank.
- d) Striking power of the Armd. Divs.: 60%.

Col. Gen. Fromm: Recommendations on the implementation of the Fuehrer's Armd.Divs. program: Activate the 36 Armd.Divs. initially with 2 Bns., each (except the Africa Divs., where 3 Bns. are specified), each Bn. of three, if possible, four Cos. To enable us to activate the eight Armd.Divs. ordered completed by next fall (incl. two for Africa), the Field Army must give up, by the end, if possible even by the middle, of August, two Armd.Divs. (Third and Seventeenth) and two mot. Divs. (both in Guderian's Gp.).

The 18 Inf. Divs. mot. we shall get together by taking the ten already existing plus Inf.Regt. "Grossdeutschland", SS Adolf Hitler and three SS Divs.mot., and then activate two Inf.Divs. mot. and one SS Div. mot. (or rather one more regular Inf.Div. mot. instead) by reducing Divs. to four mot. Bns., one mot. Rcn. Bn., reorganize the Motorcycle Bn. to a mixed Bn.(?!) and cutting the Antitank Bns. of the Divisions to two Cos. etc.

The motor transport requirements (transport, not tanks are the bottleneck in the new activations), it is hoped, can be covered from GHq Reserve Arty., Engineers (!) and Observation Bns., and by centralizing supply services.

Comment: Inasmuch as reduction in strength of the Inf.Divs. mot. and of the Rifle formations of the Armd.Divs. in favor of the newly activated units involves no reduction in fire power (the number of MGs and mortars, except light mortars, remains the same or is even increased), I have no objection to the principle of the proposal. I only want to have my say in the reduction of GHq Reserves (ratio of Artillery to Observation Bns., requirements in Engineers, Construction units, Railroad Engineers).

von Ziehlberg: Gen. Staff personnel matters (including medical opinion on Clausius) -- Decorations (Bulgaria) -- Current matters.

Col. Liss with OQu IV:

- a) Distribution of forces in the British homeland according to captured Russian documents. Figures on the whole square with our information. These documents assume that the units are still Brigs. and mot. Divs., because of lack of Artillery. (This probably does not hold true any more at this date.)
- b) Distribution of British forces in Irak (two Divs.), one more Division must be expected from India.
- c) Distribution of British forces in India. Indian troops now on the battle fronts have been replaced by newly activated units. Apart from the one Indian Div. destined for Irak, there probably can be no further withdrawal of troops from India.

Conference with ObdH on situation in AGp. South and the necessity to have the Inf.Divs. now arriving in the rear of the Sixth, moved to the area south of Kiev. The following two points must now be borne in mind by AGp. South:

- 1.) The encircling ring by Armd.Gp. must not be drawn too close, and if possible along the Dniepr.
- 2.) A strong group must be brought up to the Dniepr south of Kiev from the rear now for an early crossing.

The evening situation shows no essential changes in the picture.

In AGp. South a pocket is apparently forming at Vinnitsa as a result of Seventeenth Army's breakthrough. In the central sector, Armd.Gp. is beginning to make headway in southeastern direction, and on the northern wing Sixth Army has gained ground against the enemy at Korosten and has pushed him away from the supply route.

In AGp. Center, the battle with the encircled enemy bodies continues, but resistance varies in degree. South of Orsha little is going on, but north of the line Orsha-Smolensk, the largest group staged a break-out attempt in all directions; it was driven back.

In AGp. North our forces continue to close up to Armd.Gp.4. The enemy is throwing new forces against Hoepfner's left and right wings, but with our Inf. on the spot now, there is no danger.

Talk with Gen. von Sodenstern (AGp. South, on phone):

- a) In my opinion the envelopment will not be ample enough if Armd. Gp. strike for Uman; the Group must advance southeastward to the Dniepr in direction of Krivoi Rog. Army Gp. has reached the same conclusion. Only a weak right wing of the Armd.Gp. needs to drive in the direction of Uman. An intercepted radio signal of the Russian Twenty-sixth Army indicates that we are going to be attacked by 4 Inf.Divs. and 2 Cav. Divs. from the area south of Kiev, tomorrow.
- b) Prepare a strong group with bridging equipment, Artillery, etc. south of Kiev for the Dniepr crossing as soon as possible. Army Gp. has earmarked for this mission LV Corps, with 111th, 75th and 71st Inf.Divs. I add 132nd and 94th Inf.Divs. from Gp. Reserves. Under consideration is also XXXXIV Corps, with 57th and 59th Divs.
- c) Political friction between Hungarians and Romanians makes it desirable to separate the Hungarian Armd Corps from the Romanians; Army Gp. should think up an elegant way of doing it.

19 July 1941. (28th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South all planning is dominated by the discovery of the imminent attack by the Russian Twenty-sixth Army; captured orders indicate that it consists of 6 Inf.Divs. and 2 Cav. Divs., under two Corps Hqs. Three of these Divs. are supposed to come from the Lithuanian front, whereas the rest (VI Corps) are said to have fought in the Ukraine from the start.

The weather continues bad, which will probably slow the movements of AGp. South to a considerable degree. If we add to this the effect of the impending enemy attack by quite a sizeable force, it appears likely that the start of

this large-scale Armd.Gp. offensive will be cancelled or delayed again.

AGp. Center: Reports capture of a Russian order indicating that the Russian High Command is aiming at separating the German Armor from supporting Inf. units by driving attacks between them. In theory this is a very pretty scheme, but in practice it is something that can be carried out only by an opponent superior in number and generalship. Against our Armies, and with the Inf. Corps never slackening in closing to the Armor, I do not see a chance for applying such a policy. On the southern wing of the Army Gp., enemy pressure continues.

AGp. North: No new trends discernible in the development. The appearance of a Bn. of Moscow factory police demonstrates that communications between Moscow and Leningrad must still be open; it would be desirable from the operational standpoint if the enemy were not able to maintain communications between Lake Ilmen and Moscow. But I am beginning to wonder if we are not being confronted here with the incipient formation of a strong group between Bologoye and Rzhev, which eventually might make it necessary for Leeb's right wing to advance beyond the northern edge of the Valdai Hills.

In Estonia, the situation is developing favorably due to the enemy's inaction. The possibility of a crisis is fading.

Navy thinks that the enemy is becoming increasingly aware of our weakness and passivity in the Baltic; we must therefore expect intensification of enemy activity and a mounting threat to the sea route to Libau and Windau. These ports are essential for our supply.

Air Reconnaissance has no results worth noting due to persistent bad weather.

Gen. Buhle:

- 1.) Discussion of the BdE's plan for implementation of the Fuehrer's Armd. Forces program (fall reorganization of the Army).
 - a) Armd.Divs. On the whole no objections. The combination of motorcycle-mounted Inf.Bns.with Armd. Ren. units must not result in absorption of the unit in the Infantry. It must remain a reconnaissance unit . With Divs. becoming smaller, they will need fewer Truck Clms.
 - b) Inf.Divs. met. The proposed organization of the Inf. Bn. eliminates the Bn. Commander almost completely. By transferring to the Co.all weapons necessary for forming a main effort it would strip him of any real control over the situation. Cutting Artillery down to two light Btrys. for each Bn. can be approved only as an interim measure, designed to prevent the excessive depletion of GHq Artillery

by allotments to the new Divs. Later on, the Btrys. must again be increased to the normal number of three for each Bn.

- c.) GHq troops: Artillery: We shall still have to put up a fight to retain a substantial GHq Artillery, incl. Observ. Bns. and Corps Artillery Hqs, to facilitate exercise of control over operations. The argument that modern war is waged no longer with Artillery, but with tanks, is fallacious.

Engineer troops: It would be absurd to allocate 17 of the 20 existing GHq Eng. Bns. to the newly activated Divs. Modern motorized warfare has made the Engineers more indispensable than ever. The requirements of the new Divs. must be met by allotting to them the mot. Eng. Cos. of deactivated Inf. Divs.

Railroad Engineers: Their number must be increased. If the new organization of the Army is to be adapted to the needs created by operations over vast spaces, the Railroad Eng. units must be accorded an important place in the program.

Supply Services can probably be rendered more efficient and economical for movements in vast areas by centralizing and consolidating transport.

Heavy Artillery. Reduction will have to wait until Gibraltar is completed. These big guns tie down too much transport.

- 2.) A special organization under Balck* for the checking and revising T/Os with a view to reducing them to essential war needs will be set up at BdE, with the cooperation of Gen. Staff.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Demands by the Reich Marshal regarding safeguarding of native stocks in the operational theaters. Insofar as possible they have already been met on our own initiative.
- b) New boundaries for Rear Area AGp. Center: Joining AGp. North at the Dvina, the boundary in the main is formed by the Dvina-Dniepr line as far as Gomel. Rear Area AGp. South will eventually also be advanced to the Dniepr.
- c) AGp. North's request for motor transport to move 93rd Div. must be rejected.
- d) Arrived at Riga by sea: Convoy I, 900 tons; convoy II, 2,000 tons.
- e) Supply situation: South: Very high fuel consumption.

Not much fuel captured.

Sixty-ton truck columns only 50% operational owing to unseizable roads. Supply of AGp. nevertheless assured.

Center: The tense situation seems to be easing due to the smooth cooperation of Baentsch and the Railroad dictator dispatched by Gercke. The transport situation has improved. Little booty.

North: Owing to movement of troops (93rd Div.), three trains less are available daily for supply. Transport needs amply covered nevertheless .

Kinzel (Foreign Armies East): Command set-up on Russian front.
• (from north to south):

Field Command Hq Northwest (Voroshilov): Eighth, Twenty-seventh, Eleventh, Twenty-second (?) Armies. It is not yet clear whether Twenty-second Army belongs to Northwest or to West; the former is more likely. Important for operational appraisal of the area Rzhev-Bologoye.

Field Command Hq West (Timoshenko) : Nineteenth, Twentieth, Thirteenth and Twenty-first Armies. Behind them there seems to be additionally an Army Hq 4, which formerly operated in the Bialystok pocket and apparently was taken back.

Field Command Hq Southwest (Budyonny): Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Sixth and Twelfth Armies.

Field Command Hq South (?) : Eighteenth (?), Second, Ninth (?) Armies. The existence of this Hq appears to me doubtful. Probably it is the Hq of the Odessa Military District. If a strong operational Hq actually were committed here, we surely would know the name of the CG, just as we know the names of the three Marshals. Army Hqs 18 and 19 are known to us only through radio intelligence, and have for practical purposes not appeared at the fighting front. If they exist at all, they may be Hqs for coast defense or have other special functions.

von Thoma reports out to take over the command of Seventeenth Armd.Div.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Report on his findings in touring the supply arteries in the sector of AGp. North. With some Roadbuilding and Construction units being better equipped with transport than others, the situation has developed where all mobile units have been ordered up front and the less mobile units, left behind, never finish marching. They are continuously on the move to catch up with the others instead of doing their work. We need static organizations, which would employ PW and indigenous labor. Orders to this effect have been issued.

b) GHq Engineer and Constructions units needed in relation to the Armd. Divs. organization program.

Conference with Gen. Brand (Arty) and Gen. Gercke: Their demands within the Armd. Divs. organization program, which will require my backing.

Evening situation. No important news. Slow progress on all fronts along the lines of the development laid down by us.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu): The North African supply situation is increasingly deteriorating. Schleusner reports that Fifth Light Div. is so short of fuel that in the event of an attack on Solum it would just manage to get to the battlefield. Recommends to send additional 1,000 tons of truck transport to Africa. They can be taken only from Brussels. I turn down a proposal to obtain supposedly more suitable transport for Africa by an exchange with Romania, a process that would take four weeks. If Africa needs the stuff, send it down the quickest way possible!

Casualties: Total up to 16 July 1941 (excluding medical casualties): 102,588, i.e. 3.05% of a strength of 3,35 million.

Officer casualties in per cents of total losses: Wounded, 3,4; killed, 5,2; missing 1,6.

20 July 1941. (29th Day) Sunday.

By plane to Hq AGp. South.

0700. Situation report by Lt. Col. Grolmann. No important change in the situation since yesterday.

0730. Leave by car; 0830, take-off at Loetzen; 1130, arrival at Staro Konstantinov.

Army Hq is housed in a Russian Military School. A characteristic feature are the tokens of "culture"; on the outside, colossal plaster columns with Corinthian capitals, on the inside heroic-sized plaster statuary (sitting group Lenin-Stalin, soldiers of Army and of Air Force).

Conference with IA: Lt. Col. Winter sketches the situation for me. The over-all picture agrees with that we have at OKH. A new feature are the enormous difficulties besetting the movements of Armd.Gp. Kleist. E.g. Eleventh Armd.Div. is advancing on Uman in three distinct groups;

- 1.) Tracked vehicles, with Infantry on top.
- 2.) Polish peasant carts carrying Infantry, following behind the tracked vehicles.
- 3.) Wheeled motor vehicles, which cannot keep up on the

rainsoaked roads and so must be left behind in towns.

The main problem now is how to get Kleist's Group where we want it to go. Its main body together with elements of III Corps, brought down from the north, where they were relieved by Inf. now is fighting the Russian Twenty-sixth Army, which is attacking with its northern wing just to the south of Kiev, and with its southern wing, at Tarashcha; each wing has one fresh Division, while the rest are chipped in earlier battles. The attacks have all been repelled, but they pin down the bulk of Kleist's group so that actually only a weak Armd. force, Eleventh and Sixteenth Armd. Divs., remains available for tactical envelopment in the rear of the enemy now retreating before Schwedler's drive. The operational envelopment in the direction of Kirovograd has not yet got under way and will probably hang fire for some time yet. The assumption that the Russian Twenty-sixth Army will soon be defeated, looks to me too optimistic.

The next question, concerning Reichenau's Army, is answered to the effect that in consequence of the events at Zvyagel, his left wing has become comparatively strong. He is still confronted by a strong enemy, whose Artillery is now less active. The right wing, which is a long way off to the east, is gaining ground, but it looks as if it will be impossible to give that wing the strong forces that would enable it effectively to interpose itself between the enemy's Korostov Group and the Dniepr. Army Gp. rather expects that the enemy will be pushed against the Dniepr, which will successively be crossed by von Reichenau north of Kiev. The city then would be taken from the east.

For forming the group which we would like to build up south of Kiev, Army Gp. has available only the GHq Reserves standing far in the rear, now that LV Corps has been committed to relieve III mot. Corps. We thus get the following picture, which is also presented in a sketch submitted by Army Gp. The forces of Army Gp. fall into two groups moving in divergent directions: The big enveloping operation south of Kiev, in which Kleist will push with his main concentration in the direction of Kirovograd, and von Reichenau's attacking operation. The link between them is a weak group, LV Corps, which will have to be satisfied if it accomplishes as much as blocking enemy action from Kiev against the two large offensive groups.

Von Reichenau's prospects of success are not too rosy, for his attack will back the enemy against the Dniepr, instead of pushing him away from it and so cut him off. The Russian Twenty-sixth Army, which Kleist must shake off before he can strike southeastward with sufficient forces, will likewise be pressed back frontally behind the Dniepr. To cross to the other side, it has four military bridges available between Cherkassi and Kiev. It is altogether uncertain what Kleist's offensive against Kirovograd, which is already behind schedule, would be able to catch. Undoubtedly there are still some strong enemy groups in the area west of Uman, but whether they can be cut off depends on how much time is lost in fighting the Russian Twenty-sixth Army.

I stress the following points:

- a) von Reichenau's operation must be conducted in such a way that the enemy will be pushed away from the Dniepr. As of 25 or 26 July, it will be possible to have cooperation of XXXV Corps out of the Mozir area.
- b) Everything must be done to form a strong group south of Kiev. In addition to the GHq Divs. earmarked by Army Gp., it must be allotted also parts of von Reichenau's and Schwedler's forces at the very earliest.
- c) Everything must be done to avoid pushing the Russian Twenty-sixth Army to the Dniepr in purely frontal fighting and to prevent its withdrawal to Kiev with elements still capable of giving battle.
- d) We must soon be able to exert strong Armd. pressure in the direction of Kirovograd.

Particulars taken up at the conference:

- a) Future missions for Hansen's Corps. It must cross the Dniestr, east of Kishinev, using whatever he has got.
- b) Employment of the Italians. It will be best to commit them on the northern wing of Eleventh Army.
- c) Separation of Romanians and Hungarians. AGp. sees no difficulties.
- d) Opportunities for future operations east of the Dniepr.

Worries of Army Gp.:

- a) Horse replacements are becoming a burning question. Army Gp. has heard that there are still plenty horses to be had in Poland.
- b) Army Gp. reckons with the possibility of the enemy organizing a defense west and south of the Dniepropetrovsk industrial area, by forming a line of resistance on its western outskirts, i.e. yet west of the Dniepr.
- c) Tank strength of individual Divs.: Sixteenth Armd.Div., less than 40%; Eleventh Div., around 40%; Thirteenth and Fourteenth Divs., better.
- d) The number of operational reconnaissance planes is seriously diminishing (2 - 3 per Staffel).
- e) The enemy pockets in our rear are still a most vexing problem. We have no troops in the rear to clean them out.
- f) Bridge-building equipment for Dni crossing: Army Gp. believes that it will be able to build only one 16-ton bridge and one 8-ton bridge across the river.

Take-off from Army Gp.: 1530. Arrival Lötzen, about 1830.

After my return, brief report to ObdH: The great picture of the operation is not very cheering; Army Gp. is being split into two diverging directions, and a decisive major success in either direction is doubtful. After the Dniepr has been reached at least a short rest period will be needed by the troops, especially for refitting of tank units.

Development of the situation: In the meanwhile, the enemy on AGp. Center's front has succeeded in breaking out of the Nevel pocket. We cannot say as yet whether this is the result of Nineteenth Armd.Div. swinging toward Velikie Luki too soon; in any case, this is a distressing development. The escaped elements will hurl themselves against Velikie Luki and will make life miserable for the elements of Nineteenth Armd.Div. in the area, which have very tough going even now. And there are many more sore spots on the front of AGp. Center. On the southern flank, for instance, the enemy has been able to penetrate at several points; and on the eastern front of von Kluge's Army, which is forming north and south of Smolensk, several sectors are under heavy attack. Notwithstanding all this, we shall probably succeed in stabilizing our position east of Smolensk and so ensure an early liquidation of the big enemy pocket west of Smolensk.

The costly battles involving some groups of our Armd. forces, in which the Inf. Divs. arriving from the west can take a hand only slowly, together with loss of time due to bad roads which restrict movement and the weariness of the troops marching and fighting without a break, have put a damper on all higher Hqs.* Its most visible expression is the severe depression into which ObdH has been plunged. But in matter of fact there is really no reason for any such thing. We must let the great break-through battle take its course and judge its result later.

In AGp. South much ground has meanwhile been gained toward Uman, but the successes of our troops in the battle with the Russian Twenty-sixth Army are on the whole of a defensive character. AGp. North continues shifting its troops to the north as has been planned, without too much interference from the enemy now. AGp. Center reports a mounting bag of prisoners: Nearly 100,000 since 10 July.

21 July 1941. (30th Day).

Situation. AGp. South: The offensive of the Red Twenty-sixth Army indeed has pinned down the bulk of Armd.Gp., as was to be expected. The advance on Uman is executed by parts only of Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd.Divs. Owing to bad weather, the other Armies are advancing slowly.

AGp. Center: Velikie Luki, on the northern wing, unfortunately had to be abandoned. This is bad; many of the retreating enemy elements will get away as a result. On the southern flank of Armd. Gp. 2, at Propoisk the enemy has had local successes, which were checked by attacks of Fourth Armd. Div. Moreover, the situation is still quite precarious in the Smolensk area, where we have not yet succeeded in completely sealing the ring around the enemy.

In AGp. North, continuation and smooth completion of the initiated movements.

1100 - 1200. Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern (C of S, AGp. South):

- a) Splitting of Armd. Gp. 1 ! : * As long as the Russian Twenty-sixth Army south of Kiev has not been defeated, Armd. Gp. 1 cannot strike out for any new objectives to the south. Armd. Gp. will be lucky if, by tactical envelopment of the enemy falling back before Seventeenth Army, it can reach Uman with some elements.
- b) If Armd. Gp. 1 fails to batter its way beyond Uman, Eleventh Army must go out to meet it with at least strong Advance Combat Teams. Hungarian Cavalry alone is not enough.
- c) Reichenau's Army is splitting in two. It must put more punch in its right wing and let up on its left wing, in order to push the enemy away from, and not against, the Dniepr.
- d) Forming of a strong group south of Kiev for the eastward advance across the river must be initiated as soon as possible, or we shall be too late ! In addition to reserves and troops now far to the rear, it must comprise parts of Reichenau's and Schwedler's armies.

Gen. Brennecke (C of S AGp. North):

- a) Thoughts on the next operations of Army Gp.'s right wing. I have become increasingly convinced that the right wing of the AGp. North must be detached from its command and combined with AGp. Center; the boundary would run on Bologoye, through Kholm, with these two towns passing to AGp. Center. I request examination and comment by Army Gp.
- b) Thoughts on the eventual reduction of Kronstadt and Leningrad. Army Gp. will let us know its ideas on the subject.
- c) Condition of roads through the marsh area south of Lake Ilmen. Aerial photograph.

Otzen (Rome): Heggenreiner affair. Let him stay with his organization.

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air situation. No essential new findings apart from additional indications that the movements from

Bologoye to Leningrad, Staraya Russa and Velikie Luki are apparently being carried out under unified direction. This would support the assumption that Twenty-second Red Army after all is a part of the northern Group.

There is increasing evidence of a new rear position running from the Lake district of the Valdai hill complex through the headwater region of the Dniepr to Roslavl and the Desna.

The operational strength of the air reconnaissance units is temporarily quite low. Difficulties in material replacement. Losses.

The AA units, committed are closing on the combat troops with commendable speed.

Gen. Oehquist reports on his journey to Finland. Erfurth's suspicion that Marshal Mannerheim is opposed to the operation east of Ladoga, is unfounded. Talked with Mannerheim and Erfurth. The underlying cause of this storm in the teacup seems to be that Erfurth, having little to do and to say, suffered an attack of inferiority feelings.

The successes of the Finnish troops in the advance are very gratifying.

Gen. Matzky reports on current business in his section.

Gehlen reports on the Fuehrer's visit to AGp. North. All seems to have gone well at the conference. Someone, apparently Keitel, is constantly egging on the Fuehrer that Armor should be shifted from Center to AGp. North, that is, to the high ground east of Lake Ilmen. Doing that would be quite a mistake.

True, it might prove necessary to divert some of our steadily dwindling Armor to the Bologoye area in order to eliminate this railroad center, but farther north von Leeb now has all he can use. The Bologoye mission would best be carried out as an AGp. Center operation (after shifting the boundary !).

Major Buerker (Training Sec.): Training instructions for airborne troops, and other current questions.

Major von Ondarza reports on his trip to Guderian's Armd. Gp. Nothing new of any consequence.

ObdH went to AGp. Center, accompanied by Heusinger.

He relates his observations, and then I discuss with him my ideas on the future command organization in Center: von Kluge must take over the right wing (southern part of Second Army and Guderian's Group) to move it out of AGp. Center in a southeastern direction and then, under direction of von Rundstedt, advance with Hoth's left wing in direction of Stalingrad. Von Weichs must get the right wing of Ninth Army attached his present left wing, Strauss*, von Leeb's left wing. Von Bock would then conduct the

offensive south of the line Kholm - Bologoye (these towns included) in an eastward direction outflank Moscow on both sides (and reduce the city) and then continue with axis of advance on Kazan. As the spearhead of his front or his left wing, Hoth would lead with his tanks under von Bock's command.

This regrouping must in general be deferred until the objectives specified in the initial directives for the attack have been reached. * We can and must go beyond them in tactical operations, wherever that is necessary in overrunning those parts of the new Russian position which are situated directly in front of the objectives.

Gen. Koestring (Mil. Attaché Moscow) reports back. He gives an account of his experiences at the start of the war and is very sharp in criticizing the air and Naval Attachés for leaving their posts.

Evening situation: AGp. South: Due to more heavy rainfall, only minor changes in our positions. Uman has not yet been taken, but to the north, Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. pushed from the north into an enemy retreat movement going east and are now apparently engaged in heavy fighting. Eleventh Armd. Div. has blocked several trains loaded with troops and is fighting it out with them now.

Center: Easing of tension at Propoisk. At Mogilev there still is bitter enemy resistance. At Smolensk we have not yet succeeded in slamming the door on the last escape route. Fighting is continuing at Nevel, where considerable enemy elements obviously have fought their way out. Velikie Luki had to be abandoned. In spite of these local setbacks, von Bock's haul of prisoners in the second series of battles** has already risen to more than 100,000; over 1,000 guns have been captured.

AGp. North: On Lake Ilmen, the enemy is being driven back slowly. On the right wing of Army Gp. the movement to the north is getting under way. No other change.

22 July 1941. (31th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, heavy fighting is in progress at Uman, where Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. have clashed with strong forces of the enemy. Apparently the enemy is concentrating units taken out of his withdrawing front against our tank wedge, in order to save as much as he can of the perhaps substantial force in the area, now threatened with encirclement. This policy may of course produce some tight situations for our Armor in the Uman area, especially as the operation against the Red Twenty-sixth Army looks as if it might drag on a while.

In Reichenau's sector, adoption of our suggestion is showing

results. He is now making his main effort on the right wing in order to push the Korosten enemy away from the Dniepr. Also formation of the assault group south of Kiev has now been initiated.

In AGp. Center, the Smolensk pocket is actually not yet closed. Seventh Armd.Div. is apparently not on the great motor highway to Moscow, but north of it; fighting is continuing also in that area. Now with the Nevel pocket burst open and Velikie Luki abandoned, the prospects of an overwhelming success in terms of enemy destroyed, are dwindling. Also on the Dniepr, at Novi Bikhov, the enemy is still holding firm and fighting.

In AGp. North, the movements are developing according to plan.

Air: Bogatsch: a) Destruction of railroads. Railroad movements.
b) Aircraft destroyed to date: 7,564.
c) Assault on Moscow: 200 aircraft, using also the new 2.5 ton bombs.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Plans for future operations and new locations of Hqs of Army Gps. and of OKH.
- b) Signal troops for railroads: To date, Gercke has received one Bn. and five Cos. to strengthen his own railroad formation.
- c) Radio intelligence: Three Corps at Odessa. Leningrad: One new Army Eq., one Armd. unit southwest of Leningrad, two Divs. at Luga.
- d) Twenty-ninth Red Army at Rybinsk.
- e) Twenty-eighth Red Army at Sukhinichi.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Report on naval situation: The Russians are becoming more active under British influence. Control Gulf of Riga with light naval units. Our mine barrages cannot be adequately replenished. Riga is being used by our light naval units, but is not yet usable as a permanent base. Windau is under attack by enemy air force. Consequently, Memel and Libau are depended on as bases for our shipping in the Baltic.

France: Necessity of cooperation with France. Our problems in Mediterranean cannot be resolved any other way.

Mediterranean: Problem of shipping space can be conquered with the aid of French. The Italians are in no position to furnish the escort required.

Atlantic: No battleships in the Atlantic before next fall. Until then only submarines (at present 20, in fall 40, at the end of the year 60 operating); their effort greatly obstructed by intensified air patrolling: U.S. activity is making itself felt!

In the afternoon, ObdH returns from the Fuehrer, who is again in a state over AGp. North. It is not concentrated anywhere and does everything wrong. As a matter of fact, things up there are not quite as good as in other places, and cooperation with us is a little less smooth.

In the afternoon, work on the directives for the coming operations of the Army Gps.

Evening situation: Good progress on the southern wing of AGp. South. Otherwise no change.

Evening: Conference with ObdH, Heusinger, Wagner on conduct of operation "Barbarossa" in the weeks to come.

With Paulus, on preparations for likely operations in the West and in the Mediterranean.

23 July 1941. (32nd Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, the wedge of Armd. Gp. 1, pushed on Uman, is under heavy attacks from all sides. Our other offensive operations, also the one against the Red Twenty-sixth Army, are proceeding according to plan.

AGp. Center: The Inf.Divs. are rapidly closing up. The flanks of Army Gp. are now coming under attack.

AGp. North: When Sixteenth Army has brought the current battle to a close, it will be transferred to its jump-off sector.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance indicates start of movements against the flanks of von Bock. Kalinin and Bologoye bear continued watching. Also Rzhev! Heavy AAA on the Smolensk and Bologoye fronts.

Gen. Wagner:

- a) Supply situation. Still tight in Center, where consumption of ammunition is at a mounting rate. Instead of the required steady flow of 14 trains, arrivals vary between 8 and 15.
- b) Continuance of the operation. It will be impossible to start off three groups simultaneously in AGp. Center on 3 August. The best plan will be to move up Ninth Army first, bring Second Army up to full strength in the meantime, and after that concentrate on filling up Ninth Army. Bobruisk probably will be sufficient for von Kluge's new group.*
- c) For supply purposes, Armd. Gp. 3 must be transferred to Ninth Army (Dvinsk).

Gen. Buhle: Tank losses generally reasonable. Total losses comprise on an average. 20% of tank casualties. Personnel losses vary with Divs. ! Worst hit are Eleventh, Sixteenth, Third, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, First and Eighth Armd. Divs. Officer casualties in some units as high as 50% !
Truck situation generally satisfactory. Armd. Commands want 8 to 10 days for reconditioning. Impossible at present !

1800 Report to Fuehrer: I summarize the enemy situation and raise the question of the ultimate objectives of the operation. He has settled in his mind the objectives specified in yesterday's OKW directive and sticks to them, enemy or no enemy, or any other considerations.

Von Bock so will have to release his Armd. Gps. and move on Moscow with Inf. alone.

Moreover, the Fuehrer right now is not interested in Moscow; all he cares about is Leningrad. This sets off a long-winded tirade on how von Leeb's operation ought to have been conducted and why Armd. Gp. 3 now has to be thrown into the battle to destroy the enemy at Leningrad.

The chief object of the operations is viewed by him in the smashing of the enemy, a task which he believes would probably be accomplished by the time we are abreast of Moscow. Subsequently (and into the rainy fall season!) he imagines one could drive to the Volga and into the Caucasus with Armd. Divs. alone.

Let's hope he is right --- but all one can say is that time spent in such a conference is a sad waste.

Evening situation: At Uman, the situation is still tight. --- In AGp. Center, large numbers of prisoners are beginning to come in from the pockets. * The coming attack on von Bock's flanks is becoming more sharply outlined.

24 July 1941. (33rd Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, the situation in Eleventh and Seventeenth Armd. Divs. is growing increasingly acute. The two Divs. are much too weak to withstand the onrush of the enemy driven back by Schwedler and Seventeenth Army, and it is difficult to get reinforcements to them from the main body of Armd. Gp., which is pinned down in fighting right now. Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies are making good progress; but Eleventh Army is pointed very far to the southeast instead of hard to the east ! Sixth Army is still scattered all over the map. No concentration anywhere !

Center is closing up. Enemy pressure against the flanks is preparing or (in the north) already developing. Difficulties on the extreme right wing of Second Army.

North is regrouping for new advances. So far it is still impossible to make out at what point the main weight is going to be concentrated.

Gen. Bogatsch reports transport movements: rearward on the front of AGp. South, and frontward, in the sector of AGp. Center.

In the evening, another movement is reported running eastward from Gomel.

Radio intelligence has indications that Timoshenko's Hq has been divided into two sections, whereby it may be expected that his personal influence will be felt on the right flank of AGp. Center, and that of his C of S, on the left flank.

Gen. Buhle

- a) Ten days' pause for overhauling before Armd. Divs. start on the new offensive. Then we can count on 60 - 70% tank striking power. Dust is to blame for rise in engine casualties, since the crossing of the Beresina.
- b) Some Armd. Divs. should be stripped to fill up other Divs. That would get us to Kharkov with about 50% operational tanks.

We would release for that purpose Sixteenth Armd. Div. in Armd. Gp. 1, Seventeenth in Armd. Gp. 2, and Twentieth in Armd. Gp. 3. The Divs. destined for cannibalization will surrender the bulk of their materiel and all personnel save their Hqs. These skeleton Divs. comprising 50% of the NCO and 10% of the enlisted personnel and at least one officer of each tactical unit, will be returned to the ZI*.

Gen. Keitel (Personnel Div.): Our reserve of 2,000 young officers is used up except for a few Anti-Tank, Artillery and Engineers officers; of the 4,700 remaining in the Replacement Army, not all are fit for frontline service. -- System of direct requisitions from Mil. Districts will be discontinued. All requisitions for officers must go through Personnel Div. -- New officer training courses begin on 20 Aug; 5,000 candidates. -- Bn. COs are getting scarce. (Take good men of company rank !)

Heusinger: Current matters and preparation for the C of S conference on 25 July.

Liaison Off. AGp. North: Talk about situation in AGp. North and orientation on new operation.

Gen. Paulus: Navy does not want to continue assignments for "Haifisch". OKW will not reopen the English question before the spring of 1942, but it is essential to have something going in the West, to keep the interest of the troops alive.

Field Marshal von Bock: Had a talk with the Fuehrer:

- a) Concerning the whole at Smolensk.

b) His worries about the right wing of Second Army.

Evening situation shows nothing new. The situation on the right wing of Second Army has eased. (Apparently only reconnaissance thrusts).

25 July 1941. (34th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, some progress in the development of the situation on the northern wing and south of Kiev. On the southern wing of Armd. Gp. 1 the situation is still a little uneasy. On the whole, things are clearing up, though.

In AGp. Center yesterday's air reconnaissance shows that the enemy is bringing up forces against the right flank of Army Gp., apparently also by rail. Here we shall have to expect an attack soon.

On the northern flank of Army the enemy seems to be re-grouping with the idea of using only Armor to protect his rear position at Rzhev, and building up his front in the Valdai Hills with Inf.

In AGp. North no important developments.

1130 - 1600 Conference with the C of S of the Army Gps.: von Sodenstern, von Greiffenberg, Brennecke.

- a) Brief opening address by ObdH (thanks, interference from top level, need for adapting to the character of country and enemy; demand for energetic leadership; warning against overdispersal by lateral expansion; * maintenance of depth; resupply; need for clear-cut dispositions by sectors**). Discussion:
 - a) Brief retrospect. We review tactical and operational experiences.
 - b) Present situation. Resources for developing opportunities and necessity for Army Gps. to take a hand, especially in North and South***.
 - c) Plans for conduct of new operations, with particulars on possible execution.
 - d) Supply matters. (Presentation by Wagner.)
 - e) Organizational matters. (Presentation by Buhle.)

The AGp. Cs of S briefly comment on the possibilities envisaged by them, and on timing.

Allowing for a period of rehabilitation, AGp. Center could be ready to start the new offensive on about 10 Aug. Right wing, if necessary, could start off sooner. Also left wing, where less opposition is expected, could start

operations at an earlier date (3 - 5 Aug).

AGp. North believes it will be able to start at the end of the month, with main effort at Lake Ilmen (Busch).

AGp. South thinks that, by the end of the month, it will have everything ready for Reichenau's offensive across the Dniepr north and south of Kiev. It also hopes that Armd. Gp. 1 will have completed its mission west of the Dniepr by that time, so that it could proceed to the crossing of the river at Kremenchug and Cherkassi with a view to an eventual junction of Armd.Gps. 1 and 2 in the area northwest of Kharkov.

It remains to be seen if local cooperation with AGp. Center west or directly east of the Dniepr at an earlier date (end of July) offers any chances of success against the Russian Fifth Army.

Supply will be quite difficult, even if railroad capacity improves over present levels. Overwhelming problems need to be overcome in supplying northeastward advance of Armd.Gp. 3, toward the Valdai Hills.

Frontline messages report heavy attacks into southern flank of AGp. Center (Regt. Grossdeutschland and XII Corps).

The evening reports offer no important news apart from confirming the transport movement from Gomel on Orel through Bryansk, which started on 24 July and continued through 25 July.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the enemy put on particularly heavy attacks east of Novi Bikhov, a Vidara and northwest of Roslavl today.

In AGp. South, the unsettled situation at Uman has been stabilized.

In AGp. North, no important new developments. The attacks on Lake Ilmen are making only slow progress.

Statistics on prisoners and booty in AGp. Center: Since battle of Minsk, 185,487 prisoners, 2,030 tanks, 1,918 guns.

26 July 1941. (35th Day)

Situation: South: The enemy is still finding means to escape the developing encirclement. Savage counter attacks against the advancing pursuit forces cover the effort of extricating troops from the threatened area, which is accomplished with exceeding skill, by both rail and mot. movements. The Red Twenty-sixth Army has been severely compressed; the Red Fifth Army is shifting its main weight to the east.

Center: On the front of von Bock's extreme right wing, the enemy is giving ground. The strong forces which recently

were at Gomel apparently are being shifted northward, to the area of the Roslavl - Smolensk highway. At Yelnya, the enemy is continuing his attacks with new Divs. and new tanks, brought up from the east.

Attacks also from northeastern direction against Hoth's northern flank. Our Inf. is closing up.

North: Enemy resistance by many small enemy bodies fighting stubbornly on the front of the southern wing and on both sides of Lake Ilmen. In Manstein's sector, slow progress in very difficult terrain. West of Lake Peipus, the enemy forces are being pinched off at Dorpat.

Over-all picture: Enemy defense is becoming more aggressive; more tanks, more planes. In addition to ten new Divs. previously listed, fifteen more new Divs. have been reported.

Morning conference with ObdH. I outline the proposals of the Army Gps. for the next moves, adding my critical comments. I am surprised by his emphasis on the necessity of an early attack against the strong enemy group at Gomel. It becomes soon apparent that this is one of the Fuehrer's notions.

Such a plan implies a shift in our strategy from the operational to the tactical level. If striking at small local enemy concentrations becomes our sole objective, the campaign will resolve itself into a series of minor successes which will advance our front only by inches. Pursuing such a policy eliminates all tactical risks and enables us gradually to close the gaps between the front of the Army Gps., but the result will be that we feed all our strength into a front expanding in width at the sacrifice of depth and end up in position warfare!

ObdH calls up von Bock* to talk over the possibilities for an offensive against the Gomel group. von Bock vehemently opposes any attack with tanks from the east, holding that such a diversion of Armor would sabotage the very operational conceptions underlying the plan for the new phase of the campaign.

Major von Below (Liaison Off. to Guderian) reports on enemy picture and situation. Combat strength of our own troops after five days of refitting will be an average of about 50%.-- Memorandum in justification of himself.

von Etdorf: Japan: New Cabinet apparently continues pro-Axis orientation. Timing may be changed. -- Indochina. -- Vladivostok.

France has been put on ice. No reply to their notes before two or three weeks. Question of Bizerte is being worked on.

Turkey: Papen reports that things will follow their logical development if we make progress against Russia. German offers postponed until some later date. The Turks are thinking of the creation of buffer states in Caucasia and Turkestan.**

Iran: Government victually under British control. (gold!).

U.S.A. Entry into the war unlikely at the moment. -- Still, Roosevelt's "hectic policy" admits of surprises. -- Efforts to give assistance by supplies are indicated by stepped-up shipments to Basra.

Finland fights shy of breaking diplomatic relations with England. Seizure of Finnish ships by England will perhaps speed up the matter.

Sweden has refused joining the Axis. We shall ignore her in the future.

Balkans: Bulgaro-Romanian conversations on frontier readjustment and resettlement of populations.

Italy: War unpopular. Strong voices against the policy of Colonial and Empire expansion. Fuehrer's letter to Il Duce, reminding him to keep watchful eye on France. (The motive probably is to dissipate Italian suspicions.)

Gen. Konrad:

- a) The Reich Marshal is critical of the Army.*
- b) Air Force wants Army to tell where it wants main effort.
- c) Review of coming operations.

1800 - 2015 Report to the Fuehrer on plans of the Army Gps. Longwinded, at times warm, discussion on missed opportunities for encirclement. He wants:

- 1.) AGp. South must abandon the plan of an operational envelopment west of the Dniepr, if prospects of success are seen diminishing. All Armd. Divs. must then be put across to eastern bank.
- 2.) Disposition of Gomel by a purely tactical operation conducted by a new group to be formed under von Kluge. The operation must be launched at the earliest, regardless of the timing of other attacks, and if possible be developed into encirclement of the Korosten group.
- 3.) Von Bock's group for the frontal offensive on Moscow should start pushing ahead slowly as soon as ready.** No hurry.***
- 4.) Hoth should start his drive on the Valdai Hills as soon as possible, so that he would get there no later than the right wing of Sixteenth Army.
- 5.) In AGp. North main effort on Lake Ilmen.

The Fuehrer's analysis, which at many points is unjustly critical of the Field Commands, indicates a complete break with the strategy of large operational conceptions. You cannot beat the Russians with operational successes, he argues, because they simply do not know when they are defeated. On that account it will be necessary to destroy

them bit by bit, in small encircling actions of a purely tactical character.*

Of course, there is something in these ideas as regards the Russians. But following such a course implies letting the enemy dictate our policy, and reduces our operations to a tempo which will not permit us to reach our goal, the Volga. We must remember that the Russians have plenty of manpower, and it is very unlikely that we could pursue the new policy to the point where the enemy cracks and the way is clear again for operations on a big scale.

To me, these arguments mark the beginning decline of our initial strategy of imaginative operations, and a willingness to throw away the opportunities afforded us by the impetus of our Inf. and Armor.

It remains to be seen whether this radical change in strategic conception, which at first certainly will come as a surprise also to the enemy, will bring the desired success. My representations stressing the importance of Moscow are brushed aside without any valid counter evidence.

Gen. Paulus reports on his visit to AGp. North. Hoepfner, Manstein and Reinhard concur that the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus is unsuited to operations of Armd. units. All we can do at Lake Ilmen is to attack with Infantry while keeping in readiness the Armor not yet committed (Manstein's Corps.), for a follow-up where Infantry has cleared the path. As a consequence development of the battle will be very slow.

The situation of Reinhard's Corps is very uncomfortable. Reinhard vehemently demands to be given the go-ahead signal. But this is out of the question as long as the offensive from the direction of Luga has not become effective.

Greatly intensified enemy air activity is reported also in that area.

Evening situation: No major changes. Heavy enemy attacks in the sectors previously subjected to enemy action: In AGp. South, against the tank wedge, where the enemy evidently had a local success against Eleventh Armd.Div.; and in AGp. Center against von Kluge's wings and flanks.

Increased enemy air and tank activity, especially against Hoth's left shoulder.

The enemy shows intense activity along the entire front, evidently in the hope of freeing yet the elements encircled at Smolensk. Two or three Army Hqs are believed to be trapped in the pocket. New Army Hqs are taking their places on the front of AGp. Center.

27 July 1941. (36th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, disastrous rainstorms have paralyzed all movements. All we can try to accomplish now is to push the tank wedge aimed at Uman sufficiently far to the south, so as to cut at least the railroad and roads going east through Uman.

In AGp. Center weak enemy attacks are reported on the Dniepr, at Gomel, heavier ones at Roslavl. All were repelled, at great cost to the enemy in prisoners and guns. At Yelnya, the front has quieted. In Hoth's sector, the enemy launched local attacks mostly in Bn. or Regt. strength, without success. Attacks were also repulsed on the left wing, south of Velikie Luki. Enemy air activity is on the increase and in part quite uncomfortable.

AGp. North. Nothing new. Stiff enemy resistance on the front of our Lake Ilmen group; on the rest of this front no major actions. West of Lake Peipus, part of the enemy force is encircled north of Dorpat. The other sectors are quiet.

Gen. Wagner:

- a) Transport of wounded -- Hospital trains. A process is now underway to have all hospital cases evacuated by 10 August. To this end we need one train per Army; Sixth Army needs more.
- b) Arrival of supply trains satisfactory in South; just enough in Center; not enough in North.
- c) OQu conference on 28 July ! Program for conference. Our aim must be to fill up the first issues everywhere by 3 Aug.; after that we can begin stockpiling ammunition.
- d) Briefing on operational plans.
- e) Military Government: Ukrainians and nationals of the Baltic States are being released from prison camps. In AGp., South the boundary of the Rear Area is being moved forward.
On 1 August, Vilna will be taken over by the Wehrmacht-befehlshaber; Bialystok will be incorporated in East Prussia and Lwow passes to control of Military Commander in the Government-General.
- f) Hungarians will be taken out of the areas temporarily administered by them, which go to Government-General, on 1 Aug.
- g) Slovaks will remain in the area now taken over by Government-General, with Army Gp. retaining formal control of them. They are merging two Divs. into one and carry out a training program.
- h) Army mail. On the whole no complaints. Delivery either

way 6 - 8 days in Sixth Army, 10 - 14 days in Fourth Army.

- i) Tank spare parts situation improved, also as regards engines.
- k) Occupation costs in France reduced from 20 to 10 billion francs.

Gen. Brand (Arty.):

- a) Coastal artillery: To date only nine Btrys. along coast to Riga; three more in preparation for shore east and west of Pernau. Project for coast of Gulf of Finland: one 17 cm Bn., two 10 cm Bns.
- b) Kronstadt: Artillery armament of fortress and possibilities for attack. Pictorial map.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Loss of materiel through enemy surprise attack on Sixteenth Armd. Div.* Motorcycle Co. and a 5 cm AT Plat. must be activated.
- b) Organizational plans for the activation of first-class Divs. (present First Draft, strengthened), second-class Divs. (for all defensive missions); and of third-class Divs. (occupation duty).
- c) In each Division immobilized in the rear area, one Plat. of captured tanks will be activated for the Anti-tank Cos. (i.e., 6 tank platoons per Div., each with 4 or 5 tanks); in Security Divisions, one Plat.
- d) Himer's Staff will be recalled, Erfurth's Staff reduced.
- e) The post of a "Staff Officer in charge of Armd. Trains" must be created at OKH. Will be assigned to the Staff the Armored Troops Chief.**

Gen. Jacob :

- a) Distribution of Bridge Clms. Reallocation gives the following distribution:

Armd. Gp. 3:	13 Bridge Clms. B (add 2)	total	15
Second Armies:	18 Bridge Clms. B		
	4 " " T	total	22
Armd. Gp. 2 and			
Second and Fourth	30 Bridge Clms. B		
Armies:	3 " " G	total	33
Army Gp. South:	66 Bridge Clms. B		
	3 " " G		
	5 " " "		
	1 Bench "	total	79

Army Gp. North:	33	Bridge	Clms.	B	
	4	"	"	"	G
	3	"	"	"	T
	8	Austrian	"		total 48.

b) River mines for the Dniepr; mines and wire carried by Eng. units.

ObdH visited AGp. Center: Review of the plans for Gomel, offensive against Moscow, and Hoth's operation against the Valdai Hills:

Guderian must take out time for rehabilitation of materiel and personnel. Will be finished about 3 or 4 Aug. VII and IX Corps will be placed under Guderian's command to relieve his Armd. forces. VII Corps will strike on Roslavl; this attack should, if possible, be conducted as a preliminary to the attack on Gomel.

Hoth will come under control of Strauss. Von Kluge will be withdrawn and take over Hoth's assault group now under Hq Second Army.

Evening: In South, bad weather. Bridge is being constructed at Dubossary. Eleventh Army wants a break of three days. (Impossible, paired attack with Armd. Gp.). Kleist again wants to run off to the southeast instead of swinging southward. -- Russian Cavalry north of Korosten.

On front of AGp. Center, appearance of two Divs. previously identified at Korosten. Cavalry west of Gomel, in the Bobruisk area. Some of the Russian Inf. attacking at Roslavl had no rifles; were guarded by partisans.*

AGp. North. Lake Ilmen sector. In front of von Manstein, the enemy is holding doggedly. The time is ripe to take Narva. North of Dorpat, a Russian pocket has been cleaned out: 1,600 prisoners, over 50 guns. 9 enemy bridges north of Luga.

28 July 1941. (37th Day)

Situation: No important new developments. An order has been issued to AGp. South to swing Armd. Gp. 1 not to the southeast, but to the south, on Uman.

In AGp. Center the Russian Cavalry behind the right wing of AGp. Center is still active and is reported to have even damaged the railroad line to Bobruisk. Counter-measures have been initiated.

The Mogilev pocket is now completely cleaned out. The numbers of prisoners and guns corroborate our original estimate of 6 enemy Divs.

In AGp. North. Good progress toward Staraya Russa. Otherwise no change. AGp. asserts it can launch the Narva attack only if Reinhard's entire group is swung forward on the hinge of First Armd. Div. Sounds quite unfeasible. To my mind, the whole attack is no more than a Combat ng. assault.

Field Marshal von Bock (on phone) 1030:

- 1.) Terrain east of the Sosh river impracticable for Guderian's attack.
- 2.) Roslavl must be taken. To do this, Guderian need not advance in direction of Bryansk, but can turn off to the Iput river. Roslavl is in any event necessary as a jump-off base* for the right wing of von Bock's Group in its eastward advance, as well as for Guderian.
- 3.) Von Bock's forces too weak for further advance to the east, since he needs large forces on his right wing (echelonned flank protection)*. In that he is right!
- 4.) Action taken by Army Gp. to eliminate Russian Cav. force in its rear. (Fegelein, Schenkendorf; elements of rear Divisions are brought up for a concentric drive; Air Force is alerted).
- 5.) Guderian needs until 3 or 4 August.

Grouping of enemy:

New Front Hq South (Odessa): Ninth, Second, Eighteenth Armies.

Old Front Hq Southwest: Twelfth, Sixth, Twenty-sixth and Fifth Armies

New Army Hq near Leningrad.

Bogatsch:

- a) Unidentified transport movements from the area of Ribinsk to Leningrad. (From Moscow?)
- b) Narva bridge apparently made unusable for trains.
- c) New: Railroad line under construction from the Baltic ports south of Leningrad to the Ribinsk railroad line. Right of way and structures finished. Tracks have not yet been laid. Perhaps of service for moving troops.
- d) Extensive destructions in Bologoye-RR station (aerial photograph).
- e) Activities interpreted as attempts to prepare the Estonian ports for defense from landside. Land fortifications south of Kronstadt? * **
- f) Behind sector fronting AGp. South, industrial evacuations. For the most part the rail network appears to

be jammed at critical points. No operational movements observed.

von Ziehlberg: Current reassignments. Decorations for Gen.Staff personnel.

Report 1300: Enemy attacks south of Luga result in penetration in the sector of 289th Div. Parts of Eighth Armd.Div. must be committed.

Col. Ochsner: Reports on his tour to AGp. South. The "Do" units and the Heavy Rocket Launchers* have been exceedingly effective everywhere. We must see to it that this evidently very effective weapon is put to even more extensive use. The difficulty lies in ammunition supply.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Axes of communications for von Kluge and Hoth's Armd.Gp. in the projected operations. — Cipher operations procedure.**

Lt. Col. Stieff reports on his trip to Armd. Gp. 3. — Road problems and combat conditions. — Ammunition difficulties. — Resentment against Armd.Gp. 2. — Condition of vehicles. — Directives, not orders !***

Major Mueller-Hillebrand reports on his visit to Ninth Armd.Div. Combat conditions. — Leadership. — Roads. — Traffic control.

Evening situation: South: With roads still very bad, Army Gp. is moving its Armd. Gp. harder to south-southeast. (Should be still more to the south!)

Center: Enemy encircled at Smolensk still fairly strong. An enemy attack (allegedly a Cav. Corps of three Divs.) has broken into the southern flank. Heavy attacks at Rogachev and Roslavl, and also on the front of Armd.Gp.3, where five Rifle Divs. and three Armd.Divs. have been identified.

North: Break-through at Luga has been sealed. Advances on the right wing and toward Staraya Russa.

At the evening situation conference I again point out the absurdity of the operation now decided on. They are bound to result in dispersion of our strength and checking of the drive on Moscow, the crucial objective. Von Bock's Group obviously has been weakened to a point where he is barely able to replace his Armor with Infantry, let alone mount any offensive. Attack impossible before 10 Aug.

29 July 1941. (38th Day).

Situation: South: New restricted gains. Pockets are developing between Armd.Gp. 1 and Seventeenth Army, also between Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies.

Center: Local attacks. Enemy situation on the whole unchanged. Another new Army Hq has been inserted in the front; it controls three new Rifle Divs., one of which is made up mainly of untrained Moscow industrial workers.

North: Amazingly good progress on Kholm. Also advances in the direction of Staraya Russa. The enemy penetration in the Luga area has been contained. West of Lake Peipus two small enemy pockets have been formed.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Arrival of trains is good in North (18) and Center (10), insufficient in South (10).
- b) It will take until 15 Aug. to replenish the first ammunition issue in all organizations; stockpiling will be possible only after that.
- c) Spare parts situation: Repair installations in the Orsha base have been centralized. Engines have arrived for 80 Tanks III and 30 Czech 38 Tanks. (We requisitioned 250.) Specialist workers have arrived at the front.
- d) Truck replacements urgently needed.
- e) New operations:

North thinks it can carry out its operations with 18 trains, daily. Armd. Gp. 3 thinks its best plan is to advance along the railroad line. Railroad line usable as far as Novo Sokolniki; 8,000 tons of Truck Ctm. space (including 4,000 tons for immediate needs*).

Eighteenth Army is supplying Reinhard's Corps through Pskov (Gen Qu base). Transport capacity of Eighteenth Army has declined 40%, owing to immobilization of trailers.**

Center: Bridge *** under construction at Ulla.

South still needs more Truck Ctm. to transport supplies from the jump-off base to the front; railroad line cannot handle the volume. Dniepr crossing planned for 5 Aug. It will be possible to move up $1\frac{1}{2}$ ammunition issues for the operation. 2,000 tons have been allocated for the preparation of the crossing at Cherkassi. Balta is Army base, with fuel depots and medical services. Base in the Dniepr bend planned for later on. Preparations initiated for sea route to Nikolayev (Merk).

- f) "Administrative Orders" appendix to the Operational Orders for the new offensive.

Col. Breith (Armd. Troops) reports on his visit to Armd. Gps. 2 and 3. Nothing new of any importance. Traffic discipline and control # deficient. Control Dets. too weak. Hqs of Armd. Divs. and Corps need organic Hq guards.

Gen. Paulus, Gen. Gause: Command organization in North Africa.
Plan for attack on Tobruk.

Gen. Osterkamp (Chief, Army Rations Office):

- a) Preparations for the winter. Everything ready, expect cooking kettles.* General conference at Gen Qu's Office today.
- b) Rations for North Africa set aside: 50,000, for 50 days.
- c) Crop prospects:
Bread cereals: Last year, 11.6 mill. tons, this year 12.8. Average of last five years, 13.9.
Fodder grain: Last year, 12.08 mill. tons, this year, 11.13. Average of last five years, 12.07.
Total grain crop: Last year, 23.07 mill. tons, this year, 23.9. Average of last five years, 25.9.
- d) Total crop: Good average crop. New East produced 0.6 mill. tons more than last year. Protectorate 0.2 mill. tons under last year's production.
- e) Farm labor:
From other countries 210,000
PWs 1,500,000
Russian PWs 300,000
round 2,000,000
- f) Potatoes: Late, but not bad.
- g) Hay: First mowing good average in both quantity and quality.
- h) Livestock: Cattle, stationary; hogs, somewhat more.
- i) Comparison between food rations in England and in Germany: Meat, same; bread, better in England; jam, cheese and fat, better in Germany; sugar, coffee, tea, better in England.

Heusinger: a) Problems likely to be encountered by AGp. North in fighting coastal fortifications. Artillery!
b) Anticipated strength requirements after successful completion of operations in Russia. Memorandum on disposition of forces.

Paulus: Report on his conference with OKW:

- a) Any restrictions imposed on Army Gp. North by OKW? Answer evasive! VIII Air Corps employed in support of push of Lake Ilmen Group, without notifying OKH.

- b) North Africa is an Italian theater of operations. Bastico is in full charge there.— High Command Armd. Gp. must be organized. Will control defensive front at Sidi Barrani and the mobile wing. The Italians will decide about attack on Tobruk.
- c) Safeguarding of transport on North African route is the responsibility of the Italians. In the present situation it would be a crime to allocate German planes for this purpose. OKW has nothing left to help out with.

Evening situation:

- a) Straits of Eleventh Army due to lack of ammunition and attacks from the south.
- b) AGp. South plans to have Schwedler's strike eastward toward the Dniepr and against Kiev.
- c) Center: Enemy river boats on the Pripet are harrasing our troops. — Enemy Cav. Corps is still kicking up in the rear of the Army Gp. VII Corps is brought to bear against Roslavl. Enemy attack achieves minor penetration in Nineteenth and Twentieth Armd. Divs. Unusually heavy attacks against VI Corps and Fourteenth mot. Div.
- d) In AGp. North, enemy puts on powerful attacks on Velikie Luki. Our troops are in a precarious position owing to lack of ammunition. II Corps makes very good progress in the direction of Kholm.

The situation on the boundary between Army Gp. Center and North makes it necessary to combine the forces in the area for unified action. Order to this effect has been issued. The combined force will be under command of Ninth Army. I wanted to have this done several days ago, but was vetoed then.

30 July 1941 (39th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, the weeks of grinding at the Russian front in the Ukraine are beginning to tell. The enemy front is crumbling. Notwithstanding, we must expect that owing to the absence of any pressure from the Romanians and the existence of several well-preserved enemy Divs. in the sector of the Front Group South, an attempt will be made to hold the coastal district around Odessa. Odessa may become a Russian Tobruk. There is only one way to prevent this: Armd. Gp. 1 must strike due south through Pervomaisk.

Schwedler has reformed a large portion of his group. It would be inadvisable at this time to send him off in north-eastern direction for a crossing of the Dniepr south of

Kiev, instead, it must be moved due east so that it remains available a few days longer for operations to the south.

Sixth Army has now completely detached its left wing. Von Reichenau with his right wing is probably pressing on to the Dnieper, north of Kiev. He has his orders to destroy the enemy group at Korosten, and must be kept from doing anything else.

Center: Attempts to withdraw the Armd. Divs. from their sectors* must be abandoned owing to the incessant enemy attacks. Fourth Armd. Div. had to be committed again at Krichay, "Grossdeutschland" at Roslavl.

South and southwest of Toropets, heavy fighting is reported. Here we have a chance to catch a large enemy force, and would need cooperation of AGp. Center, attacking with Fourteenth mot. Div. from the south, and AGp. North, attacking with I Corps from the north, and with Schubert's Combat Team from Velikie Luki. The order for such an operation must come from OKH.

North: It is becoming evident that OKW is revising its erstwhile notions and no longer insists on the impossible demand for AGp. North to cut off the eastward retreat route of the enemy around Leningrad. For the time being the commitment of VIII Air Corps in the sector of AGp. North has been cancelled.-- Eighth Armd. Div. has gone into action at Luga.

Telephone talk ObdH/von Bock: Second Army claims that the enemy fronting it has softened. It proposes a small-scale operation from the west and north for clearing the enemy out of Rogachev and the surrounding country.

Army Gp. wants to do Roslavl on 31 July or 1 Aug. Twentieth Armd. Div. is up against a very tough situation (40 enemy Btrys.); XXIII Corps has passed to the defensive; Fourteenth mot. Div. is not up to its full fighting strength.

Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance:

- a) Westward movements on Leningrad, also from Moscow to Leningrad. Wrecking of railroad lines apparently was not complete enough.
- b) Plane replacement for Long-range Rcn. Staffeln has completely ceased.
- c) It has become necessary to withdraw the Close-range Staffeln from the Army Gps. Plane strength of units severely diminished, and no replacements available. Out of ten Staffeln, six at least must be reorganized as workshop formations for the period of rehabilitation**; they will be under control of the AGp. Air Officers.
- d) By scraping the bottom of the barrel, we would have replacements for our Henschel planes only until 1 Sept. Then this type will be exhausted, and there will be no replacements. In the Night Staffeln things are not

much different. Here the bottleneck is more on the personnel side than in materiel.

Gen. Ott reports on his visit to Armd. Gp. 4. He canvassed Commanders on the form Armd.Divs. should be given in the fall reorganization. Balk's proposal to give everything to the Cos., which would deprive the Bn. CO of all means for exercising control over operations, is generally rejected. Discussion on employment of the Motorcycle Bn. for reconnaissance.

Gen. Wagner (on phone): Reply to inquiry concerning possibilities to supply Hoepfner's right wing (Reinhard's Corps):

Pskov - Gdov road serviceable only for motor vehicles without trailers. Shipping on Lake Peipus has been instituted with 300 tons, navigation head Gdov. No definite data yet on time required. Available shipping space estimated at 1,500 tons. Towing vessels are few. Assault boats can help out.

Within three days the road from Pskov to Gdov is expected to be much improved; we shall see then to what extent 60-ton Truck Clms. could be brought into use to relieve the situation.

Major Meyer-Ricks has returned from Libya.* Report on the work of Felmy's Staff and on his impressions in Syria.

Wagner (Gen Qu) -- Schmidt-Altenstadt:

- a) Employment of Security Divs.
- b) Supply position of Reinhard's Corps.
- c) Care of wounded. Senior medical officer must be assigned to the Gen Qu Hqs at the Army Gps.
- d) Separation of Russian and German wounded.
- e) The Fuehrer has not signed the agreement with France on reduction of occupation costs.

Gen. Rommel comes in. Discussion on the importance of the African theater of operations. -- He does not expect an English attack before next September; I consider August more likely. -- Reviews situation in North Africa.

von Ziehlberg: Decorations and current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Major Philippi (Op. Sec.) reports on his observations in Eleventh Armd.Div. and Hq of Kempff's Corps.

1600 Gen. Jodl calls up: The Fuehrer has arrived at a new conception of the next phase of the campaign:

AGp. North must defeat the enemy at Leningrad; is left discretion in choosing direction of main effort. Plan of thrust to cut the Moscow-Leningrad railroad is dropped.

Center: Here we must pass to the defensive. Only security measures on the line Lake Ilmen -- Kholm -- Toropets! Withdraw Armd.Divs. for rehabilitation.

South: For the time being we must leave Gomel alone. Whether we shall do Roslavl is not yet decided at the moment.

Air Force: Shift main strength to AGp. North, for close support in eliminating the enemy in Estonia. Will not be withdrawn before accomplishment of mission of AGp. North is assured.

1720 von Greiffenberg (on phone):

- 1.) Cooperation with AGp. North at Velikie Luki -- Toropets, to cut off the enemy.
- 2.) Rogachev. Army Gp. wants to do this job, as a preliminary to the eventual capture of Gomel. Can be ready within two days.
- 3.) Roslavl not conceived as an independent operation but as part of the later operations against Gomel.
- 4.) I Corps will be completely out of Artillery ammunition day after tomorrow!

Evening situation:

- a) Very promising break-through of Armd.Gp. 1 in southern direction, toward Pervomaisk.--- At last!
On the eastern front * many enemy attacks, at some points eleven times in succession; all repulsed!
- b) Operation Rogachev can start in five days (4 Aug.).
- c) Roslavl can start on 1 Aug.; XXIV Corps, with VII Corps to its left.

2400. Heusinger: OKW has signed new "directive" which adopts our proposals! Limited objective: Rogachev. Not more than one Armd.Div. will be employed. At Roslavl, 263rd Inf.Div. will help. Toropets must be done. All necessary orders will be contained in the forthcoming Fuehrer order.

This decision frees every thinking soldier of the horrible vision obsessing us these last few days, when the Fuehrer's obstinacy made the final bogging down of the eastern campaign appear imminent. At long last we get a break!

Memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff on the Battle of the Atlantic. Very gratifying, but also sober in its appraisal of the situation.

31 July 1941. (40th Day)

Situation: South: No report yet on the fresh enemy forces observed south of Eleventh Army; it may be assumed to be still in the area.

The forming of pockets west and northwest of Pervomaisk is developing satisfactorily. Armd.Gp. 1 has pushed into the assembled forces of Twelfth Army as they were being taken out of the line. Apparently the left wing of Armd. Gp. 1 simply rolled over an enemy Div.

The movement of the Inf. Div. * from the rear toward the Dniepr crossing site south of Kiev has got under way. The attack against the strong enemy force directly south of Kiev is in progress. Sixth Army still shows no clear intentions.

Center: Local enemy attacks. Otherwise nothing new. The fighting power of the enemy seems to be declining. The enemy is intensifying construction of positions on the front of Army Gp.

North: Army Gp. is resisting detachment of forces from the Kholm group in the direction of Toropets.

Progress at Lake Ilmen. The southwestern shore of the Lake has been reached. Next to Eighth Armd. Div., Third mot. Div. has now been committed in the direction of Luga. Manstein seems to be pressing in that direction.

No change on the northern wing and in Estonia.

A captured Gen.Staff Officer has stated that the enemy is shifting troops from the Leningrad front to the area south of Lake Ilmen (?). Railroad movements between Leningrad and Moscow (evacuations?).

Gen. Bogatsch: Air observation shows nothing new of importance. Tactical reconnaissance apparently suffers from the fact that fighter protection on reconnaissance sorties has become thin.

Radio intelligence suggests the following enemy command set-up:

Baltic Front)	Voroshilov
Northwestern Front)	
Western Front)	Timoshenko
Central Front)	
Southwestern Front)	Budyonny
Southern Front)	

The "Armies" comprised in the "Fronts" seem to be some sort of Corps Hqs, each commanding several Divisions.

- Radke:
- a) Serious loss by 52nd Rocket Proj. Regt.: A large quantity of secret material has been captured by the enemy. Basic order**.
 - b) Propaganda leaflets. Commands want more leaflets. Arrangements made for continuous supply.

- c) Himmler states in a letter that last year's Polish incidents are now finally closed*.

Talk with Wagner (Gen Qu):

- 1.) Ammunition shortage in Ninth Army was caused by assignment of I Corps to Army, for ammunition supply.
- 2.) AGp. North will have a complete first issue in the hands of troops on 5 Aug. Armd.Gp. 4 already has its ammunition. Eighteenth Army is filled up.
- 3.) Conditions for supply of the Narva Group will be investigated. Seems to have road trouble.

Major Schroetter (Central Branch) reports on his experiences with Thirteenth Armd. Div. (Duevert) at Fastov (southwest of Kiev). Very good impression.

Surgeon-General Dr. Handloser:

- a) Epidemics: Only in Romania a short outbreak of mild dysentery; no fatal cases. Otherwise we have been lucky everywhere so far.
- b) Medical casualties: $\frac{1}{2}$ %. Very good !
- c) Allocation of "Special Groups" for blood transfusion and epidemics control.
- d) Conditions in the Field Medical Service. Transport problem. Questions of organization. One-sixth of all doctors come from the regular Army; five-sixth belong to the Reserve.
- e) ZI: Of 254,647 beds, 180,038 are occupied. We must procure additional 17,000 beds; to raise the number of free beds in the ZI to 100,000. In the light of our experiences this will last us for about a month (i.e. till early in September).

OKH issues its implementation order to the last Fuehrer "directive". Unfortunately I cannot induce ObdH to inject into this order the slightest overtone expressive of a will of his own. Its wording is dictated by an anxiety to avoid anything that could be suspected as opposition to his superior.

Evening situation: South: Eleventh Army is attacked from the south; on the front of Seventeenth Army, tough enemy resistance. Armd.Gp. 1 is wheeling into the rear of the enemy fronting Seventeenth Army; in this process its right wing is being attacked from the inside, its left wing from the outside. Echelonning on its left is deep enough to obviate any danger. Here for the first time we have a battle with inverted front, in which the attacking front is not a flank of armored Divs., but a front of wheeling units.

Sixth Army is operating in difficult terrain and against a stubborn enemy, and so its progress is slow. The group northwest of Kiev has little chance of success in the country between the wide forest areas. Massing against the enemy at Korosten is getting under way, but it probably will be a long time before the process is completed.

Center: Attack against southern flank and front. Yelnya especially is subjected to assaults from all directions.

In the Smolensk pocket everything seems to be quiet.

Three enemy Divs. on the northern flank at Velikie Luki. South of Toropets two enemy Divs. Report on enemy movements both against the southern flank and the front of Army Gp.; road movements from Moscow toward the front of the Army Gp.

North: II Corps has to overwhelm bitter enemy resistance at Kholm and therefore is still pinned down in fighting. Accordingly transfer of Twelfth Division to the south, will be impossible for the moment.

Nothing new between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus. Some progress in the area of Lake Ilmen.

Estonia: Awkward enemy raids behind the front. Ground gained to the northwest.

Gen. Wagner calls up:

- a) Road conditions east of Lake Peipus prevent sending larger reinforcements to the Narva Group. On Lake Peipus, navigation difficult. Daily capacity only 300 tons.
- b) Eckstein reports heavy requests for ammunition from AGp. Center. Field Marshal von Bock, who has been looking into the ammunition question himself; thinks Hq Ninth Army too easily upset. Army Gp. expects to replenish the first issue of ammunition by tomorrow or the day after. Only after that can they think of stockpiling. If railroad service to AGp. Center remains as it is now, we can meet current demands, but cannot accumulate reserve ammunition.
- c) Arrival of trains on 31 July: North, 10; Center, 16; South, 6 trains.

Concluded: 31 July 1941. Initial: H.

End of volume VI, without date: */

Conference of Chiefs of Staff: Use of smoke in river crossings. Not a question of organization, but of foresighted supply! **

Traffic control.

Evacuation of a border strip in the East.

Liaison Officers and monitoring.

Utilization of Truck Cms. (Engineers, CQu etc.).

Relationship Armor/Inf.

For tactical jump-off, all men on board.

Artillery of rear Divs. -- Engineers of rear Divs. must build emergency bridges. -- Signal units of rear Divs., to attend to what is needed in crossings of rivers.

Chemical warfare units, airborne troops.

AT defense (Russian doctrine of tank attack. A little everywhere!) Air defense.

Attack and pursuit at night (lessons of the Greek Campaign).
Surprise.

Field Hospitals.

All notes on this page crossed out with pencil.

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